Judgment : Sen J. :- This appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is on a certificate granted by S. K. Datta, J. a learned Single Judge of this Court and is directed against the judgment and decree dated January 22, 1973, passed by him in Second Appeal No. 182 of 1968. By the judgment now under appeal the learned Judge reversed the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court and restored those passed by the trial court. 2. This appeal is by defendants 3 and 4 and it arises out of a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession after evicting the defendants from the suit land and for meane profits. The suit land is one 2.39 decimals of land out of 4.78 acres of present Dag No. 154, Khatian 71 which corresponds to old Dag No. 147 and Khatian 42 of Mouza Paschim Raghunathpur, Police Station Jaynagar, District-24 Parganas. There is no dispute that this land once belonged to three ladies, namely, (i) Sm. Annapurna Debi, (ii) Sm. Sailabala Debi and (iii) Sm. Sumatibala Debi. According to the plaintiff-respondent this land was held in khas by the said ladies and was recorded as such in the finally published records of rights prepared under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). The plaintiff purchased this land from the ladies on April 18, 1960, and went into possession. He was cultivating the land and was paying rent to the State of West Bengal as the superior interest vested in the State under the provisions of the said Act. One Pran Krisna Das and some of his co-sharers filed an objection under section 44 (1) of the said Act to the record so prepared in favour of the ladies claiming a goola tenancy (tenancy on payment of rent in kind) but this objection failed on merits. Pran Krisna instituted Title suit No. 343 of 1958 in the local civil court for establishing his claim of tenancy and therein prayed for an injunction to protect his alleged claim of possession. Such a prayer for injunction was concurrently overruled both by the trial court and the appellate court upon a clear finding that the plaintiff therein (Pran Krishna) had neither any prima facie title nor possession of the suit land. Such a prayer for injunction was concurrently overruled both by the trial court and the appellate court upon a clear finding that the plaintiff therein (Pran Krishna) had neither any prima facie title nor possession of the suit land. That suit was thereafter allowed to be dismissed for default by Pran Krishna who then effected a collusive transfer on September 24, 1962 in favour of the defendants. The defendants, however, could not get any possession on such transfer and one of them defendant No.5 executed a Nadabi on March 27, 1963 in favour of the transferor, Pran Krishna, dearly admitting therein that it is the plaintiff who is in possession of the suit land. According to the plaintiff-respondent notwithstanding the aforesaid position, the defendants having threatened to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land he had to institute a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure wherein however, an order adverse as against the plaintiff having been passed on October 21, 1963, he had to institute the present suit as by the said order the defendants have been adjudged to be in possession and there had been a prohibitory order on the plaintiff-respondent not to disturb such possession of the defendants. 3. This suit was contested by defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 who filed written statement. They denied that the suit land was in the khas possession of the ladies or that it was recorded as such in the finally published record of right. They claimed that one Annada Das, predecessor-in-interest of Pran Krishna Das and others was a Goola tenant under the ladies in respect of the suit land which was not initially recorded in the records of rights through an error but on an objection under section 44(2A) such a tenancy was duly recorded in the finally published record of rights. An appeal against the said decision in the proceeding under Section 44 (2A) by Annapurna Debi and others failed. Pran Krishna Das and others being thus in possession had validly effected a transfer in favour of the defendants and they were in possession since such transfer. They further denied that there was any Nadabi executed by defendant No.5 and alternatively it was pleaded that in case such a Nadabi is found to have been executed by defendant No.5 then that would be a collusive one executed really at the instance of the plaintiff. They further denied that there was any Nadabi executed by defendant No.5 and alternatively it was pleaded that in case such a Nadabi is found to have been executed by defendant No.5 then that would be a collusive one executed really at the instance of the plaintiff. This, in substance, was the defence taken by the contesting defendants in contesting the claim of the plaintiff-respondent. 4. On the pleadings as aforesaid, the initial right, title and interest of the three ladies not being in dispute, it is quite evident that the plaintiff as the purchaser from the said ladies would acquire a valid title by his purchase dated 18.4.60 unless the defence claim of settlement by the ladies in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of Pran Krishna Das and others is established. The learned judge in the trial court, therefore, first considered how far such a settlement as claimed by the contesting defendants can be said to have been established by the evidence on record. He found that a Kabuliat (Ext. A) though registered was a unilateral document by Annada dated 4th Kartik, 1353 B.S. corresponding to 21.10.46 but according to him there was no evidence of acceptance of such a Kabuliat by the landlords, i.e., the ladies either by acceptance of rent and granting of any rent receipt or by any other act of acknowledgment acknowledging the settlement. A solitary rent receipt sought to be proved was found to be not proved so far its contents are concerned and the learned judge also refused to accept the said document as a reliable one on the ground that the terms of that receipt were materially inconsistent with the oral evidence as to payment and acceptance of rent. He held the receipt to be a manufactured one. On the question of possession, the learned judge in the trial court accepted the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff but he disbelieved the witnesses on behalf of the defendants. He found that the records of the attestation proceedings in the process of preparation of the records of rights clearly indicated that the ladies were on field and the plaintiff since his purchase is in possession on payment of rent from 1362 B. S to 1367 B.S to State Government. He found that the records of the attestation proceedings in the process of preparation of the records of rights clearly indicated that the ladies were on field and the plaintiff since his purchase is in possession on payment of rent from 1362 B. S to 1367 B.S to State Government. He observed on the other hand that the defendants though claiming title by an earlier transfer had failed to adduce any cogent evidence showing payment of rent either to the then landlords or the State. Accordingly, the learned judge held that the plaintiff who was in possession within 12 years from the suit was temporarily dispossessed and he having established a better title was found to be entitled to the reliefs claimed. The learned judge in the trial court also held that the presumption of correctness of the records of rights as revised in the proceedings under section 44(2A) had been successfully rebutted by the plaintiff. The suit was accordingly decreed it was so decreed, however, on contest against defendant Nos. 3 and 4 but was decreed on compromise as against defendant Nos. 2 and 6 who, in the meantime filed a solenama substantially conceding the claim of the plaintiff. As against the rest the suit was decreed exparte including defendant No.5 who had disclaimed all interest in the suit land by executing a Nadabi in favour of the vendors on 27.3.63 (Ext.1/a) referred to hereinbefore, 5. Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 preferred an appeal before the lower appellate court. The learned judge in the court of appeal below held that possession in favour of the defendants having been recorded in the settlement records the question of primary importance would be as to whether the plaintiff establishes any case of possession by the ladies prior to their transfer in favour of the plaintiff. On this issue, the learned judge considering the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff refused to accept such evidence as to possession as reliable. On a finding as such, the possession on the records of rights being in favour of the defendants he accepted the defence case of settlement by the Kabuliat and held failure to prove payment of rent cannot spoil the effects of the other factors found by him, the cumulative effect whereof is the establishment of the settlement in favour of Annanda Prasad Das. On the conclusions as above, the learned judge in the lower appellate court dismissed the plaintiff's suit as against the contesting defendants 3 and 4 but strangely and inconsistently affirmed the decree on compromise as against defendants 2 and 6. 6. The plaintiff preferred a second appeal being Second Appeal No. 182 of 1968 in this court which was heard by S.K. Datta, J. As pointed out hereinbefore, this second appeal succeeded in this court and the learned Judge setting aside the decision of the lower appellate court restored that of the trial court. The learned Judge very rightly found the decree as passed by the lower appellate court to be inconsistent because when defendants 2 to 5 were the joint purchasers by the same document dated 24.9.62 from Pran Krishna Das, the suit could not have been decreed as against defendant Nos. 2 and 6 and dismissed at the same time as against defendants 3 & 4 on a finding that the defendants' vendors having a preferential right, title and interest in the suit land by virtue of a settlement by the ladies such right, title and interest was validly transferred in favour of the defendants by the document dated 24.9.62. 7. On the merits the learned Judge affirmed the findings of the trial court that in the absence of any evidence of acceptance of the Kabuliat relied on by the defendants it cannot be said that there was any valid settlement in favour of the predecesor-in-interest of the defendants. He also affirmed the finding of the learned judge of the trial court that the orders passed in proceedings under section 44 (2A) altering the record of rights in favour of the defendants were really without foundation and as such he concluded that the tenancy claimed by the defendants not having been established the plaintiff's suit is bound to succeed. On the findings as aforesaid, the learned Judge restored the decree as passed by the trial court setting aside the one passed by the lower appellate court. 8. Being aggrieved by the said decision of the learned single Judge and on a certificate granted by him, the defendants 3 and 4 have now preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. Mr. Mitter appearing in support of this appeal has raised three points. The first point raised by Mr. 8. Being aggrieved by the said decision of the learned single Judge and on a certificate granted by him, the defendants 3 and 4 have now preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. Mr. Mitter appearing in support of this appeal has raised three points. The first point raised by Mr. Mitter is that the plaintiff's suit itself abates and is barred by Section 57B(2) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act since introduced by an amendment which came into effect only after the decision now under appeal. Hence, it is claimed by Mr. Mitter that in view of the amended provisions of the statute and as above, the suit is liable to be dismissed on abatement and accordingly it is claimed that this appeal should be allowed. Obviously, a point like this could not be raised before the learned Single Judge as the amendment itself came into effect only after the decision rendered by aim. The second, point raised by Mr. Mitter is to the effect that the plaintiff's suit being a suit for recovery of possession on an acknowledgement of dispossession, the learned Judge was in error in decreeing the suit without any specific finding that the plaintiff bad proved possession within 12 years prior to the suit as required under Article 142 of the Old Limitation Act. Thirdly, Mr. Mitter has cot ended that all the Courts below including the learned Single Judge had failed to appreciate that the rent receipt marked 'X' for identification had really been proved and as such the said document should have been admitted into evidence as proof of payment of rent and acceptance of the Kabuliat (Ext. A) establishing the settlement clamined by the defendants. Mr. Mitter has contended that once this document' is accepted, the foundation for rejecting the defence claim of settlement as made by the trial court and the learned Single Judge goes, so that the settlement so claimed should be accepted and the plaintiff's should be dismissed. 9. Mr. Shyamacharan Mitter appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent has contested each 9f these points raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. According to Mr. Shyamacharan Mitter, Section 57B(2) does not bar a suit of the present nature and as such there is no question of abatement of the suit. Secondly, Mr. 9. Mr. Shyamacharan Mitter appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent has contested each 9f these points raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. According to Mr. Shyamacharan Mitter, Section 57B(2) does not bar a suit of the present nature and as such there is no question of abatement of the suit. Secondly, Mr. Shyamacharan Mitter has contended that on the plaint case, Article 142 of the Old Limitation Act is not at all attracted and what is applicable is Article 144 thereof, inasmuch as, neither the plaintiff nor the defendants alleged dispossession of the plaintiff and the defendants are not really disputing or denying the plaintiff's title and that being the position there was no necessity for recording any finding that the plaintiff had established his possession within 12 years prior to the suit. Lastly, Mr. Shyamacharan Mitter has contested the claim that the rent receipt marked 'X' for identification had been really proved and as such could be accepted in evidence. He has further contended that even if proved on the evidence on record it not being a reliable document it must be held that no acceptance of the settlement by the landlord can be founded on such a document. 