Judgment :- 1. This petition seeks to quash the order Ext. P5 passed by the 2nd responden', the District Collector and District Magistrate, Kottayam, acting on a petition, Ext. P2, moved by the 1st respondent, the Executive Engineer, T C Division, Kerala State Electricity Board, Moovattupuzha, under S.16 (1) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, hereinafter referred to as the "Telegraph Act", for an order that he may be permitted to place electric supply-lines on the petitioner's property. By Ext. P5 order the 2nd respondent permitted the placing of supply-lines on the petitioner's property. The petitioner bad objected to Ext. P2 petition under S.16 (1) of the Telegraph Act; indeed he had objected to the placing of the supply-lines on his property by Ext P1 as soon as he came to know that an electric supply-line was to be taken over his property. The proposal was to take a 220 KV electric power line over and across the property of the petitioner. The case of the petitioner was that the taking of such a line would have the practical effect of destroying his property in that the placing of the supply lines would diminish the utility of the property and reduce its value to such an extent as to make the property practically worthless. In the objection to Ext. P2 petition two main contentions were raised by the petitioner; (1) that the 1st respondent had no locus standi to move the petition "for and on behalf of the Kerala State Electricity Board" and (2) that the only power, if any, conferred on the 1st respondent was that of a telegraph authority and that such conferment of power would not enable the 1st respondent to seek to erect such gigantic structures as pylons for placing high tension electric lines carrying not less than 2,20,000 volt alternating current. It was also the case of the petitioner that by S.10 of the Telegraph Act, no such right or power has been conferred on the Board. These contentions were negatived by the 2nd respondent by bis order Ext. P5. 2. It was also the case of the petitioner that by S.10 of the Telegraph Act, no such right or power has been conferred on the Board. These contentions were negatived by the 2nd respondent by bis order Ext. P5. 2. The main grounds raised in this petition are that the proceedings of the 2nd respondent are unauthorised, illegal and without jurisdiction and violative of Arts 19 (1) (f) and 31(1) of the Constitution; that the 1st respon-dent was incompetent in law to sue or act in his own name in any civil proceedings for the Kerala State Electricity Board; that Government have no power under S.51 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, for short, the Electricity Act, to confer any power on any person other than a public officer and that the conferment of power on the 1st respondent who h not a public officer is ultra vires and void; that the 2nd respondent had no jurisdiction or power to grant permission under S 16(1) of the Telegraph Act to cause any substantial damage, much less destruction of any valuable tree or other property in exercise of the powers conferred by S.10 of the Telegraph Act on the telegraph authority; and that the contention of 1st the respondent that the alignment proposed for placing of the supply-lines could not be deviated from was unsustainable and mala fide. 3. At the time of the argument the following submissions were made: (i) The 1st respondent, the Executive Engineer is not a public officer and therefore no powers under S.5t of the Electricity Act can be conferred on that officer. (ii) The only contention raised in the pleading by the respondents (a counter affidavit has been filed by the 1st respondent) is that the 1st respondent is a public officer. So the question whether the 1st respondent is a person engaged in the business of supply of energy to the public or not, should not be considered by this court in these proceedings. (iii) Under S.51 of the Electricity Act, power can be conferred only on particular individuals, and conferment of power in a general manner as has been done by Ext. RI produced along with the counter affidavit is not permissible. Such conferment of power on a class of officers amounted to delegation by a delegate and such delegation is not permissible in law. RI produced along with the counter affidavit is not permissible. Such conferment of power on a class of officers amounted to delegation by a delegate and such delegation is not permissible in law. (iv) The 1st respondent was not entitled to move a petition under S.16 of the Telegraph Act in his official capacity. He could, if at all, assuming he has authority vested in him by virtue of Ext. RI move the District Magistrate only in his own name. (v) Ext. R1 is bad for vagueness and uncertainty. (vi) The Board has nowhere been given power under Ext. RI and the motion by the 1st respondent on behalf of the Electricity Board is not maintainable. (vii) The powers that the public officer authorised under S.51 of the Electricity Act can exercise are only that of a telegraph authority and would not extend to the power to erect pylons and place electric lines for carrying 220 KV. electrical energy. Even under S.10 (b) of the Telegraph Act no right is conferred other than the right to use the property under, over, along, across, in or upon which the telegraph authority places any telegraph line or post and such a right does not imply a power to erect pylons and drawing of lines for carrying high voltage electrical energy. (viii) The action is mala fide. (ix) There has been violation of the principles of natural justice is that the petitioner had not been heard before deciding on the alignment of the line. 4. The relevant sections that are material for the purpose of this case are Ss.10 and 16 of the Telegraph Act, S.28 and 51 of the Electricity. Act and S.12 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, for short, the "Supply Act" which are given in the Appendix to this judgment. 