Judgment :- 1. The defendants are the appellants. The suit was for specific performance of an agreement or in the alternative for partition and separate possession of the plaintiffs one third share in the plaint A Schedule properties. The facts of the case are as follows:— The defendants are the younger brothers of the plaintiff. The suit A schedule properties are the properties of the joint family. According to the plaintiff, the parties entered into an agreement Ex. A-28, for partition, on 22nd April 1965, under which they agreed to enjoy the properties as mentioned therein. The plaintiff seeks for specific enforcement of the agreement Ex. A-28, or in the alternative he prays that if the court finds that the said document is not specifically enforceable, the court may pass a decree for partition and separate possession of his one-third share in the A Schedule properties. On the other hand, the defendants contend that subsequent to Ex. A-28, the plaintiff entered into an agreement under Ex. B-1, dated 3rd June 1965, in terms of which the plaintiff got his share and the defendants respectively get their shares of the items and are enjoying the same as being divided in status. As such, Ex. A-28 has been superseded and cannot be specifically enforced. The defendants further contend that in view of the enjoyment of the properties separately by the respective parties as per Ex. B-1, there is an question of any further partition of the A schedule properties. Apart from these contentions, the defendants had also raised various other defences in regard to properties purchased by the plaintiff subsequent to Exs. A-28 and B-1, which are unnecessary for discussion for the purpose of the present second appeal. 2. The trial Court after elaborately discussing Exs. A-28 and B-1 with reference to the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that there was a completed partition between the brothers even by June 1965, that the plaintiff had been placed to possession of the share allotted to him in pursuance thereof, that though Ex. 2. The trial Court after elaborately discussing Exs. A-28 and B-1 with reference to the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that there was a completed partition between the brothers even by June 1965, that the plaintiff had been placed to possession of the share allotted to him in pursuance thereof, that though Ex. A-28 in true, it has been superseded by a later petition effected on 2nd June 1965 which has been acted upon also, that since the parties had entered into a completed partition arrangement in June 1965 and had taken possession in accordance therewith the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of fresh partition and that the plaintiff is not entitled either to specifically enforce Ex. A-28 or to get a partition once over. In the result, the trial court dismissed the suit. 3. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal to the District Judge, Madurai. The lower appellate court held that there had been a completed partition as per Ex. A-28, that the said partition cannot be reopened except under valid grounds, that so such ground or circumstance has arisen in this case to rescind the partition arrangement under Ex. A-28 and that therefore the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance of the contract dated 22nd April 1965, which is Ex. A-28. The lower appellate court further directed the defendants to execute a duly stamped and registered document in respect of the B schedule properties allotted to the plaintiff. 4. Aggrieved by the decision of the lower appellate court, the defendants have preferred the present second appeal. I have been taken through the judgments of the courts below and also the evidence on record. Thiru D. Raju the learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that Ex. A-28 is inadmissible in evidence and the same cannot be looked into for enabling the plaintiff to get at the properties mentioned therein. The learned counsel also submitted that Ex. B-1 is a further agreement and the parties, as divided in status subsequent to Ex. B-1, possessed and enjoyed their respective shares as per Ex. B-1, and that therefore no question of specifically enforcing Ex. A-28 would arise. 5. Selvi Vimala, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent, submitted that there was a completed partition as per Ex. B-1 is a further agreement and the parties, as divided in status subsequent to Ex. B-1, possessed and enjoyed their respective shares as per Ex. B-1, and that therefore no question of specifically enforcing Ex. A-28 would arise. 5. Selvi Vimala, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent, submitted that there was a completed partition as per Ex. A-28 and that the same cannot be varied by a subsequent agreement. She read some passages from Mulla Hindu Law and also cited certain decisions to support her contention. Abdul Basith Sahib v. Shanmughasundaram (1956) I M.L.J. 513 cited by Selvi Vimala, is a Bench ruling of this Court, wherein it has been held that a declaration showing unequivocal intention on the part of a person to become separated from the family or treat himself as a separated member from a particular date is enough to create a division in status. The said division cannot be rescinded except on the ground that the partition which took place already, is either unfair or inequitable. The next decision cited by Selvi Vimala is the one in Lingrai v. Ananta A.I.R. 1957 Orissa 62 wherein a Bench of the Orissa High Court has held that once there is a severance of interest by unambiguous terms of ascertainment of shares of different members of the joint family, the members do not have the status of coparceners of a Mitakshara joint family and the position cannot be altered by the subsequent conduct of or statements made by the different members. From the foregoing two decisions, Selvi Vimala submitted that as per Ex. A-28 there was a severance in the joint status of the family and the parties enjoyed the properties as per Ex. A-28 and as such Ex. A-28 cannot be superseded by any subsequent arrangement and hence there must be a decree for specifically enforcing Ex. A-28. 