JUDGMENT DHARMADHIKARI J.- This writ petition filed has been by the petitioner who claims to be a workman, against the order passed by the first labour Court at Nagpur dated 6th May 1968 in I.D.A. No. 673 of 1967 and 674 of 1967. The petitioner, who was appointed as a medical representative of the respondent No. 1 Chemosyn Private Limited. He had filed an application under section 33. C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, referred to hereinafter as the Act, claiming recovery of unpaid bonus for the years of his employment. The petitioner also filed another application, being I. D~ A. No. 674 of 1967, which was consolidated with I. D. A. No. 673 of 1967, wherein he claimed computation .of various benefits to which he was entitled in respect of period of his employment. In the said application he claimed computation of commission of sales, his leave with wages etc. 2. The respondent No.1 company contended before the Labour Court that the Labour Court at Nagpur had no jurisdiction to entertain these applications. According to the respondents, no cause of action for filing of these applications took place at Nagpur, arid therefore, the Labour Court at Nagpur had no jurisdiction to entertain the claims. 3. On this a preliminary issue was framed by the Labour Court to decide the question of jurisdiction. It seems that another application filed by the petitioner challenging his dismissals from service and claiming reinstatement was registered as B. I. R. No. 627 of 1967, which is the subject-matter of Special Civil Application No. 67 of 1969. In the present case we are not concerned with the said dispute. After referring to the various facts the Judge of the First Labour Court, Nagpur came to the conclusion that it cannot be said that there is any industry of the respondents within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. A reference was also made to the various decisions of the High Courts and Supreme Court in this behalf and ultimately the learned Judge came to the conclusion that respondent employer has no industry within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, and therefore, no industrial dispute can possibly arise within this territory. Ultimately a finding was recorded by the learned Judge that neither the cause of action nor any industrial dispute has substantially arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the First Labour Court. Ultimately a finding was recorded by the learned Judge that neither the cause of action nor any industrial dispute has substantially arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the First Labour Court. The Labour Court further held that the industrial dispute cannot .be deemed to have been arisen at Nagpur, though the applicant was working at Nagpur, and therefore the Labour Court at Nagpur will have no jurisdiction over the subject-matte; because no industrial dispute is deemed to have been arisen in Vidarbha region where the applicant was working. According to the learned Judge, the industrial dispute is deemed to have arisen only in Bombay because the other party to the dispute, namely, the employer, exists there. Ultimately the Labour Court held that the said Court which is established by the Maharashtra State in relation to the Vidarbha region only has no territorial jurisdiction over the present claims, because no cause of action is deemed to have arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court. Consequent to this finding, the applications, filed by the petitioner were dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction. It is this order which is challenged in this writ petition. 4. Shri Pendsey, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended before us that the learned Judge of the First Labour Court committed an error in construing the provisions of section 33-C (2) of .the Act and relying upon the various decisions of the High Courts and the Supreme Court which were not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. According to Shri Pendsey, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, so far as the claim of money or benefit is concerned, does not lay down any guidelines about the territorial jurisdiction. It is not disputed on behalf of the respondents that the wages were being paid to the petitioner at Nagpur. Therefore, obviously the petitioner was entitled to receive money or the benefits claimed in the application from his employer at Nagpur. No doubt it was contended on behalf of the res. pondents that though actual payment of money was made at Nagpur, the cheques were issued from Bombay. However, it is the contention of the petitioner that he was entitled to receive from his employer the money and benefits at Nagpur. No doubt it was contended on behalf of the res. pondents that though actual payment of money was made at Nagpur, the cheques were issued from Bombay. However, it is the contention of the petitioner that he was entitled to receive from his employer the money and benefits at Nagpur. In this view of the matter, according to the learned Counsel, the Labour Court at Nagpur where the petitioner was entitled to receive the money has not jurisdiction to entertain his applications under section 33-C (2) of the Act. In our opinion there is much substance in this contention. 