A. N. SURTI, T. U. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) [in this Triple murder case the accused was convicted under secs. 302-201 of the Indian Penal Code and his son under sec. 201 I. P. Code for alleged murder of the wife and two daughters of the accused Mr. M. M. Desai Advocate of the accused submitted that the trial Judge has erred in law in taking into consideration of the discovery evidence about the three dead bodies. His Lordships after narrating and discussing the facts of the case further observed:- ( 2 ) MR. Desai submitted that having regard to the aforesaid evidence of P. S. I. Pathak Ex. 38 panch Maganbhai Motibhai Ex. 13 and panch Manabhai Ex. 19 the following facts are established beyond any doubt. (1) That when the accused person were interrogated by the police on 25 April 1974 both the accused persons made a joint statement before the police and the panchas that they had buried the three dead bodies in their field and that they were willing to show the same. (2) That both the accused persons willingly and voluntarily entered the jeep and went to their field and both the accused persons removed the earth from the pit situated in their field. (3) That both the accused persons took out the three dead bodies from the pit situated in their field. On the strength of the aforesaid established facts Mr. Desai submitted that the learned trial Judge erred in law in taking into consideration the aforesaid discovery evidence for passing the ultimate order of conviction and sentence against the accused persons. ( 3 ) IN order to substantiate the aforesaid contention Mr. Desai firstly invited our attention to secs. 24 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 Sec. 24 provides for confessions made by accused persons caused by inducement threat or promise and they are irrelevant in a criminal proceeding. Sec. 25 provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. Sec. 26 provides for confessions made by accused persons in custody of police and the same can only be proved against the accused persons if they are made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Mr. Desai thereafter invited our attention to sec. Sec. 26 provides for confessions made by accused persons in custody of police and the same can only be proved against the accused persons if they are made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Mr. Desai thereafter invited our attention to sec. 27 which is as follows :-PROVIDED that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a police officer so much of such information whether it amounts to a confession or not as dates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. ( 4 ) THE principle underlying sec. 27 of the Evidence Act is explained as follows in Naresh Chandra v. Emperor A. I. R. 1942 Calcutta 593 at page 603. Sec. 27 is enacted as an exception or qualifying rule of evidence being framed as a proviso upon the proceedings in secs. 25 and 26. One cannot fail to discern the evil or mischief which it is the intention of the Legislature to meet by enacting secs. 25 and 26 Evidence Act. Sec. 27 contemplates data which refute the possible discrediting circumstances in view of which secs. 25 and 26 are enacted by supplying material corroboration in the facts discovered. The principle upon which the rejection of confession made by an accused person to a police officer or which he is in the custody of a police officer is founded so that a confession thus made or obtained is untrustworthy. If circumstances however appear which rebut the presumption of its being false and demonstrate its truth the confession should be allowed. When in consequence of information furnished by the accused a fact is discovered. then the discovery of that fact supplies a guarantee of the truth of the information which may amount to a confession. The confession in so far as it is confirmed by the discovery should be deemed to be true. ( 5 ) MR. Desai submitted that in the instant case three dead bodies are discovered in consequence of information received by the police from both the accused persons charged with the offence and hence the aforesaid discovery of three dead bodies should not b:- treated as guarantee of the truth of the information given by the aforesaid two accused person. ( 6 ) IN this behalf in the case of R. v. Babulal (1884) 6a. ( 6 ) IN this behalf in the case of R. v. Babulal (1884) 6a. 509 (P. B.) at PP. 549 and 550 it is observed by Straight J. as follows:-I have more than once pointed out that it is not a proper course where two persons are being tried to allow a witness to state they said this or they said that or the prisoners then said. It is certainly not at all likely that both the persons should speak at once and it is the right of each of them to have the witness required to depose as nearly as possible to the exact words he individually used. And I may add where a statement is being detailed by a constable as having been made by an accused in consequence of which he discovered a certain fact or contain facts the strictest precision should be enjoined on the witness so that there may be no room for mistake or misunderstanding In detailing statements of this kind which are alleged to have led to discovery it is of the essence of things that what each prisoner said should be precisely and separately stated. If the evidence was not clear upon this point and the witness refused to be more explicit the Judge should have paid Do attention to it. ( 7 ) MR. Desai submitted that in the instant case it is impossible to find out and there is no evidence on the record to come to the conclusion what each of the accused said precisely and separately. Mr. Desai urged that the evidence is not at all clear on this point and we should not pay any