JUDGMENT - P.M. MUKHI, J.:---This Letters Patent Appeal raises a somewhat interesting question of law as to the power and jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner and other authorities under the Bombay Public Trusts Act of 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") to decide questions which are required to be decided or dealt with by them under the relevant provisions of the Act. It would appear that there is a public trust called "Samastha Lad Vanjari Samaj Ram Mandir Trust", which is said to have come into existence as far back as the 19th Century and in any event prior to 1904. On the 16th of August, 1958 an application was made for registration of this public trust under the Act and in the events that happened, after holding the necessary inquiry, the trust was registered on the 17th of October, 1958 and was given a number which is A-488 Jalgaon. It would appear that when the trust was so registered on the 17th of October, 1958 a particular property, which is Survey No. 197 situate at Meharan, Taluka Jalgaon, was not included as one of the trust properties. In these circumstances, sometime in 1962 the trustees made an application under section 22 of the Act. This application was properly treated as an application under section 22-A of the Act and after holding an inquiry, the Assistant Charity Commissioner came to the conclusion that the property in question viz. Survey No. 197, was the property of the trust. He then ordered that the relevant entry be made in the relevant register and also directed that suitable steps be taken for recovery of possession of the property. This decision of the Assistant Charity Commissioner was given on the 19th of June, 1967. However, prior thereto there had been a decision, appeal and remand which need not be discussed. After a somewhat chequered career, the matter ultimately reached this High Court as First Appeal No. 176 of 1972. This decision of the Assistant Charity Commissioner was given on the 19th of June, 1967. However, prior thereto there had been a decision, appeal and remand which need not be discussed. After a somewhat chequered career, the matter ultimately reached this High Court as First Appeal No. 176 of 1972. This First Appeal came to be heard by a Single Judge of this Court (Vaidya, J.) who, after hearing the parties, including the Assistant Government Pleader, came to the conclusion that the decision of the Assistant Charity Commissioner dated the 19th of June, 1967, the decision of the Joint Charity Commissioner dated the 25th of September, 1969 as well the decision of the Assistant Judge, Jalgaon, dated the 6th of December, 1971, must be set aside as without jurisdiction, because, according to the learned Single Judge, a Full Bench of this Court had decided that disputed questions of title cannot be gone into by the authorities under the Act and that such questions could only be decided by a Civil Court. The Full Bench Judgment referred to by the learned Single Judge is the case of (Keki Pestonji Jamadar v. Rodabai Khodadad Merwan Irani)1, 74 Bom.L.R 198. While allowing the appeal before him, the learned Single Judge observed: ".......the Full Bench in term has laid down that hostile where title is set up by persons who do not claim any interest in the trust, such title should be inquired into only by the Civil Court." The learned single Judge also found that the Full Bench had referred to section 26 of the Act and laid down that section clearly indicated that only the Civil Court could decide such a matter. Because he was allowing the First Appeal before him on this view of the matter, the learned Single Judge did not consider several other contentions which had been raised before him for the appellants therein. It is against this decision of the learned Single judge dated the 25th of September, 1973 that this Letters Patent Appeal has been brought. Now, the question which seems to have been agitated in the proceedings before the authorities under the Act was whether Survey No. 197 was the property of the trust. It was contented that this particular trust had been in existence since the 19th Century and that in the year 1904 one Jayram Motiram donated a sum of Rs. Now, the question which seems to have been agitated in the proceedings before the authorities under the Act was whether Survey No. 197 was the property of the trust. It was contented that this particular trust had been in existence since the 19th Century and that in the year 1904 one Jayram Motiram donated a sum of Rs. 500/- to the trust and from this amount the property in question, viz. Survey No. 197, was obtained from the Government under a Kabulayat dated the 15th of March, 1904, which is at Exh. 19 on the record. The difficulty that arose, however, was that although it was said that the property had been obtained for the trust, it appears to have been obtained in the name of one Narayan Ughadu Vanjari because that gentleman was the chief trustee of the trust at that time. In their application under section 22-A of the Act, the trustees claimed that the land Survey No. 197, was always in the possession of the trust and that the trust had been enjoying the usufruct thereof. It was, however, stated that after the death of the said Narayan Ughadu Vanjari, the names of his heirs came to be entered into the Record of Rights erroneously, even though the property was cultivated all along on behalf of the trust. We have already referred to the fact that when the trust was originally registered in 1958 this property, viz. Survey No. 197, was inadvertently left out and that is why the present application under section 22-A of the Act came to be filed for the purpose of including the property. No. 197, in the relevant registers as the property of the trust. The question that was required to be decided by the Assistant Charity Commissioner under sections 19(ii) and 22-A of the Act was whether the particular property was the property of the trust. In the proceedings before the Assistant Charity Commissioner, the