JUDGMENT - G.N. VAIDYA, J.:---The petitioner in the above Special Civil Application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India claimed to be a lawful sub-tenant in a suit filed by respondents Nos. 1 to 3 against defendant No. 1 Janardan Mahadeo Kalan, who was 89 years age, when the suit was filed, and the petitioner Kashinath Waman, as defendant No. 2 on the ground that the plaintiffs reasonably and bona fide required the suit premises for their occupation under section 13(1)(g) read with section 13(2) and also on the ground that defendant No. 1 had unlawfully sub-let the suit premises consisting of a godown described as one Gala to the north bearing Municipal House No. 99-141 at Pen Bazar, Taluka Pen, District Kolaba, within the meaning of section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947. The case of the petitioner was that he was a lawful sub-tenant in the suit premises as he was sub-let the suit premises in March 1959 before Ordinance No. III of 1959 came into force on May 21, 1959, and he was therefore, protected under section 15(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act 1947. Defendant No. 1 fully supported the case of the petitioner. Even the only witness examined on behalf of the plaintiffs Dhirajlal Bhagwanji Shah, son of plaintiff No. 1 admited that the plaintiffs were residing in the very building where the suit godown was situated; and that defendant No. 2 was occupying the suit premises from March 1959. On behalf of defendants, defendants No. 1 was examined on Commission; and defendant No. 2 gave evidence producing extracts of his account-books and four receipts dated March 16, 1959, May, 1959, June 17, 1959 and July 20, 1959 signed by defendant No. 1 as received rent of the suit premises which were admitted by having him to be in the possession of defendant No. 2 from March 1959. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that the accounts and the receipts were fabricated by the defendants and defendant No. 2 became the sub-tenant unlawfully in the year 1969. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that the accounts and the receipts were fabricated by the defendants and defendant No. 2 became the sub-tenant unlawfully in the year 1969. The contentions of the plaintiffs were upheld by the trial Court who had also concluded that the plaintiffs bona fide and reasonably required the suit premises for personal occupation and greater hardship would be cause if a decree for possession was not passed in their favour. The trial Court, therefore, decreed the plaintiffs suit for possession. Defendant No. 2, sub-tenant, carried an appeal against the said decision and learned District Judge, Kolaba, by his judgment and order dated October 15, 1975, reversed the finding under section 13(1)(g) as he found that the plaintiffs had already other properties in their possession, but confirmed the decree on the ground that the trial Court was right in disbelieving the defendants story that defendant No. 2 has sub-let the premises in March, 1959. In the Special Civil Application, we are only concerned with the findings of the two courts below regarding the date of sub-letting and hence the only questions to be decided are whether the two courts below were justified in holding that the evidence of defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 was false, and inspite of the admission of the plaintiffs witness that defendant No. 2 was in the possession of the premises, from March 1959, the two courts could hold that defendant No. 2 was not protected by Ordinance No. III of 1959. The Counsel for the landlord did not challenge the finding of the learned District Judge that the trial Court was wrong in holding that the plaintiffs reasonably and bona fide required the suit premises for their occupation within the meaning of section 13(1)(g), of the Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947. Mr. Morje, the learned Counsel for the defendant No. 2 sub-tenant, submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in (Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte and another)1, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1297 cannot come in the way of petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the present case, because the two courts have wrongly and illegally deprived the petitioner of the protection given by Ordinance No. III of 1959 and section 15 as amended by Bombay Act No. 49 of 1959. He submitted that the reasons given by the trial Court and the Appellate Court for considering the four receipts given defendant No. 1 to defendant No. 2 and the accounts produced by defendant No. 2 as fabricated, were arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. He urged that the very fact that the receipts were from a graph book or that they bore continues Nos. 18 to 21 or that the contents thereof were written in one ink uniformly; and the signature was also given in another ink uniformly could not make the receipts fabricated. Mr. Morje submitted that the two courts did not even care to read the contents of the four receipts which clearly showed that they