attention to the aforesaid discovery evidence. ( 8 ) IN Lakshman Singh v. The State A. I. R. 1952 Supreme Court 167 the Supreme Court considered the Discovery evidence collected at the instance of one of the three accused persons who were interrogated by the police in course of the investigation. In that case three accused persons made certain statements which were duly recorded by the police. In those statements it was disclosed that the dead bodies were thrown in the Sakinala. thereafter the police party with the three accused went to Sakinala where each of them pointed out a place where different parts of the dead bodies were recovered. In that case three accused persons made certain statements which were duly recorded by the police. In those statements it was disclosed that the dead bodies were thrown in the Sakinala. thereafter the police party with the three accused went to Sakinala where each of them pointed out a place where different parts of the dead bodies were recovered. Paragraph 11 at page 169 of the aforesaid judgment in the context of the aforesaid facts provides as follows:-THE learned counsel for the appellants cited a number of rulings in which sec. 27 has been construed to mean that it is only the information which is first given that ill admissible and once a fact has been discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence it cannot be said to be rediscovered in consequence of information received from another accused person. It was urged before us that the prosecution was bound to adduce evidence to prove as to which of the three accused gave the information first. The head constable who recorded the statements of the three accused has not stated which of them gave the information first to him but Bahadur Singh one of the witnesses who attested the recovery memos was specifically asked in cross-examination about it and he stated:- I cannot say from whom information was got first. In the circumstances it was contended that since it cannot be ascertained which of the accused first gave the information the alleged discoveries cannot be proved against any of the accused persons. It seems to us that if the evidence adduced by the prosecution is found to be open to suspicion and it appears that the police have deliberately attributed similar confessional statements relating to facts discovered to different accused persons in order to create evidence against all of them the case undoubtedly demands a must cautious approach But. as to what should be the rule when there is clear and unimpeachable evidence as to independent and authentic statements of the nature referred to in sec. 27 Evidence Act having been made by several accused persons either simultaneously or otherwise all that we wish to say is that as at present advised we ate inclined to think that some of the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants have perhaps gone farther than is warranted by the language of sec. 27 Evidence Act having been made by several accused persons either simultaneously or otherwise all that we wish to say is that as at present advised we ate inclined to think that some of the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants have perhaps gone farther than is warranted by the language of sec. 27 and it may be that on a suitable occasion in future those cases may have to be reviewed. For the purpose of this appeal however it is sufficient to state that even if the argument put forward on behalf of the appellants which apparently found favour with the High Court is correct the discoveries made at the instance of Swarn Singh cannot be ruled out of consideration. It may be that several of the accused gave information to the police that the dead bodies could be recovered in the Sakinala which is a stream running over several miles but such an indefinite information could not lead to any discovery unless the accused followed it up by conducting the police to the actual spot where parts of the two bodies were recovered. From the evidence of the head constable as well as that of Bahadur Singh it is quite clear that Swarn Sing led the police via Salimpura to a particular spot on Sakinala and it was at his instance that bloodstained earth was recovered from a place outside the village and he also pointed out the trunk of the body of Darshan Singh. The learned judges of the High Court were satisfied as appears from their judgment that this was the initial pointing out and therefore the case was covered even by the rule which according to the counsel for the appellants is the rule to be applied in the present case. ( 9 ) IN Emperor v. Shivputraya A. I. R. 1930 Bombay 244 the relevant facts are that accused Nos. 1 to 4 on being questioned by the police gave the information and offered to point out the places where the stolen property had been concealed. In that case the four accused persons led the police and the panchas to the place where they said that they had secreted the ornaments. The accused persons took the party near the Patils tank. There was nearby a prickly pear hedge. They could not be seen from outside. In that case the four accused persons led the police and the panchas to the place where they said that they had secreted the ornaments. The accused persons took the party near the Patils tank. There was nearby a prickly pear hedge. They could not be seen from outside. All the accused pointed out the same place as the one where they had secreted the stolen jewellery. In that case at page 248 it is observed as follows :-THE statements of the accused being deposed to as having been jointly made in this manner it is not clear whose statement led to the discovery of the property. When a fact is discovered in consequence of information given by one accused and other accused persons