respondents to this Letters Patent Appeal, Waman Kisan Sanap, Laxman Kisan Sanap and Namdev Shankar Sanap (hereinafter for brevitys sake referred to as "the Sanaps") came to figure as the opponents and they raised a plea that the property in question, being Survey No. 197, was their own personal property which they had inherited from Narayan Ughadu Vanjari, who was their grandfather. The Sanaps thus may be said to have get up a title in themselves hostitle to the trust. It would appear that the Sanaps asserted their title to the property to the time when the Assistant Charity Commissioner on the application before him under section 22-A of the Act had to perform his statutory duty under the relevant provisions of this Act and decide whether the particular property, viz. Survey No. 197, was the property of the trust so that it could now be included in the relevant registers after the prescribed inquiry. It was contended on behalf of the Sanaps before the learned Single Judge of this Court (Vaidya, J.) that in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Keki Pestonji Jamadar v. Rodabai Khodadad Merwan Irani, the Assistant Charity Commissioner could not decide the question of title involved because such a question of title to the property, i.e. Survey No. 197, was outside the scope of the inquiry under section 19 of the Act or for that matter under section 22-A of the Act. It is this contention which found favour with the learned Single Judge so that he came to hold that the authorities under the Act had no power or jurisdiction to decide the question of title and that is why the three orders of the authorities under the Act were liable to be set aside. Now, before we can appreciate the arguments advanced before us in this Letters Patent Appeal, it is necessary to ascertain what exactly the Full Bench of this Court decided in Keki Pestonjis case (supra). Now, it appears to us that what the Full Bench held (as the questions referred to it and to answers thereto show) was firstly that section 79 read with section 80 of the Act did not cover the question whether the author of the trust was the lawful owner of the property of which he had created the trust or had otherwise authority to create the particular trust. It was secondly held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the points mentioned in the first question in the sense that section 80 of the Act could not operates as a body to that jurisdiction. It was secondly held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the points mentioned in the first question in the sense that section 80 of the Act could not operates as a body to that jurisdiction. The Full Bench also held that the fact that the person who claimed title to the property had appeared or participated in the proceedings under the Act and made his contentions therein on the question of title was irrelevant and would not prevent such a person from bringing a suit in a Civil Court in respect of such a question. It is in our view significant, and it requires to be noticed, that while the Full Bench decided that jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred when the question of title of a third person (who asserted a title hostile to the trust) was concerned, the Court did not lay down that the Assistant Charity Commissioner or the other authorities under the Act had no jurisdiction to decide the question whether any particular property was the property of the trust; a question, the decision of which has been clearly left to them by the statute. It requires to be noticed that Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) who spoke for the Court, stated :--- "The purpose to the Act, the procedure prescribed for inquiries under section 19, the absence of any remedy under the Act to those were not parties to the inquiry under section 19 but whose anterior or superior title would be concluded by the decision in that inquiry and the general scheme of the Act, all tend to show that questions of title to the trust property are outside the scope of the inquiry under section 19". Then it was stated :--- ".....section 2(10) shows that the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner is expected and required to decide questions raised at the instance of persons who are interested in the trust. Then it was stated :--- ".....section 2(10) shows that the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner is expected and required to decide questions raised at the instance of persons who are interested in the trust. It is no part of their function under section 19 to decide claims which are adverse to the trust and which are made in assertion of titles which are hostitle to the trust......." (Emphasis supplied) Again, he said :--- ".......If the Act and the Rules thus contemplate in terms that the inquiry must be limited to the contentions of persons interested in the trust, there is no place in the inquiry for a person who wants to set up a title which is hostile to the trust. Such a claim is not a particular relating to the public trust, nor can it be said that it has remained to be inquired into." In our opinion, the conclusion is inescapable that what the full Bench has decided is that questions of title to the trust property are outside the scope of an inquiry under section 19 of the Act so that disputed questions of title are not to be dealt with by the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner and this authority had to confine itself to determination of those questions and those questions only which it is required to decide under the provisions of the statute. Now, it is obvious that it can never be said with any show of reason that if a third party were to set up a claim of title to the property in question then that would have the effect of stopping the authorities under the Act from per forming their duty of making such inquiries and taking such decisions as are permissible to then under the provisions of the statute. It appears to us that the Full Bench was fully conscious