JUDGMENT Chandrsekhara Menon, J. 1. The Cochin Thirumala Devaswom Corporate Educa­tional Agency have two schools under their management. The T. D. High School and the T. D. Basic Training School. A common seniority list is maintained for the teachers in the two schools. Each of the schools, as is required is in charge of a Headmaster. The vacancy in the post of the Headmaster of the High School was ordinarily filled by appointing the seniormost among the teachers who had the requisite qualification. 2. The petitioner was appointed as a High School Assistant under the 1st respondent, the Cochin T. D. Cor­porate Educational Agency in 1961. The appointment was to the High School section. In 1971 he was transferred to the Training School section. He is a graduate having taken the degree both in Arts and Education. He has also passed the test in the Kerala Education Act and the Kerala Education Rules in the year 1974. He appeared for the test conducted in May 1974, the results of which were published in October 1974. 3. The 3rd respondent who is a B.A., B.T. has been in continuous service in the T. D. High School since 3rd July 1959. He has acquired the test qualification in the Kerala Education Act and Rules in the test conducted January-February 1975, the results of which were published on 4th June 1975. Prior to 3rd July 1959, 3rd respondent had also temporary service in the school in the year 1956 though for want of vacancy he had been subsequently thrown out. 4. The previous Headmaster of the High School Sri Hari Prabhu attained the age of superannuation in September 1974. At that time he was under orders of suspension in connection with certain alleged malpractices in the S.S.L.C. Examination conducted in October 1973 in the T.D. High School Cochin Centre. The Senior Assistant of the School Sri K. P. George had also been suspended in connection with same incident. On allegations of mal­practices in the T.T.C. Examination conducted in October 1972, the petitioner was also placed under suspension from 16th January 1973 as per order No. EXA2-40980/72, dated 10th January 1973 of the Director of Public Instruction, Kerala. On 7th June 1974 the order of suspension was cancelled by the Director of Public Instruction as per order dated 7th June 1974, a copy of which has been marked in the case as Ext. On 7th June 1974 the order of suspension was cancelled by the Director of Public Instruction as per order dated 7th June 1974, a copy of which has been marked in the case as Ext. R-1(a) and the petitioner was reinstated on 15th June 1974. The order dated 7th June 1971 of the Director stated that orders as to how the period spent by the petitioner under suspension is to be treated will be passed after the disciplinary proceedings passed against him are completed. The final report in the enquiry against the petitioner was made by the District Educational Officer, Ernakulam on 30th December 1974 whose order is marked as Ext. R-2 in the case where the finding is that though there is no direct proof to establish any corrupt motive on his part, the conduct of the petitioner who was the Assistant Examiner in the T. T. C. II Year Examination of 1972 had not been above board and that he was guilty of various acts of commission and omission which as a conscientious and responsible officer he should not have done. On this report of the District Educational Officer, the Manager passed his proceedings dated 4th February 1975 marked in the case as Ext. P-4 wherein he said:— “On a careful consideration of all the facts of the case, and in view of the findings of the District Educational Officer, Ernakulam, that there is no direct proof to establish any corrupt motive on the part and that serious charges such has receiving illegal gratification etc., are baseless, and taking into consideration the past good conduct of the teacher, I think this is a fit case, where ends of justice will be met, if the teacher is let off with a severe warning. Hence the teacher is hereby severely warned. He is also hereby informed that any future lapse on his part will be dealt with very severely.� 5. After the suspension of the Headmaster, the 3rd respondent had been put in additional charge of the duties of the Headmaster thereof on 15th April 1974, as a stop­gap arrangement with the concurrence of the Education Department. 6. He is also hereby informed that any future lapse on his part will be dealt with very severely.� 5. After the suspension of the Headmaster, the 3rd respondent had been put in additional charge of the duties of the Headmaster thereof on 15th April 1974, as a stop­gap arrangement with the concurrence of the Education Department. 