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1975 DIGILAW 275 (CAL)

UNION OF INDIA v. Jaydev Mandal

1975-09-11

S.K.Datta, S.P.Mitra

body1975
JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an appeal from the judgment and order of Basak, J., dated July 19,1974, whereby the rule obtained by the petitioners was made absolute. The petitioners were discharged from their services under the Railways by the following order: "no. W. 416/15/2 Calcutta, dated March 17, 1973. Bridge Inspector, eastern Railway. Howrah. Sub: Civil Rule 1557/m/70 High Court, Calcutta. In connection with the above, Assistant Registrar Calcutta high Court informed this office vide his Memo. No. 1633-D dated february 22,1973 that 'it is stated by Mr. Satyendra Nath Ganguli, Learned Advocate for the petitioners, that he has instructions not to press this Rule. The Rule is accordingly discharged'. Under the above circumstances the following staff, who were retained in service during the pendency of the case, are discharged on and from March 19, 1973 (A. N.)" ** ** ** 2. THE petitioners claimed that they were in service under the bridge Inspector, Eastern Railway, Howrah, as fitters and welders or unskilled workers in the respective scales from September 18, 1969, on completion of 180 days of continuous service. There is now no dispute that the petitioners who joined firstly as casual workers worked for a period of 180 days continuously prior to September 18,1969 and they thereby acquired the status of temporary railway servants. The petitioners' case is that by the impugned order they were being retrenched from service without following the procedure laid down in Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. They accordingly moved this Court by an application under Art. 226 (1) of the Constitution praying for appropriate writs commanding the respondents to the rule, the Union of India and the Railway Administration to withdraw or rescind the impugned order. On this application a rule was issued on March 28, 1973, calling upon the said respondents to the rule to show cause as to why the writs prayed for should not be issued and other orders passed as may be deemed fit in the circumstances. The respondents contested the rule and filed an affidavit-in-opposition verified by Narayan Chandra Mukherjee affirmed on August 24, 1973. In paragraphs 3 and 4 of the said affidavit it is stated as follows: "3. The respondents contested the rule and filed an affidavit-in-opposition verified by Narayan Chandra Mukherjee affirmed on August 24, 1973. In paragraphs 3 and 4 of the said affidavit it is stated as follows: "3. With reference to paragraph 1 of the petition I say that the petitioners were first recruited as casual workers by the railway Administration and on completion of 180 days service they were given the benefit of scale of pay and retained thereafter as per Honourable Court's order, without any sanction, as temporary Railways servant. " "4. As the petitioners served continuously more than 180 days they were paid salaries in the scale instead of daily rate. " Another affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of the respondents to the rule was filed, verified by Pritindra Mohan Saha, Bridge Inspector, affirmed on June 21, 1974 and it was stated in paragraph 3 (b) as follows: "3. (b) On completion of 180 days of service they were given the status of temporary Railway servant on specific sanction. The said sanction was from August 15, 1970 to September 14, 1970 which was further extended to October 15,1970. " 3. THE petitioners filed affidavit-in-reply reiterating the contentions made in the petition. The matter came up for hearing before Basak, J. and it was held by His Lordship as follows: (1) The Railway is an industry under the Industrial Dispute act. (2) The petitioners were entitled to protection under Sections 25-F and 25-G. (3) The provisions of the said Sections admittedly were not complied with while discharging the petitioners. The rule accordingly was made absolute and a Writ of Mandamus was issued commanding the respondents to the rule to recall and rescind the impugned order. The present appeal is by the Union of india and the Railway Administration against this decision. The first point for consideration is whether the Railway is an industry as contemplated under the Industrial Disputes Act. As we have already indicated, the learned Judge has held that the Railway is an industry and no contention has been raised against this decision. The second question is whether the petitioners are entitled to the protection under Sections 25-F and 25-G before they were retrenched from service. Under Rule 2501 (b) casual labour doing same work for six months continuously acquires status and is to be treated as a temporary railway servant after the expiration of the said period. The second question is whether the petitioners