5. On the other hand, it is contended by Shri Dhabe, the learned counsel for the respondents, that in view of the phraseology used in section 33-C of the Act, the dispute involved in the applications for recovery of money will also have to be decided in the context of the Industrial dispute. According to him, the respondents in this case are not carrying on any business within the territorial limits of Vidarbha region nor have they any branch or establishment within the territorial limits of the Labour Court at Nagpur. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, as the industry of the respondents is situated at Bombay and as it cannot be said that any dispute covered by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the First Labour Court at Nagpur, therefore the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application under section 33-C (2) of the Act. In support of this proposition Shri Dhabe has relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Shri Ranga Vilas Motors (P) ·Ltd. v. Sri Ranga vilas Motors (P) Ltd.1. He also relied upon decisions in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen2, Workmen of Nomination Land of India Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal. Bangalore-20 and J. and J. Dechane Distributors, Hyderabad v. State of Kerala4. 6. He also relied upon decisions in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen2, Workmen of Nomination Land of India Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal. Bangalore-20 and J. and J. Dechane Distributors, Hyderabad v. State of Kerala4. 6. For properly understanding the controversy involved in this case it will be useful to refer to the provisions of section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which read as under: "33·C (1) Where an) money is due to a workmen from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA, the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue: Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer: Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government. (3) For the purposes of computing the money value of a benefit the Labour Court may, if it so thinks fit, 'appoint a Commissioner who shall, after taking’ such evidence as may be necessary, submit a re port to the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the Commissioner and other circumstances of the case. (4) The decision of the Labour Court shall be forwarded by it to the appropriate Government and any amount found due by the Labour Court may be recovered in the manner provided for in subsection (1), (5) Where workmen employed under the same employer are entitled to receive from him any money or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money, then, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, a single application for the recovery of the amount due may be made on behalf of or in respect of an} number of such workmen. Explanation-In this section "Labour Court" includes any Court constituted under any law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State." The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the true scope of section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act in Chief Mining Engineer. M Is. East India Coal Co. Ltd. Bararee Colliery Dhanbad v. Rameshwar5. After making a reference to its earlier decisions, in para 4 of the said decision the Supreme Court observed :- "The following propositions on the question as to the scope of section 33C (2) are deducible from these three decisions:- (1) The legislative history indicates that the legislature after providing broadly for the investigation and settlement of disputes on the basis of collective bargaining, recognised the need of individual workmen of a speedy remedy to enforce their existing individual rights and therefore inserted section 33A in 1950 and section 33C in 1956. These two sections illustrate cases in which individual workmen can enforce their rights without having to take recourse to section 10 (1) and without having to depend on their union to espouse their case. (2) In view of this history two considerations are relevant while construing the scope of section 33C. Where industrial disputes arise between workmen acting collectively and their employers such disputes must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act as for instance under section 10 (1). (2) In view of this history two considerations are relevant while construing the scope of section 33C. Where industrial disputes arise between workmen acting collectively and their employers such disputes must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act as for instance under section 10 (1). But having regard to the legislative policy to provide a speedy remedy to individual workmen for enforcing their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude their existing rights sought to be implemented by individual workman. Therefore though in determining the scope of section 33C care should be taken not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview, cases which fall, for instance under section 10 (1), cannot be brought under section 33C. (3) Section 33C which is in terms similar to those in section 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act 1950 is a provision in the nature of an executing provision; (4) Section 33C (1) applies to cases where money is due to a workman under an award or settlement or under Chapter V A of the Act already calculated and ascertained and therefore there is no dispute about its computation. But sub-section (2) applies both to non-monetary as well as monetary benefits. In the' case of monetary benefit it applies where such benefit though due is not calculated and there is a dispute