JUDGMENT V. Balakrishna Eradi, J. 1. M/s Sundaram Finance Limited, a company carrying on the business of hire purchase financing in automobiles, with its Head Office at Madras and branches at various centres in Kerala, is the petitioner in these three writ petitions. The tax due under the Kerala Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1963 (hereinafter called the 'Act), in respect of three stage carriage vehicle covered by hire purchase agreements executed with the petitioner by the concerned bus operators had been kept in arrear by those operators during certain periods prior to 31st March 1972. By the three notices produced as Ext. P-1 in each writ petition the petitioner-company was called upon by the Regional Transport Authority, Alleppey the first respondent in all the writ petitions to show cause why steps should not be taken against it for the recover of the arrears of tax due in respect of the three vehicles. The petitioner has, thereupon, come up to this Court with these writ petitions praying that the impugned notices should be quashed and that a writ of mandamus should be issued to the first respondent directing him to forbear from taking any action against the petitioner-company for the recovery of the aforesaid tax arrears. 2. The main contention put forward in these writ petitions in support of the petitioner's prayers for the reliefs aforementioned is that under the scheme of the Act the liability to pay the tax is imposed only on an ''operator", and that since the petitioner is not an "operator" as defined in section 2 (b) of the Act the demands made against the petitioner are illegal and unsustainable. It is further contended that the petitioner cannot be made liable for the arrears in question under section 11 (1) of the Act also because the petitioner is not a transferee from the "operator" and the company was in possession and control of the vehicles at the time of the issuance of the impugned notices only on account of its having exercised the right of re-possession conferred by the hire purchase agreements and not pursuant to any transfer by the operator. 3. 3. Section 2 (b) of the Act which contains the definition of the expression "operator" was originally in the following terms: "'operator' means any person whose name is entered in the permit as the holder thereof." The term "permit" has been defined in clause (c) of section 2 as meaning a permit granted or countersigned under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 authorising the use of a vehicle as a stage carriage or a public carriage vehicle in any part of the State. 4. As per the above definitions, only the person in whose name the permit for a stage carriage vehicle has been granted can be regarded as the "operator" in respect of that vehicle. If the wording of section 2 (b) had stood in its original form, the petitioner-company would have been on strong ground in its contention that since the stage carriage permits in respect of the three vehicles did not stand in its name the company was not the "operator" in respect of those vehicles and hence had no liability to pay the tax. But, unfortunately for the petitioner, subsequent to the institution of these writ petitions, the Kerala Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Amendment Act, 1972 Act 4 of 1973 -was enacted by the State Legislature whereby in the place of the original definition of "operator" contained in clause (b) of section 2 a new definition was substituted. Clause (b) of section 2 as it stands after the amendment is in the following terms: '' 'Operator' means the owner or the person having possession or control of the vehicle and includes any person whose name is entered in the permit as the holder thereof." The amendment has been brought into force with retrospective effect from the 1st day of July, 1967. 5. The periods in respect of which the arrears of tax has been demanded from the petitioner under the impugned notices are all subsequent to July 1967. No challenge has been raised by the petitioner against the validity of the Amending Act Act 4 of 1973. Hence these cases have to be decided on the basis of the provisions of the Act as they stand after the amendment. 6. Under section 2 (b) as amended, every owner of a stage carriage vehicle falls within the scope of the expression 'operator'. Hence these cases have to be decided on the basis of the provisions of the Act as they stand after the amendment. 6. Under section 2 (b) as amended, every owner of a stage carriage vehicle falls within the scope of the expression 'operator'. The definition gets attracted by virtue of his ownership of the vehicle alone, irrespective of whether he is also the person whose name is entered in the permit as holder thereof. In other, words, even an owner who is not the permit-holder has been brought within the scope of the definition with the result he is also made directly liable for payment of the tax due under the Act. 7. There cannot be any doubt that the ownership of the three vehicles covered by the hire purchase agreements was vested in the petitioner-company. Hence, applying the new section 2 (b) the petitioner-company must be held to have been the 'operator' of the vehicles during the periods covered by the impugned notices. The tax due under the Act being payable by the operator of the vehicles, the demands made on the petitioner as per the impugned notices for remitting the arrears of such tax due for the periods when the petitioner was the operator, cannot be said to be illegal. 8. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the respondents relied also on the provisions of section 11 for supporting the impugned demands. He pointed out that on the basis of applications submitted by the petitioner-company before the 1st respondent, the registration in respect of the vehicles involved in O.P. Nos. 4494 and 4495 of 1972 was transferred in the name of the petitioner on 13th March 1972 and 3rd May 1972 respectively. Our attention was also drawn to the fact that the petitioner had also assumed possession and control of those two vehicles in exercise of its right of re-possession with effect from 25th January 1972 and 31st March 1972 respectively. As regards the vehicle involved in O.P. No. 678 of 1973, it was pointed out by the learned Advocate-General that the financing arrangement entered into by the petitioner-company was in respect of a second-hand vehicle. The hire purchase agreement, which is evidenced by Ext. P-3 (O.P. No. 678 of 1973), was entered into only on 22nd March 1971. Before that date the arrears of tax now sought to be recovered had already accrued. The hire purchase agreement, which is evidenced by Ext. P-3 (O.P. No. 678 of 1973), was entered into only on 22nd March 1971. Before that date the arrears of tax now sought to be recovered had already accrued. The learned Advocate-General argued that since the petitioner had admittedly acquired the ownership of the vehicle on the date of the agreement, Ext. P-3, it automatically became liable for the payment of the arrears of tax which had already accrued due in respect of the vehicle, by virtue of section 11 of the Act. 9. In our opinion, the learned Advocate-General is well-founded in his contention that the petitioner is liable for the arrears of tax under section 11 of the Act. The two stage carriage vehicles involved in O.P. Nos. 4494 and 4495 of 1972, were admittedly in the possession and control of the petitioner-company at the time when the impugned demands were made against it. Section 11 of the Act lays down inter alia, that if the tax due in respect of any motor vehicle remains unpaid by any person liable for the payment thereof and such person, before having paid the tax, has transferred the ownership of such vehicle or has ceased to be in possession or control of such vehicle, the person to whom the ownership of the vehicle has been transferred or the person who has possession or control of such vehicle shall be liable to pay the said tax to the prescribed officer. We shall assume for purposes of argument that the petitioner was not the person primarily liable to pay the tax and the liability was that of the hirer who had been granted the permit to ply the stage carriages. Still, when the hirer ceased to be in possession or control of the vehicles and the possession and control became vested in the petitioner-company the petitioner became liable under section 11 to pay the arrears of tax to the Department. Similarly, in respect of the vehicle involved in O.P. No. 678 of 1973, the tax due in respect thereof had been kept in arrear by the original owner from whom the ownership of the vehicle became transferred to the petitioner-company on the date of the execution of the hire purchase agreement Ext. P-3. Similarly, in respect of the vehicle involved in O.P. No. 678 of 1973, the tax due in respect thereof had been kept in arrear by the original owner from whom the ownership of the vehicle became transferred to the petitioner-company on the date of the execution of the hire purchase agreement Ext. P-3. As the person to whom the ownership of the vehicle had been so transferred, the petitioner-company became liable for the arrears of tax which had accrued prior to 1971 by virtue of the provision contained in section 11 of the Act. We have therefore no hesitation to uphold the contention of the learned Advocate-General that even apart from the change brought about in the definition of the word 'operator' by the Amending Act of 1973, the petitioner-company was liable to pay the tax arrears in question under section 11 of the Act. 10. It follows from the above discussion that these writ petitions are devoid of merits. They are, accordingly, dismissed with costs.