5. S.51 of the Electricity Act has empowered the State Government to confer upon any public officer, licensee or any other person engaged in the business of supplying energy to the public, for the purpose of placing of electric supply-lines, appliances and apparatus for the transmission of electric energy, any of the powers which the telegraph authority possesses under that Act with respect to the placing of telegraph lines and posts for the purpose of a telegraph established or maintained by the Government. Counsel for the petitioner contended that the Executive Engineer, the 1st respondent is neither a "public officer" nor a "licenses" and further contended that he is not even "any other person engaged in the business of supplying energy to the public". Ext. RI is the order in writing conferring upon the Engineers of the Kerala State Electricity Board of and above the rank of Assistant Engineers all the powers which the telegraph authority possesses under S.10 to 18 of the Telegraph Act to be exercised for the purpose of placing electric supply-lines, appliances and apparatus. The contention raised is that the 1st respondent is only an employee of the Electricity Board, an independent entity which is akin to a Co-operative Society and the 1st respondent therefore is not a "Public Officer". "Public Officer" has not been d fined in the Electricity Act nor is there any definition of that term in the Telegraph Act or in the Supply Act. It will not be proper to apply the definition in any other enactment for the purpose of understanding the import of the expression "Public Officer" under S.51 of the Electricity Act So, we do not think that we should proceed on the basis of the definition in S.2(xvii) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The two decisions, Jhansi Co-operative Oil Mills v. Lala Makhan Lal AIR. 1937 Allahabad 492 and Narendra Prasad Sinha v. Maharani Janki Kuer AIR. 1947 Patna 385 dealt with the question whether the officers concerned therein, the Liquidator of a Co-operative Society in the former decision and the Chairman of a Municipality in the latter decision, were public officers within the meaning of the definition of that term in S.2 (xvii) of the Civil Procedure Code. Those decisions will not be of much help as the decisions turned on the interpretation of the definition of "public officer" in that particular statute. "Public Officer" can have different meanings is evident from judicial pronouncements on the subject. In the decision G A. Natesan, In re AIR. 1918 Madras 763 it was held that "Where a Statute appoints a body of persons to carry out purposes of public benefit, the persons constituting such a body inso facto become holders of a public office within the meaning of S.45" of the Specific Relief Act (1877). In the decision G A. Natesan, In re AIR. 1918 Madras 763 it was held that "Where a Statute appoints a body of persons to carry out purposes of public benefit, the persons constituting such a body inso facto become holders of a public office within the meaning of S.45" of the Specific Relief Act (1877). Reliance was placed in that decision on Henley v. Mayor of Lyme (1828) 5 Bing, 91 Best C. J, therein described a Public Officer as "every one who is appointed to discharge a public duty, and receives a compensation in whatever shape, whether from the Crown or otherwise." 6. Counsel for the petitioner placed much reliance on the decision In Re Mirams 1891 (1) Q. B. 594, and on the observations of Cave, J„ to the following effect: "In this case it is true that the salary is paid out of a poor-rate, and that the chaplain, although appointed by the guardians, can only be dismissed by the Local Government Board; but I am of opinion that this is no solid ground of distinction. To make the office a public office, the pay must come out of national and not out of local funds, and the office must be public in the strict sense of that term. It is not enough that the due discharge of the duties of the office should be for the public benefit in a secondary and remote sense." 