are entitled to the protection under Sections 25-F and 25-G before they were retrenched from service. Under Rule 2501 (b) casual labour doing same work for six months continuously acquires status and is to be treated as a temporary railway servant after the expiration of the said period. As we have seen there is no dispute that the petitioners had acquired and were given temporary status on September 18, 1969 and they thereafter continued to be in the same category till they were discharged. It has been contended that there was an injunction issued by this Court restraining the Railway Administration from retrenching the petitioners. It will, however, appear that in Civil Rule no. 7394 W of 1969, the petitioners along with others obtained an injunction restraining the Railway Administration from retrenching them from their service. By an interlocutory order passed in the rule on May 13, 1970 the Railway Administration was given leave to retrench workmen if it was so desired on payment of retrenchment compensation payable under the law as temporary railway servants. 4. THIS rule was discharged on March 23, 1972 and thereafter the impugned order was issued on March 17, 1973. It will thus be seen that the petitioners worked for over one year during the relevant period and thereby also they became entitled to the benefits of the provision under Section 25-F while there was no injunction restraining them from retrenching the petitioners as temporary railway servants. The impugned order indicates that no requisite notice was served on the petitioner as required under Section 25-F, sub-section (a) nor were they paid retrenchment compensation as provided in sub-section (b. Accordingly the impugned order cannot be sustained. Mr. Sen, appearing for the appellants, the Union of India and the Railway Administration contended that as the reliefs sought for in this rule can be obtained by the petitioners through other relevant statutes, that is, the Industrial Disputes Act, the Court should not issue a writ which is a discretionary remedy in the circumstances. Mr. Sen, appearing for the appellants, the Union of India and the Railway Administration contended that as the reliefs sought for in this rule can be obtained by the petitioners through other relevant statutes, that is, the Industrial Disputes Act, the Court should not issue a writ which is a discretionary remedy in the circumstances. In support, he referred to the decision in Basant Kumar Sarkar and others v. The Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd. (1964 8 FLR 334=1950-67 3 SC LJ 1535= air 1964 SC 1260 ), in which it was observed that though powers conferred on the High Court under Art. 22g are very wide these powers cannot take within their sweep industrial disputes of the kind which was raised in that proceeding. It was further observed that the proper remedy available to the petitioners to ventilate their grievance was to take recourse to section 1c of the Industrial Disputes Act. Mr. Ganguli appearing for the petitioners-respondents referred to the decision in Hirday Narain v. Income-tax Officer, Bareilly ( AIR 1971 SC 33 . In that case the petitioner filed writ petition instead of availing himself of the statutory remedy. The High Court entertained the application and gave a hearing on merits. ' It was held that the petition cannot thereafter be rejected on the ground that alternative remedy was not availed of. 5. IT has been held that although the existence of alternative remedy is no bar to the maintainability of an application under Art. 226 the High Court will not normally entertain any challenge to the order on facts which are disputed. In the case before us, as we have already seen, there is no dispute between the parties about the facts of the case. The petitioners who has acquired the status of temporary railway servants with effect from September 18, 1969 and admittedly worked for over one year as temporary railway servants and were retrenched without following the procedure laid down under Sec. 25-F. In these state of affairs, we do not think that the petition should be rejected on the ground that the petitioners had alternative remedy which was not availed of. 6. 6. IT may be mentioned here that no argument was advanced as to the violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act though, as we have found, the petitioners are entitled to relief under the provisions of Section 25-F. We may further mention that the petitioners Nos. 3, 7 and 9 have already accepted the retrenchment compensation offered to them and as such they are not entitled to any relief in these proceedings. The appeal accordingly is dismissed in respect of petitioners nos. 1,2,4,5,6 and 8 and is allowed in respect of petitioners Nos. 3, 7 and 9 and in respect of these petitioners, viz. 3, 7 and 9, the rule stands discharged. There will be no order as to costs.