Judgment :- VEERASWAMI, J. The Erstwhile French Establishments in India known as Pondicherry, Karailkal, Mahe and Yanam which, by the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act, 1962, constitute the Pondicherry Union Territory, were divided by the French Government into 17 communes approximating to Municipalities or local Self Government we are familiar with. A French Decree dt. 12th December, 1880, governed and regulated the Municipal body of each commune. It provided for the setting up of the Municipal body of each commune. It provided for the setting up of the Municipal body consisting of a Mayor and elected Municipal Council, their power including powers of taxation for municipal purposes, budgets and procedure. With the de facto transfer under an agreement dt. 21st October, 1954 of these French Territories to the Indian Government, the Government of India, in exercise of powers conferred by S. 4 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947, made on 1st November, 1954 and French Establishments (Application of Laws) Order, 1954 and the French Establishments (Administration) Order, 1954. On 28th May, 1956 there was a Treaty of Cession of those French Establishments between the President of India and President of the French Republic, and on 16th August, 1962 their de jure merger with India was carried out through Instruments of Ratification exchanged between the Indian Prime Minister and the French Ambassador, whereby France ceded to India in full Sovereignty of the Territory of French Establishments aforesaid. Then followed the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act 1962 on 28th December, 1962 which came into force from 16th August, 1962. On 16th August, 1962 the Pondicherry Administration Ordinance, 1962 was made, which was replaced on 5th December, 1962 by the Pondicherry (Administration) Act, 1962. Then followed the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act 1962 on 28th December, 1962 which came into force from 16th August, 1962. On 16th August, 1962 the Pondicherry Administration Ordinance, 1962 was made, which was replaced on 5th December, 1962 by the Pondicherry (Administration) Act, 1962. By S. 4 of this Act, all laws in force immediately before the appointed day in the former French Establishments should continue to be in force in Pondicherry Union Territory until amended or repealed by a competent legislature, or other competent authority, and by S. 7, all taxes, duties cesses and fees which immediately before the appointed day, were being lawfully levied in the former French Establishments should continue to be levied in Pondicherry Union Territory and to be applied for the same purposes, until other provision was made by a competent legislature other competent authority., We are not concerned with the other provisions of the Act except that "law" has been defined therein to include a decree, so that the decree dt. 12th March, 1880 continued to have force. On 10th May, 1963 the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 was enacted by Parliament in exercise of powers under Art. 239-A(1), providing for a local legislature and Council of Ministers, their powers, procedure and other matters. On 7th August, 1969, the Municipal council of Mahe decided to levy a Municipal Tax of 5 paise on each litre of petrol and of diesel oil sold at the petrol pump situate at Pushitala, Mahe. The mayor, based on that decision of the Municipal Council and considering the Decree dt. 12th March, 1880, issued an "Arrete" w.e.f 13th January, 1970 for levy of Municipal Tax of 5 paise as aforesaid and for collection of the tax by the Receiver Municipal, or the Agent appointed by him. On a representation by Mahe Beach Trading Company which is the respondent in Writ Appeal No. 240 of 1972, the Municipal Council by another Resolution dt. 15th May, 1970 decided to reduce the rate from 5 paise to 2 paise on each litre of petrol and of diesel oil w.e.f 24th February, 1970; and an Arrete to that effect was later issued on 16th October, 1970 by the Mayor of Mahe, who is one of the appellants in that appeal. 15th May, 1970 decided to reduce the rate from 5 paise to 2 paise on each litre of petrol and of diesel oil w.e.f 24th February, 1970; and an Arrete to that effect was later issued on 16th October, 1970 by the Mayor of Mahe, who is one of the appellants in that appeal. On a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution by the respondent in that appeal, Ramaprasada Rao, J. in Mahe Beach Trading Co. vs. The Union Territory of Pondicherry 1972 II MLJ 213 held that the tax was on sale of goods, that levy of sales tax was in excess of the Municipality's power of taxation, that the tax also violated S. 7 of the Pondicherry (Administration), Act, 1962 and that finally, the Pondicherry legislature itself having enacted a General ST Act applicable to the Union Territory, the Municipal Council in any case, possessed no power to levy a parallel sales tax for Municipal purposes. The learned Judge followed his own view and invalidated the levy of 50 paise per bag of sugar by the Villanur Municipality in Pondicherry. From both these orders arise Writ Appeals Nos. 240 and 383 of 1972 which were filed by the Union Territory of Pondicherry and the Mayor of the related Municipality. Since then, the Administrator of the Pondicherry promulgated The Pondicherry Municipal Decree (Levy and Validation of Taxes, Duties, Cesses and Fees) Ordinance 1973 which provided for levy, assessment and collection of taxes, duties, cesses and fees for the purpose of the Municipal Decree dt. 12th March, 1880 and the validation of taxes, duties, cesses and fees levied thereunder. This Ordinance came to force on 18th January, 1973, which was replaced by the Pondicherry Municipal Decree (Levy and Validation of Taxes, Duties, Cases and Fees) Act, 1973. This Act became law on 21st March, 1973 when it received the assent of the President and was published in the Pondicherry Gazette. The Act was given retrospective operation from 18th January, 1973, the date of the Ordinance. The respondents in the appeals have filed two petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution questioning the validity of the Ordinance as well as the Act. There are two other like petitions for the same purpose, in one of which the Tody Tree Tax and Mahamai Tax on outgoing vehicles imposed by Kottuchery Commune are impugned as invalid. The respondents in the appeals have filed two petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution questioning the validity of the Ordinance as well as the Act. There are two other like petitions for the same purpose, in one of which the Tody Tree Tax and Mahamai Tax on outgoing vehicles imposed by Kottuchery Commune are impugned as invalid. Since the appeals and Writ Petitions raise common questions, they have been heard together. 2. Though we agree with the view of Ramaprasada Rao, J. that the Municipal Decree of 1880 did not authorise the Municipalities to levy sales tax, on the view we are inclined take on the validity of the Validation Act, it is not necessary to examine whether the Municipal Decree of 1880 gave the Municipalities in the erstwhile French Settlements power to levy sales-tax, and for that reason we do not give our reason separately for agreeing with Ramaprasada Rao, J. on that point. On the other two points decided by the learned Judge, we are unable to agree with him. Merely because the Pondicherry legislature enacted General ST Act to raise sales-tax for purposes of Government of Pondicherry, it did not follow that it could not simultaneously authorise the Municipalities to raise sales-tax for their own purposes. By enacting the Pondicherry General ST Act, the power of Pondicherry legislator means exhausted so as to say that in view of if, it could no longer authorise the Municipalities to levy sales tax for purposes of the local Government. The Pondicherry legislature could have collected by means of the Pondicherry General ST Act a surcharge of General Sales Tax and made over the same to the Municipalities for their purposes. Instead, the same legislature without following that procedure, could directly authorise the Municipalities to levy sales-tax to meet their needs. In either case, the necessary power was available to the State legislature. As to the impact of S. 7 of the Pondicherry (Administration), Act, 1962, the matter is dealt with infra in the context of the Validating Act. Before proceeding