JUDGMENT This application on behalf of the detenu in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is for bail. The detenu was take into custody under an order issued be the Home Secretary, Government of West Bengal, under Section 3 (1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act. 1974 (Act 52 of 1974) (to be described hereinafter as the new Act) with a view to preventing the detenu from abetting the smuggling of goods and engaging in kepting smuggled goods. Earlier, the detenu was taken into custody under the amended provision of Section 3 (1) (c) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 for abetting other persons to smuggle goods and dealing in smuggled good and the detenu moved this Court against the said order and obtained a Rule. While that application was pending, the "new Act" came into force on the 13th of December, 1974 and the detention order under the old Act came to end and the detenu was released and thereafter taken into custody under a fresh order of detention on the self-same ground. This fact, of course, was disputed by the petitioner and it was disputed by the petitioner and it was contended that the detenu was never at any point of time actually released from custody. But it is now admitted that a fresh order of detention under the new Act was served on 'the detenu on 19th December. 1974. Against the said order, the detenu moved this Court, obtained the Rule and applied for bail. Meanwhile, in 1974 the President made a declaration under Clause (1) of Article 359 of the Constitution, whereby the right to move any court for the rights conferred by Article 14. Article 21 and Clauses (4) to (7) of Article 22 of the Constitution with respect to any order of detention made under the new Act was to remain suspended for a period of six months from the date of the order or the period during which the Proclamation of Emergency was to remain in force, whichever period expired earlier. Article 21 and Clauses (4) to (7) of Article 22 of the Constitution with respect to any order of detention made under the new Act was to remain suspended for a period of six months from the date of the order or the period during which the Proclamation of Emergency was to remain in force, whichever period expired earlier. In view of this Presidential Order it is contended on behalf of the Union of India and the State of West Bengal, that the petitioner has no right to move this Court for infraction of any of his rights enumerated in the Presidential Order and the instant application as such cannot be considered by the Court. Mr. Ray appearing for the petitioner contends that what has been suspended is the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 21 and Clauses (4) to (7) of Article 22 of the Constitution and not any other rights which the detenu and/or the petitioner may have and as .such the Court is entitled to look into and decide the prayer of the petitioner, Of course, Mr. Ray conceded that he has, in view of the Presidential Order, at present no right to ask enforcement of his fundamental rights conferred by the aforesaid Articles of Chapter III of the Constitution. Mr. Ray however contends that what he is asking for in the instant application is whether there has been any infraction of his statutory and other legal rights outside the scope of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 21 and Clauses (4) to (7) of Article 22 of the Constitution. These two sets of rights, according to Mr. Ray, are distinct and separate and the President's Order merely suspends a detenu's right to move the Court for enforcement of his fundamental rights conferred by the aforementioned Articles of Chapter III of the Constitution but his other rights are not affected. In view of the objection taken we have decided to hear both parties on this preliminary point. 2. Mr. In view of the objection taken we have decided to hear both parties on this preliminary point. 2. Mr. Ray contends that he is challenging the order of detention in the instant case, not for any infraction of the fundamental rights conferred by Article 14, Article 21 and Clauses (4) to (7) of Article 22 of the Constitution but for the infraction of his other statutory rights, against which he is not debarred under the President's Order made under Article 359 (1) of the Constitution. That Order only suspends the petitioner's right to move any Court for enforcement of his fundamental rights conferred by Article 14, Article 21 and Clauses (4) to (7) of Article 22 of the Constitution and there is a clear distinction between such rights and the statutory rights and he is accordingly entitled to challenge the order of detention on grounds other than those specified in the Order. Mr. Ray cited a number of decisions of the Supreme Court in support of his contention. To start with, the first case referred to by Mr. Ray is the case of (1) Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 381 . Then followed a number of decisions by the Supreme Court in quick succession and these are (2) Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 (3) K. Ananda Nambiar v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 657 (4) Durgadas Shirali v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 1078 (5) Jagannath Misra v. State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1140 (6) Jaichand Lal Sethia v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1967 SC 483 (7) Md. Yeakub v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1968 SC 765 . Apart from these decisions of the Supreme Court, Mr. Ray also referred to a recent decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of (8) Daya Sankar Kapoor v. Union of India, an unreported decision of Delhi High Court in C.R.P. no. 37 of 1974 dt. 22.11.74 and another decision of the Delhi High Court disposed of on the same day, i.e., the case of (9) Harbas Lal v. Union of India, being Criminal Writ No. 32 of 1974 and a decision of Gujarat High Court in special Criminal Applications Nos. 125 and 127 of 1974 disposed of on November 5, 1974. 