AMAL KRISHNA DE, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is the complainant in Case No. C228/73 in the Court of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. Upon his complaint filed on 26. 3. 74 against the opposite party, the learned Magistrate examined the complainant, and ordered an inquiry presumably under section 202 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure and wanted a report of the inquiry to be submitted by 11. 4. 74. On 10. 4. 74 one of the persons named as accused in the petition of complaint, entered appearance and made a prayer. Inquiry report was also available on that date. On 11. 4. 74 the complainant filed a petition praying for a judicial inquiry. The learned Magistrate heard not only the complainant's Advocate, but also the appearing opposite party's Advocate and made the following order:a petition is filed by the complainant with a prayer for judicial inquiry. Heard learned Advocates on both sides. The prayer is rejected. He has neither dismissed the complaint under section 203 nor has issued process under Section 204. ( 2 ) THE complainant filed an application in revision on19. 7. 74 for setting aside the learned Magistrate's order dated 11. 4. 74. He has simultaneously filed a petition under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act giving rise to this Crl. Misc. Case. He states that his revisional application is late by five days; that the said delay may be condoned as the learned Advocate in the Magistrate's court informed him that the application would be within time if filed by 20. 7. 74 and that acting on his advice he made over the certified copy of the order to his Advocate in this court on 17. 7. 74, the learned Advocate prepared the revisional application on 18. 7. 74 and filed it on 19. 7. 74. ( 3 ) AT the hearing Mr. Dasgupta Dutta, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that the revisional application is within time and that there is no delay which requires condonation. The petitioner filed his application for copy of the order dated 1. 4. 74 on that date. The office notified that the folios required for the purpose were to be filed by 13. 4. 74. The petitioner filed those on 18. 4. 74. Office took two days' time to prepare the copy. The office made the copy ready on 20. 4. 74. 4. 74 on that date. The office notified that the folios required for the purpose were to be filed by 13. 4. 74. The petitioner filed those on 18. 4. 74. Office took two days' time to prepare the copy. The office made the copy ready on 20. 4. 74. The petitioner took delivery of the copy on 20. 4. 74. Mr. Dutta submits that he was entitled for computation of the period of limitation, which is 90 days, to exclude 9 days i. e. the period from 11. 4. 74 to 20. 4. 74. Under sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 ?the time requisite for obtaining a copy? of the order sought to be revised is excluded in computation of the period of limitation. What is the meaning of the words ?time requisite for obtaining a copy?? These words mean the ?time beyond the petitioner's control occupied by the Copying Department after an application for copy has been duly made, and not an ideally short period within which the department could have prepared it. ? Any failure in reasonable diligence which produces unnecessary delay at one or more of the several stages in obtaining a copy of the order will disentitle the petitioner to claim the whole of the time actually spent in obtaining the copy. The time ?unnecessarily occupied? is not the ?time requisite? within the meaning of the section. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Sarat v. Upendra. ( 4 ) THE question as to when the period requisite for taking copies should begin is to be determined by the practice of the court. The general practice in W. B. is that if a party applies for a copy on a particular date, before the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, the time requisite for obtaining copy is counted from the date if he puts in the requisites notified as required by the Copying Department by the date provided in the Rules of the Court governing the Copying Department of the Subordinate Courts. Those Rules are in Chapter 17, Section 2 of the Crl. Rules and Orders Vol. 1. Rules 322 and 323 are relevant here. In the instant case, the application for the copy was filed within time. Requisite stamps and folios were notified to be filed by 13. 4. 74. Those Rules are in Chapter 17, Section 2 of the Crl. Rules and Orders Vol. 1. Rules 322 and 323 are relevant here. In the instant case, the application for the copy was filed within time. Requisite stamps and folios were notified to be filed by 13. 4. 74. But those were not filed by 13. 4. 74 and were put in only on 18. 4. 74 i. e. beyond 3 days allowed under Rule 323. This failure entailed the consequence in the Rule i. e. rejection of the application for the copy and resultant necessity of filling a fresh application for the copy under Rule 324 giving a fresh start for counting the period under Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act. It was, therefore, argued by Mr. Moitra, learned Advocate appearing for the opposite parties that the period to be excluded under Section 12 (2) is the period from 18. 