JUDGMENT : P.N. Bakshi, J. This is a Defendant's Second appeal arising out of a suit filed by the Plaintiffs for ejectment, arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. 2. The Plaintiffs claim to be the owners of the shop situate in Karkhana Bazar, Almora. It is alleged that the Defendant was the tenant of the shop on a monthly rent of Rs. 30.00. He was in arrears of rent for four years and three months till November, 1970. The claim for rent in the suit was confined from April 1968 till November 1970 i.e. for 32 months. The Plaintiff sent a composite notice of demand for ejectment and arrears of rent on 5th December 1970 which was replied to by the Defendant on 6-1-1971. The Defendant having failed to vacate the premises and to pay the arrears of rent, the present suit was filed by the Plaintiffs. 3. In his written statement the Defendant admitted that he was tenant of the premises in question of Rs. 16.00 per month. He denied that the rate of rent was Rs. 30.00 as claimed by the Plaintiffs. He further alleged that he had asked the Plaintiffs to accept rent but the latter stated that the rent should be allowed to accumulate for two or three years and it should be paid in lumpsum. The Defendant further pleaded that he had paid the rent upto October, 1968. It was alleged that on receipt of the notice of demand the Defendant remitted 26 months rent amounting to Rs. 416 on 6-1-l971 to the Plaintiffs counsel which was refused by him. He then remitted the amount of Rs. 416 by money order on 8-1-1971 to the Plaintiffs which was also refused. The Defendant pleaded that he was not liable to ejectment. 4. The Munsif decreed the suit of the Plaintiffs for ejectment. On the question of payment of rent the trial court found that the Defendant had not paid arrears of rent upto October 1968. It further found that the rate of rent payable was Rs. 16-00 per month. Aggrieved thereby an appeal was filed by the Defendant which was dismissed by the Civil and Sessions Judge Kumaun on 28th April, 1972. The appellate court held that the Defendant had defaulted in the payment of rent rendering him liable to eviction. It further found that the rate of rent payable was Rs. 16-00 per month. Aggrieved thereby an appeal was filed by the Defendant which was dismissed by the Civil and Sessions Judge Kumaun on 28th April, 1972. The appellate court held that the Defendant had defaulted in the payment of rent rendering him liable to eviction. It further found that the money order sent by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs counsel on 6-1-1971 pertaining to the arrears of rent for 26 months could not be a valid tender and that the Defendant had failed to prove that he sent a money order on 8-1-1971 to the Plaintiffs within one month of the notice of demand. The Defendant has now come up in second appeal to this Court. 5. I have heard counsels for the parties and have also perused the record of the case. An application u/s 151 CPC has been filed on behalf of the Defendant Appellant. In paragraph 10 of the affidavit filed in support of his application it is alleged that the Defendant has deposited the entire decrial amount of Rs. 560-00 as ordered by the learned Munsif in original suit No. 29 of 1971 and three months further rent upto 12th July 1971 in the court of the Munsif Almora. It is further averred in paragraph 11 of the affidavit that the Defendant has remitted a sum of Rs. 300.00 to the Plaintiff from Allahabad which includes the rent of the shop in dispute along with 9% interest thereon as also the cost of the First Appeal No. 19 of 1971 on 8th August, 1972 by a money order for which he has obtained postal receipt No. 2865. On the basis of these averments it has been prayed that the benefit of Section 20(4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting and Eviction) Act, 1972 should be extended to the Defendant and he should not be ejected from the premises in question. 6. The U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 came into force on 15th July, 1972. Chapter IV of the aforesaid Act regulates eviction of tenants. Section 20 of the said Act bars the eviction of a tenant except on specified grounds. 6. The U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 came into force on 15th July, 1972. Chapter IV of the aforesaid Act regulates eviction of tenants. Section 20 of the said Act bars the eviction of a tenant except on specified grounds. Sub-section (1) of Section 20 runs as follows: (1) Save as provided in Sub-section (2) no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of notice to quit or in any other manner. Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall bar a suit for the eviction of a tenant on the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time where the tenancy for a fixed term was entered into by or in pursuance of a compromise or adjustment arrived at with reference to a suit, appeal; revision or execution proceeding, which is either recorded in court or otherwise reduced to writing and signed by the tenant. Sub-section (2) of Section 20 lays down seven different grounds on which a suit for eviction of a tenant from a building may be instituted after the determination of his tenancy. One of those grounds, with which we are concerned in the present appeal, is mentioned in Sub-section (2)(a) which permits the institution of a suit for ejectment when a tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord from the notice of demand. One of those grounds, with which we are concerned in the present appeal, is mentioned in Sub-section (2)(a) which permits the institution of a suit for ejectment when a tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord from the notice of demand. Sub-section (4) of Section 20 which has been relied upon by the Appellant's counsel in the application referred to above runs as follows: In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub-section (2), if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlord's costs of the suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under Sub-section (1) of Section 30, the court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground. A perusal of the various clauses of Section 20 of the above Act indicates that it refers to the institution of a suit for ejectment after the commencement of this Act i.e. after the 15th of July 1972. In such a suit the eviction of a tenant will not be permitted provided on the first hearing of the suit the tenant, unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord the amount of rent and damages together with interest ' at 9 percent and the costs of the suit, as indicated above. There is nothing in this section which would make it applicable retrospectively to suits, appeals and second appeals pending on the date when this Act came into force. 