about its calculation. (5) Section 33C (2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claim that the benefit to which they arc entitled should be computed in terms of money even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers. It is open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workmen's right rests. (6) The fact that the words of limitation used in section 26 (2) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act 1950 arc omitted in section 33C (2) shows that the scope of section 33-C (2) is wider than that of section 33C (1). Therefore, whereas sub-section (1) is confined to claims arising under an award or settlement or Chapter VA, claims which can be entertained under sub-section (2) are not so confined to those under an award, settlement or Chapter VA. Therefore, whereas sub-section (1) is confined to claims arising under an award or settlement or Chapter VA, claims which can be entertained under sub-section (2) are not so confined to those under an award, settlement or Chapter VA. (7) Though the Court did not indicate which case other than those under sub-section (1) would fall under sub-section (2) it pointed out illustrative cases which would not fall under sub-section (2), viz. cases which would appropriately be adjudicated under section 10 (1) or claims which have already been the subject-matter of settlement to which sections 18 and 19 would apply. (8) Since proceedings under section 33C (2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in term, of money the benefit claimed by a workman is in such casts in the position of an executing Court, the labour Court like the executing Court in executions proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, is competent under section 33-C (2) to interpret the award or settlement where the benefit is claimed under such award or settlement and it would be open to it to consider the plea of nullity where the award is made without jurisdiction." From this decision of Supreme Court- as well as from the Legislative history, therefore, it is quite clear that the proceedings under section 33C (2) are analogous to execution proceedings. This aspect of the matter was further considered by the Supreme Court in National Buildings Construction Corporation Ltd. v. Pritam Singh Gill6. In para 7 of the said judgment the Supreme Court observed.” "Now, it is noteworthy that section 2 of the Act, which is the definition section begins, as is usual with most of the definition sections with the clause, "unless, there is anything repugnant in the subject or context." This clearly indicates that it is always a matter for argument whether or not this statutory definition is to apply to the word "workman" as used in the particular clause of the Act which is under consideration, for this word may both be restricted or expanded by its subject-matter. The context and the subject-matter in connection with which the word "workman" is used are accordingly important factors having a bearing on the question. The propriety or necessity of thus construing the word' "workman" is obvious because all parts of the Act have to be in harmony with the statutory intent. The context and the subject-matter in connection with which the word "workman" is used are accordingly important factors having a bearing on the question. The propriety or necessity of thus construing the word' "workman" is obvious because all parts of the Act have to be in harmony with the statutory intent. Keeping this in mind we may turn to the purpose and object of section 33 C of the Act. This section was enacted for the purpose of enabling individual workman to implement, enforce or execute their existing individual rights against their employers without being compelled to have recourse to section 10 by raising disputes and securing a reference which is obviously a lengthy process. Section 33-C of the Act has accordingly been described as a provision which clothes the Labour Court with the powers similar to those of on executing Court so that the workman concerned receives speedy relief in respect of his existing individual rights. The primary purpose of the section being to provide the aggrieved workman with a forum similar to the executing Courts it calls for a broad and beneficial construction consistently with other provisions of the Act, which should serve to advance the remedy and to suppress the mischief. It may appropriately be pointed out that the mischief which section 33-C was designed to suppress was the difficulties faced by individual workmen in getting relief in respect of their existing rights without having resort to section 10 of the Act. To accept the argument of the appellant, it would always be open to an unfair unsympathetic and unscrupulous employer to terminate the services of his employee order to deprive him of the benefit conferred by section 33-C and compel him to have resort to the lengthy procedure by way of reference under section 10 of the Act thereby defeating the very purpose and object of enacting this provision. This in our view, quite clearly brings out the repugnancy visualised in the opening part of section 2- of the Act and such a position could hardly have' been contemplated by the legislature. In order to remove this repugnancy section 33-C (2) must be so construed, as to take within its fold a workman, who was employed, during the period in respect of which he claims relief, even though he is no longer employed at the time of the application. In order to remove this repugnancy section 