of this aspect of the matter because Chandrachud, J., has dealt with the provisions of section 79 and this is what has been stated :--- "The provisions of section 79 are too clear to admit of doubt or difficulty as regards the descriptions of questions which the Deputy of Assistant Charity Commissioner has to decide or deal with under the Act and in respect of which the decision is final and conclusive. The next step is brought with difficulty and that step is to determine the scope and ambit of these questions." After making the aforesaid observations, the Full Bench went on to consider the three questions which the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner is required by the statute to decide: The first is whether or not a trust exists. The next question is whether such a trust is a public trust. And the third question (with which we are concerned) is whether a particular property is the property of the trust. While referring to the third question, this is what the Court said :--- "The third question related to the decision of the Deputy Assistant Charity Commissioner is whether the particular property is the property of such trust." This clause is couched in words of doubtful import leading to the expression of divergent views as regards its scope. Learned Counsel for the appellant contends for the view that as the question whether the particular property is the property of the trust cannot be answered without deciding whether the author of the trust had the right or title to the property conveyed to the trust, the authorities must decide this letter question and, indeed, it is their function and duty to decide it. It is urged that questions of title to the particular property are thus required to be decided in inquiries under section 19 and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide those questions is barred under section 80. The contesting respondents contend for the rival view that the question whether the author of the trust had title to the property conveyed to the trust is outside the scope of the inquiry under section 19 and therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to decide or deal with that question is not barred. The learned Government Pleader has pointed out the merits and demerits of both the views but he has given good reasons why the contention of the respondents should be accepted in preference to that of the all appellant. Having considered the matter in all the aspects presented before us, we are of the opinion that the respondents are right in their contention. Having considered the matter in all the aspects presented before us, we are of the opinion that the respondents are right in their contention. The purpose of the Act, the procedure prescribed for inquiries under section 19, the absence of any remedy under the Act to those who were not parties to the inquiry under section 19 but whose anterior or superior title would be concluded by the decision in that inquiry and the general scheme of the Act, all tend to show that question of title to the trust property are outside the scope of the inquiry under section 19". Now, it requires to be noticed that as held by the Full Bench, the dominant purpose of the Act is to regulate and administer public trusts and not to settle disputed titles to the property alleged to belong to the trust. The above discussion, in our opinion, clearly brings out the salient point which we are required to consider in this appeal. When the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner is called upon to decide (under section 19 or section 22-A of the Act) whether a particular property is the property of the trust, what is the extent or the limit of his power to so decide? What is the scope and ambit of his inquiry? It is obvious that the Act calls upon the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner to take an inquiry in the prescribed manner for the purpose of ascertaining inter alia whether any property of the trust. How does not then proceed to make this determination? The relevant provisions as to the conduct of an inquiry in the prescribed manner show that the inquiry is to be held under Rule 7 by following the procedure prescribed for trial of suits under the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act or the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, as the case may be. Rule 7 provided that the officer concerned may make a short memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness. It is entertainrially clear that the officer concerned is to take into consideration whatever oral of documents evidence that is or may be placed before him. Rule 7 provided that the officer concerned may make a short memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness. It is entertainrially clear that the officer concerned is to take into consideration whatever oral of documents evidence that is or may be placed before him. It is also clear that by reason of 7-A, a public notice is to be given, but it is significant that by such a notice only those persons who have interest in the trust are entitled to appear before the officer concerned and submit their objections, if any. As stated by the Full Bench, the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner is expected and required to decide questions raised by the persons who are interested in the trust. He is not concerned with third parties at all. It is appropriate to notice that section 2(10) of the Act before "person having interest" and the Full Bench has said that the Assistant Charity Commissioner is expected and required to decide questions raised at the instance of persons who are interested in the trust. In our view of person who sets up a claim hostile to the trust cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to be a person having interest in the trust. If this then is the correct view of the relevant provisions of the statute under which the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner has to function, then it follows that what to Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner has to decide is whether there is sufficient material before him, whether placed by persons having interest or otherwise, to come to the conclusion that the particular property is the property of the trust. If he has, then he must so decide. And if he so decides, then an appropriate entry must be made in the relevant Register and appropriate action will hare to be taken for possession and administration of that particular property. The Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner, therefore, must held the inquiry in the prescribed manner and if he is satisfied that the property which is claimed on behalf of the trust is the property of the trust, then he must record finding accordingly. He may even say, if the facts of the case so show, that the particular property is being claimed by a third party adversely to the trust. He may even say, if the facts of the case so show, that the particular property is being claimed by a third party adversely to the trust. But as has been held by the Full Bench, it is not for him to adjudicate upon the question of title as such, in the sense that a Civil Court adjudicates a title and gives a judgment declaring the title of a particular person. It is, of course, conceivable that the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner may come to the conclusion that the particular property claimed on behalf of the trust does not belong to the trust. If he arrives at such a conclusion then he is merely performing his duty to decide the question (being the third question, as mentioned in the Full Bench judgment relegated to him as to whether a particular property is (or is not ) the property of the trust. If he comes to the conclusion that the particular property is not the property of the trust, then he keeps it out and it does not matter to him as to who has title to such a property, so long as he is satisfied that it is not the property of the trust. On the other hand, he any also come to the conclusion that there is sufficient material before him to show that particular property is the property of the trust, how though there be a third party who is claiming a title to that very property. After giving the matter and the observations of the Full Bench our careful consideration, we have come to the conclusion that it is really a matter of levels. The Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner is duty bound, as required by the statute, to decide the question relegated to him that the particular property is or is not the property of the trust. His power and jurisdiction, therefore, extends to that lerd or limits upto which he can so decide without tourching on disputed questions of title. The Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner is duty bound, as required by the statute, to decide the question relegated to him that the particular property is or is not the property of the trust. His power and jurisdiction, therefore, extends to that lerd or limits upto which he can so decide without tourching on disputed questions of title. If he stops at that level, as he must, then it is always upon to a third party, as held by the Full Bench, to assert his hostitle claim, either by filing a suit in a Civil Court for a declaration that the property belongs to him, or to claim such a title by way of defence in any other proceedings that may be adopted in relation to that property. If, as has been held by the Full Bench, questions of title to the trust property are outside the scope of inquiry under section 19, then no real difficulty arises because nothing in the decision of the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner or other authorities under the Act will affect any anterior or superior title or any question as to whether the author of the trust was the lawful owner of the property because all those questions will be decided in appropriate proceedings by a Civil Court. In other words, these questions operate at a different level then that at which the Charity Commissioner has to decide the questions which he is required to decide under the statue. It bears repeating that the Full Bench of this Court in Keki Pestonjis case (supra) did not decide, and, indeed, could not in the face of the statute, decide that the authorities under the statute were not to decide the specific question which had been relegated to them by the statute, namely, whether any particular property was the property of the trust or not merely because a third party has laid claim in mercy to that properties. In the case before us that specific question could only be whether Survey No. 197, Meharun, Taluka Jalgaon, was the property of the Ram Mandir Trust. In the case before us that specific question could only be whether Survey No. 197, Meharun, Taluka Jalgaon, was the property of the Ram Mandir Trust. A correct reading of the Full Bench decision revocates that the true owner, if there be any, is not affected by an inquiry under section 19, because the question that has to be decided by the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner is a different question operating at a different level. This view is clearly borne out by the fact that under section 26 of the Act is provided that the entries in the register are required to be amended in certain cases and in particular where a Court of competent jurisdiction has decided a question in relation to such entries. It is appropriate to notice that in the Full Bench decision it was stated by this Court : (p. 212) "That may serve to explain the intendement of section 26 under which any Court of competent jurisdiction deciding any question relating to any public trust, which by or under the provisions of the Act it is not expressly or impliedly barred from deciding, has to send copy of such decision to the Charity Commissioner and the Charity Commissioner has to cause the entries in the register to be made or amended in accordance with such decision. If a Civil Court upholds the title of a third