7. To understand the import of the words, "Public Officer" in S.51 of the Electricity Act, it is necessary to remember the context in which it is used in the section and the scope and purpose of the Act in which the section occurs will also have to be borne in mind. In American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition, Vol. 63, there is the following passage at page 625: "There are numerous and varied definitions of the terms "office," "officer," "public office," and "public officer," as used in statutes and constitutions. In American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition, Vol. 63, there is the following passage at page 625: "There are numerous and varied definitions of the terms "office," "officer," "public office," and "public officer," as used in statutes and constitutions. They are terms of vague and variant import, the meaning of which necessarily varies with the connection in which they are used, and, to determine it correctly in a particular instance, regard must be had to the intention of the statute and the specific matter in reference to which the terms are used." We must therefore turn to the statute, the Supply Act, which provides in S.5 that the "State Government shall as soon as may be after the issue of the notification under sub-section (4) of S.1, constitute by notification in the official Gazette a State Electricity Board under such name as shall be specified in "the notification." The general powers and duties of the Board are detailed in Chapter IV and in S.18 in that Chapter the Board has been charged with the general duty of promoting the co-ordinated development of the generation, supply and distribution of electricity within the State in the most efficient and economical manner. Referring to S.5, 6, 8, 9, 18, 78A, 79, 81 and 82 of the Electricity Supply Act, the Supreme Court made the following observations in Sukhdev Singh and others v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and another AIR 1975 SC. 1331 in Para.82, 85, 86, 87 and 111: "82. Part IV of the Constitution gives a picture of the services which the state is expected to undertake and render for the welfare of the people. Art.298 provides that the executive power of the Union and State extends to the carrying on of any business or trade. As I said the question for consideration is whether a public corporation set up under a special statute to carry on a business or service which Parliament thinks necessary to be carried on in the interest of the nation is an agency or instrumentality of the State and would be subject to the limitations expressed in Art.13(2) of the Constitution. A state is an abstract entity. It can only act through the instrumentality or agency of natural or juridical persons. Therefore, there is nothing strange in the notion of the state acting through a corporation and making it an agency or instrumentality of the State." "85. A state is an abstract entity. It can only act through the instrumentality or agency of natural or juridical persons. Therefore, there is nothing strange in the notion of the state acting through a corporation and making it an agency or instrumentality of the State." "85. The tasks of government multiplied with the advent of the welfare state and consequently, the framework of civil service administration became increasingly insufficient for handling the new tasks which were often of a specialised and highly technical character. At the same time, 'bureaucracy' came under a cloud. The distrust of government by civil service, justified or not, was a powerful factor in the development of a policy of public administration through separate corporations which would operate largely according to business principles and be separately accountable". "86. The public corporation, therefore, became a third arm of the Government In Great Britain, the conduct of basic industries through giant corporations is now a permanent feature of public life." "87. The employees of public corporation are not civil servants. It is, infact, likely that in due course a special type of training for specialized form of public service will be developed and the status of the personnel of public corporation may more and more closely approximate to that of civil service without forming part of it. In so far as public corporations fulfil public tasks on behalf of government, they are public authorities and as such subject to control by government." "111. The crux of the matter is that public corporation is a new type of institution which has sprung from the new social and economic functions of government and that it therefore does not neatly fit into old legal categories. Instead of forcing it into them, the latter should be adapted to the needs of changing times and conditions." 8. Viewed in the above light, we have to understand the Electricity Board, the statutory authority created by the Supply Act, as a body established to fulfil a public task, on behalf of the Government, and that it is thus in a sense a public authority. Its officers though they are not civil servants will be functioning for the purpose of carrying out the objects and purposes for which the Board has been established and the Board can function only through such officers. Its officers though they are not civil servants will be functioning for the purpose of carrying out the objects and purposes for which the Board has been established and the Board can function only through such officers. It is in this background that we will have to understand the expression "Public Officer" in S.51 of the Electricity Act. Placing.of electric supply-lines, appliances and apparatus for the transmission of electric energy which as in this case would be on a fairly large scale involving the erection of pylons of commendable size and height for carrying lines capable of transmitting high voltage electricity of 2,20,000 