JUDGMENT K. N. SINGH, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of the Labour Court, Allahabad, dated 20th September. 1972. issued under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 (Central Act) holding that the petitioner is liable to pay a sum of Rs. 19.3581- to Shyam Lal Sharma. a workman of the petitioner Milk, as arrears of salary and other allowances. 2. The petitioner is a company which carries on business of manufacture and sale of woollen blankets. It has got three different units. Shyam Lai Sharma, respondent No. I. was employed as workman in Unit No. 1 of petitioner Mills. A domestic enquiry was held against him on certain charges and he was dismissed from service on 29th October, 1967. Since some labour dispute was pending at that time, the petitioner made an application to the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal for approval of the dis- missal of respondent No. I under Section 6-F (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but the approval was refused by the afore. said authorities. Shyam Lai Sharma the respondent workman, thereafter made an application under Section 6-1-I (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before the Labour Court at Allahabad for computation of the benefits due to him with effect from 20th May, 1967. The Labour Court awarded salary to respondent workman for the period from 20th May. 1967 to 31st August. 1968. but his claim for subsequent period was rejected by the Labour Court on the ground that there was closure in the Mills after 31st August. 1968, and that the workman could get his right adjudicated only after a regular reference tinder Section 4-K was made by the Government. Aggrieved. the workman filed writ petition No. 4158 of 1969 challenging the order of the Labour Court. 'The writ petition was allowed by Justice B. N. Lokur on 23rd July, 1971. and the proceedings were remanded to the Labour Court for adjudicating the workman's claim in accordance with law. After the remand the Labour Court dismissed the workman's application by its order dated 29th March. 1972, on the ground that the workman's application was not maintainable under Section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act for arrears of salary and other allowances as the money claim could not be claimed under the aforesaid pro- vision. After the remand the Labour Court dismissed the workman's application by its order dated 29th March. 1972, on the ground that the workman's application was not maintainable under Section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act for arrears of salary and other allowances as the money claim could not be claimed under the aforesaid pro- vision. Aggrieved, the workman challenged the validity of the order of the Labour Court in Writ Petition No. 4452 of 1972, which was heard along with this petition and dismissed. 3. After the dismissal of his application under Section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, the respondent workman filed another application under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act) claiming that he was entitled to receive from the petitioner Mills money as arrears of salary, benefit of bonus, house rent allowance and leave pay up to the date of the application, namely, 1st August, 1972. The workman made a further prayer before the Labour Court to compute the amount of money and benefits due to him under the aforesaid heads and issue direction for the payment of the same to him. The employers, namely, the petitioner Mill contested the workman's application on the ground that the application was not maintainable under the Central Act and that the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter as the Labour Court was not constituted under the Central Act and the Presiding Officer did not possess the requisite qualifications laid down under the Central Act for the appointment as Presiding Officer and since it similar application made earlier by the workman under Section 6-H (2) had been dismissed, the second application was not maintainable on the principles of constructive res judicata. The Labour Court repelled the employer's contention and accepted the workman's claim and awarded a sum of Rs. 19,308/- as arrears of salary and other allowances by its order dated 20th September, 1972. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached this Court by means of the present petition challenging the order of the Labour Court. 4. Sri B. C. Dey, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that the provisions of Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act were not applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh as the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached this Court by means of the present petition challenging the order of the Labour Court. 4. Sri B. C. Dey, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that the provisions of Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act were not applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh as the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 1947, contained similar provisions in Section 6-H (2) which did not empower a Labour Court to compute the "money claim". It was further urged that since the Central Act and the State Act both operated in the same field, the State Act shall prevail in the State and as such the provisions of Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act were not applicable, therefore the workman's application was not maintainable. Section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act was in parimateria with the provisions contained in Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act, prior to its amendment by Central Act No. 36 of 1964, (the Industrial Disputes Amendment Act. 1964). Both the sections were almost identical in terms. The scope of Section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act was considered in Kays Construction & Co. v. State of U. P., ( AIR 1965 SC 1488 ). The Supreme Court laid down that no direction for payment of arrears of salary could be given under that Section as the expression "benefit which is capable of being computed in terns of money" occurring in sub-section (2) of Section 611 of the State Act did not envisage money claims, as there was an inti the sis between "money due" and "benefit" which could be computed in terms of money. Similar view was expressed by the Supreme Court while interpreting Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act (prior to its amendment in 1964) in Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. K. L. Kharbanda, ( AIR 1963 SC 487 ). After the aforesaid declaration of law the Parliament intervened and amended Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act by Act 36 of 1964. After the aforesaid declaration of law the Parliament