6. The petitioner has approached this Court with this Writ petition for the issue of a writ in the nature of manda­mus or other appropriate order or direction for directing the 1st respondent to fill up the vacancy of the Headmaster’s post in the High School in accordance with rules 43, 44 (1) and 44 A (1) by appointing the petitioner as Headmaster of the school with effect from at least 1st week of October, 1974 and for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari or other appropriate order or direction for quashing the order by the 1st respondent by which the 3rd respondent was permitted to continue in charge of the Headmaster’s post at least up to 1st October 1974 the date on which the petitioner became fully qualified to be appointed as Headmaster. Along with the O. P. the petitioner had moved an injunction application as C. M. P. No. 8080 of 1975 on 9th June 1975 in order to restrain the 1st respondent from appointing the 3rd respondent as Headmaster. When the C. M. P. came up for hearing the learned counsel for the 1st respondent submitted in the court that the 3rd respon­dent will not be appointed as Headmaster till 1st July 1975. This was recorded by the court on 9th June 1975 and the O.P. itself was posted to 25th June 1975 and no further orders also obtained in the petition for injunction. Subsequently the 3rd respondent was appointed as Headmaster with effect from 8th August 1975 and he took charge as Headmaster of the High School on 11th August 1975. This was recorded by the court on 9th June 1975 and the O.P. itself was posted to 25th June 1975 and no further orders also obtained in the petition for injunction. Subsequently the 3rd respondent was appointed as Headmaster with effect from 8th August 1975 and he took charge as Headmaster of the High School on 11th August 1975. On the petitioner’s motion for staying all further proceedings to give approval to the appointment of the 3rd respondent as Headmaster of the High School in C. M. P. No. 12066 of 1975, this Court ordered that the approval if any, of the appointment of the 3rd respondent as Headmaster shall be subject to the result of the O. P. and without prejudice to the petitioner’s claims advanced in the O. P. and also so stated in the order of approval. The petitioner got the O. P. amended by order dated 30th October 1975 in C. M. P. No. 16223 of 1975 by addition of prayers for quashing the order of the Manager dated 8th August 1975 appointing the 3rd res­pondent as Headmaster and directing the District Educa­tional Officer, Ernakulam to see that the 3rd respondent does not function as the Headmaster of the High School and the provisional approval, if already given to the appointment, revoked. 7. The contentions raised by the petitioner are as follows:— As the previous Headmaster of the school attained the age of superannuation in September 1974 and as at that time he was under suspension that gentleman could not have continued in service up till the end of the school year. In any view he would have to be considered to have retired by the end of the school year 1974-75. The 2nd respondent had directed the Manager early in 1975 to fill up the vacancy as per the rules. The petitioner was the only teacher under this management who satisfied all the conditions in the Kerala Education Rules to be appointed as Headmaster at the relevant time. He was eligible to be appointed as Headmaster from 7th May 1974 on which date he appeared for the Kerala Education Act and the Rules test. The result of that test was published in the first week of October 1974. Therefore the petitioner was duly qualified to be appointed as Headmaster from the first week of October 1974. He was eligible to be appointed as Headmaster from 7th May 1974 on which date he appeared for the Kerala Education Act and the Rules test. The result of that test was published in the first week of October 1974. Therefore the petitioner was duly qualified to be appointed as Headmaster from the first week of October 1974. Therefore the petitioner was duly qualified to be appointed as Headmaster from the first week of October 1974 on the publication of the result of the test. The 3rd respondent was not qualified at the relevant period. He became qualified even according to the management only when the results were published of the Kerala Education Act and the Rules test conducted in January-February 1975 on 4th June, 1975. As till that time the petitioner was the only qualified hand to be appointed as Headmaster and as the vacancy arose long before June 1975 the petitioner ought to have been appointed as the Headmaster. For his contentions the petitioner depends upon rules 43, 44 (1) and 44 A (1) to (3) of Chapter XIV (A) of the K. E. R. which are the relevant rules for determining claim and eligibility of a teacher to be appointed as, Headmaster. Those rules are extracted below: “43. Subject to rules 44 and 45 and considerations of efficiency and any general order that may be issued by the Government, vacan­cies in any higher grade of pay shall be filled up by promotion of qualified hands in the lower grade according to seniority, if such hands are available. 44 (1) Appointment of Headmasters shall ordinarily be according to seniority. The Manager will appoint the Headmaster subject to the Rules laid down in the matter. A teacher if he is aggrieved by such appointment will have the right of appeal to the Department. 