cannot be entrusted to the ordinary public officers of the State The Electricity Board is, as it were, a State within a State, constituted for a specific purpose and the discharge of its duties and powers would call for specialised knowledge and the possession of the necessary technical know-how. Such a statutory body can function only through its officers. We conceive that it: is on such officers of the Board that the power envisaged by S.51 of the Electricity Act should be conferred. It is difficult to conceive that the legislative intent was that the Government should entrust the task envisaged by S.10 to 18 of the Telegraph Act on Government servants who have no training, no experience and who are not qualified to discharge those functions. It is in this background that the expression "Public Officer" occurring in the section has to be interpreted. 9. "Public Officer" is not the only authority on which power can be conferred as envisaged by S.51. On a licensee also the power can be conferred. A licensee need not be a'Public Officer" and more often than not he will not even be a public servant. It has also to be remembered that the power can be conferred on any person engaged in the business of supplying energy to the public under the Act. The section therefore certainly provides for the power being conferred on persons other than those who are in the limited sense public officers. "Public Officer" in S.51 has therefore to be given a wider meaning than that of a public servant employed by the State and paid by the State. The section therefore certainly provides for the power being conferred on persons other than those who are in the limited sense public officers. "Public Officer" in S.51 has therefore to be given a wider meaning than that of a public servant employed by the State and paid by the State. We are therefore unable to accept the contention that has been advanced by counsel that the conferment of power "by the State on the 1st respondent, the Executive Engineer of the Kerala State Electricity Board is against the terms of S.51 of the Electricity Act. 10. Submission No. (ii) made by counsel and detailed in Para.3 above does not arise for consideration in view of our conclusion on submission No. (i). 11. Passing on to submission No. (iii), what was urged was that Ext. RI has conferred power not on any particular "Public Officer" but on a class of officers of and above the rank of Assistant Engineers. The submissions in this regard were two told. It was submitted that there could not be any general conferment of power on a class of officers without reference to the individuals holding those offices for the time being. It was therefor, urged that such conferment of power on a class of officers is not a proper conferment as visualised by S.51 of the Electricity Act. Secondly it was urged that the effect of the conferment of power generally in the manner in which it has been done by Ext. RI really amounted to a delegation by the delegate. The contention was that S.51 has authorised the Government and the Government alone to determine who should exercise the powers of placing supply-lines. The effect of Ext. RI was to confer power on the Electricity Board to choose the persons who will exercise the power for, it was argued that it was open to the Electricity Board to appoint any one as an Assistant Engineer, or as an Engineer holding a rank above that of an Assistant Engineer. Strong reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Gour Chandra Rout and another v. The Public Prosecutor, Cuttack AIR 1963 S. C. 1198 in support of this argument. The section that came up for construction before the Supreme Court in the case was S.198-B (3) (a) of the Criminal Procedure Code (1898) which was in these terms: "198B. The section that came up for construction before the Supreme Court in the case was S.198-B (3) (a) of the Criminal Procedure Code (1898) which was in these terms: "198B. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code, when any offence falling under Chapter XXI of the Indian penal Code is alleged to have been committed against the President, or the Vice-President, or the Governor or Rajpramukh of a State, or a Minister, or any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State, in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public functions, a Court of Session may take cognizance of such offence, without the accused being committed to it for trial upon a complaint in writing made by the Public Prosecutor. (2) Every such complaint shall set forth the facts which constitute the offence alleged, the nature of such offence and such other particulars as are reasonably sufficient to give notice to the accused of the offence alleged to have been committed by him. (3) No complaint under sub-section (1) shall be made by the Public Prosecutor except with the previous sanction, (a) in the case of the President or the Vice-President or the Governor of a State, of any Secretary to the Government authorised by him in this behalf; The section has imposed two conditions. There must have been a sanction to lodge a complaint and the other is that sanction should be accorded by a certificate of the person authorised by the Government in this behalf. It was held that "when the Governor says that he leaves it