4. 74, when requisites were actually filed, to 20. 4. 74 i. e. only two days. This contention would have been upheld had the application for the copy filed on 11. 4. 74 been rejected under Rule 323 on 13. 4. 74 or 16. 4. 74 for failure to file the requisites within three days from 13. 4. 74, the notified date. In this case, however, the Copying Department did not reject the application as obligatory under Rule 323, accepted the folios filed on 18. 4. 74 and proceeded with the preparation of the copy. By so doing the application filed on 11. 4. 74 was allowed to continue as a defective application and the date for putting any requisites would be taken to have been altered or extended to 18. 4. 74. In this view of the matter, the petitioner is entitled to exclude the period from 11. 4. 74 to 20. 4. 74 for computing the period of limitation prescribed for his revisional application His revisional application is thus within time. ( 5 ) THE matter may be viewed from another standpoint. The petitioner is entitled to exclude two periods - one from 11. 4. 74 to 17. 4. 74 (the time taken by the Copying Department to notify requisites) and the other from 18. 4. 74 to 20. 4. 74 (the time taken by the Department to prepare the copy ). The petitioner is entitled to exclude two periods - one from 11. 4. 74 to 17. 4. 74 (the time taken by the Copying Department to notify requisites) and the other from 18. 4. 74 to 20. 4. 74 (the time taken by the Department to prepare the copy ). He is also entitled to contend that the time taken by the learned Advocate to prepare the copy is a sufficient cause within the meaning of the expression in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. If these periods are excluded, as I hold these should be excluded, the revisional application is found to be within time. For, the petitioner cannot be said to be wanting in 'reasonable diligence' or that he has made ?unnecessary delay?. His conduct is that he took 'proper and reasonable steps' in making the requisition and in obtaining the copy on such requisition. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Pramatha v. Lee. The application for condonation of delay in view of the above conclusions shall be held to be redundant and the revisional application shall be heard as filed within time, in due course. ( 6 ) MR. Dutta, appearing for the petitioner submits that he is entitled to have the period of 5 days condoned as the petitioner was mistakenly advised by his learned Advocate in the trial court and he acted on that wrong advice. His case in paragraph 11 of the petition is that on the advice of his Advocate Mr. Moitra he applied for certified copy of the order on 11. 4. 74 and that the said copy on being taken delivery of on 20. 4. 74 was kept by Sri Moitra. His case in paragraph 12 of the petition is that the said Mr. Moitra handed over the copy to him on 17. 7. 74 telling him that the last date for his making the application in the higher Court was 20. 7. 74. The petitioner also stated that he made over the copy to his Advocate in this court on the same date i. e. on 17. 7. 74 when his Advocate in this Court stated that the last day for his filing the application was 14. 7. 74. Thereafter he prepared the application by 18. 7. 74 and filed the same on 19. 7. 74. 7. 74 when his Advocate in this Court stated that the last day for his filing the application was 14. 7. 74. Thereafter he prepared the application by 18. 7. 74 and filed the same on 19. 7. 74. It appears from these statements that the petitioner's Advocate in the trial court had kept the copy with him from 20. 4. 74 to 17. 7. 74 and his lawyer in this court took two days time to prepare the application for being filed in this court. In these circumstances it is submitted that the petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause from filing his application within time. Mr. Moitra appearing for the opposite parties submitted that these statements should not be accepted as the lawyer in the lower court did not swear any affidavit. I am unable to give any effect to this contention of Mr. Moitra. The petitioner states in his affidavit that the statements made in paragraph 11, 12, 13 and 15 are statements which are true to his knowledge. I see no reason to disbelieve these statements. As the delay that has been caused is on account of the advice that the lawyer gave the petitioner cannot be said to have not acted diligently or property to file his application. The delay, if there had been any, would have been condoned on this ground holding that the petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause from filing it in time. ( 7 ) THE result is that I discharge the Rule as redundant and direct that the application in revision filed on 19. 7. 74 be put up for hearing in due course as having been filed in time. Rule disposed of.