must have been made at or about the time when Ordinance No. III of 1959 must have come into force. He referred to the contents as showing that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were careful enough only to mention that defendant No. 2 was in possession of the suit premises without saying in what capacity he was. Mr. Morje rightly submitted that there was no reason for the two courts below to suspect these receipts, which were natural having regard to the circumstances in which the Rent Act was being evaded prior to the coming into force of the Ordinance No. III of 1959 in Cities and Towns in Maharashtra to which the Act was applicable. Mr. Morje pointed out that if the receipts were subsequently written there was no necessity for them to imagine that the rent was being collected by defendant No. 1 for payment to the landlord or for saying that defendant No. 2 was mere in possession of the suit premises. Mr. Morje further argued that the trial Court was not at all justified in ignoring the clear admissions of the plaintiffs witness that the defendant No. 2 was in possession of the suit premises which he described as unauthorised from March 1959. According to Mr. Morje, the lower courts ignored the important fact that the plaintiffs were residing in the very building in which the suit premises was situated. The plaintiffs witness could not have made a mistake about the time when defendant No. 2 came into possession of the suit premises. Mr. According to Mr. Morje, the lower courts ignored the important fact that the plaintiffs were residing in the very building in which the suit premises was situated. The plaintiffs witness could not have made a mistake about the time when defendant No. 2 came into possession of the suit premises. Mr. Morje further contended that merely because the income-tax authorities and the sales tax authorities had not endorsed on the account-books from which entries were produced to show payments of rent from 1959, it could not be said that the accounts were fabricated or that the petitioner had not paid the rent as sub-tenant to defendant No. 1. Mr. Morje submitted that the reasons given by the trial Court were no reasons at all as they were not even reasonable having regard to the natural course of human conduct, and that the trial Court appears to have merely accepted the contention on behalf of the plaintiffs-landlords that the documents were fabricated without any good or valid reasons whatsoever, and the finding of the trial Court was endorsed by the learned District Judge without applying his mind to the contents of the documents and the admissions made by the plaintiffs witness that defendant No. 2 was in possession from March 1959. Mr. Morje further argued that the entire documentary evidence in the case was ignored by the two courts below, inasmuch as when the letter (Exh. 49) was sent on March 7, 1969, Exhibit 50 was written by defendant No. 1 specifically informing the plaintiffs that from March 1959 defendant No. 2 was the sub-tenant of the suit premises. Mr. Morje rightly pointed out that the two courts below ignored that this reply and the further reply given at Exhibit 52 dated October 6, 1969 reply to the registered letter (Ex. 51) sent by the plaintiffs on September 18, 1969 clearly referred to the sub-tenancy being in existence from March 1959, and as this was a statement of defendant No. 2 prior to the termination of the tenancy and the filing of the suit, there was no reasons whatsoever for defendant No. 1 to make a false statement. Defendant No. 1 was an old man who was also a Kalan like defendant No. 2 and what he stated was actually supported by the plaintiffs witness. Mr. Defendant No. 1 was an old man who was also a Kalan like defendant No. 2 and what he stated was actually supported by the plaintiffs witness. Mr. Morje, therefore, submitted that the findings recorded by the two courts below were findings totally inconsistent with the oral and documentary evidence in the case and the admissions made by plaintiffs witness and without any foundation in facts or in reason which can be considered as reasons by any ordinary prudent person; and therefore, the finding which has the effect of denying the protection of Ordinance No. III of 1959 must be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. Mr. Andhyarujina the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-landladies strenuously urged that the only questions in this Special Civil Application is regarding the date of subletting; and that can never be a question, the finding on which could be interfered with by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He argued that, as the Appellate Court below, this Court may also differ with the view taken by the two courts below, but as there was no question of law involved, this Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of the two courts below under section 13(1)(e) of the Rent Act. Mr. Andharujina further vehemently contended that the two courts had come to the conclusion that the defendants had given false evidence by purjuring themselves and fabricating documents for the