further, we may observe that if the Validating Act is held to be valid, the appeals will succeed and the Writ Petitions fail. 3. As to the impact of S. 7 of the Pondicherry (Administration), Act, 1962, the matter is dealt with infra in the context of the Validating Act. Before proceeding further, we may observe that if the Validating Act is held to be valid, the appeals will succeed and the Writ Petitions fail. 3. The attack on the validity of the Pondicherry Municipal Decree (Levy and Validation of Taxes, Duties, Cesses and Fees) Act, 1973 is levelled on three main grounds :-(1) Excessive delegation of legislative power; (2) The Act is arbitrary and offends Art. 14, and inasmuch as it makes no procedural safeguards as to levy, assessment, collection, appeals, limitation and the like, it violates Art. 19(1)(g); and (3) Violation of S. 7 of the Pondicherry (Administration) Act, 1962. Two other minor points taken for the petitions are :- (1) The Pondicherry legislature being a subordinate legislature, it has no power to enact retroactive legislation; and (2) in any case, the Pondicherry legislature has no power to amend the pre-Constitution laws. We shall deal with these grounds variation 4. Before we deal with the first ground, we may set out the relevant provisions of the Validating Act which are identical with the Ordinance. Mention has already been made of the object of the Act and the Presidential assent thereto. Sec. 2 defines "Government" in terms of the Administrator of the Union Territory of Pondicherry, appointed by the President under Art. 239 of the Constitution, "Municipal commune" as a commune mentioned in Art. 1 of the Municipal Decree, "Municipal council" as the body constituted to manage the municipal affairs in a municipal commune, and "Municipal Decree" as the Decree of French Government dt. 12th March, 1880, as amended from time to time. Secs. 3 and 4 are as under :- "3. 12th March, 1880, as amended from time to time. Secs. 3 and 4 are as under :- "3. Any tax, duty, cess of fee which the legislature of the Union Territory of Pondicherry has power to levy may; subject to any general or special order which the Government may make in this behalf, also be levied, assessed and collected for the purposes of the Municipal Decree in accordance with the provisions contained in or made under the Municipal Decree and notwithstanding the provisions of the S. 7 of the Pondicherry (Administration) Act, 1962, or of any provisions of any Act passed by the legislature of the union Territory of Pondicherry, the Municipal Decree shall have, and shall be deemed to have had on and from the 16th August, 1962, effect accordingly." * 4. Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, all taxes, duties, cesses and fees (being taxes, duties, cesses and fees which the legislature of the Union territory of Pondicherry has power to levy) levied, assessed or collected or purporting to have been levied, assessed or collected under the Municipal Decree before the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to have been validly levied, assessed or collected in accordance with law, as if the provisions of S. 3 had been in force at all material times when any such tax, duty, cess or fee was levied, assessed or collected; and accordingly - (a) all acts, proceedings or things done or taken by the Municipal councils or by any other authority, office or person in connection with the levy assessment or collection of any such tax duty, cess or fee shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be, and to have always been done or taken in accordance with law : (b) no suit or other proceedings shall be maintained or continued in any Court against the Municipal Councils or any other authority, officer or person whatsoever of the refund of any tax, duty, cess or fee so collected; and (c) no Court shall enforce any decree or other directing the refund of any tax, duty, cess or fee so collected; 5. Provided that no act or omission on the part of any person shall be punishable as an offence which would not have been so punishable if this Act had not been passed "Sec. 5 repeals the Ordinance and makes the usual savings. 6. Provided that no act or omission on the part of any person shall be punishable as an offence which would not have been so punishable if this Act had not been passed "Sec. 5 repeals the Ordinance and makes the usual savings. 6. When an imposition and collection of tax are found by a Court to be invalid for want of authority therefor, it is set right by the legislature, if it minds to do so, not by invalidating Court's decision right away which it cannot do, but by enacting provisions by which first the competence or authority it was lacking is supplied with retrospective effect, and next by declaring, on the basis of the retrospective law, that the tax imposed and collected should be deemed to have been validly levied and collected. Accordingly, consequential subsidiary provisions are made giving insulation to all acts, proceedings and things done as validly done, inhibiting suits and Court's jurisdiction in respect of refund claims. The Validating Act under consideration takes this stereo-type pattern of such legislation. Sec. 3 is capable of dissection into five parts :(1) A Municipal Commune may levy, assess and collect any tax, duty, cess or fee which the Pondicherry legislature has power to levy. This is subject to any general or special order which the Pondicherry Government may make in that behalf : (2) The word "also" in the phrase "also be levied" in S. 3 suggests that the power of the Pondicherry legislature to raise revenue for purposes of the Government is left intact : (3) The levy, assessment and collection of the impost by a Municipal Commune shall be for purposes of the Municipal Decree : (4) Such levy, assessment and collection shall be in accordance with the provision contained in or made under the Municipal Decree; and (5) The Municipal Decree shall have and shall be deemed to have had effect from 16th August, 1962, and this shall be so irrespective of S. 7 of the Pondicherry (Administration) Act, 1962, or any provision of any Act passed by the Pondicherry Legislature. 7. On the basis of these premises, S. 4 validates levy, assessment and collection of any tax etc. made under the Municipal Decree before the amending Act came into force, to wit, any levy, assessment or collection from 16th August, 1962 which was anterior to the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963. 8. 7. On the basis of these premises, S. 4 validates levy, assessment and collection of any tax etc. made under the Municipal Decree before the amending Act came into force, to wit, any levy, assessment or collection from 16th August, 1962 which was anterior to the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963. 8. Venugopal for the petitioners contends, with ability and skill, that S. 3 is a case of total abdication by the Pondicherry legislature of its legislative power to tax by setting up the Municipal Communes as parallel legislatures and transferring to them the whole of the taxing power, or the entire gamut of its taxing power. The learned Additional Solicitor-General has of course ably and even more strenuously centered him, thus both counsel citing and relying on a plethora of decided cases in support of one or the other view. 9. Though the law regarding permissible limits of delegation of legislative power to subordinate authorities has been stated in some of the decided cases, as for insane, The Municipal Corpn. of Delhi vs. Birla Cotton & Spinning & Weaving Mills, Delhi in as such as the test have been variously propounded in different decision and by different learned Judges even in the same cases, it has still to be found how that law on that matter has been settled. The authorities, however are uniform, that having regard to the modern complexities of fast changing political, economic and social values, needs and advancement, it is impossible for legislatures with sovereign legislative power to given effect by themselves and on their own, to their legislative intention, and therefore, in the nature of things, delegation for subordinate legislation has been and is inevitable. The practice of this principle, even widening as it is, is evidence even in countries where there is supposed or claimed to be complete separation of powers of State. Skeleton legislation expressing but merely the legislative policy, sometimes with or without standards