also give the same information it is not legitimate to say that the fact is discovered within the meaning of sec. 27 from the information given by all of them. Further owing to the form in which these statements of the accused have been deposed to. is not even possible to say that the statement which actually led to the discovery of the property was an incriminating statement at all. ( 10 ) IN Durlav Namasudra v. Emperor A. I. R. 1932 Calcutta p. 297 at p. 299 it is observed as follows :-THE statement made by the first individual (one of the four accused persons) under sec. 27 and in the circumstances described therein may be treated as evidence against him; but it is not allowable under the provisions of the law to treat the evidence of the other -persons who may have made statements of the description referred to in sec. 27 as evidence admissible under the provisions of that section. . . _ And it has always been held that the fact discovered should not be treated as having been discovered from the joint information of all the persons who may have made statements under sec. 27 and in the circumstances stated in section. . . . . . . . . . . . It should be deposed that a particular fact has been discovered from the information of one person and this will let in under sec. 27 so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact discovered by reason of the statement made by that one person. . . . . . . . . . . . It should be deposed that a particular fact has been discovered from the information of one person and this will let in under sec. 27 so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact discovered by reason of the statement made by that one person. ( 11 ) IN Rafiqueuddin Ahmad v. Emperor A. I. R. 1935 Calcutta 184 at page 188 it is observed as follows :- Where joint acts of several persons are sought to be proved in order to ask the Court to draw an inference from such conduct evidence should be led with some degree of particularity so that it may be possible for the Court to draw the necessary inference from the conduct of each one of the persons concerned in the act The principle applies not only to evidence relevant under sec 27 but also to that under see 8 Evidence Act. ( 12 ) IN Abdul Kader v. Emperor A. I. R. 1946 Calcutta 452 at page 456 in paragraph 13 it is stated at follows :-IN the case which we are now considering there has been no attempt to indicated which of the accused Fazil or Kalu first made the statement which led to the discovery or pointed out the place in which the different alamats were found Indeed the evidence adduced indicates that the statements were made jointly and the action was taken jointly a state of affairs which though not perhaps entirely impossible is certainly distinctly improbable moreover it is admitted that Fazil and Salu had both made statements to the Sub-Inspector which he had recorded separately and it was on the basis of these statements that these accused persons took the Sub Inspector and the witnesses to certain places and that the alamats went recovered If of course the prosecution are in a position to establish that the statements or the action which led to the discovery were actually made or took place simultaneously we do not think that evidence in regard to the simultaneous statements or the simultaneous action would be entirely shut out by the provisions of sec 27 Evidence Act but there must be clear and satisfying evidence on this point such as will enable the Court to decide and to give a specified direction to the jury whether the evidence is admissible against both of the accused or against either and if so against which The learned Sessions Judge recognised the difficulty in this case and in the end of his charge attempted to explain to the jurors the position in case they thought that either of the accused had made the statement first. The provisions of sec 298 Criminal P C however enjoin that it is the duty of the Judge to decide all questions as to the admissibility of evidence and we do not think it was proper for him to put this matter before the jury in the manner in which he did and to leave it to the jurors to decide whether this important evidence relating to discoveries was admissible against either of the accused Fazil or Kalu or against both We realise of course the difficulties in deciding in all cases which particular accused first made the statement or first took the action which in fact led to the discovery and that there may be some element of unfairness in the admission of evidence of discovery against one accused and its exclusion against another merely because the former accused happened to make his statement or took some action just a little earlier but it has been consistently recognised that the provisions of sec 27 Evidence Act must be very strictly construed and the decision of the Courts in regard to admissibility of statements made by more than one accused must be followed We are not satisfied that the evidence adduced in this case vas sufficient to show that the evidence of joint statements was admissible against both Fazil and Kalu or whether any particular part of that evidence was admissible against either Fazil or Kalu though it will be open to the prosecution in the retrial which we propose to order to satisfy the Court in regard to those matters if it is in a position to do so ( 13 ) IN Gurubaru Praja v. The King A. I. R. 1949 Orissa 67 at page 69 in paragraph 7 it is observed as follows :-IF in consequence of an information given by one of the several accused Persons the incriminating material is discovered it does not remain to be discovered within the meaning of sec. 27 Evidence Act in consequence of any subsequent information given by any other. That would amount to discovery of a thing