37 of 1974 dt. 22.11.74 and another decision of the Delhi High Court disposed of on the same day, i.e., the case of (9) Harbas Lal v. Union of India, being Criminal Writ No. 32 of 1974 and a decision of Gujarat High Court in special Criminal Applications Nos. 125 and 127 of 1974 disposed of on November 5, 1974. These later decisions relate to the identical points examined in the context of the amended Section 3 (1) (c) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, now repealed. 3. The learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the Union of India opposed the application and contended that the detenu or for the matter of that the petitioner has no right to move the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution after the President's Order under Article 359 (I) of the Constitution was made. The learned Advocate General in the first instance contends that the remedy of the detenu under Article 226 is barred in view of the fact that Article 21 which is the sole repository of the rights of personal liberty of a citizen has been suspended. As such, the learned Advocate General submitted it is not open to the petitioner to say that anyone who was detained otherwise than in accordance with the procedure established by law, once the President's Order under Article 359(1) of the Constitution was made, has right to move the court. We are unable to accept this contention. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider a previous Presidential declaration issued under Article 359(1) suspending Articles 14, 21, and 22 of the Constitution. That Order is dated 3rd November, 1952 and is to the following effect: ORDER: New Delhi, the 3rd November 1962. G.S.R. 1464-ln exercise of the powers conferred by Cl. (1) of Article 359 of the Constitution the President hereby declares that the right of any person to move any Court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation of Emergency issued under CI. (1) of Article 352 thereof on the 26th of October 1962, is in force if such person has been deprived of any such rights under the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962 (4 of 1962) or .any rule or order made thereunder." 4. (1) of Article 352 thereof on the 26th of October 1962, is in force if such person has been deprived of any such rights under the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962 (4 of 1962) or .any rule or order made thereunder." 4. The supreme Court has considered this aspect of the case in (1) Makhan Snigh Tarasikka's case reported in A.I.R. 1964 S. C. 381. In that decision the Supreme Court considered the sweep of President's Order suspending the above provisions of the Constitution. The challenge under Article 32 of the Constitution was held to be still available to a detenu. Article 226 of the Constitution for a Writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus is similarly available to a detenu as there had not been suspension of the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution and the President's Order did not and could not suspend the right of a citizen to move the Court against illegal detention under Article 226 of the Constitution. Moreover, the Supreme Court pointed out in paragraph 35(a) of the reported judgment that "if in challenging the validity of his detention order, the detenu is pleading any right outside the rights specified in. the President's Order, his right to move any Court in that behalf is not suspended, because it is out side Article 359(1) and consequently outside the Presidential Order itself. The catena of the Supreme Court cases referred to earlier dearly establishes the detenu's right to move the Court for enforcement of his other statutory rights in the case of illegal detention and it is only the enforcement of the fundamental rights specified in the President's Order under Article 359 (1) which stood suspended. Mr. Ray contends on behalf of the detenu that he has come to Court for the enforcement of his other rights which include his statutory rights under the new Act. 5. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider Articles 21 and 22 with reference to the President's Order suspending the enforcement of the rights thereunder. In (2) AIR 1966 SC 740 , Ram Manohar Lohia v. The State of Bihar and another, Hidayatullah J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for himself and Bachawat J. observed in paragraph 27 as follows : "Article 21 lays down that no person is to be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. This Article thinks in terms of ordinary laws which govern our society when there is no declaration of emergency and which are enacted subject to the provisions of the Constitution including the Chapter on Fundamental Rights but other than those made under the powers conferred by the Emergency Provisions in Part XVIII. When the President suspended the operation of Article 21, he took away from any person dealt with under the terms of his Order, the right to plead in a Court of law that he was deprived of his life and personal liberty otherwise than according to the procedure established by the laws of country. In other words, he could not invoke the procedure established by ordinary law. But the President did not make lawless actions lawful. He only took away the fundamental right in Article 21 in respect of a person proceeded against under the Defence of India Act or any rule or order made thereunder. Thus a person so proceeded could not claim to be tried under the ordinary law or bring an action under the ordinary law. But to be able to say that the right to move the Court for the enforcement of right under Article 21 is suspended, it is necessary to establish that such person has been deprived of any such right under the Defence of India Act or any rule or order made thereunder, that is to say, under the authority of the Act. The action of the authorities empowered by the Defence of India Act is not completely shielded from the scrutiny of Courts. The scrutiny with reference to procedure established by laws other