JUDGMENT Gulati, J. - This petition arises out of proceedings under the. U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act.) 2. The petitioners are brothers. Their family consists of the selves, their 3 brothers, one of whom is, married and their parents. The father of the petitioners, Sardar Ishar Singh, along with his wife and 5 sons, had been living in a flat of a building known as "Kunj Bihari Place" situated in Kaushalpuri, at Kanpur, for the last about 15 years. This accommodation, according to the petitioners, was neither enough nor suitable for their requirements and when one of their brothers, Jaspal Singh, got married, he had to hire a separate flat in Swaroopnagar at Kanpur at a rental of Rs. 800/- per month. Sardar Ishar Singh purchased- House No. 7/154 Swaroop Nagar, Kanpur. It was in the occupation of U.P. Financial Corporation. It is stated that Sardar Ishar Singh pursued the Corporation to vacate the house so that he could live there wait his family. The Corporation eventually purchased a building of its own. As it was likely to shift its offerer to it, own building, the petitioners made an application to the District Magistrate, Kanpur for the release of the house in their favour. This application appears to have been passed on to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for disposal. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer without deciding the release application and without notice to the petitioners allotted the house to respondent No. 4, the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Kanpur (hereinafter referred to as the allottee). The allotment was made on the orders of the District Magistrate to whom the allottee had addressed a letter. The petitioners moved an application before the District Magistrate protesting against the manner in which the house had been allotted to another person without considering their; release application. The petitioners fearing that they may not be able to get redress at the hands of the District Magistrate because the allottee was a senior I.A.S. Officer who had been a Commissioner of Lucknow Division, filed a Writ Petition in this Court (Civil Misc. Writ No. 4397 of 1971). While this petition was pending the District Magistrate, Kanpur cancelled the allotment order as a result the petition was dismissed as having become in fructuous. Writ No. 4397 of 1971). While this petition was pending the District Magistrate, Kanpur cancelled the allotment order as a result the petition was dismissed as having become in fructuous. Thereafter the release application of the petitioners was taken up for consideration by Sri G.K. Tandon, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur. The allottee filed an objection and the petitioners filed rejoinder-affidavit stating inter-alia that the house in dispute had been purchased for their persona occupation as was mentioned in sale-deed itself and that the landlord of the flat in Kunj Bihari Palace, where they had been residing, had filed a. Civil Suit for their ejectment on the ground that they had made unauthorised constructions. Arguments were heard on 7th September, 1971 on behalf of the petitioners and the allottee and 17th September, 1971 was fixed as the date for judgment. In the meantime on 15th September, 1971 Mr. Tandon sent a note to the District Magistrate asking him to transfer the case to the District Supply Officer, Kanpur. On the same date the District Magistrate to accepted this request and transferred the cafe to the file of District Supply Officer. The District Supply Officer heard the arguments and passed order dated 30th September, 1971 rejecting the application of the petitioners for the release of the house in their favour. The petitioners thereupon filed the present writ petition and a Bench of this Court passed an ad-interim order directing the respondents not to allot the house until further orders. In the meantime the Financial Corporation vacated the house and its possession was delivered to the petitioner. It has been alleged that at about midnight on that very day a large number of policemen along with P.A.C. came and tried to dislodge the petitioners forcibly. The petitioners have challenged the order of the District Supply Officer dated 30th September, 1971 rejecting their release application. 3. The impugned order has been challenged on a large number of grounds. It is said that the allotment order in favour of the 4th respondent was a mala fide order which had been passed to oblige the allottee ignoring completely the meras of the case. In my opinion, it is not necessary to record a finding on this point even though the way in which proceedings have been conducted does smack of favouritism, because this petition can succeed on another ground. 4. In my opinion, it is not necessary to record a finding on this point even though the way in which proceedings have been conducted does smack of favouritism, because this petition can succeed on another ground. 4. The District Supply Officer has been at pains to demonstrate now the rented accommodation in possession of the petitioner's family is large enough for their needs. He has also tried to balance the need of the allottee. He has largely relied upon the objection filed by the allottee. Clearly he was not entitled to do either. He had no jurisdiction to reject the application of the petitioners on the ground that the accommodation in their possession was sufficient for their need nor was he entitled to take into consideration the need of the allottee. It is well settled that an application for release under Rule 6 of the Rules framed under the Act is made by a landlord at a time when there is no sitting tenant and the accommodation is vacant or is likely to fall vacant. All that the District Magistrate has to do is to satisfy himself that the application of the landlord is bona fide. The word "bona fide" has been