already discovered. Taken in this sense the word discovery will lose its meaning. Apart from the question of principle the evidence is not clear as to who gave the information first and who next. 27 Evidence Act in consequence of any subsequent information given by any other. That would amount to discovery of a thing already discovered. Taken in this sense the word discovery will lose its meaning. Apart from the question of principle the evidence is not clear as to who gave the information first and who next. Had it been known we could have held the statement made first by one of the two accused persons as admissible in evidence against him; but the evidence is too vague to lead us to any conclusion as to which of the accused persons made the statement in consequence whereof the dead body was discovered first. ( 14 ) IN Motilal v. State A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 54 at page 56 and 57 in para 10 and 29 respectively the Court observed as follows :-WHAT is not desirable to admit is vague and indefinite statement like saying two or more persons said this and said that. What should be insisted upon by the Courts is that the statements should be recorded as precisely as possible attributing the respective words to each accused whether they made the statements simultaneously or immediately one after the other before the discovery of the fact was made. As a rule of prudence vagueness in such statements of information leading to the discovery of a fact should be avoided. THE scope of sec. 27 can be simply stated in this way. If a relevant fact is discovered in consequence of statements made by one or more accused in custody so much of those statements as relates distinctly to the discovery of that fact is admissible under s c. 27. No such statements relating to a relevant fact is admissible if it is made after the discovery of that fact or if it does not relates distinctly to the fact discovered. ( 15 ) IN Karuppa v. State of Kerala A. I. R. 1960 Kerala p. 238 at page 239 in paragraph 4 provides as follows :-IN the present case there is a distinction in that the same statement is said to have been made to the Police Officer by the three accused but the principle applies equally for there is no knowing on whose information the material fact was discovered. The recovery of these articles is therefore no incriminating circumstances against this accused. The recovery of these articles is therefore no incriminating circumstances against this accused. The fact remained that this accused was found in the company of accused 1 and 2 at the time they were arrested on the 22nd October 1958 This was several days after the occurrence and this in it itself is not a circumstance of great evidentiary value in fixing the accused guilt. THE Court referred the observations made by Wadsworth J. in Peria Guruswami Gounder v. Emperor 1941 Mad. WN 766 A. I. R. 1941 Madras 765 It seems to us improper to treat as individual statements of two different persons a composite statement of this kind which appears to have been made up of information gathered from the two persons it being impossible to say how much of the statement was made by one of them and how much was made by the other. In Peria Guruswami Gounders case (Supra) the Court observed at page 766 as follows :-IT appears to us that sec. 27 Evidence Act has no application to a confessional statement made to a police officer before the deponent has come into the custody of that police officer. Moreover it seems to us improper to treat as the individual statements of two different persons a composite statement of this kind which appears to have been made up of information gathered from the two persons it being impossible to say how much of the statement was made by one of them and how much was made by the other. ( 16 ) IN Re. Sheikh Mehboob A. I. R. 1942 Madras 542 it is observed as follows :-THE only evidence against the accused persons was a confession which is said to have been made by them and which led to the discovery of the stolen articles. All the four accused could not of course have been questioned together nor is it to be believed that they simultaneously made a confession of their guilt. All the four accused could not of course have been questioned together nor is it to be believed that they simultaneously made a confession of their guilt. If the police officer and the other panchayatdars had discovered the whereabouts of the stolen article from the statement of one accused 4 the statements of the other accused would not be admissible because they did not lead to any discovery There is no evidence on record which leads one to conclude that it was accused 4 who made the crucial statement or that it was accused 4 who led the panchayatdars to the place where the stolen articles were found. I think therefore that he should be given the benefit of the doubt and acquittal. ( 17 ) IN State Government M. P. v. Chhotalal Mohanlal A. I. R. 1955 Nagpur 71 the relevant facts are that in course of investigation two accused persons admitted the offence as per memorandum of admission and got the stolen property duly recovered in hidden condition as per seizure memo in the presence of the witnesses. On these Facts the points for determination in the appeal were as follows :- (I) Are the statements made by the respondents (accused persons) joint statements or are they distinct and separate statements ? (II) Are joint statements of the accused persons leading to discovery not admissible in evidence ? (III) Assuming those statements are admissible in evidence as alleged by the prosecution can an inference of guilt under sec. 379 I. P. C. be drawn against the respondents ?in that case the statement alleged to have been made by accused Chhotalal is as under :-I and