10. To consider the first point raised by Mr. Mitter it will be necessary to refer in particular to two of the provisions of the said Act, as amended. These arc Sections 44 and 57B and are set out hereinbelow : "44. Draft and final publication of the record-of-rights - (1) When a record-of-rights has been prepared or revised the Revenue Officer shall publish a draft of the record so prepared or revised in the prescribed manner and for the prescribed period and shall receive and consider any objections which may be made to any entry therein or to any omission therefrom during the period of such publication : Provided that no order passed under Section 5A shall be liable to be reopened in pursuance of an objection made under this sub-section. (2) When all such objections have been considered and disposed of according to such rules as the State Government may make in this behalf, the Revenue Officer shall finally frame the record and cause such record to be finally published in the prescribed manner and make a certificate stating the fact of such final publication and the date thereof and shall date and subscribe the same under his name and official designation : (2al) Separate publication of different parts of draft or final records may be made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). (2a) An officer specially empowered by the State Government may, (on application within nine months, or of his own motion (within fifteen years,) from the date of final publication of the record-of-rights or from the date of coming into force of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 West Ben. Ord. X of 1957), whichever is later revise an entry in the record finally published in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) after giving the persons interested an opportunity of being heard and after recording reasons therefore : Provided that nothing in the foregoing paragraph shall be deemed to empower such officer to modify or cancel any order passed under section 5A, while revising any entry : Provided further that no such officer shall entertain any application under this sub-section or shall of his own motion take steps to revise any entry, if an appeal against an order passed by a Revenue Officer on any objection made under sub-section (1), has been filed before the commencement of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1957, before a Tribunal appointed for the purpose of this section, and, notwithstanding anything in this section any such appeal may continue and be heard and disposed of as if the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1957, had not been promulgated. (3) And person aggrieved by an order passed in revision under sub-section (2a) may appeal in the prescribed manner to a Tribunal appointed for the purpose of this section, and within such period and on payment of such court fees as may be prescribed. (3) And person aggrieved by an order passed in revision under sub-section (2a) may appeal in the prescribed manner to a Tribunal appointed for the purpose of this section, and within such period and on payment of such court fees as may be prescribed. (3a) The certificate of final publication referred to in sub-section (2), or in the absence of such certificate, a certificate signed by the Collector of any district in which the area to which the record-of-rights relates is wholly or partly situate, stating that a record-of-rights has been finally published on a specified date, shall be conclusive proof of such publication and of the date thereof. (3b) The State Government may, by notification, declare with regard to any specified area, that a record-of-rights has been finally published for every village included in such area and such notification shall be conclusive proof of such publication. (3c) In any suit or other proceeding in which a record-of rights prepared and published under this Chapter, or a duly certified copy thereof or extract therefrom, is produced, such record-of-rights shall be presumed to have been finally published unless such publication is expressly denied. (4) Every entry in the record-of-rights finally published under subsection (2) including an entry revised under sub-section (2a), made under section 42A or corrected under section 45 or section 45A shall, subject to any modification by an order on appeal under sub-section (3), be presumed to be correct." "57B. Bar to jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of certain matters.-(1) Where an order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 39 directing the preparation or revision of a record-of-rights, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application for the determination of rent or determination of the status of any tenant, or the incidents of any tenancy to which the record-of-rights relates, and if any suit or application, in which any of the aforesaid matters is in issue, is pending before a Civil Court on the date of such order, it shall be stayed, and it shall, on the expiry of the period prescribed for an appeal under subsection (3) of section 44 or when an appeal has been filed under that sub-section, as the case may be, on the disposal of such appeal abate so far as it relates to any of the aforesaid matters. (2) No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application concerning any land or any estate, or any right in such estate, if it relates to- (a) alteration of any entry in the record-of-rights finally published, revised, made, corrected or modified under any of the provisions of Chapter V, (b) a dispute involving determination of the question, either expressly or by implication, whether a raiyat or an intermediary is or is not entitled to retain under the provisions of this Act such land or estate or right in such estate, as the case may be, or (c) any matter which under any of the provisions of this Act is to be, or has already been, enquired into, decided, dealt with or determined by the State Government or any authority specified therein, and any such suit or application which is pending before a civil court immediately before the commencement of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973, shall abate so far as it relates to all or any of the matters referred to in clause (a), clause (b) or clause (c). (3) Any dispute referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2) may be decided by a Revenue Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Settlement Officer, specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, who shall dispose of the same in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that in deciding a dispute under this sub-section the Revenue Officer shall not re-open any matter which has already been enquired into, investigated, determined or decided by the State Government or any authority under any of the provisions of this Act. (4) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Revenue Officer made under sub-section (3) may appeal to the prescribed authority not below the rank of a Settlement Officer, within such time, in such manner and subject to payment of such fees as may be prescribed. (5) A decision made by the Appellate Authority under sub-section (4) shall be final. Explanation - In this section- (i) suit includes an appeal, and (ii) an authority includes an authority to hear an appeal." 11. According to Mr. Mitra sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 57B are independent provisions providing for bar and abatement of suits in civil courts. What is invoked by Mr. Mitra in the present case is sub-section (2) of Section 57B. According to Mr. Mitra sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 57B are independent provisions providing for bar and abatement of suits in civil courts. What is invoked by Mr. Mitra in the present case is sub-section (2) of Section 57B. He claims that the suit out of which the present appeal arises relates to matters referred to in the three clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 57B(2) so that on the provisions of that subsection the suit shall abate. According to Mr. Mitra, on the revision effected under section 44(2a) the tenancy claimed by the defendants in favour of their predecessor-in-interest by the three ladies had been duly recorded in the finally, published record-of-rights and the present suit necessarily involves a claim of alteration in respect of the record of rights so revised, so that it comes within the mischief of Section 57B (2)(a). Alternatively it is claimed by Mr. Mitra that the suit relates to a dispute involving by implication the determination of a question as to whether the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest is or is not entitled to retain the disputed land as in their khas possession so that the suit comes within the mischief of Section 57B (2) (b). As a third alternative it is contended by Mr. Mitra that the suit would involve an enquiry into matters already enquired into and decided in the proceedings under Section 44(2) and 44(3) so that it would come within the mischief of Section 57B(2)( c). 