Judgment :- 1. The petitioner, an Assistant Conservator of Forests, was placed under suspension by an order dated 24-11974, copy Ext. P1. This order referred to a series of charges against the petitioner on which Government was proposing to make a detailed enquiry before the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings. The charges concerned the conduct of the petitioner as Assistant Conservator of Forests, Teak Plantation Division, Parambikulam from 191969 to 23-5-1971. It is said that loss was caused to the Government by removal of timber and such other acts affecting the interests of the Government. It was said in Ext. P1 that there were several Forest Contractors and other forest subordinate staff to give evidence as prosecution witnesses before the Tribunal and that the continuance of the petitioner in service even at a distant place was likely to influence the evidence of the witnesses to be examined before the Tribunal. This order is attacked as incompetent as also mala fide. To understand this attack it is necessary to refer to the previous history of the case. 2. While the petitioner was working as Assistant Conservator of Forests, Teak Plantation Division, Parambikulam, there were reports of large scale smuggling of timber. It was said that this was possible by reason of the collusion of the contractors with the officers of the Department. The petitioner was placed under suspension on the basis of the report and an enquiry was ordered to be conducted by the Ex-Branch Vigilance Division. This was by order dated 19-3-1971. This order was subsequently reviewed by the Government on 3-12-1971. The petitioner's suspension was vacated and the petitioner was reinstated. It was thereafter that as a result of the enquiry conducted by the Ex-Branch Vigilance Division the Government was satisfied of a prima facie case against the petitioner and in those circumstances the Government passed a fresh order dated 17-7-1973 placing the petitioner again under suspension. This order of suspension was attacked before this Court in O.P.No. 2442 of 1973. That attack succeeded as evidenced by Ext. P2 judgment of this Court. It succeeded mainly on the ground that there was no proper consideration of the relevant facts in placing the petitioner under suspension by the order impugned. This order of suspension was attacked before this Court in O.P.No. 2442 of 1973. That attack succeeded as evidenced by Ext. P2 judgment of this Court. It succeeded mainly on the ground that there was no proper consideration of the relevant facts in placing the petitioner under suspension by the order impugned. It was further observed by this Court that if the continuance of the petitioner in the department, wherever he was, will be detrimental to or embarrass the enquiry that may be a circumstance which may occasion review of the earlier order of reinstatement. Evidently what was wanting in the order which was impugned in the earlier petition was made up by passing Ext. P1 stating the reasons for suspending the petitioner. 3. The attack against Ext. P1 order is three-fold. The petitioner attacks this as malafide. It is also attacked on the ground that the order suffers from the same vice as the earlier order challenged before this Court. Lastly it is said that the Government had no power to suspend any person retrospectively and therefore in as much as Ext. P1 placed the petitioner under suspension retrospectively from 17- 71973, the order was bad. 4. The counter affidavit details various matters relating to the charges against the petitioner, refers to several materials as having been collected against the petitioner by the Ex-Branch Vigilance Division at the enquiry and states the necessity for enquiry into such charges against the petitioner. It also seeks to justify the suspension on the ground that in the nature of the evidence to be adduced at the enquiry, particularly the witnesses to be examined, it was necessary to keep the petitioner off his office pending finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings. If the order of suspension is competent it cannot fail on the ground that it is mala fide, for, on the facts stated mala fides cannot be easily inferred. If there was a case for enquiry against the petitioner or if there were materials before the Government to satisfy the Government that there was a case for enquiry, then there can be no inference of mala fides merely because this Court is not satisfied with the way the Government had considered the question of suspension. If there was a case for enquiry against the petitioner or if there were materials before the Government to satisfy the Government that there was a case for enquiry, then there can be no inference of mala fides merely because this Court is not satisfied with the way the Government had considered the question of suspension. Evidently the earlier judgment of this Court opened the eyes of the Government Jo the necessity of passing a proper order and it passed a rather elaborate order, Ext. P1. Mala fides cannot be inferred in the circumstances disclosed in the case. 5. It cannot also be said that Ext. P1 order is bad for the same reason as that which vitiated the earlier order. The earlier order was passed in terms of R.10 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1968 without referring to the facts. Advertence has been made to the facts here. The suspension was evidently not under R.10 (1) (c) but under R.10 (1) (a). It would appear from Ext. P2 that it was assumed in the earlier order that suspension was under R.10 (1) (c). That assumption has evidently been made as seen from the judgment because of the use of the expression "then prevailing circumstances and public interest" in the order of suspension impugned in the earlier judgment. That order is Ext. P3. But these words it appears to me, are not words which refer merely to suspension under R.10 (1) (c) but qualifies the order of suspension whether it be under R.10 (1) (a), (b) or (c). Whatever that be, there is no case here that the order in this case is passed under R.10 (1) (c). The order has been passed under R.10 (1) (a), for, the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner are seen to be contemplated at that time. Therefore I see no reason to hold that the order Ext. P1 is bad for the same reason as that which vitiated the earlier order. 