33-C (2) must be so construed, as to take within its fold a workman, who was employed, during the period in respect of which he claims relief, even though he is no longer employed at the time of the application. In other words the term "Workman" as used in section 33-C (2) includes all persons whose claim, requiring computation under this sub-section, is in respect of an existing right arising from his relationship as an industrial workman with his employer. By adopting this construction alone can we advance the remedy and suppress the mischief in accordance with the purpose and object of inserting section 33-C in the Act. We are, therefore, inclined to agree with the view taken by the Madras decisions and we approve of their approach. According to Shri Malhotra, in cases where there is no dispute about the employee's right which is not denied, he will be entitled to file a suit. Whether or not the right of suit can be claimed by the employee, we are not persuaded on the basis of this argument to accept the construction canvassed on behalf of the appellant and deny to a dismissed employee the benefit of speedy remedy under section 33-C (2) of the Act: Therefore, in our opinion, the primary purpose of section 33-C being to provide the aggrieved workman with a forum similar to executing Courts, the said provision calls for a broad and beneficial construction, which should serve to advance the remedy and to suppress the mischief. 7. The section 33-C was inserted in the Industrial Disputes Act for making a provision for recovery of money due from an employer to a workman. This provision has nothing to do with the industrial disputes as such. Nature of the right conferred upon a workman is only to recover the money due from an employer on the basis of his existing individual right in that behalf. Sub-section (1) of section 33-C makes a provision for computation of the benefits which is consequential in nature of the right conferred upon a workman to recover money due from an employer. This provision, therefore, deals with the recovery' of the money due from an employer to a workman which are virtually execution proceedings. In substance, it has nothing to do with the industrial disputes as such. This provision, therefore, deals with the recovery' of the money due from an employer to a workman which are virtually execution proceedings. In substance, it has nothing to do with the industrial disputes as such. Therefore, in our opinion, the decisions to which reference has been made by the learned counsel for the respondents, based on interpretation of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are of no assistance while construing the provisions of section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. As observed by this Court in Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills Ltd. v. Dhanubhai Motilal Vin7 the Industrial Disputes Act does not deal with the causes of action, nor does it indicate what factors will confer jurisdiction upon the Labour Court. In this context this Court further observed: "But applying the well known tests of jurisdiction, a Court or Tribunal would have jurisdiction if the parties reside within jurisdiction or if the subject-matter of the dispute substantially arises within jurisdiction. And therefore the correct approach to this question is to ask ourselves where did this dispute substantially arise and in our opinion the only answer to that question can be that the dispute substantially arose in Bombay and not in Ahmedabad. What is the dispute? The dispute is not as to whether the employee approached the employer in, Ahmedabad and no agreement was arrived at. The dispute is whether the employer was justified in dismissing the employee, and inasmuch as the employment was in Bombay and the dismissal was in Bombay, it is difficult to understand how it can possibly be urged that the dispute did not substantially arise in Bombay." The principle laid down by this Court was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen and Workmen of Shri Ranga Vilas Motors (P) Ltd. v. Sri Ranga Vilas Motors (P) Ltd. (cit. supra). In this context in the latter case the Supreme Court observed: “As the High Court observed, there should clearly be some nexus between the dispute and the territory of the State and not necessarily between the territory of the State and the industry concerning which the dispute arose. This Court in Indian Cable Co. supra). In this context in the latter case the Supreme Court observed: “As the High Court observed, there should clearly be some nexus between the dispute and the territory of the State and not necessarily between the territory of the State and the industry concerning which the dispute arose. This Court in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, held as follows: 'The Act contained no provisions bearing on this question, which must, consequently, be decided on the principles governing the jurisdiction of Courts to entertain actions or proceedings. Dealing with a similar question under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, Chagla C. J. observed in Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills Ltd. v. Vin. But what we are concerned with to decide is: where did the dispute substantially arise? Now, the Act does not deal with the cause of action, nor does it indicate what factors will confer jurisdiction upon the Labour Court. But applying the well-known tests of jurisdiction a Court or Tribunal would have jurisdiction if the parties reside