to the Government to take such action as it thinks fit the inference must be that he is personally indifferent whether a complaint is lodged or not. When such is the attitude of the Governor it would be futile to suggest that he has authorised the lodging of a complaint." We do not think that the decision has any application in determining the manner in which the power conferred by S.51 of the Electricity Act can be exercised by the Government. Here again, we have to bear in mind the purpose for which the power is to be conferred. Here again, we have to bear in mind the purpose for which the power is to be conferred. Normally one would expect that the Engineers of the Electricity Board are the most competent persons to exercise the authority to place supply-lines and we consider that the post of an Assistant Engineer is a sufficiently responsible post and any person holding that post has to be considered as a sufficiently responsible person with the necessary knowledge and experience required for placing supply-lines. What we have said must apply with greater force to those holding higher posts There is not much of the personnel element involved in this matter. On whom power can be conferred will have to be determined with reference to elements like qualifications held, the knowledge and experience that the person can be expected to possess, and his capacity for carrying out the objects, namely, of ensuring the supply of electricity. If there are a class of persons, each of whom can be considered to be competent to exercise the authority, we conceive that the authority to place the power-lines can be conferred on all of them. We see no impediment in the power being conferred on a group of persons who have certain special qualifications and attributes. 12. The second argument advanced within this main heading, we consider, is too far-fetched based as it is on hypothetical possibilities which are so remote from realities. One cannot expect the Electricity Board, which has incidentally to be guided and controlled by the State Government in the discharge of its functions, appointing someone who is not competent and not qualified to be an Assistant Engineer, as an Assistant Engineer, or to any post above it. Qualifications to those posts are prescribed and there ought to be rules relating to the manner of selection of such officers and the State Government will have a voice on those aspects. We are unable to accept the suggestion that some persons or any person are likely to exercise the powers conferred by Ext RI. We are not able to discern any delegation by a delegate in Ext. RI. We reject this contentions as well. 13. Allied with the point that we have just now dealt with is point No. (v) in Para.3. We do not consider Ext. RI is vague and uncertain. It is sufficiently specific and clear. 14. We are not able to discern any delegation by a delegate in Ext. RI. We reject this contentions as well. 13. Allied with the point that we have just now dealt with is point No. (v) in Para.3. We do not consider Ext. RI is vague and uncertain. It is sufficiently specific and clear. 14. Points (iv) and (vi) in Para.3 can be dealt with together. The contention was that the application Ext P2 should have been moved in the personal name of the Executive Engineer. It was, as a matter of fact, moved by him in his official capacity describing himself as the Executive Engineer. It is said that the Executive Engineer is not a corporation sole and only a corporation sole will be entitled to move a petition in that manner. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in P. B. Shah and Co. and others v. Chief Executive Officer and others AIR 1962 Calcutta 283. The Court held therein that the Chief Executive Officer functioning as the Commissioner and the person occupying the post of City Architect were not corporate bodies. It was therefore held that unless the persons who occupied those offices were impleaded as such the suit was not maintainable. So it was urged that Ext. P2 application moved by the 1st respondent in his capacity as Executive Engineer was not maintainable We do not think that we should take such, a strict view in regard to an application under S.16 of the Telegraph Act made by an Executive Engineer who had been authorised under S.51 of the Electricity' Act. It was the same Executive Engineer who had been thwarted in his attempt to place supply-lines that moved the District Magistrate is not disputed. The motion was under S.16 of the Telegraph Act. The District Magistrate has the authority to direct under the section that the telegraph authority shall be permitted to exercise the powers mentioned in S.10 of the Telegraph Act. As the person authorised under S.51 of the Electricity Act, the Executive Engineer has the authority to exercise for placing electric supply-lines, the same powers a telegraph authority has for placing telegraph lines, considering all these aspects, the rule that is applicable in the case of suits, we do not think should apply in proceedings before the District Magistrate under S.16 of the Telegraph Act. It has been ruled that "In proceedings for the issue of high prerogative writs and in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution against a public officer or a public body, the individual occupying