GULATI, J. The respondent, Dr. R. S. Gupta, was compulsorily retired by an order dated November 8, 1973. At that time he was holding the post of Chief Medical Officer, Basti. He challenged that order by means of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitu tion. A learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition and has quashed the order of compulsory retirement. The State has come up in appeal. The State Government under Note (1) attached to Regulation 465-A can retire a Government servant after he attains the age of 50 years without assigning any reason by giving him three months notice or pay in lieu thereof. Such decision shall be taken by the Govern ment in the Administrative Department if it appears to it to be in public interest. It is under this provision that the impugned order of compulsory retirement was passed. The respondent had challenged the order of compulsory retirement on three grounds: (i) that the or der was mala fide inasmuch as it had been manoeuvred by Dr. D. N. Sharma, Director of Medical and Health Services, U. P. , Lucknow who core an ill-will against him, (ii) that the order was against the G. O. dated November 2, 1973 and (iii) that the order was arbitrary. The learned Single Judge turned down the first contention on the ground that the allegations of mala fide had been denied by Dr. Sharma and there was nothing on the record to show that the im pugned order had been passed at his instance. The remaining two grounds were accepted by the learned Single Judge. He found that the Government had not kept in view the G. O. of November 2, 1973 and that there was no material on record to warrant the impugned order. It was found that the petitioner had a very good academic career and had been promoted from time to time and was allowed to cross the efficiency bars. The adverse entries given against the res pondent were of no consequence. Admittedly the Government has issued G. O. dated November 2, 1973 which lays down that a Government servant will be considered for compulsory retirement only under two conditions: (1) that his in tegrity was doubtful and (2) that his efficiency had gone down beyond improvement. The adverse entries given against the res pondent were of no consequence. Admittedly the Government has issued G. O. dated November 2, 1973 which lays down that a Government servant will be considered for compulsory retirement only under two conditions: (1) that his in tegrity was doubtful and (2) that his efficiency had gone down beyond improvement. This G. O. , in our opinion, embodies a test for deter-"mining whether or not it would be in public interest to retire a govern ment servant prematurely. The test has been laid down by he Govern ment for its own guidance as well as for the guidance of its subordi nate officer who have to deal with the question of compulsory retire ment of Government servants. Unless either of these two conditions exist it would not be considered in public interest to retire a Government servant from active service. Now in this instant case there is no allegation muchless a find ing that the respondents integrity was doubtful or that his efficiency had declined to such a point that it was beyond improvement. The requirements of the G. O. was thus clearly ignored, in the instant case and the respondent was retired on grounds which have not been spe cifically stated. The respondent has averred that his retirement took place during the Presidents regime and soon afterward when the popular ministry came in power, his case was reviewed by two Secre taries of the Government who gave their reports that the respondents retirement was not justified being contrary to the G. O. of November 2, 1973. The Health Minister had accepted the recommendation of the Secretaries and had ordered his reinstatement but the Chief Minister declined to endorse the action of the Health Minister on the ground that as the order was passed during the Presidents regime it was not proper to interfere with it for administrative reasons. These averments have also not been denied. In our opinion, the consideration upon which the Chief Minister turned down the recommendations of the Health Minister were wholly irrelevant. There was nothing impro per in recalling an unjust order merely because it had been passed in the Presidents regime. Any order passed during the Presidents re gime could not be said to be sacrosanct. In our opinion, the consideration upon which the Chief Minister turned down the recommendations of the Health Minister were wholly irrelevant. There was nothing impro per in recalling an unjust order merely because it had been passed in the Presidents regime. Any order passed during the Presidents re gime could not be said to be sacrosanct. The learned Chief Standing Counsel then stated that the G. O. of November 2, 1973 was not binding on the State Government and it was not exhaustive. He stated that the instructions had been issued under note 2-A appended to Regulation 465-A which provide that Government may delegate its power under Note 1 to any officer or autho rity not lower than the authority by which the government servant concerned was appointed and where the power is so delegated, Gov ernment may, from time to time, issue executive instructions indicat ing guiding principles in that behalf. According to him the instruc tions were meant for the guidance of the officers subordinate to the Government and it did not apply to the Government itself. We are unable to agree with this contention. In our opinion, the G. O. con tains so to say a definition of public interest which has not been otherwise defined in the Regulations. It