party to the property, which under section 19 has been found to belong to the trust, the record of the Charity Commissioner has to be amended so as to accord with that decision. In the instant case, therefore, the decision of the Civil Court in Rodabais suit will have priority over the decision recorded in the inquiry under section 19". These observations of the Full Bench support the view that we have taken that the decision of the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner and the decision of a Civil Court operate at different levels and in different cases so that there is really no conflict between the two. These observations of the Full Bench support the view that we have taken that the decision of the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner and the decision of a Civil Court operate at different levels and in different cases so that there is really no conflict between the two. Indeed, it would appear that is why the Full Bench, while dealing with the case of (Taraben Baldevdas v. Charity Commissioner)2, 57 Bom.L.R. 1069 and overruling it, stated that decision was not an authority for the proposition that the titles of third parties are held to be concluded by decisions recorded in an inquiry under section 19 of the Act. The Court observed that the decision in Tarabens case assumed that a contest on title was within the purview of the inquiry under section, 19 and the said that assumption was not correct. The Court then went on to say :--- "If the question is outside the pale of the inquiry envisaged by section 19, the Civil courts would have jurisdiction to decide or deal with the question........". Applying this state of the law to the facts of this case, we find that what the authorities under the Act have decided on the material placed before them is (a) that a sum of Rs. 500/- was donated by one Jayram Motiram as far back as 1904 to the temple trust, (b) that the said amount was utilised for obtaining the land in question, and (c) that the Kabulayat dated the 15th of March, 1904 was taken in the name of Narayan Ughadu Vanjari, who was at that time the chief trustee. On this footing, the Assistant Charity Commissioner could well decide and, in our view rightly so that this particular property was the property of the trust. By doing so, the Assistant Charity Commissioner was deciding the question relegated to his determination that the particular property in question was the property of the Ram Mandir Trust. He was deciding nothing more. Now, it is true that the respondents, i.e. the three Sanaps, had interposed and were asserting a title hostile to the trust, but that was not a question to be decided by the Assistant Charity Commissioner at all and even if it can be said that he has gone on to decide that questing also, then his finding to that extent may be considered as surplusage. But so far as it can be properly maintained that on material before him, the Assistant Charity Commissioner could and did come to the conclusion that the particular property was the property of the trust then there can be no difficulty in holding that he was acting with his jurisdiction. That being sufficient, no other question need have been considered. Indeed it is significant and ought to be noticed that the Assistant Charity Commissioner found that all along the property in question was treated as the property of the trust and income received and applied by the trust for its own use. In this view of the matter, we must hold that the learned Single Judge was in error in coming to the conclusion that the three authorities under the Act had no jurisdiction to consider the matter and to decide on the martial act then that the land in dispute was the property of the trust. As a matter of fact, we must emphasise that this was precisely the question which the authorities under the Act were duty bound to consider and determine, after holding the inquiry under section 22-A read with section 19, in the prescribed manner. Now, it may be noticed that the learned Single Judge has said that Mr. Kankaria, the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant before him (respondents before us), had urged six other grounds. There is an observation of the learned Single Judge that there is some force in almost every contention urged by him. Ordinarily, this would have entailed that we remand the matter back to the learned Single Judge to consider those contentions which be did not decide, because he was allowing the appeal on the question of jurisdiction. We find, however, that the points not decided by the learned Single Judge really pertain to the assertion of their hostile title by the Sanaps to the land in dispute and these again are not questions which are required to be determined and dealt with by the authorities under the Act. If that is so, then there is no need to remand the matter to the learned Single Judge. All questions pertaining to the title of a third party may be property be determined only by a Civil Court in appropriate property. If that is so, then there is no need to remand the matter to the learned Single Judge. All questions pertaining to the title of a third party may be property be determined only by a Civil Court in appropriate property. The orders and judgments of the three authorities under the Act must be allowed to stand in so far as these decisions pertain to the specific question required to be decided by the authorities under the Act, namely, that Survey No. 197. Mahrun, Taluka, Jalgaon belonged to the Ram Mandir Trust and must be, therefore, dealt with under the Act as the property of the trust. We, therefore set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated the 25th of September, 1973 and restore the order and judgement of the Assistant Charity Commissioner dated the 19th of June, 1967; of the joint Charity Commissioner dated the 25th of September, 1969 and of the Assistant Judge, Jalgaon, dated the 6th of the December, 1971. In the circumstances of the case there will be order as to costs. -----