than the Defence of India Act is, of course, shut out but :In enquiry whether the action is justified under the Defence of India Act itself is not shut out". Their Lordships then proceeded to observe that the court will not enquire if any other law was followed but the court will certainly enquire whether Defence of India Act or the Rules have been obeyed or not. In Paragraphs 28 and 29 of the judgment Article 22 was considered with reference to the President's Order. "Clauses (4), (5), (6) and (7) of that Article provided for the procedure for dealing with persons arrested or detained under any order providing for preventive detention, and laid down the minimum or compulsory requirements. In Paragraphs 28 and 29 of the judgment Article 22 was considered with reference to the President's Order. "Clauses (4), (5), (6) and (7) of that Article provided for the procedure for dealing with persons arrested or detained under any order providing for preventive detention, and laid down the minimum or compulsory requirements. The provisions of Article 22 Would have applied to arrests and detentions under the Defence of India Act if the President's Order had not taken away from such a person the right to move any court to enforce the protection of Article 22." "The net result of the President's Order is to stop all claims to enforce rights arising from laws other than the Defence of India Act and the Rules, and the provisions of Article 22 at variance with the Defence of India Act and the Rules are of no avail. But the ('resident's order does not say that even if a person is proceeded against in breach of the Defence of India Act or the Rules he cannot move the Court to complain that the Act and the Rules, under the colour of which some action is tak6n do not warrant it. It was thus that the Court questioned the detention orders by Additional District Magistrates who were not authorised to make them or detentions of persons who were already in detention after conviction or otherwise for such a long period that detention orders served could have had no relation to the requirements of the Defence of India Act or the Rules". We are not therefore prepared to accept the argument advanced by the learned Advocate-General that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would not lie at the instance of the detenu in view of the suspension of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. 6. The next question for consideration is whether and to what extent other rights are available to the detenu. These other rights, according to Mr. Ray, include his statutory rights which the detenu has under the new Act. How far and to what extent those rights are available to the detenu, had also been considered by the Supreme Court in (1) Makhan Singh Tarsikka's case referred to above. We have already referred to paragraph 35 (a) of the judgment. These other rights, according to Mr. Ray, include his statutory rights which the detenu has under the new Act. How far and to what extent those rights are available to the detenu, had also been considered by the Supreme Court in (1) Makhan Singh Tarsikka's case referred to above. We have already referred to paragraph 35 (a) of the judgment. In paragraph 36, the Supreme Court considered the position where the detenu moved the court for a writ of habeas corpus the ground that his detention had been ordered mala fide. The Supreme Court observed that it was hardly necessary to emphasise that exercise of a power malafide was wholly outside the scope of the Act (Defence of India Act) conferring the power and can always be successfully challenged in a Court. Another ground on which the validity of the detention could be challenged was considered by the Supreme Court in paragraph 38 of the same judgment. If a detenu contents that the operative provisions of the law under which he is detained suffers from the vice of excessive delegation and was therefore invalid, the plea thus raised by the detenu cannot, in limini, be said to be barred by Presidential Order. In terms, it is not a plea which is relatible to the fundamental rights specified in the said Order. It is a plea which is independent of the said rights and its validity must therefore, be examined. In the case of (5) Jagannath Misra v. State of Orissa (A.I.R. 1966 S. C. 1140) the Supreme Court in considering a case of detention under the Rule 30 (1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules pointed out that the Defence of India Rules deprived a citizen of this country of his personal liberty and in view of the suspension of some of the fundamental rights by the 'President on account of the emergency, a citizen had very limited right of challenge against an order of detention properly passed under the Rules. It was therefore the duty of the. Court to see whether the authority concerned bad acted with all due care and caution and with the sense of responsibility necessary when a citizen was deprived of his liberty without trial. Where this was not done or complied with, person detained, the Supreme• Court points out, would be entitled to be released. 7. Court to see whether the authority concerned bad acted with all due care and caution and with the sense of responsibility necessary when a citizen was deprived of his liberty without trial. Where this was not done or complied with, person detained, the Supreme• Court points out, would be entitled to be released. 7. In the case of (4) Durgadas Shirali v. Union of India, (A.I.R. 1966 S. C. 1078) the Supreme Court considered the question of malafide, where a citizen was detained under Rule 30 (1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules, in the light of the President's order and held that such a challenge was outside the preview of the President's Order. The Supreme Court observes as follows :- Similarly it will be open to the citizen to challenge the order of detention on the ground that any of the grounds given in the order of detention is irrelevant and there is no real and proximate connection between the ground given and the object which the legislature had in view". Reference in this connection may also be made to the case of (3) K. Ananda Nambiar v. Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 657) where certain propositions had been laid down. In construing the effect of the Presidential Order it is necessary to bear in mind the general rule of construction that where the President's Order purports to suspend the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizen by the Constitution, the said Order must be strictly construed in favour of the citizen's fundamental rights. Last clause of the President's Order postulates that the Defence of India Ordinance or any rule or order made thereunder was valid. It is true that during the pendency of the Presidential Order, the validity of the Ordinance, rule or order made thereunder cannot be questioned on the ground that they contravene Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution; but this limitation will not preclude a citizen from challenging the validity of the Ordinance, rule or order made thereunder on any other ground, as for instance if the order suffers from the vice of excessive delegation, a plea raised by the detenu at the threshold cannot be said to be barred by the President's Order because in terms it is not a "Plea which is relateable to the said fundamental rights specified in the said order. Reference may also be made1 to the case of (6) Jaichand Lal Sethia v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1967 SC 483 ) wherein the Supreme Court was considering the case of a detention under tile Defence of India Rules in he light of the Presidential Order. It was pointed out that during the pendency of the Presidential order, the validity of the Ordinance of any rule or order made thereunder cannot- be questioned on the ground that it contravened Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution but this limitation con not preclude a citizen from challenging the validity of the Ordinance or any rule or order made thereunder on any other ground. In that event the Presidential Order cannot come into operation. It was not also open to the detenu to challenge the order on the ground of contravention of Article 19 because as soon as a declaration of emergency is issued by the President the provisions of Article 19 are automatically suspended but the appellant as per provisions of Article 358 of the Constitution can challenge the validity of the order on grounds other than those covered by Article 358 or the Presidential Order issued under Article 359 (1). Such a challenge is outside the preview of the Presidential Order. For instance, a citizen would not be deprived of the right to move an appropriate Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his detention has been ordered malafide. Similarly, it will be open to the citizen to challenge the order of detention on the ground that any of the grounds given in the detention is irrelevant and there is no real or proximate connection between the grounds given and the object which the legislature has in view. 8. In other words, where these claims put forward by the citizens in a Court of law cannot be examined or effectively adjudicated upon without examining the question as to whether the citizen is in substance seeking to enforce any of the specified fundamental rights, or as observed by the Supreme Court in (1) Makhan Singh Tarsikha's case (paragraph 19) whether a particular proceeding falls within the mischief of the Presidential Order or not, what has to be examined is not so much the form which the proceeding has taken, or the words in which the relief is claimed but the substance of the matter. Every case has therefore to be examined on its own merits to assess the position. 9. These challenges are, accordingly, open to the detenu in a writ for habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution. We are therefore unable to accept the contention put forward by the learned Advocate-General and Mr. N. C. Chakraborti on behalf of tile Union of India that the Court is precluded from looking into or granting any reliefs to the detenu who is detained under the new Act of 1974. 10. The learned Advocate General has drawn our attention to the language used in the Presidential Order in his endeavour to distinguish the same from the Order of 1962 which we have quoted hereinbefore. The instant presidential Order runs thus: GAZETTEE OF INDIA EXTRAORDINARY DATED DEC. 23, 1974 In exercise of the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 359 of the Constitution, the President hereby declares that: (A) The tight to move any court with respect to orders of detention which have already been made or which may hereafter be made under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (52 of 1974), with respect to any other action (including the making of any declaration under section 9 of the said Act) which has already been or hereafter to be taken or omitted to be taken in respect of detention under such orders, for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 21 and clause (4), clause (5) read with clause (6) and clause (7) of Article 22 of the Constitution and (B) All proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of any of the aforesaid rights with respect to orders of detention made under the said Act or any other action including the making of any declaration under the said section (9) taken or omitted to be taken in respect of detention under such orders shall remain suspended for a period of six months from the date of issue of this order or the period during which the proclamation of emergency issued under (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution on the 3rd December, 1971 remains in force whichever period expires earlier. This order shall extend to the whole of the territory of India". This order shall extend to the whole of the territory of India". It is true that the Presidential Order which the learned Advocate General relies is differently worded than the Order of 1962 and is unquestionably of wider amplitude but the principles enuntiated by the Supreme Court, in our view, would apply with equal force to the present Presidential Order. We are not therefore prepared to accede that a different view should be adopted in interpreting the instant Presidential Order. 