JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. 1. (For self and FOR H. N. Seth, J.):- This a tenant's appeal. It is directed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. The writ petition in turn was directed against an order releasing an accommodation in favour of the land-lord under Section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. 2. The appellant was the tenant in a a portion of the premises 11, Mayo Road, Allahabad. This building was owned by a joint family of which the respondent No. 3 was the Karta. The land-lord owned another adjoining building No. 13, Mayo Road, Allahabad. In this big building a large number of the family members of the land-lord were actually residing. The land-lord was in service as District Judge. He retired and started living in a couple of rooms in 13, Mayo Road, Allahabad. Soon after he was appointed a Judge of this Court. THEre after the respondent moved an application for release of the building 11, Mayo Road, Allahabad which was in occupation of the appellant as well as two other tenants. He prayed that all the three tenants be evicted and vacant possession be given to the landlord to enable him to personally reside in it. The tenants contested the application. The appellants took a large number of technical as well as factual and legal pleas. The Prescribed Authority by an elaborately discussed order repelled the pleas taken by the appellants and allowed the application for release of the accommodation as against, all the three tenants. The tenants went up in appeal. The Additional District Judge dismissed the appeals after repelling the points raised on their merits. 3. The appellants then filed a writ petition which was also dismissed leading to the present appeal. 4. Mr. Saksena, learned counsel for the appellant raised three points : In the first place, it was urged that there was no evidence in support of the finding that the respondent landlord was living in two rooms in 13, Mayo Road, Allahabad. 3. The appellants then filed a writ petition which was also dismissed leading to the present appeal. 4. Mr. Saksena, learned counsel for the appellant raised three points : In the first place, it was urged that there was no evidence in support of the finding that the respondent landlord was living in two rooms in 13, Mayo Road, Allahabad. In the next place it was argued that explanation (ii) to Section 21(1) of the Rent Control Act (Act 13 of 1972) was not applicable to the facts of the case with the result that it was incumbent upon the authorities to compare the needs of the land-lord and tenant under Rule 16 of the Act. In the last place it was urged that the authorities below committed an error of law in not comparing the needs of the land-lord with those of the tenants. With regard to the first point, the position is that in the application for release the land-lord stated in paragraph 2-A that at present he was residing in two rooms of premises no. 13, Mayo Road, Allahabad. It was mentioned that when he came to Allahabad after his appointment as Judge of this Court he asked his cousin brother Sri Prem Behari Capoor son of late Mr. Justice C. B. Capoor to vacate two rooms for him so that he could reside in them for the time being and he was kind enough to do so as a temporary measure. In paragraph 4 it was stated that the aforesaid two rooms which were in the occupation of the applicant (land-lord) were extremely insufficient to meet his needs. The applicant has been living in these two rooms with his wife and a grown up daughter who is a student of M. A. Second year in the University of Allahabad. It was also stated that the accommodation was insufficient for his needs specially in view of his status as a Judge of the High Court. The appellant filed a reply to the application in paragraph 29 whereof he stated that the land-lord was living in an independent accommodation in front of the main building which had five well sized rooms. According to him this accommodation was sufficient for the requirements of even a High Court Judge. The appellant filed a reply to the application in paragraph 29 whereof he stated that the land-lord was living in an independent accommodation in front of the main building which had five well sized rooms. According to him this accommodation was sufficient for the requirements of even a High Court Judge. A rejoinder affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondent landlord in paragraph 21 of which he admitted that he was residing in a portion of the building which was in front of the main building. He stated that this portion has only three comfortable rooms, the other two rooms are small rooms one of which was used as Kitchen and in the other Sri Munni Lal Baijal, nephew of Lt. Col. K. L. Capoor has been residing. 5. It is thus apparent that there was no dispute between the parties that the landlord applicant was at present residing in a portion of the cottage which is infront of the main building. 6. The tenant appellant applied that a commissioner should go and inspect the house in dispute. The commissioner in his report stated that in the northern block of the premises there were four rooms one of which was occupied as the office of Sri K. Capoor, Advocate whose files and books were in it. The other was a common drawing room of Sri Hira Lal Capoor (the Respondent) and Sri K. Capoor, Advocate. The third was the Respondents living room and the fourth was the kitchen. In these last two rooms the respondent landlord was living. The commissioner was told that the landlord had borrowed the same from Sri G. B. Capoor and late Justice S. B. Capoor. The appellant does not appear to have filed any objection to this report. This report was made at the instance of one Lalmani Singh, a tenant in an adjoining portion of the same building but since all the three cases have been consolidated and were proceeding as one, there was no difficulty in the appellant filing an objection to this report if he had any. This report was made at the instance of one Lalmani Singh, a tenant in an adjoining portion of the same building but since all the three cases have been consolidated and were proceeding as one, there was no difficulty in the appellant