for its execution, and even vital details of working and effectuating the express legislative policy being left to subordinate legislation, is getting into vogue more and more in modern times. Necessity of the situation, therefore, has to be borne in mind in resolving a problem of alleged excessive delegation. Necessity of the situation, therefore, has to be borne in mind in resolving a problem of alleged excessive delegation. One other fact of which there is unanimity in decided cases is, the time honoured legislative practice in India and in major parts of the world, of the legislatures necessarily entrusting municipal bodies or local self Government as they are so called, set up on more or less elective principle, with powers or raise revenue to meet the needs of Municipal administration. This has been recognised by the Government of India Act, 1935 and, as a matter of fact, by also the several Constitutional Acts preceding it. 10. Entry 5 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is, "Local Government" that is to say, the constitution and powers of Municipal Corporations, improvement trusts, district boards, mining settlement authorities and other local authorities for the purpose of local self Government or village administration." * When this topic a State legislature enacts to set up a local self Government for a town, city or area, and makes provision for its constitution and powers, necessarily, such powers have to include the power to raise revenue as may be required to carry out its duties and obligations as a civic or local body, conventionally concerned with road, water, drainage, health and sanitation within Municipal limits. There is nothing to prevent the State legislature itself to arise the needful revenue and make the same over to the Municipal bodies. But this device has been seldom resorted to. The legislative power on the subject of local Self-Government in Entry 5 should, therefore, be taken to inherently include, in the set up of the local Government, the right to make over some of the powers of taxation which the State legislature itself has. This is also justified by the fact that the functions of the local Self Government are but identifiable with and derived from those of the State Government itself. For convenience and more effective control and effectuation and representation, what may be regarded as local functions peculiar to civic matters are entrusted to, and carried out through local self Government. In our opinion, therefore, delegation if taxing powers to Municipal bodies is within the ambit of those powers and, if necessary, of Entry 5 as well, provided the State legislature itself has those taxation powers. In our opinion, therefore, delegation if taxing powers to Municipal bodies is within the ambit of those powers and, if necessary, of Entry 5 as well, provided the State legislature itself has those taxation powers. Competency of the Pondicherry legislature to delegate to the Municipal Communes its taxing powers cannot, therefore, be questioned. That legislature, under the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 by s. 18(1) may make laws for the whole or any part of the Union territory with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or in the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule. 11. But the question is, whether the Pondicherry legislature was competent to make unselective and omnibus delegation to the Municipal Communes of the power to raise any tax, duty, cess or fee whatsoever. Usually, property tax, profession tax, water tax and the like, are allowed to be levied and collected by municipalities for their purposes. But, some of the Municipalities' Acts is in Bombay, Delhi, Calcutta, after enumerating those usual taxes, also mentioned "any other tax which the State legislature has power to impose". In some cases of Municipalities as in Delhi, taxes which the Municipalities can raise are classified as compulsory and optional. In Western India Theatres Ltd. vs. Municipal Corporation, Poona a general and object of which the approval of the Governor in Council was obtained, was held to be valid because the tax was imposed for the purpose of the municipality. In dealing with and rejecting an argument that S. 59(1)(xi) of the Bombay District Municipalities Act, 1901 which authorised the Municipality to raise any other tax as aforesaid unconstitutional in that the legislature had completely abdicated its functions and had delegated essential legislative power to the municipality to determine the nature of the tax to be imposed on the rate payers; and that the power thus delegated to the municipality was unguided, unanalysed and vagrant, because there was nothing in the Act to prevent the municipality from imposing any tax it liked, even say, income-tax and that such omnibus delegation could not, on the authorities be supported as constitutional, the Supreme Court observed : In the first place, the power of the Municipality cannot exceed the power of the provincial legislature itself and the municipality cannot impose any tax, e.g. income-tax which the provincial legislature could not itself impose. In the next place, S. 59 authorises the municipality to impose the taxes therein mentioned 'for the purposes of this Act'. The obligations and functions cast upon the municipalities are set forth in Chapter VII of the Act. Taxes, therefore, can be levied by the Municipality only for implementing those purposes and for no other purpose...............Finally, the provincial legislature had certainly not abdicated in favour of the Municipality, for the taxing power of the Municipality was quite definitely made subject to the approval of the Governor in council. ....................... In our opinion the impugned section did lay down a principle and fix a standard which the municipalities had to follow in imposing a tax and the legislature cannot, in the circumstances, be said to have had abdicated itself and, therefore, the delegation of power to impose any other tax cannot be struck down as being in excess of the permissible limits of delegation of legislative functions. "The test is, therefore, one of the competence of the legislature to delegate, and the delegation is not unconstitutional because the legislature itself did not select, but gave the option to the Municipality to decide to levy any other tax. If competence to delegate the power for any taxes is granted, it makes no difference to its constitutionality that selection of taxes to be imposed, is left to the Municipality, provided the legislature in making the delegation expressed its legislative policy, principles and standard. The policy indicated in S. 59(1)(xi) of the Bombay district Municipalities Act was that the Municipality could raise any other tax then those enumerated in the earlier part of the Section, and the principle was that the Municipality could raise any tax for the purposes of the Municipality, and the standard and control the legislature laid down was that the Municipality could so, with the previous approval of the Governor-in-Council. 12. The Bombay Municipal boroughs Act, 1925 authorised by S. 73(xiv) the Municipal Borough to levy and other tax (not being a toll on motor vehicles and trailers, save as provided by S. 14 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1935) which under the Government of India Act, 1935, the Provincial legislature has power to impose in the Province. 