A. BANERJI, J. This is an appeal by the defendants tenants. The suit for eiectment filed by the plaintiff Rabu Ram was dismised by the trial court but has been decreed by the lower appellate court. The courts below differed on the cmestion as to what had been let out. While the trial court had held that what was let out was accommoda tion within the meaning of Section 2 (a) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the lower appellate court held that what was let out was not an ac commodation within the meaning of Section 2 (a) of the Act. The very same question has been raised in this appeal. It is not necessary in this apneal to refer to any Question of fact or the uleadings. They are sufficiently stated in the judgment of the court below. The principal question that arises for the consideration of this Court is as to what was let out, whether it was an accommodation within the meaning of Section 2 (a) of the Act or a plot of land or something else. Both parties relied on the lease deed Ex. 7. It is dated August 30, 1952. The material portion of the lease deed which des cribes what was let out is contained in the following words: - "vidit ho ke ek kita plot numbery 108 block scheme number 1 waikai Juhi Darshan Purwa shahr Kanpur Jiski cahardiwari khinchi hui hai aur usme pipe wa phatak laga hua hai wa beech me juj khaprail para hua hai. " In para 1 of the lease deed it is stated that the above plot includ ing the Cahardiwari (boundary wall), the Khaprail and the gate were being let out for a period of three years at Rs. 100/- per month. The describing the boundaries of the plot was described in the same manner as has been stated above. " In para 1 of the lease deed it is stated that the above plot includ ing the Cahardiwari (boundary wall), the Khaprail and the gate were being let out for a period of three years at Rs. 100/- per month. The describing the boundaries of the plot was described in the same manner as has been stated above. From the description of the plot as given in the opening part and in the concluding part of the lease deed it was urged what was let out was not an open piece of land but an enclosed piece of land which contained water pipe and gate but also a roofed structure, and since there was a roofed structure it would mean that what was let out was an accommodation and not merely an open plot of land. The word accommodation has been defined in Section 2 (a) of the Act in the following words: - "definitions- In this Act: - (a) accommodation means residential and non-residential ac commodation in any building or part of a building and includes, (i) gardens, grounds and out houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building; (ii) any furniture suonlied by the landlord for use in such build ings or part of a building; (in) any fitting affixed to such building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. But does not include any accommodation used as a factory or for an industrial purpose where the business carried on in or upon the building is also leased out to the licensee by the same transaction. " It would be evident that the word accommodation has been given a wide meaning. It covers both residential and non-residential ac commodation in any building or part of a building and also includes gardens, grounds, out houses appurtenant to such building or part of a building and also includes any furniture or fittings. The only thing to be seen is whether what has been let out in this case comes under the definition of the word accommodation in this Act. Admittedly, the plot in dispute Avas let out for industrial and commercial activity. It would, therefore, mean that it was being used for non-residential purposes. A building used for such a purpose would also be an ac commodation. Admittedly, the plot in dispute Avas let out for industrial and commercial activity. It would, therefore, mean that it was being used for non-residential purposes. A building used for such a purpose would also be an ac commodation. It is evident from the lease deed that the land which was enclosed by the boundary walls measured more than 10000 square feet and what was covered under the Khaprail, i. e. , under the tiled roof, was approximately 600 square feet. There is no dispute that if the Khaprail did not exist on the land it would be an open plot of land and would not be covered under the definition of the word accommo dation notwithstanding the fact that it was enclosed by a boundary wall. The question for determination arises only because there is a roofed structure on this plot of land. In Section 1 (2-a) the third clause in the third proviso provides that nothing in the Act shall apply to any tenancy or other relationship in respect of any plot of land not covered by roofed structure. It is, therefore, evident that if there is a tenancy in respect of a plot of land which did not have a roofed structure it would not come within the purview of the Act. The sole question, therefore, in this case is whether the exis tence of the roofed structure in the plot of land would bring the plot of land within the purview of the Act. It is apparent from a com plete reading of the lease deed that what was