44 A. (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-rule (1) of rule 44 the minimum service qualification for appointment as Headmaster, in Aided Complete High Schools/Training Schools shall be twelve years of continuous graduate service (with a pass in the test in the Kerala Education Act and the Kerala Education Rules). 44 A. (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-rule (1) of rule 44 the minimum service qualification for appointment as Headmaster, in Aided Complete High Schools/Training Schools shall be twelve years of continuous graduate service (with a pass in the test in the Kerala Education Act and the Kerala Education Rules). (2) If no teacher with the minimum service qualification in the school or schools in the unit is available for appointment as Head­master; the Manager may appoint any other qualified person selected through advertisement in papers following the directions issued by the Director from time to time in the matter. (3) If no teacher with the prescribed service qualifications is available in spite of compliance with the directions referred to in sub rule (2) above, the seniormost graduate teacher on the staff of the school in the unit shall be put in charge for a period not exceeding one year at a time with the approval of the District Educational Officer.� The petitioner also contends that the appointment of the 3rd respondent during the pendency of the O.P. after rule nisi was issued by this Court is illegal and ultra vires. For sustaining that contention he depends upon the decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court reported in Ouseph Ouseph v. Minister for Food A.I.R. 1951 T.C. 226 and P. J. Joseph v. Assistant Excise Commissioner A.I.R. 1953 T.C. 146=I.L.R. 1952 T.C. 960 8. The management has resisted these contentions stating that at the time when the 3rd respondent was appointed he was fully qualified. The qualification at the time of the appointment alone need be looked into. 3rd respondent, who is senior to the petitioner and who had then 14 years of unblemished continuous service in the T.D. School and who had been appointed as Headmaster in charge from 15th April 1974, has been properly appointed as Headmaster. The petitioner has no right to be appointed as Headmaster, in view of the finding by the District Edu­cational Officer that the petitioner’s conduct had been not above board and that he was guilty of sins of commission and omission which as a conscientious and responsible officer, he should not have done although there is no direct proof to establish that he was actuated by any corrupt motives. The findings of the District Educational Officer are not at all complementary to the petitioner and he has not emerged unscathed from the enquiry. There is a serious aspersion on his conduct as a teacher and examiner which would make any management think twice before it could consider him for the Headmaster’s post. Therefore though taking a lenient view the management only inflicted the punishment of censure on him it was thought it would not be proper to appoint him as a Headmaster. The management came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not fit for that post despite the fact that he passed the K.E.R. test earlier. It is pointed out on the basis of a Full Bench deci­sion of this Court that the post of the Headmaster is of pivotal importance in the life of the school as around him wheels the tone and temper of the institution, on him depends the continuity of its tradition, maintenance of its discipline and efficiency of its teaching. It is alleged that the conduct of the petitioner could not inspire confidence in this ability to retrieve the reputation of the schools. The management also thought that the 3rd respondent with his unblemished record of service in the school was the fittest person in the existing circumstances to be appointed as the Headmaster of the T.D. High School. It is also contended that the rule nisi issued by this Court in the writ petition has not disentitled the management from appointing the 3rd respondent as Headmaster in the absence of an existing order of stay in the matter. The 1st respondent also claims that the school is a minority school. The school is owned by Cochin Thirumala Devaswom. Majority of the students in the High School and the Training School belong to Gowda Saraswath Brahmin Community which is a linguistic minority. The schools have been serving effectively the cultural and educational needs of the Community for a long time. The relevant orders by which the Government have recognised the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin Community as a linguistic minority have been produced in the case by the 1st respondent. The said orders are marked as Exts. R-5 to R-8. I need only refer to Ext. The relevant orders by which the Government have recognised