12. To decide these questions raised by Mr. Mitra it would first be necessary to find out and determine what is the true nature of the dispute involved in the suit out of which the appeal arises and what are the reliefs claimed. I have already referred to hereinbefore the pleadings of the parties. It is quite evident that the plaintiff is claiming his title to the disputed land by virtue of the purchase dated April 18, 1960, from the admitted owners, namely, the three ladies. His further claim is that he went into possession on such purchase as the lands were in khas possession of the vendors; that the defendants and their predecessor-in-interest put forward a false claim of tenancy which failed in some of the earlier proceedings but in view of an adverse order under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure he had to institute this suit. The plaintiff, therefore, totally denies existence of any right, title or interest of the defendants in the suit property and on that basis has sought for a' declaration of his title which is adversely affected by the order under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The dispute involved is purely one of title and the relief claimed is one of declaration of plaintiff's title necessitated by the cloud thrown on it by the order under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code and recovery of possession if the plaintiff is found to be dispossessed as a result of that order. 13. Section 57B (1) and Section 57B (2) (a) primarily relate to preparation of record of rights. While under sub-section (1) all determinations of disputes relating to rent, status of a tenant and incidence of such tenancy in the proceedings for preparation or revision of records of rights has been conferred the finality in respect of which suits shall either be not maintainable or in cases of pending proceedings those shall abate, sub-section (2) (a) makes a similar provision in respect of any suit if it relates to alteration of any entry made in the record of rights finally published, revised, made, corrected or modified under the provisions of Chapter V. 14. In my considered opinion, in order to come within the purview or mischief of either section 57B(1) or 57B(2) the dispute or the question must be one which comes within the purview of determination in the preparation of the record' of rights. Section 57B(2) may bar a suit for alteration of an entry made in the finally published record of rights, but such an entry must be an entry made only as a' result of preparation or revision of the record of rights, and as such must come within the purview of determination in the preparation of the record of rights. A question or a dispute which does not at all fall for determination in the process of preparation or revision of the record of rights does not come within the purview of either of these two provisions and entertainment of a civil suit for determination of such a dispute or question is not obviously barred by them nor was it intended to do so. 15. 15. The question which necessarily arises for consideration is as to whether the dispute as to title which arose for adjudication in the suit, did also fall for determination in the process of preparation or revision of the record of rights. The scope of determination or adjudication in the process of preparation or revision of record of rights is to be determined on the provisions relating thereto. 16. The relevant provisions are in Chapter V. Section 39 provides that for carrying out the purposes of the Act, the State Government may make an order directing preparation or revision of records of rights by a Revenue Officer in accordance with the provisions of that Chapter and such rules as may be made in that behalf by the State Government. The procedure prescribed is in Schedule B to the Rules. The Rules framed under the Act and in particular the procedure prescribed in Schedule B are clearly indicative of the fact that the Revenue Officer or the Assistant Settlement Officer had not been given any authority to adjudicate pure disputes of title. Such disputes, if raised, can be gone into only in a summary manner solely on the basis of possession. On the object of the statute and the rules so framed it had been consistently held by this Court that questions of title were never left to be decided by the Revenue Officer or the Assistant Settlement Officer in these proceedings for preparation or revision of the records of rights. Reference may be made to the cases of (1) Ramesh Chandra Sood v. Assistant Settlement Officer, 76 CWN 149 and (2) Jyotirmoyee Debi v. Assistant Settlement Officer, AIR (1973) Calcutta 486. Such being the legal position with reference to the adjudication involved in the proceedings for preparation or revision of record of rights, it would be difficult to hold that a dispute which is not left for adjudication in such proceedings would be given a finality by the statute and the civil suit involving such a dispute would be barred. It is now well settled that an entry in the record of rights does not confer any title in whose favour it is made nor does an erroneous entry therein take away title of the real owner. It is now well settled that an entry in the record of rights does not confer any title in whose favour it is made nor does an erroneous entry therein take away title of the real owner. When an entry so made on a limited adjudication based on possession only, creates no right nor takes away any, it is difficult to comprehend why a person's rights to institute a suit for vindication of his title in a civil court should be barred. 17. I am unable to agree with Mr. Mitra that the suit out of which the present appeal arises is a suit which relates to alteration of any entry in the record of rights. The suit is based on the plaintiff's own title to the land and infrigement thereof by an adverse order made under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code in favour of the defendants. The entry in the record of rights of a tenancy in favour of the defendants with the attached presumption of correctness may be an important piece of evidence as against the plaintiff's claim but when such an entry neither creates nor takes away any title, notwithstanding the entry the person having the real title can assert the same and pray for declaration of the same if it is threatened or infringed on proof thereof. It would not be essential for him to seek an alteration of the record of rights as prepared or published for getting such a declaration, so long he suffers the presumptive evidence arising out of such entries and is prepared to rebut the same. This view, in my opinion, finds ample support from the decision of this Court in the case of (3) Keshab Chandra v. Madan Mohan, 40 CWN 22 where considering the parallel provision of the Bengal Tenancy Act and reviewing earlier judgments on the point, this Court