filing an objection to this report if he had any. The fact that the appellant or any of the tenants did not file any objection questioning the statement that the land-lord was living in one room and one Kitchen of the northern block of the premises, leads one to the conclusion that it cannot be said that there was no evidence in support of the fact that landlord was actually living in two rooms. Subsequently, when Prabhakar Pandit, Advocate, was appointed as Commissioner, he also filed a report. That report also gave the actual position of the premises in question. There is no discrepancy in the report prepared by him and the earlier report. He also stated the same facts. From a perusal of his report it appears that he wrongly described the rooms in the Cottage in front of bungalow no. 13 Mayo Road, Allahabad to be in the main building. Be that as it may, the appellant filed his objection to the report but he did not question the correctness of the statement of fact mentioned by the commissioner that of the three rooms one was being used as office of the lawyer brother of the land-lord while the middle room was common drawing room of the two brothers and the respondent land-lord was residing in the third room to which was attached a kitchen and a bath. Subsequently, another affidavit was filed by the lawyer brother on behalf of the respondent land-lord on 6th June 1974. In paragraph 8 it was specifically stated that in portion no. 1 of the map out of the three rooms the eastern room and connected dressing room and bathroom are in occupation of sons of late Sri Janki Prasad Capoor but in view of emergency and shortage of accommodation the applicant has taken their permission to use the same temporarily. The central room is the common drawing room of the applicant's joint family. The western room is the office of the deponent. The adjoining dressing room and bathroom are in occupation of the family of Lt. Col. K. L. Capoor who has permitted his Bhanja Sri M. L. Baijal. The central room is the common drawing room of the applicant's joint family. The western room is the office of the deponent. The adjoining dressing room and bathroom are in occupation of the family of Lt. Col. K. L. Capoor who has permitted his Bhanja Sri M. L. Baijal. This affidavit of Krishna Capoor who was the brother of the respondent makes the position clear that the respondent was living in one out of the three main rooms and the kitchen. This was the evidence in support of the landlord's plea and the finding. We are hence unable to up hold the contention of the appellant that there was no evidence in support of the finding that the respondent landlord was living in two rooms. There is no substance in the first submission. 7. In the next place it was mentioned that Explanation (ii) to Section 21 (1) was not applicable and hence it was incumbent upon the authorities to compare the needs of the landlord and the tenant as prescribed by Rule 16. The authorities below as also the learned Single Judge have held that Explanation (ii) to Section 21 (1) aforesaid was applicable to the instant case with the result that it was not at all necessary for the Prescribed Authority to compare the needs of the land-lord and tenants. We are, however, not inclined to express any opinion on the law point. We will assume that the Explanation (ii) was not applicable. 8. Rule 16 (e) upon which learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance provides that if there are a number of tenants separately occupying a block of tenements and the land-lord desires their eviction on ground of his personal need the prescribed authority shall consider whether suitable alternative accommodation is likely to be available to such tenants. A perusal of the orders of the Prescribed Authority as well as the District Judge shows that they have considered the question of availability of suitable alternative accommodation and in that connection both the authorities observed that the appellant did not make a bonafide effort for an alternative accommodation and that if the appellant had been keen to find out an alternative accommodation he would have been able to obtain it by now. Under clause (e) the authorities have only to see whether there is a likelihood of suitable alternative accommodation being available. Under clause (e) the authorities have only to see whether there is a likelihood of suitable alternative accommodation being available. They do not have to make it actually available to the tenant. Mr. Saksena then referred to clause (a) of Rule 16 which provides that where a landlord already has adequate and reasonably suitable accommodation having regard to the number of members of his family and their respective ages and his means and social status, his claim for additional requirements shall be construed strictly. Even Mr. Saksena found it difficult to justify the appellant's case under this clause. The land-lord is a Judge of the High Court. It does not require much effort to understand the need of a person in that position. Actually he has been found to be living in two rooms one of which is being used as kitchen. It requires no argument to conclude that the accommodation was not only insufficient but in view of the fact that this accommodation was according to the land-lord, given to him temporarily by his cousin brother, heightens the necessity of the land-lord for some other suitable accommodation. The appellant is a practising lawyer in this Court. He was a tenant in a portion of the building owned by the respondent land-lord. The fact that he was carrying on the profession of law in this accommodation does not in any manner increase the gravity of his need. If he shifts to some other suitable accommodation, he can continue his practice with equal facility in the other accommodation. Lawyers often change the venue of their office. These facts have been elaborately dealt with and discussed by the authorities below. It cannot be said that they were oblivious to the needs of the tenants. We, therefore, see no force in the submission. 9. In the result, we find no substance in the appeal. It is accordingly dismissed but we make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.