the office or the individuals forming the public body need not be named and they may be proceeded against under their official titles" See B, C. Das Gupta v. Bijoyranjan Rakshit AIR. 1953 Calcutta 212 and In re, Natesan ILR. 40 Mad. 125 These decisions were referred to in P. B. Shah and Co. and others v Chief Executive Officer and others AIR. 1962 Calcutta 283, relied on by counsel but were distinguished on the ground that in the case the court was concerned with a suit and not with a proceeding under Art.226 of the Constitution. Reference was also made to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. We are not concerned with a suit nor are the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as such applicable. We think that more appropriately it is the principle of the decision in B. C. Das Gupta v Bijoyranjan Rakshit AIR. 1953 Calcutta 212 and In re, Natesan ILR 40 Mad. 125 that must apply here. We see no infirmity in the application moved by the Executive Engineer in his official capacity. 15. The second wing of the argument regarding this matter was based on the statement in Ext. P2 that the application was made on behalf of the Electricity Board. The Electricity Board is a corporation sole by virtue of S.12 of the Supply Act. S.12 is in these terms: - "12. Incorporation of Board. The Board shall be a body corporate by the name notified under sub-section (1) of S 5, having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to acquire and hold property both movable and immovable, and shall by the said name sue and be sued." It is said that if the Board is to sue, it should sue in the name of the Board. Not only has there been no suit in the name of the Board but the Board has not been empowered under S.51 of the Electricity Act to place supply-lines and therefore no motion can be made on behalf of the Board. We understand Ext. P3, though it is not happily worded, as a motion by the Executive Engineer as well. Though at the beginning of Ext. We understand Ext. P3, though it is not happily worded, as a motion by the Executive Engineer as well. Though at the beginning of Ext. P2 it is stated that the petition is submitted for and on behalf of the Kerala State Electricity Board, the petitioner is styled as the Executive Engineer, and the prayer is that "In the circumstances it is prayed that your goodself be pleased to pass orders permitting the petitioner, the Executive Engineer, T. C. Division, Moovattupuzha, to place electric supply lines, appliances and apparatus for the transmission of energy over the property comprised in Sy. No. 71/6 of Lalam Village belonging to the counter-petitioner". Further, we do not think that the omission, if any, in following the form as such has resulted in any grievance to the petitioner which would necessitate interference under Art.226 of the Constitution. 16. The further submission made by counsel was that the power if any conferred on the 1st respondent was only that of a telegraph authority. A telegraph authority has power only to place telegraph posts and lines. Such a power will not entitle the 1st respondent to place such heavy structure on the property and take energy of over 2,20,000 voltage Certain observations from the judgment of a Full Bench decision of this Court is Bharat Plywood & Timber Products Private Ltd. v Kerala State Electricity Board 1970 KLT. 872 were relied on by counsel. "25. We quite realise that S.10 is contained in an enactment which came into force on the 1st October, 1885, at a time when even the placing of telegraph lines was a rare phenomenon and that the Act concerned itself only with the placing of telegraph lines, which in scope and extent and in dimensions are entirely different from the laying of electric supply lines in a modern city or a State, where one can expect, and one can see a net work of lines being drawn across country, over the properties, and near buildings and other structures The exercise of the powers under S 10 of the Telegraph Act, controlled by S.16 thereof, may be quite inadequate for the supply and distribution of electricity in modern times. In fact, we feel that entirely different provisions which will expedite the laying of lines and which will provide a more flexible and speedy procedure have become indispensable. In fact, we feel that entirely different provisions which will expedite the laying of lines and which will provide a more flexible and speedy procedure have become indispensable. But the legislature, in enacting S.51 of the Electricity Act, has chosen to confer on the public officer, the licencee or other person chosen by the State Government only the powers of a telegraph authority under the Telegraph Act. As matters stand, we have to come to the conclusion that, when a public officer, licensee or other person on whom the powers under the Telegraph Act have been conferred by the State Government acting under S.51 of the Electricity Act is resisted or obstructed, that authority has no alternative but to approach the District Magistrate under S.16(1) of the Telegraph Act for an order enabling him to exercise those powers. We come to this conclusion, reluctantly no doubt, because we can see how inconvenient and inexpedient it may be that every time an authority is resisted or obstructed there should be an