12. The Bombay Municipal boroughs Act, 1925 authorised by S. 73(xiv) the Municipal Borough to levy and other tax (not being a toll on motor vehicles and trailers, save as provided by S. 14 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1935) which under the Government of India Act, 1935, the Provincial legislature has power to impose in the Province. The Borough Municipalities situate within the province of Bombay could levy any tax other than the one mentioned in the exception referred to, which could be levied by the Provincial legislature itself in the province. In Cantonment Board Poona vs. Western India theatres Ltd. 1954 AIR(Bom) 261, the validity of this section was upheld, and in doing so, the Court observed :" * 15............................................................................there was unanimity upon the point that where the legislature had laid down a policy or in other words where in the first instance the legislature had legislated itself upon the subject matter of the statute, it was permissible to allow others, may be a provincial Government, may be an outside body, to under take subordinate legislation within the powers conferred, and no legislation could be impugned on the ground that this had been permitted ................................... ....................................................... ................................... ..... It was thus observe in Schechter vs. United State 1934 (295) US 495. "So long as a policy is laid down and a standard established by a statute, no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power is involved in leaving to selected instrumentality the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply" * After quoting the words of Justice Cardozo in Panama Refining Co. vs. Rayan 1934 (293) US 388, that the discretion left to the subordinate legislative authority must not be unconfined and vagrant, but it must be canalised within even banks which kept it from overflowing, the Bombay Court further stated : "It appears to us that applying this test there is nothing in s. 59(1), cl. (xi), which renders that section ultra vires of the Governor in Council because of legislative power having been delegated. The Governor in Council in this case was legislating upon the subject of local self Government. (xi), which renders that section ultra vires of the Governor in Council because of legislative power having been delegated. The Governor in Council in this case was legislating upon the subject of local self Government. If was deemed desirable that Municipalities should be constituted within the province, and if Municipalities are to be constituted with the Province, it was necessary to allot to them sources of taxation. The sources of taxation mentioned in cl. (i) to (x) of S. 59(1), therefore, were in the first instance allotted to them. Then it was considered necessary apparently either because these sources may be insufficient or because sometimes the Municipalities might pefer to levy another tax in lieu of taxes mentioned in cl. (i) to (x) that they should have power to levy other taxes also. The question that arose what other taxes the Municipalities can be empowered to impose.Sec. 59(1) cl. (xi), provides that they had the power to impose any other tax provided that the previous approval of the Governor in Council to the nature and object of the tax had been obtained. It cannot possibly be said, therefore, in this case that the legislature had not itself legislated at all on the subject matter. As I have already mentioned the subject of the legislation was the constitution of Municipalities. If the Municipalities were constituted, then they had to be allotted certain sources of revenue. A policy was consequently laid down to a very large extent." * 13. In Hirabhai Ashbhai Patel vs. State of Bom. 1955 AIR(Bom) 185, water tax levied by measurement through meter was impugned. Sec. 169 gave discretion to the Commissioner to charge for water supplied by measurement, at such rate as shall, from time to time, be prescribed by the Standing Committee in that behalf. The validity of the section was canvassed on the ground of competency. The Bombay High Court, while rejecting the contention, referred to Entry 5 of the State List in the constitution and observed "Now, there can be no doubt that the power of taxation conferred upon the Bombay Municipality is for the purpose of local self Government" * and held that, therefore, the State legislature was competent to confer upon the local authority the power to tax. It was further pointed out that if the State legislature was competent to confer upon the local authority the power to tax, its competency could not be affected because the power that had been conferred was an unlimited power, and that the fact that no limitation had been imposed may lead to the legislation being challenged on some other ground; but it could not be challenged on the ground of competence. 14. The Municipal Corpn. of Delhi vs. Birla Cotton & Spinning & Weaving Mills, Delhi contains elaborate consideration of the question of excessive delegation, and review of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject. The learned chief Justice for himself and Shelat, J. Summed up the result : "A review of these authorities therefore leads to the conclusion that so far as this Court is concerned, the principle is well established that essential legislative function consists of the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct and cannot be delegated by the legislature. Nor is there any unlimited right of delegation inherent in the legislative power itself. This is not warranted by the provisions of the Constitution. The legislature must retaining its own hands the essential legislative functions and what can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation necessary for implementing the purposes and objects of the Act. Where the legislative policy is enunciated with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, the Courts should not interfere. What guidance" * should be given and to what extent and whether guidance has been given in a particular case at all depends on a consideration of the provisions of the particular Act with which the Court has to deal including its preamble. Further it appears to us that the nature of the body to which delegation is made is also a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether there is sufficient guidance in the matter of delegation Hidayatullah, J. as he then was, who spoke for himself and Ramaswami, J., was of opinion that the proper test to apply was not the existence of safeguards but whether the legislative will to impose the tax was adequately expressed so as to bind those who have to pay the tax. This, he pointed out, required an examination of the policy and provisions of the Act with a view to determining whether the legislative will was fully expressed to invest the Municipal Committee with the power to levy the tax subject, of course, to a proper procedure being evolved. The learned Judge declined to accept the principle that the legislature must itself impose the tax by laying down the rate of the tax, the persons to be taxed, the manner of the levy and collection, and held :" * The doctrine that Parliament cannot delegate its powers, therefore, must be understood in a limited way. It only means that the legislature must not efface itself but must give the legislative sanction to the imposition of the tax and must keep the control in its own hands. Once it is established that the legislature itself has willed that a particular thing be done and has merely left the execution of it to a chosen instrumentality (provided that it has not parted with its control) there can be no question of excursive delegation. If the delegate acts contrary to the wishes of the legislature, the legislature can undo what the delegate has done. Even the Court and as we shall show presently, may be asked to intervene when the delegate exceeds its powers and functions..............................................Even in America the doctrine is much watered down especially when it is a question in investing municipalities with power of such taxation. Parliament when it confers such powers, cannot be said to abdicate or efface itself unless it can be said that it has lost its control over the action of the delegate." Shah and Vaidialingam, JJ. expressed the view :- " The increasing complexity of modern administration, the difficulty in passing complicated measures through the method of parliamentary debate and discussions, and the number of details and technical matters which must of necessity be provided for in statutes, have led to an increase in the practice of entrusting power to executive or other agencies to make subsidiary ancillary legislation. By entrusting that power to another body, the Parliament does not delegate its essential legislative function. But the authority to entrust subsidiary or ancillary power is not unrestricted; the power cannot be conferred upon a delegate without setting out some principle, policy, or standard which is to guide the delegate in discharging its delegated functions. By entrusting that power to another body, the Parliament does not delegate its essential legislative function. But the authority to entrust subsidiary or ancillary power is not unrestricted; the power cannot be conferred upon a delegate without setting out some principle, policy, or standard which is to guide the delegate in discharging