11. We will now turn to the examination of the provisions of the new Act under which the detenu has been detained. The learned Advocate General submits that there is no other legal right, apart from Constitutional rights, available to the detenu under the New Act; in view of the language used in Section 3 (3) and Section 8 of the new Act. Mr. Ray on behalf of the detenu concedes that it is not open to him to challenge the validity of the Act on the anvil of Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution in view of the Presidential Order and he is not entitled to challenge his detention with reference to these rights. He, however, contents that the statutory provisions of the new Act enacted by the Parliament in exercise of its plenary powers, are required to be complied with and if there is infraction of the same, the Order is open to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. He further adds that subject to the soverignty and supremacy of the Constitution, the Parliament's power to make the Jaw is plenary and the Parliamentary enactment cannot come within scope and ambit of the Presidential Order under Article 359 (1) of the Constitution. He has referred to the Reference case reported in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 745. The learned Advocate General does not challenge the Parliament's plenary power of legislation but contends that in making the enactment the Parliament has linked section 3 (3) and Section 8 of the new Act with the provisions of Article 22 of the Constitution of India and it is not for the Court to delink the same. It is necessary for us to advert to these provisions of the new Act. It is necessary for us to advert to these provisions of the new Act. Section 3 (3) runs this : "(3) For the purposes of clause (5) of article 22 of the Constitution, the communication to a person detained in pursuance of a detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention" Section 8 of the Dew Act runs as follows : "For the purposes of sub-clause (a) of clause (4), and sub-clause (c) of clause (7), of Article 22 of the Constitution," Section 8 (a) and 8 (b) are quoted separately in this connection. "(a) the Central Government and each State Government shall, whenever necessary, constitute one or more Advisory Boards, each of which shall consist of a Chairman and two other persons possessing the qualifications specified in sub-clause (a) of clause (4) of article 22 of the Constitution; (b) save as otherwise provided in Section 9, the appropriate Government shall, within five weeks from the date of detention of a person under a detention order make a reference in respect thereof to the Advisory Board constituted under clause (a) to enable the Advisory Board to make the report under sub-clause (a) of clause (4) of article 22 of the Constitution". Other part of section 8 need not be quoted for our purpose. The learned Advocate-General contends that the provisions of section 3 (3) and section 8 (a) and (b) would not be-available to the detenu because those provisions were introduced by the Parliament for the purpose of the Constitution and have no seperate existence apart from the Constitution so that with the suspension of the right under Article 22 (4) to (7) of the Constitution, the rights under the statute would not be available for enforcement in a court of law, as such as provisions being linked to the Constitution remains suspended during a period of six months as mentioned by the Presidential Order. Mr. Mr. Rayon behalf of the detenu joins issue on this point by contending that the Parliament was making the aforesaid eractment with full awareness of the Constitutional provisions for the purpose of introducing a check on President's powers and the provisions of the statute are independent of the Constitutional provisions and are not within the sweep of the Presidential Order. It is worthy of note in this connection that the Maintenance of Internal Security Act,1971 (to be hereinafter referred to as the old Act) was amended by the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1974 whereby "conservation of foreign exchange" or "smuggling of goods" or "abetting other persons to smuggle goods" Or "dealing in smuggle goods" were included within the category of prejudicial activities and for regulating and/ or controlling such prejudicial activities, the Act of 1971 was amended. The amendment came into force On September 17, 1974, and on November 16. 1974, the President made a declaration under Article 359(1) of the Constitution whereby the right to move any court with respect of the order of detention made under section 3(1)(c) of the Old Act for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and clauses (4) to (7) of Articles 22 of the Constitution were suspended for a period of six months from date of issue of the order or during which the Proclamation of Emergency issued under clause (1) of Article 359 of the Constitution was in force. The provision of Section 8(1) of the old Act was not in any way modified with the introduction of section 3(1)(c) in that Act. This section 8 provided for the communication of the ground of order of detention to the detenu and also afforded him an opportunity to make a representation. This section re-enacts the constitutional safeguard guaranteed to a person in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and it is conceded on all hands that apart from the fundamental rights embodied in Article 22 (5) the detenu also had a statutory right under section 8(1) of the old Act and although these two rights overlap, they were also distinct and separate. It is significant to note that section 3(3) of the new Act of 1974 makes a clear departure from Section 8(1) of the old Act, i.e., communication of the ground to