6. Thiru Raju, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, cited Kumaraswami Gounder v. Arvagiri Gounder (1974) 1 M.L.J. 413 : 87 L.W. 215 wherein a Bench of this court, dealing with the admissibility of an unregistered deed of partition, held that though an unregistered partition deed cannot be admitted in evidence to prove the terms of the partition, it can certainly be admitted in evidence for proving the division in status and the fact of partition. This principle is laid down in the decision of the Privy Council in Rajangam Ayyar v. Rajangam Ayyar A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 266: 16 L.W. 615. The said decision further held that if the parties reduce the transaction of partition to a formal document which is intended to be the evidence of the partition, it has the effect of declaring the exclusive title of the coparcener to whom a particular property is allotted by partition, and is, thus within the mischief of S. 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. It is clear from the above decision that there can be an oral partition or a partition list without being registered, but once a partition deed is drawn allotting the properties, the same cannot be admitted in evidence under S. 49 of the Registration Act to prove the allotment of properties to the respective parties. No doubt the said document can be entertained for collateral purpose such as proving division in status as among the coparceners. 7. The next decision cited by Thiru Raju is Panchapagesa v. Kalasundaram A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 472 wherein a Bench of this Court has held: “A compulsorily registrable but an unregistered document is admissible in evidence for a collateral purpose, that is to say, for any purpose other than that of creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing a right to immovable property. The expression “collateral purpose” is no doubt a very vague one and the Court must decide in each case whether the purpose for which it is sought to use the unregistered document is really a collateral one or is to establish directly title to the immovable property sought to be conveyed by the document. But by the simple device of calling it a “collateral purpose” a party cannot use the unregistered document in any legal proceedings to bring about indirectly the effect which it would have if registered.” Relying on the above two decisions, Thiru Raju submitted that Ex. A-28 cannot be looked into and there cannot be any allotment of properties under Ex. A-28. 8. It is clear from the facts of the case that the plaintiff wanted to treat Ex. A-28 as an agreement for specifically enforcing the terms thereof. If it is only an agreement and if it has not taken the effect of a partition deed, there is no difficulty in rescinding the said agreement by Ex. A-28. 8. It is clear from the facts of the case that the plaintiff wanted to treat Ex. A-28 as an agreement for specifically enforcing the terms thereof. If it is only an agreement and if it has not taken the effect of a partition deed, there is no difficulty in rescinding the said agreement by Ex. B-1, which is subsequent to Ex. A-28. It is also clear from the evidence of the plaintiff himself that he is in enjoyment of the properties allotted to him in terms of the partition under Ex. B-1. If that be so, he cannot be allowed to pray for a fresh partition unless he makes out a case for setting aside the earlier partition. In Raghava Rao v. Gopalarao A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 125 (F.B.) on a construction of a document concerned in the case, the court held that the argument that the document cannot be taken as a final partition and does not require registration cannot be accepted, for, it is not disputed there that the allotment of the immovable properties under the document was intended to be final. “The mere fact that the parties contemplated the execution of a more comprehensive partition deed later on does not make Ex. A any the less operative to create interests in the immovable properties comprised therein. It cannot, therefore, be said that Ex. A-28 does not require registration. It clearly falls within S. 17, Registration Act, and being unregistered, it must be held to be inadmissible in evidence.” Applying this principle to the present case, it is clear that Ex. A-28, intended the allotment of the immovable properties to the plaintiff. If that be so, the document requires registration, and as such, cannot be admitted in evidence as per S. 49. Registration Act. 9. In Ramayya v. Achamma A.I.R. 1944 Mad. 550: 57 L.W. 427 a full Bench of this Court has held:— “Where a deed of partition is inadmissible by reason of the fact that it has net been registered a co-sharer who happened to he in sole enjoyment of a particular property cannot sue to eject another co-sharer who had disturbed his possession when be based his title on the partition deed. Where the property belonged to the joint family and the agreement for partition cannot be proved for want or registration, the court can only regard the property as still belonging to the joint family.” Following the above two decisions, there cannot be any allotment of property to the plaintiff under Ex. A-28, since it has not been registered, even if it is considered that it is a partition deed. On the other hand, if we take Ex. A-28, to be a mere agreement, the said arrangement can be rescinded by consent of all the parties concerned. Ex. B-1 is a subsequent arrangement, and according to Ex. B-1., the parties enjoyed the properties. This is also made clear from the admission of the plaintiff in his deposition given as P.W. 1. Thus, it is clear that properties enjoyed as per Ex. B-1 after division in status cannot be re-partitioned. Ex. A-28, as already observed, has no effect in view of the subsequent oral partition pleaded by the defendants. The evidence is clear to warrant the conclusion that the parties got themselves divided in status and enjoyed the properties as mentioned in Ex. B-1. The lower appellate court has completely gone wrong in observing that Ex. A-28 is a completed partition and cannot be varied be a subsequent agreement. This is a clear error of law in the light of my foregoing discussion. The trial court correctly approached the issue and dismissed the suit. 10. In these circumstances, the Second appeal is allowed, with the result the judgment and decree of the trial court are restored. There will be no order as to costs. No leave.