the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin Community as a linguistic minority have been produced in the case by the 1st respondent. The said orders are marked as Exts. R-5 to R-8. I need only refer to Ext. R-8 wherein it is stated:— “The Konkani Bhasha Prachar Sabha has represented that the Konkani Linguistic Minority should get the right for the selection of all candidates in the training schools run by them, as they from a Linguistic Minority. The Commissioner for Liguistic Minorities in India has recommended to consider the request of the Sabha in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Indian constitution and also the verdicts of courts in this regard. Government have examined the question in great detail and they are pleased to order that the Konkani Linguistic Minority will have the right for selection of all the candidates for training in the training schools run by them, as they are entitled to the protection guaranteed under Article 30 of the Indian Constitution.'' 9. I think the petitioner’s contentions have to fail. The 3rd respondent had been appointed with the approval of the Department to be the teacher in charge of the Head master’s post much earlier before the then Headmaster who was under suspension retired from service. The Head master’s retirement could take effect as per the rules from the closing of the school for the academic year. There is no statutory rules or orders which prescribe that on the date of the retirement itself the new Headmaster should be appointed. The 3rd respondent was appointed within a reasonable period as Headmaster. There is no rule like 28 (bb) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules in this connection which states that the qualifications should be as on the date of occurrence of the vacancy and not on the date of the appointment. 3rd respondent is senior to the petitioner; on the date of appointment he was duly qualified. I am also satisfied that this is a linguistic minority school. The school belongs to the Cochin Thirumala Devaswom, which exclusively a religious institution of the Gowda Saraswatha Brahmin Community. As pointed out in Ext. R-8 this community is a linguistic minority in the State. No doubt a person who claims that the school is established and administered by a minority has to prove the same. The school belongs to the Cochin Thirumala Devaswom, which exclusively a religious institution of the Gowda Saraswatha Brahmin Community. As pointed out in Ext. R-8 this community is a linguistic minority in the State. No doubt a person who claims that the school is established and administered by a minority has to prove the same. 1st respondent has been able to prove that aspect. That the Cochin Thirumala Deaswom High School is very old High School in the State, that this school was established and it was originally being exclusively conducted out of the funds of the Cochin Thirumala Devaswom is revealed from the Cochin State Manual itself. The institution concerned need not be on seeking to conserve any language, script and culture of the minority for the community claiming right under Article 30 in respect of the institution. I need in this connection refer only to the following decisions of the Supreme Court, W. Proost v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 465. and D.A.V. College, Jullundur v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1737. In the first case Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court had held: “The width of Article 30 (1) cannot be cut down by introducing in it considerations on which Article 29 (1) is based. The latter article is a general protection which is given to minorities to conserve their language, script or culture. The former is a special right to minori­ties to establish educational institutions of their choice. This choice is not limited to institution seeking to conserve language, script or culture and the choice is not taken away if the minority community having established an educational institution of its choice also admits members of other communities. That is a circumstance irrelevant for the application of Article 30 (1) since no such limitation is expressed and none can be implied. The two articles create two separate rights although it is possible that they may meet in a given case�. In the second case this decision had been quoted with approval. The linguistic minority for the purpose of Article 30 (1) is one which must at least have a separate spoken language. It is not necessary that the language should also have a distinct script for those who speak it. 10. In the second case this decision had been quoted with approval. The linguistic minority for the purpose of Article 30 (1) is one which must at least have a separate spoken language. It is not necessary that the language should also have a distinct script for those who speak it. 10. I also find no merit in the contention of the petitioner that the order of appointment of the 3rd respon­dent is invalid as it was