its delegated functions. If the Parliament lays down by legislative act adequate guidance, whatever form it takes, and the delegate is required to conform to that guidance, entrustment of authority to the delegate to make subordinate legislation will be upheld. The power of delegating legislative authority cannot, however, be extended to investment of authority, in another body in respect of matters relating to principle or policy of legislation, to the amendment of Parliamentary Acts so as to affect the substance thereof or to investment in the executive power when no guidance or standard is laid down in that behalf or to authorise the executive to encroach upon the judicial power of the State........................................................................................................ The power of the State to legislate in matters of taxation within the allotted field is plenary, but in entrusting that power to a local authority the legislature cannot confer unguided authority. "The learned Judges further observed on a review of some of the cases decided by the Supreme Court :-" * On a review of the cases the following principles appear to be well settled; (i) Under the Constitution, the legislature has plenary power within its allotted field; (ii) Essential legislative function cannot be delegated by the legislature, that is, there can be no abdication of legislative function or authority by complete effacement, or even partially in respect of particular topic or matter entrusted by the Constitution to the Legislature; (iii) Power to make subsidiary or ancillary legislation may however be entrusted by the legislature to another body of its choice, provided there is enunciation of policy, principles, or standards either expressly or by implication for the guidance of the delegate in that behalf. Entrustment of power without guidance amounts to excessive delegation of legislative authority; (iv) Mere authority to legislate on a particular topic does not confer authority to delegate its power to legislate on that topic to another body. Entrustment of power without guidance amounts to excessive delegation of legislative authority; (iv) Mere authority to legislate on a particular topic does not confer authority to delegate its power to legislate on that topic to another body. The power conferred upon the legislature on a topic is specifically entrusted to that body, and it is a necessary intendment of the constitutional provision which confers that power that it shall not be delegated without laying down principles, policy, standard or guidance to another body unless the Constitution expressly permits delegation; and (v) the taxing provisions are not be exception to these rules".Sikri, J : as he then was, who spoke for himself opined :" Apart from authority, in my view Parliament has full power to delegate legislative authority to subordinate bodies. This power flows, in my judgment, from Art. 246 of the Constitution. The word "exclusive" means exclusive of any subordinate body. There is, however, one restriction in this respect and that is also contained in Art. 246. Parliament must pass a law in respect of an item or items of the relevant list. negatively this means that parliament cannot abdicate its functions. It seems to me that this was the position under the various Government of India Acts, and the Constitution has made no difference in this respect. "I read 1883 (9) AC 117 and 1885 (10) AC 282 as laying down that legislatures like Indian legislatures had full power to delegate legislative authority to subordinate bodies. In the Judgment in these cases no such word as "policy"" * standard ", or guidance' is mentioned. It is true that in 1883 (9) AC 117 the words "ancillary to legislation" are mentioned but if we examine ss. 4 and 5 of the Liquor Licence Act, 1877, it would be found that no guidance is contained in these sections for defining the conditions and qualifications requisite to obtain tavern licences, for limiting the number of tavern and shop licences, and the nature of the penalty to be imposed for the infraction thereof" * In The Municipal Corpn. 4 and 5 of the Liquor Licence Act, 1877, it would be found that no guidance is contained in these sections for defining the conditions and qualifications requisite to obtain tavern licences, for limiting the number of tavern and shop licences, and the nature of the penalty to be imposed for the infraction thereof" * In The Municipal Corpn. of Delhi vs. Birla Cotton & Spinning & Weaving Mills, Delhi (supra) which we have just now referred to, it was held that S. 150 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act which authorised the Municipality to levy any of the optional taxes by prescribing the maximum rates of tax to be levied fixing the class or classes of persons or description or descriptions of articles and properties to be taxed and laying down the system of assessment and exemptions, if any, to be granted, was not unguided and could not be said to amount to excessive delegation. In Corpn. of Calcutta vs. Liberty Cinema (supra) and G. B. Modi vs. Ahmedabad Municipality it was pointed out that fixing of rate of tax was not an essential legislative function. In Shama Rao vs. Union Territory the Pondicherry General ST Act was held to be void. It was also held that the Pondicherry General ST (Amendment) Act, 1966 did not have the effect of reviving it. The majority in that case said :- "The Pondicherry General ST Act, (10 of 1965) which extended the Madras General ST Act (1 to 1959), as it stood immediately before the date on which the Pondicherry Act would be brought into force in the territory of Pondicherry by a Notification issued by the Government as provided in S. 1(2), was void and still born, because the Pondicherry legislature in enacting the Act in that manner had totally abdicated its legislative functions in the matter of sales-tax legislation and surrendered it in favour of the Madras legislature" * It may be noticed that in that case, the Pondicherry legislature not only adopted the Madras Act as it stood on the date when it passed the principal Act, but also enacted that if the Madras legislature were to amend its Act prior to the date when the Pondicherry Government would issue its notification, it would be the amended Act which would apply. As a result the Pondicherry legislature accepted the Madras amended Act though it was not and could not be aware that the provisions of the Madras Amended Act would be. naturally, in the circumstances, it was held that this was a case of total surrender by the Pondicherry legislature of its legislative powers in the matter of sales-tax legislation, to the Madras legislature. 15. We shall, now refer to Cobb. & Co. Ltd. vs. Narman Eggert Kropp & Thomas Alfred Hiley 1967 (1) AC 141. It was decided by the Privy Council. The validity of State Transport Facilities Act, and the State Transport Act, both of Queensland, was challenged. The Acts gave the Commissioner for Transport, power to fix and recover licences and permit fees. The two actions which eventually led to the appeals before the Privy Council were for repayment of fees levied and collected by the Commissioner under the two enactment. In upholding the validity of the two Acts, the Privy Council held that by enacting them the Queensland legislature did not abdicate itself of its power to legislate for the peace, welfare and good Government of the State. It was pointed out that the Queensland legislature was entitled to use any agent or any subordinate agency or any machinery that they considered appropriate for carrying out the objects and purposes that they had in mind and which they designated, and they were entitled to use the Commissioner for Transport as their instrument to fix and recover the licence and permit fees provided they prescribed their own capacity intact and retained perfect control over him, and that, as they could at any time repeal the legislation and withdraw such authority and discretion as they had vested in him, they had not assigned or transferred or abrogated the sovereign power to levy taxes, nor did they renounce or abdicate their responsibilities in favour of a newly created legislative authority. In repelling an argument that the two enactment amounted to an abandonment or abdication of power in favour of a newly created legislative authority, the Privy Council referred to The Queen vs. Burah 1878 (2) AC 889 to the effect that the Indian