Hirachand have kept (them) hidden at mile No. 313 in the jungle near the railway line 3 bales in the nala and 2 bales in the bushes. I can go and point out them. Hirachand Teli and I together have concealed the bales for which I shall go and point out. The statement alleged to have been made by accused Hirachand is as under :-ALL these 5 bales were kept hidden on the same day in the night before sun-rise I am prepared to go and point. In that case prosecution witness Raghubeersingh who was present at the time the statements were made deposed:-THE three accused mentioned by me above (the witness is referring to Hirachand Chhotalal and Mangilal) were also there present. In that case prosecution witness Raghubeersingh who was present at the time the statements were made deposed:-THE three accused mentioned by me above (the witness is referring to Hirachand Chhotalal and Mangilal) were also there present. The police enquired from these three accused about the cotton cloth bales which were stolen from the running train. On being questioned the accused Hirachand had volunteered to point out the cloth bales. The statement about this was recorded by the S. I. in my presence. Similarly the accused Chhotalal had also agreed to point out the cloth bales and hence his statement was also recorded to this effect by the S. I. in my presence. The two accused then agreed to take the police party to the spot to point out the cloth bales. Accordingly the two accused then led the police party to the spot. The S. I. Railway Police along with his assistants myself Mal Babu were then taken by these accused persons to the spot. We all had 8one to the spot by the goods train by getting into the brakes van of the train. The accused were told by the S. I. that the train would be stopped whenever they tell us to do so for the purposes of pointing the spot according to them. Accordingly when the train was in motion and when we were near the mile number 313 the accused Hirachand asked the S. I. to stop the train. Accordingly the train was stopped there when we approached that mile post. . . . . The bale was seized under memo Exhibit F-9 which is signed by me as an attesting witness. The same is also signed by the accused Hirachand in my presence The cloth bale Article A is the bale produced by the accused Hirachand from the bush. I can identify it because of the tar marks thereon. The accused Hirachand then led us to other spot at some distance away from the tree. He then took us by the side of the Nala about thirty paces from the tree. The accused Hirachand then took out another bale from the bushes near the nala. Article B is the bale taken out by the accused from the nala. The accused Chhotalal then took us some distance away from the Nala for showing the other bales for which he was questioned. The accused Hirachand then took out another bale from the bushes near the nala. Article B is the bale taken out by the accused from the nala. The accused Chhotalal then took us some distance away from the Nala for showing the other bales for which he was questioned. The accused Chhotalal then produced three cloth bales from the bushes which were at a distance of about 20 paces from the nala. The two bales were produced from one place and the third one was lying close to those two bales. In paragraph 14 the Court observed as follows:-A scrutiny of the aforesaid evidence will show that the information given by both the respondents was simultaneous. . In paragraph 15 it is observed that on the evidence it is not established as to which of the two persons made the statement first. No doubt at the spot the two bales were pointed out first by Hirachand then three bales were pointed out by Chhotalal. But it cannot be said that the discovery made by Hirachand or that the discovery made by Chhotalal was consequent upon the statement made by him. As would be seen from the portions of the depositions quoted above both the respondents knew the place where all the five bales were hidden. In paragraph 17 the court observed as follows:-TO our mind it appears that the Sub Inspector has made Hirachand to discover two bags and Chhotalal to discover three bags not because Hirachand or Chhotalal was individually not in a position to discover all the five bags; but to establish the fact that both the accused persons knew the places where the bales were keptthe court took the view that the facts discovered by each of the accused affords guarantee about the truthfulness of the statement of each of the accused. In paragraphs 21 and 22 it is stated as follows:-We are not in agreement with the view that the words a person in sec. 27 Evidence Act in any way excludes admission of information from more than one persons simultaneously received provided it fulfils the requirements of sec. 27. Sec. 13 (2) General Clauses Act provides that words in the singular shall include the plural and vice versa provided there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context. In our opinion there is nothing repugnant in the provisions of sec. 27. Sec. 13 (2) General Clauses Act provides that words in the singular shall include the plural and vice versa provided there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context. In our opinion there is nothing repugnant in the provisions of sec. 27 for acceptance of statements jointly made by more than one person provided that facts discovered in Consequence thereof afford some guarantee about truthfulness of their statements. It will depend on the facts of each case. There cannot be rediscovery of the fact already discover such is not the case here. Facts discovered by each of the accused are distinct and separate. ( 18 ) IN Faquira v Emperor A. I. R. 1929 Lahore 665 at page 666 it is observed as follows:- it has been frequently