observed: "The entry in the record of rights neither creates not takes away any rights, having been made on the basis of possession; it remains as a piece of evidence with the evidenciary value, namely, with a presumption of correctness attaching to it. It is not absolutely incumbent on and indeed it is often unnecessary for a party to avoid the effect of the presumption ; a party affected by the presumption can come to court as and when he finds any injury actually arising from it. It is not absolutely incumbent on and indeed it is often unnecessary for a party to avoid the effect of the presumption ; a party affected by the presumption can come to court as and when he finds any injury actually arising from it. And so long as he frames his suit to avert or remedy the injury and is in time for that purpose, the fact that he seeks for a declaration as regards the incorrectness of the entry, but only as ancillary to the relief as to injury that he asks for, it is not possible to see how and why his suit should not be held to be in order. The view so expressed was approved in a number of cases thereafter (See A.C. Ghosh on Bengali Tenancy Act, 3rd Edition, page 835). The principle underlying the decision as above well justifies the conclusion that notwithstanding an entry adverse to the claim put forward by a plaintiff, a suit for declaration of title based on an independent cause of action is well maintainable in law: nothing prevents him from getting the relief claimed by him even without altering or correcting the erroneous entry in the record of rights. 18. Amendment of Section 44(4) by deleting the words 'until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect" does not materially alter the situation because the rule of evidence based on rebuttable presumption still remains so notwithstanding repeal of those few words and such amendment does not convert the rule of presumption into an irrebuttable one or conclusive evidence even in respect of the entries so made. This follows from Section 4 of the Evidence Act read with the amended provision of Section 44 (4) of the said Act. 19. So far as the bar under section 57B (2) (b) invoked by Mr. Mitra is concerned, I do not think that the said provision can be of any help to the appellant in the present case. In order to come within the mischief of that provision the suit itself must relate to a dispute and an adjudication involving determination of a question whether the plaintiff, as a Raiyat or an intermediary, is or is not entitled to retain the land in suit under the provisions of the Act. In order to come within the mischief of that provision the suit itself must relate to a dispute and an adjudication involving determination of a question whether the plaintiff, as a Raiyat or an intermediary, is or is not entitled to retain the land in suit under the provisions of the Act. Such question may arise for determination by implication, not having arisen expressly in some cases, to bring the case within the mischief of the clause. But the point to note is that such a question must arise for determination in the suit and unless it so arises the provision is not invoked. In my opinion, the provision is not invoked only because a decree in favour or against the plaintiff may have some ulterior bearing on what land the plaintiff would retain under the Act. In the suit now under consideration the court is not called upon either expressly or by necessary implication to determine any question as to whether the plaintiff would be entitled to retain or not to retain the land in suit, though if the decree be in favour of the plaintiff, the land being declared his, he may retain it. The fact that the decree may in its ultimate analysis have its bearing on the plaintiff's right to retain by itself would not bring the suit within the mischief of this provision. Because, so construed, the provision would bring within its mischief any number of suits concerning agricultural or non-agricultural land never intended to be brought within its fold, inasmuch as, decrees in such suits in ultimate analysis may have its bearing on the plaintiff's right to, retain under the Act. In this view, I find no merit in the second alternative contention put forward by Mr. Mitra in support of the plea of bar under section 57B(2)(b). 20. Now I proceed to consider the third alternative contention put forward by Mr. Mitra in support of the above plea of bar under section 57B (2) relying on the provisions of clause (c) thereof. On the plain language of clause (c) as aforesaid, the suit would be barred only if it relates to and involves adjudication of an issue which is to be or has already been enquired into, decided, dealt with or determined either by the State Government or by any specified authority under the provisions of the Act. According to Mr. On the plain language of clause (c) as aforesaid, the suit would be barred only if it relates to and involves adjudication of an issue which is to be or has already been enquired into, decided, dealt with or determined either by the State Government or by any specified authority under the provisions of the Act. According to Mr. Mitra the suit now under consideration would involve reconsideration of issues already enquired into and decided in the proceedings under sections 44 (2a) and 44 (3). Section 44 (2a) is one of the steps provided by the statute in the process of preparation and finalisation of the record of rights whose object is as provided in section 39. On the scheme of the Act once the draft record of rights is prepared by the Revenue Officer, under section 39, the same is published under section 44 (1) inviting objections thereto. Such objections being disposed of the record of rights is finally framed and published under section 44 (2). Section 44 (2A) next contemplates that once the record of rights is so finally published, an officer specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government may of his own motion or on an application from any party revise any entry in the record of rights so finally published within the time prescribed by the said provision. I have considered hereinbefore the limited scope of adjudication by a Revenue Officer in the matter of preparation of the record of rights wherein such an officer is not called upon to go into or decide any question of title and section 44 (2a) being a step in the same process involves determination of questions of similar limited scope. On the language of section 44 (2a), the legislature never intended to enlarge the scope of enquiry or adjudication in a proceeding under section 44 (2a) and this court bad consistently held that in a proceeding under section 44 (2a) the officer specially empowered is not called upon to determine any question of title except to the limited extent as provided by Rule 6 Schedule Bread with Rule 25 of the rules framed under the Act. Such being the limited scope of enquiry and adjudication in the proceeding under section 44 (2a) it is quite apparent that the wider issue of title involved in the suit now under consideration is not a matter which under the provisions of the Act had been enquired into, decided, dealt with or determined by an officer specially empowered by the State Government to exercise the powers under section 44 (2a) and the suit would not, therefore, be barred on that account. 