legislature had powers expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it, and that, they are acting within the limited which circumscribed them, it was not in any sense an agent or delegate of the Imperial Parliament, but had, and it was intended to have, plenary powers of legislation, as large, and of the same nature, as those of parliament itself, and then stated that nothing comparable with a new legislative power armed with general legislative authority had been created by the passing by the Queensland legislature of the two Transport Acts. The circumstances that the Commissioner was endowed with certain powers of decisions and measures of discretion, was not considered to support in any realistic sense the contention that the Queensland legislature exceeded its plenary and ample power. The Privy Council Quoted the following from Hodge vs. The Queen 1883 (9) AC 117; "It was argued at the bar that a legislature committing important regulations to agents or delegates effaces itself. That is not so. It retains its power in tact, and can, whenever it pleases, destroy the agency it has created and set up another, or take the matter directly into his own hands. How far it shall seek the aid or subordinate agencies, and how long it shall continue them, are matters for each legislature, and not for Courts of Law, to decide". It went on to say :- " The legislature were entitled to use any agent or any subordinate agency or any machinery that they considered appropriate for carrying out the objects and purposes that they had in mind and which they designated. They were entitled to use the Commissioner for Transport as their instrument to fix and recover the licence and permit fees. They were entitled to use the Commissioner for Transport as their instrument to fix and recover the licence and permit fees. They were not abrogating their power to levy taxes and were not transferring that power to the Commissioner, what they created by the passing of the Transport Acts could not reasonably be described as a new legislative power or separate legislative body armed with general legislative authority.........Nor did the Queensland legislature 'create and endow with it own capacity a new legislative power not created by the Act to which it owes its own existence'.......In no sense did the Queensland legislature assign or transfer or abrogate their power or renounce or abdicate their responsibilities. They did not give away or relinquish their taxing powers. All that was done was under and by reason of their authority. It was by virtue of their will that licence and permit fees became payable. Nor was there alteration of the legislature." * The ratio of the Privy Council Judgment is very significant and telling. It seems that it is unnecessary to refer to the other cases which have been cited before us on either side in respect of the first ground of the petitioners. 16. To sum up the legal position as to abdication of legislative powers or excessive delegation, abdication means total surrender or transfer by the legislature of its legislative functions to another body to legislate on a particular subject matter, within its legislative competence. Such surrender or the abdication is illustrated by Shama Rao vs. Union Territory (supra). What is legislative function will depend upon the particular subject matter of legislation. There is no adjudication, surrender of legislative function or excessive delegation, so long as the legislature has expressed its will on a particular subject matter, indicated its policy and left the effectuation of the policy to subordinate or subsidiary and ancillary legislation, provided the legislature retained the control on its hand with reference to it, so that it can act as a check or a standard and prevent or undo the mischief by subordinate legislation when it chooses to, or thinks fit. These principles apply as well to delegation of the power of taxation. The power to delegate is inherent in the power of the legislature to legislate on any subject matter within its competence. These principles apply as well to delegation of the power of taxation. The power to delegate is inherent in the power of the legislature to legislate on any subject matter within its competence. In addition, we are of opinion that when legislating on the subject in entry 5 of the State List, it is competent for the legislature to delegate for Municipal purposes and subject to the procedure indicated any or all of its taxing powers. Applying these tests, we are of opinion that the first ground of petitioners should fail because the Pondicherry legislature in enacting ss. 3 and 4 in the Validation Act had the legislative competence to authorise the Municipal communes to raise, for the purpose of the Communes, any of the taxes to be levied, assessed and collected in accordance with the provisions of the Municipal Decree of 1880. The Amending Act clearly expressed the legislative policy to make an enabling law with retrospective effect to impose any tax, so that it could also validate under its cover as it were, the tax which the communes had actually imposed, assessed and collected under the Municipal Decree before the commencement of the Amending Act, on the erroneous assumption that the Municipal Decree itself had conferred authority to levy and collect the related tax. Sec. 3 made it clear that this delegation of taxing power was subject to any general or special order which the Government might make in this behalf. As we mentioned earlier, by the word 'also' in S. 3, the Pondicherry legislature indicated that while it retained its own power of taxation under the State List, it also enabled the municipal communes to levy, assess and collect any tax, duty, cess or fee within the competence of the legislature. The legislature did not leave the matter there. It also by S. 3 laid down the principle that any tax, duty, cess or fee which the communes could levy, assess and collect, should only be for purposes of the Municipal Decree which means that such levy, assessment and collection of any tax should be for purposes of the related municipal commune. It also by S. 3 laid down the principle that any tax, duty, cess or fee which the communes could levy, assess and collect, should only be for purposes of the Municipal Decree which means that such levy, assessment and collection of any tax should be for purposes of the related municipal commune. Sec. 3 went still further and forged the procedural check or control by making it clear that such levy, assessment and collection of any tax, should also be in accordance with the provisions "related to the procedure of levy, assessment and collection is clear from Raichur Municipality vs. B. A. Prasnna. The Court there observe that the expression 'imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act' in S. 97(1) of the Mysore Municipalities Act, 1964 meant 'imposed in accordance with the procedure provided under the Act'. We, therefore, think that Hamdard Dawakhana vs. Union of India Vasanlal Maganbhai vs. State of Bombay Corpn. of Calcutta vs. Liberty Cinema (supra), Devidas vs. State of Punjab Shama Rao vs. Union Territory (supra)., The Second GTO, Mangalore vs. D. H. Hazareth and Firm L. Hazari Mal vs. ITO Ambala 1957 AIR(Punjab) 5, to which our attention was drawn by Venugopal, do not help to uphold the first ground. 