approach to the District, Magistrate for an order. It is easily imaginable that in almost all cases there will be resistance or obstruction as the desire of every owner and occupier would be to avoid lines being drawn over the property in which he is interested. We are fully aware of the delay that will ensue and the labour that will be involved in having the matter placed before the District Magistrate on a number of adjourned hearings in order to satisfy the Magistrate that the exercise of the power is desirable, nay necessary. The volume of work that will result by petitions by the persons whom powers under the Telegraph Act have been conferred can be very considerable. Whether a District Magistrate burdened with other responsibilities, will be able to deal with this question as expeditiously as they should, is a matter of grave doubt. These are all matters which we feel ought to betaken note of by the legislature, and it is for the legislature to modify the law or to substitute other machinery for the purpose of enabling the authorities who are burdened with the task of doing very essential service in the interests of the general public of distributing and supplying electrical energy, to act with the expedition required. It may as well be that the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution can be safeguarded if some officer, responsible enough and adequate in stature, is entrusted with the task of deciding in given cases whether lines should be placed or not. There is no reason why such an officer should not be a Government servant or any other authority under the Electricity Board. These again are all matters that have to be considered, and considered seriously, in the interests of the Electricity Boards and what is far more paramount, in the interests of the general public, by the authorities concerned." The last part of the first part paragraph above when read alone can give the impression that the powers exercisable by an authority empowered to place electric supply-lines will be only such powers as are required for placing telegraph lines. But it is clear on reading the whole of that paragraph with the following one and when the context in which the observation was made is also borne in mind it is evident that nothing like was meant. Reference was also made to the following sentence in the sub-paragraph of Para.24: "The power that can be exercised by a person empowered under S.51 is the identical power which the telegraph authority possesses under the Telegraph Act." Here again the meaning is clear when the sentence is read with what is said in the earlier sub-paragraph. We do not think that it was meant that the person authorised under S.51 of the Electricity Act could do only what a telegraph authority could have done for placing telegraph lines, ie., by erecting only such posts as are necessary and placing such lines as are required for telegraph purpose. To so read the section would make the section useless, it will then serve no practical purpose and would become otiose. Such a meaning cannot be given. But we notice that such an interpretation has been given by the Madras High Court in the decision in S.M.E.S. Corporation v. Jagannatha AIR. 1960 Mad. 374. With great respect we are unable to agree with this view. Reference was also made by counsel to the decision of the Supreme Court in Patna Ele. Supply Co. v. Patna Municipality AIR. 1970 SC. 491. 1960 Mad. 374. With great respect we are unable to agree with this view. Reference was also made by counsel to the decision of the Supreme Court in Patna Ele. Supply Co. v. Patna Municipality AIR. 1970 SC. 491. All that has been decided therein is that "Merely because some of the powers conferred under the Telegraph Act on the telegraph authority could be conferred on a licensee under the Electricity Act, it does not follow that all the rights and liabilities of a licensee under the Electricity Act are governed by the provisions of the Telegraph Act" and so it was held that a dispute that bad arisen between the corporation and the company concerned cannot be referred to arbitration under S.15 of the Telegraph Act. This decision is not helpful for the purpose of this case. 17. Though the Telegraph Act was in the year 1885, the Electricity Act was in the year 1910 and by that time it was fairly well-known what was the type of the structures to be erected on properties for carrying electric supply-lines. S. Sl of the Electricity Act specifically states that "the State Government may, by order in writing, for placing of electric supply-lines, appliances and apparatus for the transmission of energy or for the purpose of telephonic or telegraphic communications necessary for the proper co-ordination of works, confer upon any public officer any of the powers which the telegraph authority possesses under that Act, with respect to the placing of telegraph lines and posts for the purposes of a telegraph established or maintained by the Government or to be so established or maintained" It is clear from the section that the power is for the placing of electric supply-lines, appliances and apparatus. The dimensions of these supply-lines were certainly known to the legislature and the legislature was also aware that those supply-lines were in no way comparable to the telegraph