21. Next, I proceed to consider the effect of the decision of the appellate tribunal in the proceedings under section 44 (3). Section 44(3) only confers a right of appeal to a person aggrieved by an order passed in the proceedings under section 44 (2a). Neither section 44 (3) nor the Rules framed under the Act specifically provides for the scope of adjudication in such an appeal. Such being the position, an appeal being a continuation of the original proceeding its scope would be equally limited as that of the original proceeding unless the law prescribes it to be otherwise. There being no prescription to the otherwise, the scope of an appeal under section 44 (3), in my opinion, is limited to the same extent as the scope of an adjudication under section 44 (2a). The appellate tribunal, therefore, is not called upon to decide finally any question of title as is the case with the officer specially empowered under section 44 (2a). Therefore, in my view, the issue which is involved in the suit now under consideration did not arise for consideration or decision by the appellate tribunal under section 44 (3) for the same reason on which I have held it did not arise for consideration in the proceeding under section 44 (2a) so that the bar under section 57B (2) (c) cannot be invoked on that account. 22. Incidentally, Mr. Mitra contended that apart from section 57B, the decision of the appellate tribunal under section 44 (3) would be conclusive between the parties and hence binding on them so that the present suit which would have the effect of nullifying the said decision is not maintainable in law. Mr. 22. Incidentally, Mr. Mitra contended that apart from section 57B, the decision of the appellate tribunal under section 44 (3) would be conclusive between the parties and hence binding on them so that the present suit which would have the effect of nullifying the said decision is not maintainable in law. Mr. Mitra refers to the provisions of section 44 (4) which prescribes 'Every entry in the record of rights finally published under sub-section(2) including an entry revised under subsection (2a), made under section 42A or corrected under section 45 or section 45A shall subject to any modification by an order on appeal under sub-section (3), be presumed to be correct. According to Mr. Mitra the presumption is attached to the record of rights published under sub-section (2) or revised under sub-section (2a) or made under section 42A or corrected under section 45 or section 45A but it does not extend to cover the modification by the decision ,of the appellate tribunal under section 44 (3). Such tribunal having been conferred exclusive jurisdiction to consider and determine the appeal under sub-section (3) that decision constituting judicial determination must be construed to be conclusive and binding between the parties. In my opinion, however, there are more reasons than one why such a contention of Mr. Mitra cannot be accepted. Section 44 (3) is but one stage in the process of preparation and finalisation of the record of rights so that the entry in such a record of rights acquires the statutory presumption of correctness whether it is left at the stage of 44 (2), (2a) or carried over on an appeal under section 44 (3). Sub-section (4) when it confers the statutory presumption of correctness on the entries subject to the modification on an appeal under subsection (3), the entry so modified is what is to be presumed to be correct. Section 44(3) merely takes over the proceeding under Section 44 (2a) to the appellate tribunal so that the correctness of the decision of the original tribunal can be reviewed by the appellate tribunal. It does not provide for or contemplate any new or separate adjudication independent of section 44 (2a) nor does it confer any wider powers on the appellate tribuna1 as a result whereof such a tribunal can go into questions of title between the parties and decide the same conclusively. It does not provide for or contemplate any new or separate adjudication independent of section 44 (2a) nor does it confer any wider powers on the appellate tribuna1 as a result whereof such a tribunal can go into questions of title between the parties and decide the same conclusively. Therefore, it is not correct to suggest that the appellate decision under sub-section (3) has been conferred any more sanctity by the statute than the statutory presumption of correctness. Secondly, for reasons already given, the appellate tribunal exercising limited powers and jurisdiction as the officer specially empowered under section 44 (2a) of the said Act and not being called upon to decide fina1ly the question of title between the parties which specifically is the issue involved in the present suit, I am unable to appreciate how the decision of the appellate tribunal even if it be conclusive could bar the present suit. I am unable to agree with Mr. Mitra that the scope of the present suit is one to set aside or nullify the decision of the appe1late tribunal which only goes to support an entry in the record of rights in favour of the respondents and nothing more. 23. On the conclusions as above, I am unable to accept the first contention raised by Mr. Mitra or to hold that a suit of the present nature is barred by the provisions of section 57B of the said Act or that the present suit should abate on the provisions thereof. I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed by two of the learned Single Judges of this Court in the cases of (4) Ramkrishna Mullick v. State of West Bengal, ILR (1974) Ca1cutta 61 and (5) Ram Barai Shaw v. Bibhabati Basak 1975 (1) CLJ 382 in so far as the learned Judges have taken similar view of section 57B of the said Act. 24. The second point raised by Mr. Mitra is that the plaintiff/respondent having prayed for a decree for recovery of possession in respect of the suit land by admitting dispossession therefrom, the suit is governed by Art. 142 of the old Limitation Act, the suit having been filed before the enforcement of the new Act. According to Mr. Mitra, the plaintiff/respondent having failed to prove his possession within 12 years from the suit, the suit should be held to be barred by limitation. According to Mr. Mitra, the plaintiff/respondent having failed to prove his possession within 12 years from the suit, the suit should be held to be barred by limitation. Serious comments have been made by Mr. Mitra on the learned single Judge not considering this aspect while setting aside the appellate decree of dismissal of the suit. 25. Mr. S.C. Mitter appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent has not disputed the position that the present suit would be governed by the old Limitation Act. According to him, however, on the frame of this suit and particularly in view of the defence of tenancy under the interest held by the plaintiff/respondent pleaded by the appellants, the article of the old Act to apply would be Art. 144 and not Art. 142 so that the defendants having failed to prove adverse possession for more than 12 years prior to the suit, the plaintiff/respondent's suit had been correctly decreed. 26. I have carefully considered the rival contentions as aforesaid raised by the learned counsel for the respective parties. In my opinion, however, the plaintiff's suit is such as it comes clearly within Art. 47 of the old Act and having been filed within 3 years from the final order made under S. 145 Cr. P.C. was well within time. Plaintiff/respondent in his plaint has never admitted dispossession ; he has no doubt prayed for a decree for possession and mesne profits but that too merely in view of the adverse order made against him in 145 Cr. P.C proceeding. I have referred to the pleading in the plaint in details hereinbefore. Expressly and clearly the plaintiff/respondent has pleaded that being aggrieved by the final order dated October 21, 1963, passed in 145 Cr. P. C proceeding he had to institute the suit and seek the reliefs though his specific case is that the defendants were never in possession of the suit property and the alleged settlement in their favour is a false one. Such a suit is not a suit contemplated by Art. 142 and hence it cannot be held to be barred by that Article. 