intended to be let out was a plot of land to the defendants with a right to make construc tions thereon. The principal item let out was the open piece of land and not the roofed structure. The roofed structure happened to exist in that open plot of land just as there existed a boundary wall and a gate. In paragraphs 7 and 8 of the lease deed reference has been made specifically to the plot and not to the roofed structure. Further the document of lease read as a whole gives an impression that what was let out was the plot of land and not any building with land ap purtenant to it, for if that were so the lease deed would have des cribed it in a different fashion. Further the document of lease read as a whole gives an impression that what was let out was the plot of land and not any building with land ap purtenant to it, for if that were so the lease deed would have des cribed it in a different fashion. It would have then described that a roofed structure and land appurtenant to it enclosed by a boundary wall, and gate and a water pipe was let out. But that is not how the lease deed describes what has been let out. If it was intended to let out the building the lease deed would have stated it to be so. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation of documents that the words should be given their natural meaning. It is also a rule of interpretation that something must not be read into the words which are not there. To interpret this lease deed as a lease deed for the building would be to read words which are not there. In my opinion the description of what has been let out in the lease deed makes it clear that it was an open piece of land enclosed by a boundary wall and containing a gate and a water pipe and a small roofed structure. It did not spell out that what was let out was a building with land appurtenant to it. If that were so the lease deed would have indicated that the open piece of land was appurtenant to the roofed structure. In the case of Raj Ndrain v. Shiv Raj Saran 1969 A. L. J. 358 a learned Single Judge had occasion to consider a similar case where an open land was leased out and there was a small Kothri appurtenant to land. It was held that it was not the letting of an accommodation and consequently the pro visions of the Act were inapplicable. In that case the Kothri was building on a land 13 feet x 10 feet out of a total area of 10000 srmare feet. It was held in that case that the letting out was in respect of an open land which contained the Kothri but was not in respect of any accommodation. Learned counsel for the appellant had urged that the decision in the aforesaid case was distinguishable on facts. In my opinion the facts in the cases are somewhat similar. It was held in that case that the letting out was in respect of an open land which contained the Kothri but was not in respect of any accommodation. Learned counsel for the appellant had urged that the decision in the aforesaid case was distinguishable on facts. In my opinion the facts in the cases are somewhat similar. However, as indicated above the decision in this case would depend on the inter pretation given to the lease deed. A contention had been raised by the learned counsel for the ap pellant that in view of paragraph 9 of the lease deed which enjoined the second party to take care and maintain the boundary wall, the gate, the water pipe and the Khaprail indicated that it was a lease for the building. Clause 9 of the lease pertained to Section 108 (m) of the Transfer of Property Act. It would be noticed at once that clause (9) referred not only to the Khaprail but also to the boundary wall, gate and the water pipe. Admittedly, neither the boundary wall nor the gate nor the water pipe came within the meaning of the word accommodation. What was the necessity to incorporate clause (9) in the lease deed. The only answer is that as a prudent owner of a property he would expect the tenant to take good care of the pro perty and see that it was properly maintained in good repair. I can not infer that this clause only referred to the khaprail and not to the boundary wall, the gate and the water pipe. It does not appeal to reason that only because of the existence of this clause the lease be held to be a lease for an ar-pommodation. The deed as a whole has to be looked into and one cannot pick and choose one clause only to arrive at certain conclusion. Read as a whole, I have no doubt in my mind that the lease in the present case was intended for the land which contained several items but the presence of those items did not bring the case within the meaning of the word accom modation as used in the Act. In my opinion the lease was in respect of the plot of land and not for any accommodation. I am, therefore, unable to accept any of the contentions of the learned counsel for the applicant. In my opinion the lease was in respect of the plot of land and not for any accommodation. I am, therefore, unable to accept any of the contentions of the learned counsel for the applicant. In my opinion, the view taken by the court below is correct and must be affirmed. 8. In the result, therefore, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. .