lines. We understand the section to mean that the authority conferred with power to place electric supply-lines may place such supply-lines as are necessary for the transmission of electric energy by exercising the powers which the telegraph authority would have exercised for entering on the property of another and erecting posts and drawing lines for the purpose of placing telegraph lines. We understand the section to mean that the authority conferred with power to place electric supply-lines may place such supply-lines as are necessary for the transmission of electric energy by exercising the powers which the telegraph authority would have exercised for entering on the property of another and erecting posts and drawing lines for the purpose of placing telegraph lines. In other words, the power conferred is of the nature exercised by a telegraph authority for placing telegraph lines but is certainly not coeval or co-extensive with what is exercised by a telegraph authority. It was submitted that if such a view was taken the exercise of authority will result in deprivation of property and what S.10 contemplates is only the user of the property. Counsel is well-founded in the submission that there can be a diminution in the value of the property to a considerable extent by the placing of the electric supply-lines of the dimensions involved in the case. To offset this loss we conceive, there is provision in S 10 (d) of the Telegraph Act for the payment of full compensation. Apparently the legislature proceeds on the basis that it would be a reasonable restriction considering the object to be achieved by the placing of the electric supply-lines, viz., vital service to the public which is of general public interest. We are unable to accept the submission that what is intended by S.51 of the Electricity Act is only the conferment of power for the purpose of placing lines similar to what would have been placed by the telegraph authority for telegraph purposes. 18. From the pleadings and the materials placed before us, we are not satisfied that there has been any ground of mala fides made out. It is said that the alignment could have been adjusted so as to cause much less damage to the petitioner. In the counter affidavit that has been filed, it is stated that it is not possible to alter the lines substantially as it would cause damage to others. These are matters which, unless there is clear mala fides made out. or arbitrariness or caprice or perversity made out are outside the purview of Art.226 of the Constitution. 19. In the counter affidavit that has been filed, it is stated that it is not possible to alter the lines substantially as it would cause damage to others. These are matters which, unless there is clear mala fides made out. or arbitrariness or caprice or perversity made out are outside the purview of Art.226 of the Constitution. 19. Finally it was argued that if the petitioner had been heard before the alignment had been fixed, he would have been able to suggest an alternative line and by not giving such an opportunity, the principles of natural justice had been violated. We do not think a prior notice to the owner before the officers empowered made up their minds to place the lines in a particular manner is necessary. The petitioner did get a chance of representing against the proposal and he had also the opportunity to place the matter before the District Magistrate who is the authority to decide whether a line in the manner suggested is to be taken or not. In these circumstances we cannot hold that there has been any violation of the principles of natural justice. 20. It has been alleged that irreparable loss has been caused to the petitioner in that the only ancestral property that the petitioner has had been rendered practically useless and the high power line has been taken over the very place where the petitioner had laid the foundation and partly built a house for his retirement. While one has to reconcile himself to the personal inconvenience and loss and great disappointments in the cause of the interests of the general public, we cannot help wondering whether a more satisfactory method could not be adopted for the purpose of drawing such lines. We pointed out in Para.25 of the Full Bench judgment of this Court that the provision now existing for drawing lines are those covered under an ancient statute and are inadequate. The facts of this case indicate that those provisions are not only inadequate but unsatisfactory. Atleast in the case of drawing such high power lines, we conceive that there should be a more satisfactory machinery providing for prior notice, for compulsory acquisition by resort to the law of Land Acquisition when consent could not be obtained. These are matters which ought to be considered by the appropriate legislature. 21. Atleast in the case of drawing such high power lines, we conceive that there should be a more satisfactory machinery providing for prior notice, for compulsory acquisition by resort to the law of Land Acquisition when consent could not be obtained. These are matters which ought to be considered by the appropriate legislature. 21. We are however unable to grant any relief to the petitioner. We dismiss this petition. The parties will bear their respective costs. Dismissed.