subsequent to the issuance of the rule nisi by this Court. The law on the point with reference to the two Travancore-Cochin decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner has been discussed at length by Chandra Reddy Offg. C. J. as he then was speaking for himself and Ansari, J. in Kesava Rao v. Director of P & T, A.I.R. 1958 Andhra Pradesh 697 . As I am in complete agreement with what the learned Judge had stated I would quote it in full: “Lastly, an objection was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the Deputy Director had no jurisdiction to pass an order retiring the petitioner from service after the issue of writ nisi. It is maintained that once the respondent was acquainted with the proceedings started in this court by the petitioner he should not do the very thing which is sought to be prevented. The foundation for this argument is two rulings of the Travancore-Cochin High Court—Ouseph Ouseph v. Minister for Food, A.I.R 1951 Travancore-Cochin 226 (2) (F) and P.J. Joseph v. Assistant Excise Commissioner, A.I.R. 1953 Travancore-Cochin 146 (G). It was held in the first that if a party in order to circumvent the proceedings in a court does anything with the object of rendering the relief to be granted, ineffective, a court’s jurisdiction to pass orders in a manda­tory form restoring the status quo ante to the extent possible was unaffected. It was an fortiori case when the prayer asked for was for the issuance of a writ. The proposition enunciated therein is a familiar one. It is a settled rule of law that if a party does something with the object of getting the position of advantage in the action before a court could interfere, he will not be permitted to plead that since he had already done the thing, it should not be undone. The proposition enunciated therein is a familiar one. It is a settled rule of law that if a party does something with the object of getting the position of advantage in the action before a court could interfere, he will not be permitted to plead that since he had already done the thing, it should not be undone. Such a person does that act at his own risk. The court has ample powers to direct the restoration of the status quo ante. In the other case there was no plea that since the collection was already made though subsequent to the filing of writ, the Govern­ment could not be directed to restore it. Yet, the learned Judge who delivered the opinion of the court and who was a party to A.I.R. 1951 Travancore-Cochin 226 (2) (F) wanted to reiterate the principle referred to above and to refer to two decisions of English Courts—Daniel v. Ferguson, 1891-2 Ch. 27 (H) and Vol. Joel. v. Hornsey, (1895, 2 Ch. 774 (I) as laying down the rule that: “When an application is made for a writ of directions for prohi­biting anything being done, and the court admits the petitioner and issues notice, the respondent should not after getting notice do the very thing sought to be prevented."There need not be any separate order of injunction restraining the doing of it. In cases of urgency, the orders of the court should be taken for the duration of the proceedings or a prayer made for expeditious disposal of the proceedings themselves.� The doctrine of the two English cases cited in the above judgment is in conformity with the principle stated above in 1895-2 Ch. 774 (I) which followed the precedent in 1891-2 Ch. 27 (H). The defendant began the erection of building so as to interfere with the plaintiffs light in spite of the warning of the plaintiff that he would sue him. The defendant also evaded service of summonses for a few days. On a motion for an interlocutory mandatory injunc­tion, ordering the defendant to pull down so much of the building as has been erected after the warning given by the plaintiff, the objection was put forward on behalf of the defendant on the ground that no case was made out to pull down the building since it was not done in defiance of the order of the court. This was overruled by Kekewich, J. and the rule was issued as prayed for by the plaintiff. This was affirmed on appeal, by Lindley, L. J., Lopes, L. J. and Rigby L. J. in dismissing the appeal, Lindley, L. J. observed: “If builders will take the chance of running up a building in that way, they must taken the risk of pulling it down, and to that extent I think Kekewich, J., was perfectly justified in the view that he took; and this appeal must be dismissed, with costs.� These rulings are only authorities for the position summed up above. They do not lay down that any order passed subsequent to the issuance of a writ nisi is without jurisdiction and consequently should be struck down. It is one thing to say that a party will not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong and put forward some thing done by him, with a view to render an order passed by court ineffective, as an accomplished fact.� In the light of the above the Original Petition is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.