Judgment :- 1. I regret, I have to dispose of this case without the assistance of a counter-affidavit and the relevant files. It cannot be that more than 2 years is not sufficient for the respondents to instruct their counsel. 2. The short question for decision in this case is whether the Director of Telegraphs, Kerala Circle, Trivandrum was competent to review an order of the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs, Kottayam censuring the petitioner under R.29 (1) (v) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (in brief, the rules). The order Ext. P6 passed by the Director of Telegraphs, Kerala Circle, Trivandrum so reviewing the order of the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs and imposing a punishment of barring, for a period of 2 years, one increment of the petitioner who was an Engineering Supervisor was confirmed in appeal by the Postmaster General, Kerala Circle, Trivandrum. Ext. P8 is the copy of that order. There is a time limit prescribed by R.29 (1) of the Rules, for action by way of review suo mote by an appellate authority. Sub rule (v) of R.29 (1) provides that the appellate authority, within six months of the date of the order proposed to be reviewed may at any time either on his or its own motion or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and review any order made under the rules or under the rules repealed by R.34 from which an appeal is allowed but from which no appeal has been preferred or from which no appeal is allowed. It is further provided that in the process of reviewing such order the appellate authority may confirm, modify or set aside the order or confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order or impose any penalty where no penalty has been imposed or remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such authority to make such further inquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case or the appellate authority may pass such other order as it may deem fit. Where the appellate authority in making the review imposes or enhances the penalty that can be done only after giving a reasonable opportunity to the person affected to meet the case. Where the appellate authority in making the review imposes or enhances the penalty that can be done only after giving a reasonable opportunity to the person affected to meet the case. The rule therefore Indicates that such review can be only within a period of 6 months from the date of the order proposed to be reviewed. The order of the Divisional Engineer Telegraphs, Kottayam, Ext. P3, which was reviewed by Ext. P6 order was passed on 28 71970. The order of review is dated 16 31972, evidently after more than 6 months from the date of the order reviewed. 3. The petitioner's case is that the appellate authority was incompetent to review the order when once the period of 6 months from the date of that order had expired. It appears that the stand taken by respondents, the authorities who passed Exts. P6 and P8 orders respectively is that the period of 6 months is not one within which the order under review itself should be passed but it is sufficient to initiate proceedings by way of review within the period of 6 months. The words of the relevant rule indicate that the appellate authority, within six months of the date of the order proposed to be reviewed may call for the records of any inquiry and review any order made under the rules. Prima facie, it appears to me that the period of 6 months is the period within which not only the records are to be called for but the order on review should also be passed. But 1 am not finally deciding that question here as it may not be necessary for the purpose of this case. Even if it is sufficient to call for the records within the period of 6 months, it has not been averred much less has it been shown that the records were called for within a period of 6 months. As to averment, there is no counter-affidavit and at to showing, there is no finding in the impugned order and therefore there is no apparent justification for the action taken. Reference to Ext. As to averment, there is no counter-affidavit and at to showing, there is no finding in the impugned order and therefore there is no apparent justification for the action taken. Reference to Ext. P6 order is of no assistance, for, even assuming that the statements made in the order are true an assumption which need not be made unless and until the respondents seek to support the finding by production of files the stand taken by the respondents cannot succeed, for, what is mentioned therein is only that the Director of Telegraphs took the decision to review the case on 4-1-1971. The mere fact that he might have taken a decision or had made up his mind will not make the date of his decision relevant, for, going by the rule what is contemplated is the calling for the records of any inquiry and reviewing any order made and it is not shown that the records were called for within a period of 6 months. Any decision tentative or final reached by any appellate authority may not have any relevance. That is the reason why I said earlier that it is not necessary to go into the further question as to whether the order under review should be passed within the period of six months. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner urges that even if the records were called for within 6 months that would not be sufficient, for, if the action is initiated as against the petitioner by issue of notice giving an opportunity to show cause against the review proposed within a period of 6 months that will not be within the period. I fail to see how the date of issue of notice would be relevant, for the relevant rule does not refer to initiation of proceedings within the period of 6 months. It refers to calling for records for the purpose of review and the controversy, it at all, can be only whether it is sufficient to so call for records or whether it is necessary further to pass an order of review within the period of 6 months. Even if it is held that it is sufficient to call for records within the specified period that would not amount to saying that it is sufficient to issue notice within the period of 6 months. Even if it is held that it is sufficient to call for records within the specified period that would not amount to saying that it is sufficient to issue notice within the period of 6 months. Notice may be issued before calling for records, which latter event may be after the specified period. In that case the action cannot be pursued as it would be belated. 5. My attention has been invited to a decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Shoukata Khan v. Director of Postal Services, (1972 (7) S.L.R. 875). That was a case where in exercise of the power under R.29(1) of the Rules the appellate authority called for the records within a period of 6 months but initiated action by issue of notice to the petitioner beyond the period of 6 months. It is true that in that case the learned judges took the view that the relevant date would be the date when notice was issued to the petitioner and not the date when records were called for. With great respect to the learned Judges, I see no warrant for such an approach to the rule which makes plain reading. If the date of review need not be within 6 months I see no reason why it should be held that the relevant date is not the date for calling for records, but some other subsequent date, namely, initiating proceedings for review. In fact the rule does not, either expressly or impliedly, indicate that the date of initiation of the proceedings is relevant in the matter of fixing the time. It is true that the learned judges have observed in the judgment that when ones the proceedings are commenced within the time limited for the purpose by law the authority concerned could take any time that is reasonably necessary for completing the review proceedings. It would appear that this position was conceded by the petitioner's counsel in that case. I have my own reservations on this question, but it is not necessary to express my views on this here. 6. In the light of what I have said earlier, Ext. P6 order passed by the Director of Telegraphs, Kerala Circle and Ext. P8 order passed in confirmation by the Postmaster General are incompetent as the proceedings have been commenced after the expiry of; the prescribed time limit, Ext. P6, as confirmed by Ext. 6. In the light of what I have said earlier, Ext. P6 order passed by the Director of Telegraphs, Kerala Circle and Ext. P8 order passed in confirmation by the Postmaster General are incompetent as the proceedings have been commenced after the expiry of; the prescribed time limit, Ext. P6, as confirmed by Ext. P8 is vacated. The Original Petition is allowed as above with costs. Allowed.