within jurisdiction or if the subject-matter of the dispute substantially arises within jurisdiction. In our opinion, those principles are applicable for deciding which of the States has jurisdiction to make a reference under section 10 of the Act. Applying the above principles to the-facts of this case it is quite clear that the subject-matter of the dispute in this case substantially arose within the jurisdiction of the Mysore Government. " 8. If the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Workmen of Shri Ranga Vilas Motors (P) Ltd. v. Sri Rangavilas Motors (P) Ltd. (cit. supra) are applied to the provisions of section 33-C (2) of the Act, then, in our opinion, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case it could safely be said that the subject-matter of the dispute involved in the applications for recovery of money substantially arose within the jurisdiction of the First Labour Court at Nagpur. It is not disputed before us and it is quite clear from the record that the wages were being paid to the petitioner at Nagpur, though the cheques were drawn at Bombay. Therefore, it cannot be disputed that the money was payable to the petitioner at Nagpur. It is not disputed before us and it is quite clear from the record that the wages were being paid to the petitioner at Nagpur, though the cheques were drawn at Bombay. Therefore, it cannot be disputed that the money was payable to the petitioner at Nagpur. The question or dispute involved in the present applications under section 33-C (2) of the Act relates to the recovery of money due from the employer, namely, the respondents. Section 33-C (2) of the Act makes a provision for recovery of money by any workman which he is entitled to receive from his employer. The entitlement contemplated by section 33-C (2) relates to the receiving of money or benefit from the employer. This is the only controversy or dispute involved in the proceedings under section 33-C (2) of the Act. Therefore, if the general principles incorporated in the Code of Civil Procedure and particularly in section 20 of the said Code are applied to the proceedings under section 33-C (2) of the Act, then, in our opinion, it could safely be held that the subject-matter of a dispute will substantially arise within the jurisdiction of a Court where the money is payable, or where a workman is entitled to get the benefits which are capable of being computed in terms of money. Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the institution of suits in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction either the defendant resides or the cause of action arises. In the present case the cause of action for institution of an application under section 33-C (2) of the Act is the recovery of money due from an employer by the workman. If the money or the benefits which are to be computed and to which the workman was entitled are payable at Nagpur, then, in our opinion, the subject-matter of the dispute involved in this case substantially arose within the jurisdiction of the First Labour Court at Nagpur. The controversy which is germane, for deciding the matter, under section 10 of the Act is not at all relevant for deciding the question as, to whether a Labour Court; will have Jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 33-C (2) of the Act for recovery of money due from an employer. The controversy which is germane, for deciding the matter, under section 10 of the Act is not at all relevant for deciding the question as, to whether a Labour Court; will have Jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 33-C (2) of the Act for recovery of money due from an employer. Therefore, in our opinion, the First Labour Court at Nagpur obviously committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the dispute in this case did not substantially arise within the jurisdiction of the First Labour Court at Nagpur. 9. It is no doubt true that a contention was also raised at the time of hearing by the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner is not a workman within the meaning of section 33-C (2) of the Act, or that he had entered into a contract with the respondents employer wherein he has agreed that cause of action relating to any dispute or legal proceeding arising out of the letter of his appointment shall lie in any Court of law situated in the City of Bombay. According to the learned counsel for the respondents this was one of the terms of the contract of employment. This fact is disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner before us. He further contended that such a constructing out is not permissible it being against the public policy. In view of this dispute between the parties in this behalf and as the matter has been disposed of by the First Labour Court at Nagpur on preliminary question relating to jurisdiction only, it is not possible for us to deal with this aspect of the matter in this writ petition. It is open for the parties to place this aspect of the matter before the First Labour Court. 10. In the result, therefore, the writ petition is allowed. The order passed by the First Labour Court dated 6th May 1968 in I. D. A. Nos. 673 and 674 of 1967 is, therefore, quashed and set aside and the matter is sent back to the First Labour Court at Nagpur for deciding the applications filed by the petitioner under section 33-C (2) of the Act in accordance with law, with advertance with the observations made hereinbefore. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.