lays down the test by which the public interest shall be measured. If the subordinate officers are required to comply with the test to determine whether it would be in public interest to retire a person or not the same test, in our opi nion, is required to be applied by the Government also, otherwise it will lead to discrimination. The guideline contained in the G. O. is, in our opinion, of universal application and applies equally when the decision to retire a Government servant is taken by a subordinate offi cer or by the Government itself. May be that the G. O. is not exhaus tive and there may be some other considerations upon which Govern ment servant may be retired in public interest. But in the instant case it has not been stated on what other ground it was thought ne cessary to retire the respondent. In that sense the impugned order appears to us to be wholly arbitrary. But in the instant case it has not been stated on what other ground it was thought ne cessary to retire the respondent. In that sense the impugned order appears to us to be wholly arbitrary. We are of the opinion that an order which is in contravention of the G. O. of November 2, 1973 will be an arbitrary order unless some other cogent reason is disclosed. In the instant case the only other material upon which the order could be justified is the adverse entries awarded to the respondent, upon which strong reliance is applied by the learned Chief Standing Coun sel. We have examined the entries but before we deal with them it is necessary to set out a few facts. The respondent had a brilliant academic records. He stood first in the M. B. , B. S. examination and was awarded distinctions and medals-gold and silver and a certificate of honours. He took his M. D. degree in 1947 and was selected for the Provincial Medical Service I in the year 1948. He left for higher studies in 1949 and took his M. R. C. P. degree from London and Edinburg in 1951. After returning from the U. K. he resumed his duties as P. M. S. I. He worked in various hospitals as Medical Officer Incharge. In 1961 he was pro moted to the post of Civil Surgeon. In that capacity he served in various districts. He was allowed to cross efficiency bars as and when they fell due. In July, 1973 a few months prior to the passing of the impugned order, he was appointed the Chief Medical Officer. Basti. All these clearly show that the adverse entries awarded to the respondent did not affect his career at all. He earned promotions and crossed efficiency bars without any let or hindrance. His promotion to the post of Chief Medical Officer, shortly before the order of com pulsory retirement was passed, shows very clearly that the Govern ment did not attach any value to the adverse entries. The argument of the learned Chief Standing Counsel is that the appointment of the petitioner as Chief Medical Officer was not as a result of promotion, inasmuch as it was merely a case of change of nomenclature. All Civil Surgeons were designated as Chief Medical Officers. This is not correct. The argument of the learned Chief Standing Counsel is that the appointment of the petitioner as Chief Medical Officer was not as a result of promotion, inasmuch as it was merely a case of change of nomenclature. All Civil Surgeons were designated as Chief Medical Officers. This is not correct. All the Civil Surgeons were not appointed to the post of Chief Medical Officers under G. O. No. 2811|chikitsa-4-1973, dated June 26, 1973. This Government Order provides that Chief Medical Officers shall be selected from P. M. S. men, P. M. S. Women and P. H. S. and the Chief Medical Officer shall be responsible for the integrat ed medical health and family planning programmes in the district. The remaining Civil Surgeons were designated as Deputy Chief Medi cal Officers. The Chief Medical Officer was to supervise the work of the Deputy Chief Medical Officers. Every Chief Medical Officer had attached to him certain number of Deputy Medical Officers who were in a way subordinate to him as he could direct their work. Chief Medical Officers of Kanpur, Allahabad, Varanasi, Agra, Lucknow, Bareilly and Meerut were given higher scale of pay but the Chief Medical Officers of other districts were given a special pay of Rs. 75/-in addition to their pay. It is clear, therefore, that a Chief Medical Officer was paid higher emoluments than the other Civil Surgeons who became Deputy Chief Medical Officers. His rank was superior to the rank of Deputy Chief Medical Officers who were subordinate to him and the appointment of the Chief Medical Officer was by selec tion. The learned Chief Standing Counsel says that merely because the respondent was allowed to cross the efficiency bars does not mean that the adverse entries had been wiped out. That may be so. But in the instant case the respondent was hot allowed merely to cross the efficiency bars but he has also promoted to the post of Chief Medical Officer just four months before the order of compulsory retirement. It is not the case of the State that during these four months the res pondent had earned any adverse entries or had otherwise become un fit to hold that post. As regards the adverse entries we do not find them to be damag ing at all. For the year 1961-62 and 1962-63 the following adverse en tries were awarded to him: - ". . . As regards the adverse entries we do not find them to be damag ing at all. For the year 1961-62 and 1962-63 the following adverse en tries were awarded to him: - ". . . . . . but does not get on well with his colleagues, subordi nates and local people. The Administrative Officers have report ed that he can be more helpful if he did not get involved in local politics and intrigues. . . . . . . He is still not able to get on well with his colleagues and subordinates and lacks team work. His hosipital administration needs toning up. " 1964-65. . . . . . . he is still not popular and is not able to pull on well with his colleagues and subordinates. Lacks administrative tact and is not able to obtain co-operation from his colleagues and subordinates. His general reputation is not satisfactory. 