7. The U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 was not applicable to any building or part of the building which was under errection or was constructed on or after 1-1-1951. It controlled the letting and eviction of the permises which pertained to years prior to 1951. This Act was repealed by the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 (Act No. 13 of 1972). It controlled the letting and eviction of the permises which pertained to years prior to 1951. This Act was repealed by the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 (Act No. 13 of 1972). Under the Amending Act constructions which were made after 1951 were progressively brought within the purview of the said Act. Section 39 of Act 13 of 1972 lays down that in any suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply and which was pending on the date of the commencement of this Act which has been brought under regulation for the first time under. U.P. Act 13 of 1972 the tenant was to be afforded protection from ejectment provided he deposited the entire amount of rent and damages and interest at 9% plus costs of the suit within one month from the date of the commencement of this Act. Thus in two categories of the cases namely, suits for ejectment of tenant filed under Act No. 13 of 1972 and suits pending on the date of the commencement of this Act to which old Act did not apply the protection from ejectment has been fully provided to the tenant, subject to the conditions specified above. 8. There is yet a third class of cases which have been filed under the old Act i.e. U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, with respect to this class of cases the relevant provision in Act 13 of 1972. Sub-section (1) of Section 43 repeals the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. Sub-section (2) of Section 43 of this Act lays down certain categories of proceedings which will not be effected by the repealing Act. In other words Sub-section (2) provides the saving clause with regard to different proceedings and suits mentioned from Clause (a) to Clause (t). For our purposes the relevant clause is Sub-clause (2)(s). Sub-section (2) of Section 43 of this Act lays down certain categories of proceedings which will not be effected by the repealing Act. In other words Sub-section (2) provides the saving clause with regard to different proceedings and suits mentioned from Clause (a) to Clause (t). For our purposes the relevant clause is Sub-clause (2)(s). This clause runs as follows: Notwithstanding any such appeal any suit for the eviction of tenant instituted on any ground mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the old Act, or any proceeding out of such suit (including any proceeding for the execution of a decree passed on the basis of any agreement, compromise or satisfaction) pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, may be continued and concluded as if this Act has not been passed There is no dispute that the present suit out of which this second appeal arises has been filed under the old Act. Counsel for the Appellant has submitted that this saving clause would not apply in the facts and the circumstances of the present cases. His argument is that Act 13 of 1972 had come into force on 15th July, 1972. At that time the Defendants appeal was pending before the Civil Judge Kumaun. This appeal was decided on 28th July 1972 The present Second Appeal was filed in the High Court on 9th August 1972. From a narration of the above dates learned Counsel argues that Sub-section (2)(s) only permitted the continuance of a suit, according to the o d procedure, which was pending before the commencement of the Act upto the stage that it was concluded. In other words, he submits that the appeal which was pending before the lower appellate court was continued and concluded on 28th July, 1972. Thereafter Sub-section (2)(s) could not be applied to second appeal which was filed in the High Court on 9th August 1972. I have carefully considered this submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant but I am afraid it is not possible for me to agree with it. It has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in. Garikapatti Veeraya Vs. I have carefully considered this submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant but I am afraid it is not possible for me to agree with it. It has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in. Garikapatti Veeraya Vs. N. Subbiah Choudhury, AIR 1957 SC 540 : The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the carrer of the suit." Their Lordships have observed further in the aforesaid decision that The legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that thee is no warrant in law for a distinction being drawn between a first appeal and a second appeal. The appeal is a continuation of a suit. It makes a little difference whether it is a first appeal or a second Appeal. In my opinion, therefore the saving Clause (2)(s) of the Act would be applicable, as much to the first Appeal, which was pending before the Civil Judge, as it would be applicable to the second appeal which has come up for decision before me today. In that view of the matter the Appellant cannot be afforded protection from eviction on grounds specified u/s 20(4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. 9. I, therefore, do not find any force in this submission of the Appellants counsel. For the reasons given above. I am unable to extend the benefit of Section 20(4) of the said Act to the Defendant-Appellant. 