pointed out by this Court that these joint discoveries are not admissible at all against any of the accused unless it can be shown who first made the discovery. If sec. 27 is to be used then since the information has been supplied by the first person to the police subsequent peaces of information are not information leading to any discovery. ( 19 ) WE have carefully considered the aforesaid decisions cited at the bar and we are of the view that in the instant case the joint statement made by the accused persons is not per sc inadmissible in evidence. The Court must necessarily take into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. It is of the utmost importance that before the discovery evidence is considered against the accused persons the alleged discovery of offending articles must be made in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a police officer and that such information relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered. The subsequent conduct of accused in the discovery of the offending articles must necessarily guarantee the truth of the information received from each of the accused persons. In the light of this principle. We are to appreciate the discovery evidence in the instant case. Both the accused persons made a joint statement before the panchas and the police that they had buried the aforesaid three dead bodies. In the light of this principle. We are to appreciate the discovery evidence in the instant case. Both the accused persons made a joint statement before the panchas and the police that they had buried the aforesaid three dead bodies. Both the accused persons led police and the panchas in the field removed the earth from the relevant spot and both the accused persons took out the three dead bodies from a pit in the field on the state of evidence in the instant case it is impossible to come to the conclusion which of the two accused persons gave any specific or definite information to the police and the panchas which related distinctly to the discovery of the three dead bodies. None of the accused persons stated before the police and the panchas that the dead bodies were concealed or buried at a certain distance from any named field or indicating any adjacent boundaries near the spot from where the dead bodies were ultimately found. In this view of the matter we are convinced that the aforesaid discovery evidence cannot be used against the accused persons in order to connect them with the crime in question. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Per T. U. MEHTA J. (Concurring ). ( 20 ) ). I have perused the judgment recorded by my learned brother and I find myself in complete agreement with the views expressed therein. I would however like to add a few lines on the question which is raised at the bar regarding the admissibility as well as acceptability of the discovery evidence made by the accused after making the confessional statement contemplated by sec. 27 of the Evidence Act. . ( 21 ) WHILE construing the provisions sec. 27 of the Evidence Act the court should constantly bear in mind that the section operates as an exception to the prohibitions contained in secs. 27 of the Evidence Act. . ( 21 ) WHILE construing the provisions sec. 27 of the Evidence Act the court should constantly bear in mind that the section operates as an exception to the prohibitions contained in secs. 24 25 and 26 of the Act and should therefore be construed strictly. The prohibitions contained in secs. 24 25 and 26 enact a general rule that a confessional or incriminating statement made by a person in police custody to the police officer himself should never be admitted in evidence. The reason of the rule is that the proof of such a statement does not carry with it any guarantee that it was made voluntarily or that it was true. Sec. 27 however makes an exception in one case wherein such a guarantee is inherent if the information conveyed by the statement of the accused in police custody relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered. In other words law presumes the truth and the voluntaries of such a statement if it leads to the discovery of a fact which was not previously known to the police. If a fact was previously known to the police then there is no guarantee that the knowledge was not falsely ascribed by the police to the concerned accused and therefore the case would not fall in the exception contemplated by sec. 27 This is the crucial point which should be borne in mind when the court is called upon to accept the statements made by more than one persons under sec. 27. ( 22 ) THE facts of this case disclose that both the accused made the crucial statement jointly and simultaneously and then made even the discovery of the concealed dead bodies jointly and simultaneously. The reported cases on the subject to which my learned brother has made a very exhaustive reference show that where there are more than out accused the statements which the courts are generally called upon to consider under sec. 27 are of two types viz. (1) the statements which are made by different accused persons at different times and (2) the statements which are made by more than one accused jointly and simultaneously i. e. at the same time and place. 