27. That apart on the pleadings of the present case, Mr. S. C. Mitter is well justified in his claim that of the two Arts. 142 and 144 it would be Art. 144 that would be attracted on the facts and circumstances of this case. 27. That apart on the pleadings of the present case, Mr. S. C. Mitter is well justified in his claim that of the two Arts. 142 and 144 it would be Art. 144 that would be attracted on the facts and circumstances of this case. Here in the present case the plaintiff as pointed out hereinbefore did not base his case on any admission or allegation of dispossession. Nor did the defendants allege as such whose only defence was possession under the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest by virtue of a settlement from them. The defendants did not deny the paramount title of the three ladies which devolved on the plaintiff by his purchase, They only claimed a tenancy under them. Hence possession by the plaintiff/respondent or his predecessor-in-interest and their right to possess is not in dispute because if the defendants succeed in their defence their possession would be also the possession of their landlord the plaintiff/respondent or his predecessor-in-interest and if they fail there is no dispute to plaintiff/respondent's possession. by virtue of his admitted title. In such cases the admitted title would raise a presumption of possession as in rightful owner so that the plaintiff/respondent's right to possess in such cases can be defeated only by proof of adverse possession and not otherwise. This view is well supported by the Full Bench decision of Patna High Court in the case of (6) Jaladhari v. Raghunath Singh AIR (1958) Pat. 386 which has been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of (7) Mt. Murti v. Mohd. Mir Khan, AIR (1965) SC 875. 28. Moreover, though there is no specific finding as to possession recorded by the learned Single Judge in his judgment disposing of the second appeal, yet it would appear from the said judgment that he was confirming the findings of the learned trial Judge. The learned trial Judge specifically went into the issue as to possession. He considered a number of documentary evidence having their bearing on the issue of possession. He considered the oral evidence adduced both by the plaintiff and the defendants. He came to the definite finding that though the defendants temporarily dispossessed the plaintiff, the plaintiff well proved his possession within 12 years. In arriving at such a conclusion he relied more on documentary evidence than on oral evidence. He considered the oral evidence adduced both by the plaintiff and the defendants. He came to the definite finding that though the defendants temporarily dispossessed the plaintiff, the plaintiff well proved his possession within 12 years. In arriving at such a conclusion he relied more on documentary evidence than on oral evidence. He also gave reasons why he could not accept the oral evidence adduced in behalf of the defendants and why he preferred the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff. Furthermore, in the facts and circumstances he observed that the plaintiff being the rightful owner presumption of possession being with the plaintiff would follow in case the other evidence adduced by the respective parties be evenly balanced or be equally conflicting. The lower appellate court, however, did not specifically enter into the issue as to possession or record any specific finding thereon. No doubt the findings recorded by the lower appellate court may imply a finding in favour of the defendants in respect of possession but that was a finding which was clearly not sustainable even in a second appeal. The learned Judge in the court of appeal below failed to take into consideration any of the documentary evidence having material bearing on the issue as to possession. Though he rejected the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff, he did so without considering such evidence in the light of the material documentary evidence and without at all considering the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants. That being the position, in our opinion the learned single Judge was perfectly right in setting aside such a finding even in the second appeal. But since the learned single Judge has not recorded any specific finding of his own on the issue as to possession and when Mr. Mitra, the learned counsel for the appellant before us has raised a point that in the absence of any finding in favour of the plaintiff in respect of possession within 12 years, the suit could not have been decreed, we have decided to enter into this issue and decide for ourselves on the evidence on record. This we are doing clearly on the assumption that it is Article 142 of the old Limitation Act which governs the case. 29. Plaintiff's witness No.4 is the son of Sailabala, one of the plaintiff's vendors. This we are doing clearly on the assumption that it is Article 142 of the old Limitation Act which governs the case. 29. Plaintiff's witness No.4 is the son of Sailabala, one of the plaintiff's vendors. On his evidence, the suit land was in khas possession of the ladies prior to the sale thereof in favour of the plaintiff's witness No.3 is one of the cultivators under the ladies whose evidence goes to show that for two or three years between 1364 B. S. to 1366 B. S. he cultivated the land on behalf of the ladies. Plaintiff's witness No. 2 gave evidence to show that the plaintiff cultivated the land till 1369 B.S. and prior to his purchase one Saib Ali was cultivating the land on behalf of the ladies plaintiff's witness No.5 is the Plaintiff who proves his own possession and the same is supported by his witness No. 1. 30. Apart from such oral evidence as to possession adduced by the plaintiff what is more important in the present case is the documentary evidence. The rent receipts (Ext. 3 series) well support the plaintiff's claim of possession of the suit land. It is important to note that although the defendants claimed possession since 1946 under a settlement in favour of their predecessor-in-interest they failed to adduce any evidence of payment of rent except one receipt marked 'X' for identification which was not accepted either by the trial court or by the lower appellate court and which I shall consider hereinafter. It would be rather unusual that the defendants notwithstanding the fact that they claimed tenancy in their favour existing since 1946, could not produce any evidence of payment of rent not only to the satisfaction of the learned Judges in the present suit but the learned Judges in the earlier suit being Title Suit No. 343 of 1958. Ext. 2, the order in Section 44(1) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act proceeding indicates that at the time of field survey possession was found in favour of the plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest and not with the defendants. It is not in dispute that the predecessor-in-interest of the present defendants filed Title Suit No. 343 of 1958 for declaration of their tenancy right in the suit land and for injunction as against the predecessor-in-interest of the present plaintiff. It is not in dispute that the predecessor-in-interest of the present defendants filed Title Suit No. 343 of 1958 for declaration of their tenancy right in the suit land and for injunction as against the predecessor-in-interest of the present plaintiff. In this suit he prayed for a temparory injunction to protect his possession which, however, failed upto the appellate court on a prima facie finding that the plaintiffs of that suit (predecessor-in-interest of the present appellants) had failed to make out possession in their favour. No doubt that was not a conclusive finding, inasmuch as, it was a finding on an interlocutory application. Ext. (4a) is an order dated 18.12.59 passed by the learned Magistrate in a proceeding under section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code initiated by the predecessor-in-interest of the present defendants as against the ladies which goes to show that the preliminary order passed against the ladies was rescinded on a finding that the predecessors-in-interest of the present defendants failed to make out possession in there favour. 