10. It is urged on behalf of the Appellant that the lower appellate Court has erred in law in holding that the money order dated 6-1-1971 which was remitted to the Plaintiffs counsel and refused by him did not amount to a valid tender. It is not disputed that such a money order was sent. A perusal of the notice of demand dated 5-12-1970 sent by Sri Goverdhan Upreti, Advocate on behalf of the Plaintiffs to Sri Manorath Pandey Defendant-Appellant clearly shows that the tenancy of the Defendant was terminated by this notice and he was asked to pay Rs. It is not disputed that such a money order was sent. A perusal of the notice of demand dated 5-12-1970 sent by Sri Goverdhan Upreti, Advocate on behalf of the Plaintiffs to Sri Manorath Pandey Defendant-Appellant clearly shows that the tenancy of the Defendant was terminated by this notice and he was asked to pay Rs. 1530/- arrears of rent within one month of the receipt of the notice. There was nothing in this notice to indicate to whom the arrears of rent should be sent. The courts below were of the view that the arrears of rent should have been sent to the Plaintiffs-landlords and not to their counsel. Since the arrears were not tendered to the landlords it was not a valid tender. In my opinion, this is an erroneous view of the law. Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of Justice K.B. Asthana (as he then was) reported in Noor Mohd. v. Nanwa 1972 AWR 504. It may be pointed out that in that suit for ejectment the notice of demand included a specific direction that the amount of arrears should be tendeied to the landlord. Inspite of this direction the learned Judge was of the opinion that the tender of the arrears of rent by the tenant to the lawyer who sent the notice of demand on behalf of the landlord within one month of the receipt of the notice, was a valid tender, in compliance with the demand notice. It was held that the Defendant-tenant could not be held liable to ejectment on the ground that he had failed to pay the arrears demanded and had defaulted within the meaning of Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Evict ion Act, 1947. I have carefully perused the aforesaid decision and I do not find any reason to hold a different view. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the tender in question in the present case of arrears of rent by money order to Sri Goverdhan Upreti, Advocate was a valid tender arid on this ground the Defendant should not have been ejected. 11. The crucial question, however, which still remains to be deierroined is: whether the entire arrears of rent have been tendered by the tenant to the landlords? 11. The crucial question, however, which still remains to be deierroined is: whether the entire arrears of rent have been tendered by the tenant to the landlords? On this question the courts below were of the opinion that the Defendant has failed to prove that he had paid the rent upto October 1968 to the landlords. This is a pure finding of fact. The Plaintiffs in their suit had claimed arrears of rent for thirty two months in other words, the claim of the Plaintiffs was that they had not been paid rent from April 1968. This has been deposed to by the Plaintiff No. 1 in his oral testimony which has been accepted by the courts below. On 6-1-1971 the Defendant had sent a money order for Rs. 416/- to cover the rent for 26 months. This, 1 have held above, was a valid tender. This amount would cover the period from November 1968 to December 1970. The question, therefore, which remained for consideration was: whether the rent from April 1968 to October 1968 had been paid by the Defendant or not? As I have mentioned above both the courts below have held that this payment was not made. Apart from relying upon the statement of the Plaintiff in this connection the court below was also of the view that the Defendants statement was not satisfactory and could not be relied upon. In his examination-in-chief the Defendant has stated that all the rent upto October 1970 has been paid. During cross-examination, however, he has stated that at the time of the receipt of the notice of demand i.e. 5th December 1970, he was in arrears of rent for three years less a month or a half. In cross-examination the statement of Defendant is: Jis samay muihan wadi ka notice mila us samay tak teen sal main aik adha mah ka kiraya chor ker teen sal ka kiraya wajib tha jo money order say bhaija tha aur wapis aa gaya tha. On the basis of these two contradictory statements also the courts below were of the opinion that the Defendants statement was palpably false and not reliable. He has not paid the rent upto October 1968 to the landlords. The Appellants counsel has urged that (his statement of the Defendant cannot be taken as an admission and it has not been correctly construed by the court below. He has not paid the rent upto October 1968 to the landlords. The Appellants counsel has urged that (his statement of the Defendant cannot be taken as an admission and it has not been correctly construed by the court below. The interpretation which has been put on it by the Civil Judge Kumaun does not appear to be incorrect. Even though 35 months are not mentioned therein but the statement is to the effect that for a month or half a month less than three years the rent has not been paid. This would obviously mean about 35 months which has been mentioned by the lower appellate court. In my opinion, the question now raised by the counsel for the Appellant that the courts below wrongly took this as an admission is misconceived. The court was merely considering the contradictory statement which was made by the Defendant in the examination-in-chief and in his cross examination and on this basis he came to the conclusion that the statement of the Defendant was palpably false, As I have mentioned above this is not the only ground on which the Plaintiff's case has been accepted, The evidence of the Plaintiff has also been taken into consideration by the courts below. The finding of fact recorded concurrently by both the courts below is that Defendant has failed to prove that he had paid rent upto October 1968 to the Plaintiff. As such it has been correctly found that the Defendant had defaulted in the payment of rent which was due to the Plaintiff within one month of the notice of demand. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the default in the payment of rent on behalf of the Defendant having been conclusively established he was clearly liable to be ejected under the provisions of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 12. For the reasons given above, I am of the opinion that there is no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed. Bat having regard to all the facts and the circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the parties should bear their own costs of this Court.