1966-67. . . . . . . He could not pull on well with his colleagues and got involved in local politics through the local press and the reputation of the district hospital suffered because of these reasons. He could not administer the Hospital as is expected of a senior man of his standing. Has not been satisfactory. Some people spoke well of him but majority of people were against him because of his mishanding of the local hospital situation and getting involved in local party politics. Has not been satisfactory in family planning work as it should have been. " All these entries merely show that the petitioner was not very tactful and his subordinates were not generally pleased with him. There is no suggestion that the petitioners integrity was doubtful or that he was inefficient in his work. It is a matter of common experience that people who are highly efficient in their work are not equally popular. The adverse entries no doubt show that the respondent lacked ad ministrative capacity. But surprisingly he was appointed as the Chief Medical Officer whose main work was administrative. This shows that the Government did not attach any value to these entries otherwise he would not have been given an administrative job. More-ever, the entries are all stale. They were not communicated to the respondent in the years in which they purported to have been award ed. All these entries were communicated to him together in August, 1973. This shows that the Government did not attach any value to these entries otherwise he would not have been given an administrative job. More-ever, the entries are all stale. They were not communicated to the respondent in the years in which they purported to have been award ed. All these entries were communicated to him together in August, 1973. The entry for the year 1961-62 was communicated to him on August 17, 1973 after the lapse of about 12 years. This shows very clearly that no importance was attached to the entries when they came to be made. We have already indicated that in spite of al these entries the respondent was never held up at any efficiency bar nor was he denied the promotion when it fell due to him. The fact that he was promoted just four months before the impugned order was passed shows very clearly that the entries had lost all value. If the adverse entries are out of the way there is no other material upon which the impugned order can be justified. The order thus becomes arbitrary and capricious. The learned Chief Standing Counsel argues that the decision to compulsorily retire the respondent is administra tive and we cannot interfere with it. He also says that we should not act as a court of appeal against the decision of the Government. To support this contention he places strong reliance upon a decision of this Court in the case of State of 17. P. through the Secretary to Govt. , U. P. v. S. M. Banerji and others 1974 A. L. J. 239. Paragraph 10 of the judgment far from supporting him endorses our view that even an administra tive action is open to challenge if it is arbitrary or capricious and it is open to the Court to examine the circumstances to discover if an or der of compulsory retirement is passed upon relevant considerations. We might well reproduce paragraph 10: - "it is also settled that a decision to compulsorily retire is ad ministrative. Courts of law cannot sit as a court of appeal on facts over the decision of the State Government or the appoint ing authority, but it is equally well settled that if the decision is capricious or arbitrary, it can be set aside by the Courts. Courts of law cannot sit as a court of appeal on facts over the decision of the State Government or the appoint ing authority, but it is equally well settled that if the decision is capricious or arbitrary, it can be set aside by the Courts. In Berium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 295, Hidayatullah J. , observed that in cases where the formation of opinion is sub jective, the existence of circumstances relevant to the interference as the sine qua non for action must be demonstrable. If the action is questioned on the ground that no circumstances leading to an inference of the kind contemplated by the section exists, the ac tion might be exposed to interference unless the existence of the circumstance is made out. In the same case Bachawat, J. , held that if it is established that there were no materials upon which the authority could form the requisite opinion, the Court may infer that the authority did not apply its mind to the relevant facts. An administrative decision reached on subjective satis faction can be attacked in a Court of law inter alia on the ground that it is arbitrary or capricious. If the Court is satisfied that no reasonable person could have, on the relevant materials before him, formed the impugned opinion which was formed by him, the decision would be arbitrary or capricious. See: State of Malmrashtra v. B. K. Rakkamore A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1353. " We having held that the impugned order is arbitrary, there is no bar in our way in striking it down. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, with costs. .