17. The second ground complains that the Municipal Decree of 1880 does not have a reasonable procedure with reference to levy, assessment and collection peculiar to the particular taxes which the Municipalities were authorised to levy, assess and collect and that, therefore, the Amending Act violated Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It is further said that the Amending Act gives the Municipal communes arbitrary power to pick and choose any tax or impost as they like, fix any rate of tax without any legislative guidance, and even to impose the entire financial burden of municipal administration on one section of tax payers, and that this was in violation of Art. 14. The substance of these contentions bears on alleged lack of control and guidance on the taxing powers of the communes in the light of the Validating Act. But we find that there is adequate control, both external and internal, over the exercise of those taxing powers. The Decree of 1880 shows that the Municipal Council in a commune is an elected body. But we find that there is adequate control, both external and internal, over the exercise of those taxing powers. The Decree of 1880 shows that the Municipal Council in a commune is an elected body. The Governor of the erstwhile French Establishments was under the Decree given the power of dissolving the Municipal councils or suspending the same. Similarly, the Mayors and Deputy Mayors of the Municipal Councils are also subject to similar powers of the Governor. In exercise of the taxing power of the Municipal communes as authorised by the Validating Act, tax could be raised only of purposes of the Municipal, and these purposes are elaborately set out in the Municipal Decree. The powers of the Municipal Councils have also been laid down in he decree, the exercise of which are subject to the controlling powers of the Governor. Cl. 46 of the Municipal Decree enjoins on the Municipal Councils to deliberate over the budget of the commune and in general, all receipts and expenditure either ordinary or extraordinary, the mode of assessment, rates and rules regarding collection of all Municipal revenue, except dock dues, and the deliberations of the Municipal Councils shall only be enforced after the approval of the Governor in Privy Council. Clause 48 says that the Municipal Council shall always be required to give its opinion on certain matters, including the mode of assessment, rates and rules relating to levy of Municipal tolls, docks dues and high road charges. Chapter III of the Municipal Decree deals with the budgets of the communes, divides receipts as ordinary and extraordinary, and by cl. 54 the budget of each commune submitted by the Mayor and voted by the Municipal Council shall be finally approved by an Arrete of the Governor made in Privy Council. If the income of the commune is not sufficient to meet the compulsory expenditure which is detailed, provision shall be made under cl. 59 for an extraordinary tax introduced by an Arrete of the Governor made in Privy Council. By cl. 63, the special taxes due by the inhabitants or owners under the local rules or custom shall be distributed by deliberation of the Municipal council approved by the Governor in Council. By cl. 59 for an extraordinary tax introduced by an Arrete of the Governor made in Privy Council. By cl. 63, the special taxes due by the inhabitants or owners under the local rules or custom shall be distributed by deliberation of the Municipal council approved by the Governor in Council. By cl. 65 any taxpayer entered in the tax payers' list of the Administrative Court, legal proceedings which are deemed by him to be incumbent upon the commune or section of commune and which the commune or section of the commune previously called upon to deliberate over the same would have refused or failed to institute. Whoever wants to institute legal proceeding against a commune or section of the commune shall be bound to address before hand to the Governor a Memorandum explaining his cause. The submission of the memorandum to the Mayor shall suspend the barring by limitation and prevent the lapse. The Governor shall forward the Memorandum to the Mayor with authorisation to convene the Municipal Council to deliberate over it. These particulars are found in cls. 66 and 67 of the Municipal Decree. We have then cl. 79 which says that the provisions of the Decree dt. 26th September, 1885, which was replaced by the Decree dt. 30th December, 1912, dealing with the financial rules of the colonies shall be applied to the Municipal accounts and to the Municipal "Received" in so far as they are not repugnant to Decree. These financial rules dealing with the manner of assessment and recovery of tax, procedure and appeal, refund and remissions, shall mutatis mutandis apply to the Municipalities as well as Municipal Received. Article 160 of these rules provides for the method of collection of direct taxes and other taxes and deals with the assessment book, authority competent to assess and to approve the list and the details that should be given against each entry, the period within which the tax should be paid by the tax payer, and also the period within which any claim against the assessment is to be preferred and the date on which any claim for payment of tax lapses. The assessment books are to be laid open to public and then entrusted to the Collector for the recovery of the taxes included therein. The assessment books are to be laid open to public and then entrusted to the Collector for the recovery of the taxes included therein. Article 161 deals with the method of recovery of direct tax, and the next Article provides for appeals against any claim in respect of any direct tax before the Administrative Tribunal. Article 163 concerns itself with the method of recovery of indirect taxes, and Art. 164 deals with appeals against any claim in respect of any indirect tax before a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. Remission or reduction in claims and complaints against double or false entry in respect of any tax, are to be dealt with under Arts. 173 and 174. Article 183 lays down the procedure for the recovery of tax. Article 191 deals with appeals, wrong assessment or against any assessment which is alleged to have been made in contravention of the resolutions made for the levy of any tax. 18. We have referred to the foregoing matters in detail to show that elaborate Procedure controlling and regulating the whole matter of taxation from the stage of proposal to tax, until its collection, which serve as safeguards not only from the stand point of the municipal communes, but, also the tax payers. The Municipal communes are not, having regard to the provisions of the Municipal Decree, free to pick and choose any tax for imposition, assessment and collection without going through the rigorous procedure, including previous assent and subsequent control of the Governor. This applies not merely to the selection of tax, but also its rate. In the circumstances, K. T. Moopil Nair vs. State of Kerala can have no application, which is a case where land tax was fixed on an arbitrary basis without classification and procedural control. Nor do we think that, notwithstanding the whole process of tax procedure envisaged by Municipal Decree, there is any sign of violation or likelihood of violation of either Art. 19(1)(g) or Art. 14. In view of the external and internal control and the elaborate procedure we reject the second contention of the petitioners as without any substance. 19. The third ground urged against the Validating Act is that it violates S. 7 of the Pondicherry (Administration), Act, 1962 20. The administration of the Union Territories is governed by Part VIII of the Constitution. In view of the external and internal control and the elaborate procedure we reject the second contention of the petitioners as without any substance. 19. The third ground urged against the Validating Act is that it violates S. 7 of the Pondicherry (Administration), Act, 1962 20. The administration of the Union Territories is governed by Part VIII of the Constitution. Union territory shall be administered by the President, and he can through an Administrator appointed by him. But Parliament may, by law, provide otherwise. The President, as a matter of fact has, in exercise of the power, appointed an Administrator for the Union Territory of Pondicherry. Under Art. 239A (1), and this we have already touched upon, Parliament enacted the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963, by which it provided for Legislative Assembly and Council of Ministers for the Union Territory of Pondicherry. Sec. 18 defines the extent of the legislative power, subject to the provisions of the Act, the Legislative Assembly may make laws for the whole or any part of the Union Territory with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the seventh schedule to the Constitution. But, this subject to the overriding powers of Parliament under sub-s. (2) of S. 18 to make laws with respect to any matter for a Union Territory or any part thereof, which is in consonance with Art. 246(4) of the Constitution by which Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State, notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List. The Union Territory of Pondicherry is not a State, and the legislature of Pondicherry is not a Legislative Assembly as contemplated by Arts. 54 or 163. It was so held in S. K. Singh vs. State vs. V. V. Giri by a Division Bench of this Court, to which both of us were parties, in writ petition No. 774 of 1974. The