27 are of two types viz. (1) the statements which are made by different accused persons at different times and (2) the statements which are made by more than one accused jointly and simultaneously i. e. at the same time and place. If a statement of the second type is oral the obvious question which would immediately arise is whether it is possible to believe that all the accused persons made that statement in a chorus. Some courts have therefore rightly pointed out that it is difficult to believe that when statements are made by more than one accused orally they could have been made jointly and simultaneously. In other words there must be some time lag in the so called joint statements if they are oral. In view of this all the so called joint oral statements are covered by the first of the two types mentioned above. ( 23 ) IF once it is believed that there is no joint and simultaneous oral statement strictly so called it must follow as a necessary corollary that every oral statement is separate and should be treated as such. To put it differently only one of the several accused persons can be said to have made the first statement and the statements made by the other accused must be taken to be subsequent statements. The pertinent question which arises here is how far these subsequent statements are admissible and how far they can be accepted in proof of the prosecution case. ( 24 ) I am of the opinion that a correct answer to this question should depend upon the facts of each case. It cannot be said that because a statement happens to be a subsequent one following a similar statement made by one accused it becomes ipso facto inadmissible If the time lag between the first and the subsequent statement is much and if after taking into account the facts and the circumstances is of the case the court is of the opinion that subsequent statement is likely to have been wrongly ascribed to the concerned accused the court may reject the subsequent statement either as inadmissible or as unacceptable. But simply because statement happens to be a subsequent statement it does not become inadmissible. In this sense I agree with my learned brothers observation that a joint statement made by the accused is not per se inadmissible. But simply because statement happens to be a subsequent statement it does not become inadmissible. In this sense I agree with my learned brothers observation that a joint statement made by the accused is not per se inadmissible. ( 25 ) IT should be recalled that even an inculpatory statement made by an accused in police custody is made admissible by sec. 27 of the Evidence Act only to the extent to which it relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered. Therefore if a statement does not lead to the discovery of any fact it cannot be said that it relates distinctly to any fact. This statement which is not followed by a discovery of any fact cannot be received in evidence. Discovery of a fact pursuant to the statement is therefore a safety valve of the exception carved out by sec. 27. If this safety valve is defective the exception would not operate. ( 26 ) IN my opinion in cases where more than one accused make a joint and simultaneous discovery of the same fact and from the same place the above referred safety valve does not operate because it becomes difficult to know which of the several accused persons are really responsible for discovering the fact in question. A fact which is discovered once cannot be re-discovered and just as it is difficult to conceive a simultaneous joint oral statement by more than one accused it is equally difficult to conceive a simultaneous and joint discovery of a fact by them. ( 27 ) WE can of course conceive a case wherein more than one accused make an oral statement giving the same type of information one after the other in quick succession. But even in such a case unless the guarantee of the truth and voluntaries of such statements is obtained by the discovery of a distinct fact provisions of see. 27 would not in any manner help the prosecution. Suppose for instance two or three accused persons make statements in quick succession giving an information of some or similar nature and then proceed to discover different facts from different places. In such case even though the statements made by them is treated as joint the discovery is not joint because it is the discovery of different facts from different places. Such discoveries guarantee the protection contemplated by sec. In such case even though the statements made by them is treated as joint the discovery is not joint because it is the discovery of different facts from different places. Such discoveries guarantee the protection contemplated by sec. 27 and therefore can be of good use to the prosecution. In my opinion the cases of Lakshman Singh v. State A. I. R. 1952 S. C. 167 and State Govt. of M. P. v. Chhotalal A. I. R. 1955 Nagpur 71 were the cases of this type. ( 28 ) IT is important to note that in Lakshman Singhs case Supreme Court has doubted the correctness of some High Courts decisions on the question of joint and simultaneous statements. Referring to the facts of that case the Supreme Court has clearly observed that even if several accused gave information to the police that dead bodies could be recovered in the Sakinala the said information was indefinite and could not have led to any discovery unless the accused followed it up by conducting the police to the actual spot from where the parts of the dead bodies were recovered. In the Nagpur case different facts were discovered from different places by different accused. Thus in both these cases discovery evidence was accepted only because it could be said that the statement made by each accused related to the facts thereby discovered distinctly. ( 29 ) IN the case before us the evidence is purely of a joint discovery of the same fact from the same place said to have been made by both the accused simultaneously with the result that it is not possible to say which statement of a particular accused relates distinctly to the discovery of a particular fact. Thus in this case the safe guards contemplated by sec. 27 are not evident and in absence of these safe guards the discovery evidence cannot be utilised against any of the accused. Conviction set aside. .