purpose of making out a false claim of protection under Ordinance No. III of 1959, and therefore, this Court should not exercise its discretionary powers under Article 227 of the Constitution in favour of the petitioner who came to Court with unclean hands. As already indicated above, even though ordinarily the date when the defendant No. 2 came into possession of the premises as a sub-tenant was a question of fact, and appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the question becomes a jurisdictional question in view of Ordinance No. III of 1959, and at least jurisdictional fact, inasmuch as, if it is held that the tenant was in possession as a sub-tenant from March 1959, courts under the Bombay Rent Act will have no jurisdiction under section 13(1)(e) of the Rent Act. It is true that in Bhabhutmals case, the Supreme Court has, with respect, observed that this Court should not convert itself into a Court of Appeal and the function of this Court is limited to see that the subordinate courts function within the limits of its authority. It is also true that the High Court cannot in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and reappreciating it. The facts of the present case, however, lie beyond the limits which are prescribed in the said decision. The two courts have ignored a clear, unequivocal and unexplained admission given by the plaintiffs witness that defendant No. 2 was in possession of the suit premises from March 1959. It is impossible to understand the reasons given by the trial Court for ignoring this admission. The plaintiffs reside in the building where the suit premises ate situated as already stated above. No attempt was made by the plaintiffs to explain away the admission which was clearly and emphatically made by the plaintiffs witness in the very first paragraph of the cross-examination of the witness. Mr. Andhyarujina submitted that what is the effect of this admission and whether it should be conclusive of the matter is for the Court appreciating the oral evidence to determine. Mr. Andhyarujina submitted that, as the appeal Court has dealt with this admission and has discarded it, it is not open for this Court to interfere with the appreciation of evidence made by the two courts below. It is no doubt true that under section 31 of the Evidence Act, admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted, but they may operate as estoppels under the provisions of the Evidence Act. That by itself is not enough to discard the admission as a whole, particularly when the plaintiffs witnesses stated on oath in cross-examination very clearly that defendant No. 2 was in possession of the premises from March 1959. Even though it may not be conclusive proof, it supports the defendants case which is even otherwise supported by other evidence. That by itself is not enough to discard the admission as a whole, particularly when the plaintiffs witnesses stated on oath in cross-examination very clearly that defendant No. 2 was in possession of the premises from March 1959. Even though it may not be conclusive proof, it supports the defendants case which is even otherwise supported by other evidence. The learned trial Judge has not even cared to refer to this fatal admission on the part of the plaintiffs, while the learned District Judge curiously described the admission, which is a fatal admission, as a solitary sentence in the statement of the plaintiffs witness not sufficient to remove the effect of what he has stated in the examination-in-chief. It is difficult to understand what the learned District Judge means by saying that the statement was not sufficient to remove the effect of what he has stated in the examination-in-chief. Mr. Morje has referred to the examination-in-chief of this witness and contended that all that the witness has stated in the examination-in-chief was "Defence of the defendant that defendant No. 2 is a sub-tenant of defendant No. 1 since 1959 is false". The plaintiffs witness has not stated anywhere in the examination-in-chief that defendant No. 2 was inducted in the premises in 1969 as contended by the plaintiffs in the suit. What he stated in the cross-examination was : "It is my say that defendant No. 2 is unauthorisedly occupying the suit premises from March 1959". In view of these statements and also the law as it existed prior to Ordinance No. III of 1959 (which were completely ignored by the two courts below), it cannot be said that there was any contradiction between what he stated in his examination-in-chief and in the cross-examination. On the contrary, the only inference which could be drawn by my Court of justice from his admission was that defendant No. 2 was in the premises from a period prior to the coming into force of Ordinance No. III of 1959 as contended by Mr. Morje. On the contrary, the only inference which could be drawn by my Court of justice from his admission was that defendant No. 2 was in the premises from a period prior to the coming into force of Ordinance No. III of 1959 as contended by Mr. Morje. Another reason given by the learned District Judge, which was patently erroneous, was