used in contradiction to "mala fide". So long as the application is not bona fide in the sense that the landlord in fact, does not want to occupy the house himself but wants to let it out on a higher rent, the District Magistrate is bound to permit the landlord to occupy it. He has no option in the matter. Although the rule has been couched in permissive language yet in reality it is a mandatory provision. He has no jurisdiction to judge the extent of the need of the landlord nor is he entitled to take into consideration the need of a prospective tenant. What is meant by a landlord's needing the accommodation for his awn occupation has been explained in Sikh Swaroop v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Sp. He has no jurisdiction to judge the extent of the need of the landlord nor is he entitled to take into consideration the need of a prospective tenant. What is meant by a landlord's needing the accommodation for his awn occupation has been explained in Sikh Swaroop v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Sp. A.No. 247 of 1957, D/d. 26.10.1960 by Mootham, C.J. and A.P. Srivastva, J. where they have observed that all that a District Magistrate has to do under Rule 6 is to determine whether the application by the landlord is made in good faith and that unless he comes to the conclusion that the landlord does not wanted the accommodation for his own personal occupation he is bound hold that the landlord's need is bona fide. In Abida Begum v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1959 A.L.J. 704, it has been observed that Rule 6 was made "to preserve the right of the landlord if he wants to occupy the house himself." It would hardly be a matter of right if he had to depend upon another's will or discretion. A Full Bench of this Court in Ram Surat Singh v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1964 A.L.J. 412 has endorsed this view, where it has been held that the District Magistrate has no jurisdiction to Judge the requirements or the extent of the landlord's need nor is he entitled to take into consideration the need of it prospective tenant. If has further been held that the word "need" implies the necessity but the degree of necessity is not material except in so far as it may throw light that the landlord's application has been made in good faith. It is not open to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to measure the landlord's need. All that he has to determine is that the application has been made in geed faith. 5. Similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rent Control and Eviction Officer v. Dr. M.M. Laloria, 1973 R.C.J. 389 in that case the release application of the landlord was rejected on the ground that the accommodation already in his possession was sufficient for his need. 5. Similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rent Control and Eviction Officer v. Dr. M.M. Laloria, 1973 R.C.J. 389 in that case the release application of the landlord was rejected on the ground that the accommodation already in his possession was sufficient for his need. This is what has been observed in paragraph 6 : "It is clear that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application for release only on the ground that the existing accommodation was sufficient for the needs of the landlords. This according to the Full Bench, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to consider." 6. The District Supply Officer Kanpur therefore, clearly misdirected himself in rejecting the release application on the ground that the accommodation in possession of the petitioners was sufficient nor was he entitled to take into consideration the objection filed by the allottee because he had no locus standi to do so. The need of the allottee was also irrelevant. The only ground upon which he could reject the application was that the landlords did not want to occupy the house themselves and their application for release was a a camouflage or a make believe. There is no such suggestion much less a finding in the impugned order. 7. Before parting with this case I may also mention that the allottee has not filed a counter-affidavit and has not contested the petition. He was the only person who could be interested in saving the allotment order from the petitioner's challenge. Curiously the counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the District Magistrate Kanpur, Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur and the District Supply Officer, Kanpur and the State of Uttar Pradesh. None of them have any interest in the subject matter in dispute. A similar situation arose in the case of Rent Control and Eviction Officer v. Dr. M.M. Laloria and the Bench made the following observations : "The Rent Control and Eviction Officer has not indicated anywhere in the appeal or otherwise as to what precisely is his interest in the subject matter in dispute. He never wanted occupation or allotment of the accommodation. He merely disposed of the application for release and allotment. He passed suitable orders under section 7-A. His orders were judiciously adjudicated in the writ petition. He never wanted occupation or allotment of the accommodation. He merely disposed of the application for release and allotment. He passed suitable orders under section 7-A. His orders were judiciously adjudicated in the writ petition. He not having any interest in the subject matter was not an aggrieved person and had, in our opinion, no locus standi to prefer an appeal." 8. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the District Supply Officer, Kanpur dated 30th September, 1971 rejecting the release application of the petitioners is quashed. The District Magistrate, Kanpur is directed to dispose of the petitioners release application afresh in accordance with law and the observations made hereinbefore. The petitioners are entitled to the costs.