the detenu within the specified date was linked up with the constitutional right under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution by use of the opening words "for the purpose of clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution." The parliament obviously enacted sub-section (3) of Section 3 and Section 8 of the new Act in order to conform to the constitutional requirements of the statute, as otherwise the statute would have been violative of the provisions of Article 22 of the Constitution. But the Parliament also thereby intended that such statutory rights as granted thereunder would be linked with the constitutional provisions with the result that with the suspension of constitutional rights under Article 22, the statutory rights ceased to have any independent existence. These statutory provisions could not be separated or clearly demarcated from the constitutional provisions, which stood suspended so far as the detenu is concerned. The necessity of communication under the statute would still be the-re, because as Soon as the Presidential Order comes to an end, the order of detention will be open to challenge on that ground. For the Presidential Order does, not mean a holiday for the executive from its statutory obligations but is only suspends the right of the detenu to enforce his fundamental rights enshrined in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution, so long as the 'Presidential Order remains in force.. Consequently, failure on the part of the executive to communicate the ground to the detenu or non-consideration of the representation submitted by the detenu will not be open to challenge in a court of law. We, accordingly, uphold the contention of the learned Advocate-General that "the detenu is not entitled to challenge his detention based on the ground communicated in accordance with section 3(3) of the Act during the period the Presidential Order remains in force. 12. We, accordingly, uphold the contention of the learned Advocate-General that "the detenu is not entitled to challenge his detention based on the ground communicated in accordance with section 3(3) of the Act during the period the Presidential Order remains in force. 12. Let us now examine the provisions of section 8, the opening words of which run as follows: "For the purposes of sub-clause (a) of clause (4) and sub-clause (c) of clause (7) of Article 22 of the Constitution....." The rights conferred by clauses, (a) and (b) of Section 8 are being expressly linked with sub-clause (a) of clause (4) and sub-clause (c) of clause (7) of Article 22 of the Constitution. Clause (a) of Section 8 provides that the Chairman and members of an Advisory Board constituted by the Central Government and the State Government must possess qualifications specified in sub-clause (a) clause (4) of Article 22 of the Constitution. Sub-clause (b) similarly requires an Advisory Board constituted under the aforesaid sub-clauses (a) to make a report under sub-clause (a) of clause (4) of Article 22 of the Constitution. Mr. Ray contended that the Advisory Board to be constituted under clause (a) of Section 8 shall continue to function in accordance with the provisions of the succeeding clause of section 8 of the new Act, even though the right to enforce the fundamental rights in clauses (4) and (7) of Article 22 remains suspended by the Presidential Order and any infraction of these requirements gives him a right to move the court. That would mean that the opening words of section 8 of the new Act, "for the purposes of sub-clause (a) of clause (4) and sub-clause (c) of clause (7) of Articles 22 of the Constitution" are either non-existent or the section has got to be read without those words. It is well settled that when a legislation is repealed and re-enacted substantially on the same terms, the' new legislation is taken to have been drafted with knowledge of the judicial decisions on the old. (vide, Maxwell, The Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Ed. 1969 at page 73). Mr. It is well settled that when a legislation is repealed and re-enacted substantially on the same terms, the' new legislation is taken to have been drafted with knowledge of the judicial decisions on the old. (vide, Maxwell, The Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Ed. 1969 at page 73). Mr. Ray however contends that the Parliament was fully aware of the judicial decisions on section 8 and sections 9 to 12 of the old Act and if the Parliament advisedly introduced those opening words in the new sections then its intention was to put a check on the Presidential powers in the event pf the President acting under Article 359 (1) of the Constitution. Such an interpretation in our view, can not be accepted for the sections, in our view, cannot have any independent existence without the opening words. We hold accordingly, that these two provisions in the enactment are linked to the Constitution and have no independent or separate existence apart from the provisions of Article 22 of which falls within the purview of the Presidential Order. Apart from those provisions of the statute which we have discussed hereinbefore, attack or challenge based on infraction of other statutory rights not linked with the Constitution in the new Act will still be available to the detenu; for instance, the detenu would be at liberty to challenge the order of detention on the ground that the provision of section 3 (1) has not been complied with or that the prejudicial activity does not fall within the categories enumerated in Section 3(1). The detenu is also entitled to challenge the legality of the order of detention on grounds which emerge from the Supreme Court decisions to which we have already referred. We decide the preliminary point in the aforesaid light and hold that the Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution can be entertained in this Court and the detenu is entitled to challenge the order of detention on these other grounds, available to him. This instant application will be heard on merits.