a as follows :--- "It was for defendant No. 2 to prove that he came to occupy the premises on behalf of defendant No. 1 from March 1959 or prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance." This entire approach of the learned District Judge shows that he did not even care to apply his mind to the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act prior to the Ordinance and after coming into force of the Ordinance. The sub-tenant has to prove sub-tenancy and not occupation of the premises on behalf of the tenant. He must show occupation under the tenant on payment of rent. The learned District Judge, thus to tally misconceived the law when he approached the evidence as if defendant No. 2 had to prove that he was in possession on behalf of defendant No. 1. So far as the reasoning and the finding of the two courts below with regard to the alleged fabrication of the documents is concerned, the contention of Mr. Morje, that none of the reasons given by them can be considered as reasons and the finding was arbitrary and capricious, deserves to be accepted. In substance and effect, the two courts have held the documents to be fabricated, because it was contended on behalf of the plaintiffs-landladies that it was without consideration of the circumstances which existed prior to Ordinance No. 3 of 1959. They have not cared to apply their mind to the contents of the receipts, which, as stated above, clearly showed that the receipts were intended as accounts between defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to support the sub-letting which were validated after Ordinance No. III of 1959 came into force. The courts below have ignored the documentary evidence consisting of the letters addressed by defendant No. 1 long before the present suit was instituted on April 24, 1970 that defendant No. 2 was the sub-tenant in the premises from March 1959. 1 and 2 to support the sub-letting which were validated after Ordinance No. III of 1959 came into force. The courts below have ignored the documentary evidence consisting of the letters addressed by defendant No. 1 long before the present suit was instituted on April 24, 1970 that defendant No. 2 was the sub-tenant in the premises from March 1959. The mere fact that the accounts produced by defendant No. 2 were not counter-signed by the Sales -tax and Income-tax Officers does not mean that those accounts are fabricated. It may be that the Income-tax Officer and the Sales-tax Officer were satisfied that the returns, if at all made by the defendants and they did not care to countersign these entries. The two courts wrongly described these documents as fabricated on baseless speculation without any foundation in any material placed before the Court. Mr. Andhyarujina submitted that the two courts below had believed the plaintiffs and disbelieved the defendant and characterised their evidence and case as false and that is merely a matter of appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, and therefore, this Court should not interfere with the appreciation of their evidence. But what I find is that instead of appreciating the evidence, the two courts have ignored all the evidence which support the defendants, including the material admissions of the plaintiffs witnesses and relied not on evidence but merely on the contention that the receipts and accounts were fabricated. In other words, the findings recorded by the two courts below are so recorded because the two courts ignored the material and relevant oral and documentary evidence, including the admission of the plaintiffs witnesses. In such circumstances, certiorari must lie; and this Court can interfere in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution with the findings recorded by the lower courts, particularly, when the findings result in depriving the protection given by law to sub-tenants and the jurisdiction given to courts to evict sub-tenants under section 13(1)(e) of the Rent Act. In such circumstances, certiorari must lie; and this Court can interfere in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution with the findings recorded by the lower courts, particularly, when the findings result in depriving the protection given by law to sub-tenants and the jurisdiction given to courts to evict sub-tenants under section 13(1)(e) of the Rent Act. In the result, the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Kolaba, on October 15, 1975 and the decree passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Pen, on August 31, 1974 for possession of the suit premises are quashed and set aside, as the two courts below had no jurisdiction to pass a decree for possession under section 13(1)(e) when the sub-letting in favour of defendant No. 2 was protected by Ordinance No. III of 1959 for the reasons stated above. It seems that immediately after the decree was confirmed by the learned District Judge, the petitioners were deprived of the possession of the suit premises. The plaintiffs, are therefore, hereby directed to restore possession of the suit premises forthwith to the petitioner. Rule absolute with costs. -----