Pondicherry legislature is but a creature of Parliament acting under Art. 239-A. 21. In the light of the foregoing position, the contention of Venugopal is that ss. The Pondicherry legislature is but a creature of Parliament acting under Art. 239-A. 21. In the light of the foregoing position, the contention of Venugopal is that ss. 3 and 4 of the Validating Act are repugnant to, or derogate from S. 7 of the Pondicherry (Administration), Act, 1962 which was made by Parliament, and S. 21 of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963. He refers us to Amraoti Municipality vs. Ramachandra and says that the expression 'lawfully levied' in S. 7 of the 1962 Act means validly and actually levied. In that case, dealing with the expression" * may continue to be levied' in Art. 277, it was pointed out that it only meant that the tax was one which was lawfully levied by the local authority for the purpose of the local area, the identity of the body that collected the tax, the area for whose benefit the tax was to be utilised, and the purposes for which the utilisation was to take place continued, to be the same, and the rate of tax was not enhanced, nor its incidence in any manner altered so that it continued to be the same tax. It was pointed out that the word 'levied' meant was actually levied'. It is, therefore, argued that since the tax authorised by the Validating Act does not come under S. 7 which prohibits a new levy, S. 4 afforded no power, and that since the Pondicherry (Administration), Act was an organic law made under Art. 239-A, like the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963, the Validating Act made by the Pondicherry legislature cannot override S. 7 in 1962 Act, and S. 18(2) and 21 of 1963 Act. The Validating Act, according to the petitioners, not only violates S. 7, but is repugnant to S. 21. Sec. 3 of the Validating Act, it is said, inasmuch as it says "notwithstanding the provisions of S. 7 of the" Pondicherry (Administration), Act, "the section is not valid. 22. As held in Vajesingji Joravarsing Ji vs. Secretary of State for India in Council 51 IA 357, when a territory is acquired by a Sovereign State for the first time, that is an act of State, irrespective of how the acquisition has been brought about. 22. As held in Vajesingji Joravarsing Ji vs. Secretary of State for India in Council 51 IA 357, when a territory is acquired by a Sovereign State for the first time, that is an act of State, irrespective of how the acquisition has been brought about. It may be by conquest, it may be by cession following on treaty, it may be by occupation of territory hitherto unoccupied by a recognised ruler. In all these cases, the Privy Council pointed out, the result is the same. The Privy Council went on :-" * Any inhabitant of the territory can make good in the Municipal courts established by the new sovereign only such rights as that sovereign has, through his officers, recognised. Such rights as he had under the rule of predecessors avail him nothing, nay more, even if in a treaty of cession it is stipulated that certain inhabitants should enjoy certain rights, that does not give a title to those inhabitants to enforce these stipulations, in the Municipal Courts. The right to enforce remains only with the high contracting parties ". That applies to the erstwhile French Establishment was which by cession by Treaty, an act of State, became merged with India. It is in that background we have to view ss. 4 and 7 of the Pondicherry (Administration), Act, 1962. So, the position of Arts. 372 and 277 of the Constitution is different. Under Art. 277, the existing taxes for purposes of the State, Municipality, district or a local area, which was being lawfully levied by them, may continue to be levied "Until provision to the contrary is made by Parliament by law". But, S. 7 which continues its existing taxes would apply" * until other provision is made by a competent legislature of other competent authority ". It may be seen that there is nothing in S. 7 which comes into conflict with ss. 3 and 4 of the Validating Act. While S. 7 enables continuance of taxes lawfully levied immediately before merger, it does not prevent the Pondicherry legislature which is competent legislature, to enact S. 3 and validate under its cover, the tax which had been actually collected before or after 16th August, 1962. Violation of S. 7 of the Pondicherry (Administration), Act or its repugnance to ss. While S. 7 enables continuance of taxes lawfully levied immediately before merger, it does not prevent the Pondicherry legislature which is competent legislature, to enact S. 3 and validate under its cover, the tax which had been actually collected before or after 16th August, 1962. Violation of S. 7 of the Pondicherry (Administration), Act or its repugnance to ss. 18(2) and 21 of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 would arise only if the Validating Act contained any interdict contrary to the provisions of those sections in the parliamentary enactment. That is not the case. In our opinion, the Validating Act was within the competence of the Pondicherry legislature, and on the principle of United Province vs. Aliqa Begum 1961 AIR(FC) 16, retroactive legislation, as the amending Act, is within its power, and is valid. Like S. 292 of the Government of India Act, 1935, S. 7 of the Pondicherry (Administration), Act does not stand in the way of the Pondicherry legislature enacting retrospective legislation. This is in accord with Mt. Jadao Bahuji vs. Municipal Committee, Khandwa where it was observed following United Province vs. Aliqa Begum 1961 AIR(FC) 16, that the burden of proving that the Indian legislatures are subject to a strange and unusual prohibition against retrospective legislation lay upon those who asserted it. The third ground of the petitioner also fails. 23. It is next contended on their behalf that the Pondicherry legislature bring a subordinate legislative body, cannot validly enact retrospective legislation. We are an able to agree. In The Queen vs. Burah (supra) the Privy Council held :" * The Indian legislature has powers expressly limited by the Act of the imperial Parliament which created it, and it can, of course, do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribe these powers. But, when acting within those limits, it is not in any sense an agent or delegate of the Imperial Parliament, but has, and was intended to have, plenary powers of legislation, as large, and of the same nature, as those of Parliament itself. "This principle is clearly applicable to powers of the Pondicherry legislature. Its legislative powers are plenary within their ambit, except to the extent they are limited by either the Pondicherry (Administration) Act, or the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963. "This principle is clearly applicable to powers of the Pondicherry legislature. Its legislative powers are plenary within their ambit, except to the extent they are limited by either the Pondicherry (Administration) Act, or the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963. Within the ambit of each of the legislative subject matter, the Pondicherry legislature is supreme and its powers are plenary, which means that it is within its competence to make retroactive legislation. Within the sphere of legislative power, the power is exclusive on the related subject of legislation and it is supreme within the ambit of its competence. The Parliamentary control in this respect makes no difference to the principle that when the Pondicherry legislature acts within its limits, its powers are plenary. We cannot, therefore, accept the contention that the Validating Act, in its retrospective operation, is invalid. 24. The last contention of the petitioners is that the Pondicherry legislature has no power to amend per-constitution laws, namely, the Decree of 1880. This argument has only to be stated to be rejected. In A. H. Abdul Shukoor & Co. vs. State of Madras it was held that the State legislature was free to enact laws which would have retrospective operation. The Supreme Court observed :" * Its competence to make a law for a certain past period depends on its present legislative power and not on what it possessed at the period of time when its enactment is to have operation". That is a sufficient answer to the petitioners' contention. The Appeals are accordingly allowed, and the Writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.