31. An evidence of greater importance is Ext. 1a. It was a Nadabi or a disclaimour by defendant No.5, one amongst the five joint purchasers from Pran Krisna Das and others clearly acknowledging therein that the suit land was in possession of the present plaintiff and his predecessors-in-interest and not with their vendors. In our opinion, Mr. Shyama Charan Mitter has rightly contended that such an admission by one of the co-sharers who were co-sharers by their joint purchase is of great importance and in the absence of any explanation explaining such an admission it was good evidence for the court to rely on in finding possession with the plaintiff. 32. As against all these, there is the oral evidence of four witnesses on behalf of the defendants whose evidence is so discrepant that the learned trial Judge could not accept or rely on the same. The learned Judge in the lower appellate court has not considered the evidence of the said defence witnesses at all. We have carefully read the evidence of these witnesses but on the discrepancies pointed out by the learned trial Judge and on the overwhelming evidence to counter the same adduced by the plaintiff, we are not in a position to place any reliance on such oral evidence. We have carefully read the evidence of these witnesses but on the discrepancies pointed out by the learned trial Judge and on the overwhelming evidence to counter the same adduced by the plaintiff, we are not in a position to place any reliance on such oral evidence. What is left is only the two orders made in the proceedings under section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, One by the Settlement Officer and the other by the appellate tribunal. Those orders, however, are based on the Kabuliat dated 21.10.46 (Ext. A). This Kabuliat is an unilateral document and in the absence of any evidence of acceptance thereof by the landlords, the learned single Judge had rightly pointed out that the same could not constitute any settlement in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants. In our opinion, the learned single Judge rightly set aside the finding of the lower appellate court that such a Kabuliat was acted upon. Apart from the alleged rent receipt marked 'X' for identification, the defendants failed to produce any evidence which could establish acceptance of the Kabuliat by the landlords. The orders in the proceedings under section 44 (2a), therefore, based solely on such a Kabuliat can hardly be said to have proved possession in favour of the defendants. Presumption arising out of the record of rights so revised under section 44 (2a) is clearly rebutted as such revision has no foundation. 33. On the evidence as above, we feel no hesitation in finding that it was the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest who were always in possession of the suit land until the plaintiff was bound down by the adverse order dated 21.10.63 in the proceeding under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. We, therefore, overrule the second point raised by Mr. Mitra to the effect that the Plaintiff not having proved his possession within 12 years, the suit ought to have been dismissed. 34. The last point raised by Mr. We, therefore, overrule the second point raised by Mr. Mitra to the effect that the Plaintiff not having proved his possession within 12 years, the suit ought to have been dismissed. 34. The last point raised by Mr. Mitra is to the effect that all the courts below including the learned single Judge hearing the second appeal had failed to appreciate that the rent receipt marked 'X' for identification was really proved and as such the said document should have been admitted into evidence as proof of payment of rent by the tenant and acceptance thereof by the landlord which would further establish acceptance of the settlement evidenced by the Kabuliat (Ext. A) by the landlords. This is a receipt dated 31st Baisak 1362 B.S. said to have been executed by one Nani Lal Chakraborty in favour of Annada Prasad Das. It is a receipt for a sum of Rs. 208/- being the price of 1.1/2 kahan of paddy alleged to have been paid in lieu of 2 kahan 4 kudi paddy payable for the land of Paschim Raghunathpur. According to Mr. Mitra, when defendant's witness No. 2 had proved the signature of Nani Lal Chakraborty in this receipt nothing more was required for proof of this document so that the courts below were not right in discarding this important evidence on the ground that the contents of this document had not been proved. In our opinion, however, this document is to be discarded not so much on the ground that the contents had not been proved but because the document itself is unreliable. As a matter of fact, we are of the opinion, that the learned Judge in the trial court is well justified in coming to his conclusion that it was a manufactured document. Such a position is proved by the intrinsic evidence appearing from this document. According to the defendants and on Ext. A the rent payable on the alleged settlement was paddy measuring 2 kahan 6 kudi, whereas this document recites the paddy payable to be 2 kahan 4 kudi. Such a position is proved by the intrinsic evidence appearing from this document. According to the defendants and on Ext. A the rent payable on the alleged settlement was paddy measuring 2 kahan 6 kudi, whereas this document recites the paddy payable to be 2 kahan 4 kudi. It has rightly been pointed out by the learned Judge in the trial court that on the defence evidence the tenants were delivering paddy to the ladies and not paying the price in lieu of the paddy so that payment of the price of the paddy as evidenced by this document is wholly inconsistent with the defence evidence as also the defence case. Moreover, it is difficult to follow why the landlord would accept the price of 1.1/2 kahan of paddy when the alleged rent payable in kind is 2 kahan 4 kudi when the receipt itself does not show such payment to be part payment or on account payment. Furthermore, the order (Ext. 2a) in Title Suit No. 343 of 1958 would show that in the said suit the predecessor-in-interest of the present defendants relied on this receipt along with another dated 12th Jaistha, 1364 B.S and the said other receipt clearly indicated that the predecessor-in-interest of the present defendants as a labourer and not as a tenant. That receipt, however, has since been withheld by the defendants obviously because that would not only be inconsistent with the aforesaid receipt dated 31st Baisak, 1362 B.S. but would also be inconsistent with the very case of tenancy set up by the defendants. For these reasons, we are unable to place any reliance on this document nor can we accept the contention of Mr. Mitra that this receipt would well establish acceptance of the Kabuliat by the ladies the landlords. 35. As all the points raised by Mr. Mitra in support of this appeal fail, this appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Ray J. : I agree.