6. There is certainly substance in the contention of the petitioner that retrospective operation of an order of suspension is not contemplated by any statutory provision. R.10 of the Kerala Civil Senses (Classification Control & Appeal) Rules, 1968 confers power on the Government to place a Government servant under suspension. The rule does not, in terms, empower any retrospective suspension. 6. There is certainly substance in the contention of the petitioner that retrospective operation of an order of suspension is not contemplated by any statutory provision. R.10 of the Kerala Civil Senses (Classification Control & Appeal) Rules, 1968 confers power on the Government to place a Government servant under suspension. The rule does not, in terms, empower any retrospective suspension. Suspension is by its very nature one that cannot be retrospective in character. During the period of suspension the relationship between the employer and the employee continues. The status continues to be what it was. The tie is not broken until the services are terminated. By suspending an employee he is only kept off from the regular duties of his office. He is told not to exercise himself in the matter of performing the normal duties attached to his office. By its very nature such a direction can only operate in the present and the future and not in the past. Hence there cannot be any retrospective operation for an order of suspension. 7. The same view has been indicated in the decisions in Venkiteswaran v. State of Kerala 1963 K. L. T. 1097), Mohd. Azam v. State of Hyderabad (A. I. R.1968 A. P. 619) and Dukhooran v. Co-op. Agrl. Asson. Kawardha (A. I. R.1961 M. P. 289). 8. The order Ext. P1 is therefore bad to the extent it purports to act retrospectively from 17-71973. The question then is, should the order be quashed for that reason or would it be proper to declare that order as inoperative to the extent of its retrospectively. An order of suspension, as I said earlier, is intended to operate in the future and would be competent in that respect. If that order purports to act retrospectively alone, then possibly the order would be unsustainable. But if it purports to operate retrospectively and prospectively I see no reason to strike down that order in its entirety. Counsel for the petitioner urges that an order of suspension would be impossible in this case even prospectively. This is on the ground that at the time the petitioner is said to have been suspended he was not in service. What is meant is that though this Court quashed the earlier suspension in Ext. P2 judgment the petitioner was not allowed to join duty. That of course is so. He was not actually on duty. This is on the ground that at the time the petitioner is said to have been suspended he was not in service. What is meant is that though this Court quashed the earlier suspension in Ext. P2 judgment the petitioner was not allowed to join duty. That of course is so. He was not actually on duty. It was not as if he was reinstated and again suspended. The question would be one of the effect of Ext. P2 judgment. It is true that an order of reinstatement would normally follow a decision cancelling the suspension. But even if it does not follow suspension would not continue in force. The suspension order was effaced by the judgment of this Court. The petitioner was also entitled to his salary and he was also entitled to claim that he should be given work. If the petitioner was in service and he had a right to work it was open to the Government to pass an order of suspension to operate prospectively if that order was otherwise justified. Therefore I uphold the order of suspension to the extent it operates as suspension from the date of the order. The order is bad to the extent it operates from 17 71973. The difference is material, for, if the petitioner is to be considered as under suspension only from the date of Ext. P1 order there is justification for him to claim that he was in service during the period from 17 7 1973 to Ext. P1 date and this may entitle him to the salary til! the date of order of suspension. 9. Learned counsel further contended that in the absence of a plea on the part of the State Government that the order is severable to the extent it has prospective operation such a plea is not to be considered. Such a case need not necessarily be particularly pleaded when the order is under attack and the whole order is sought to be salvaged. If the court finds that the whole order could not be saved it is for the court to mould the relief to be granted. 10. The Original Petition is allowed to the extent of quashing Ext. P1 order in so far as it concerns the operation from 17-7-1973 up to the date of Ext. P1 order. It is sustained for the period subsequent to the date of Ext. 10. The Original Petition is allowed to the extent of quashing Ext. P1 order in so far as it concerns the operation from 17-7-1973 up to the date of Ext. P1 order. It is sustained for the period subsequent to the date of Ext. P1 order. Parties are directed to suffer costs. 11. It is mentioned at the hearing that notwithstanding the fact that an order of suspension has been operating for more than a year and a half now and disciplinary proceedings had been taken they are still pending. It goes without saying that it is necessary that an early end of this state of affairs is desirable. Continuance of the suspension must be seriously reviewed in case Government is unable to complete the proceedings and finalise the action to be taken thereon without further delay. In other words, the indefinite continuance of suspension is quite undesirable. Partly allowed.