intervened and amended Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act by Act 36 of 1964. After the amendment, sub-section (2) of section 33-C runs as under : "(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government." Prior to the amendment, sub-section (2) of section 33-C laid down that the workmen were entitled to receive any benefit which was capable of being computed in terms of money. But after the amendment a significant change has been made. Now under the amended section a workman is entitled to claim from his employers "any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money." The workmen can therefore raise it claim not only for a benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money but also any money due from the employers, which may include arrears of wages, salary or other allowances which may have been withheld by the employers, The provisions contained in Section 33-C of the Central Act provide a summary procedure for speedy recovery of the amount due to a workman from the employers. Since, the arrears of salary could not be recovered under the unamended Section 33-C, the Parliament made it clear that any arrears of salary or any claim of money may be claimed by a workman against the employer before the Labour Court and if such a claim is raised the Labour Court has jurisdiction to issue direction for the payment of the same to the workman. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that even if the money claim could be raised by the workman under Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act, it does not prevail in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Sinch the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act had been reserved to the President and received his assent, the law made by the State Legislature shall prevail in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Sinch the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act had been reserved to the President and received his assent, the law made by the State Legislature shall prevail in the State of Uttar Pradesh. It was further urged that the respondent-workman's application under Section 33-C (2) was not main'able as that provision was not applicable, instead Section 6-H (2) of the State Act was applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The subject of 'industrial and labour laws' is in the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, the Parliament as well as the State Legislature both have jurisdiction to enact laws on the subject. The Central legislature legislated the industrial Disputes Act 1947 (Central Act), whereas the State Legislature enacted U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The State Act was referred to the President for his assent and it received his assent. Thereafter, in view of the provisions contained in Article 254 (2) of the Constitution, the State law would prevail in the State and if the Central Act contained any provisions repugnant to the law made by the State legislature the same would be inapplicable within the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Central Act as well as the State Act were amended from time to time and most of the provisions contained in the two Acts were similar and there was no repugnancy in the two Acts. The State Government had jurisdiction to refer a dispute for adjudication both under Section 10 of the Central Act as well as under Section 4-K of the State Act. Both the Acts have been complementary and supplementary to each other and the provisions contained in the two Acts were not in the nature of supplanting the other. After the Supreme Court judgment in AIR 1963 SC 487 (supra) the Parliament considered it necessary to confer jurisdiction on the Labour Court to grant relief to a workman in respect of money claims also and for that purpose it amended Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act by the Amending Act No. 36 of 1964. After the Supreme Court judgment in AIR 1963 SC 487 (supra) the Parliament considered it necessary to confer jurisdiction on the Labour Court to grant relief to a workman in respect of money claims also and for that purpose it amended Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act by the Amending Act No. 36 of 1964. It is true that no similar amendment was trade by the State Legislature in the State Act with the result no money claim can legally be made by a workman under Section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Act, but that does not necessarily follow that the provisions of the Central Act, as amended in 1964, will not he applicable to the State of Uttar Pradesh. Article 254 of the Constitution makes it amply clear that if the Parliament has power to enact a law, the law made by it will prevail, notwithstanding any law made by the State Legislature. In my opinion the Central Act, as amended in 1964. would prevail in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Moreover, proviso to Article 254 (2) makes it further clear that the Parliament is competent to enact at any time any law with respect to the same matter (a subject-matter of legislation included in the Concurrent list) which may add or amend or repeal any law made by the Legislature of a State. The Central Amending Act does not expressly make any amendment in the State law, instead it amends the Central Act. 6. The question whether the Central Act and the State Act can or create simulitly as both the Acts operate in the same field was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Vishnu Das v State of U. P., (1974) 29 had LR 335 = (1974 lab IC 1287) (All) (FB). The State Government had referred an individual dispute for adjudication under Section 10 read with Section 2-A of the Central Act. The State Government had referred an individual dispute for adjudication under Section 10 read with Section 2-A of the Central Act. The validity of the reference was questioned on the ground that since the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act operated in the same field and did not contain any provision for referring an individual dispute to adjudication, the State Government could not exercise its power under the Central Act, The Full Bench considered the question at length and there fore it renelled the contention and held that the provisions of the Central Act and the U. P. Act clearly show that both the Parliament and the State Legislature intended that the W o Acts should coexist and remain as complementary and supplementary without one supplanting the other and that the two Acts were left to operate simultaneously in relation to industrial disputes covered by both the Acts and it was in the discretion of the State Government to refer industrial dispute for adjudication either under the Central Act or under the State Act according to its sweet will. In view of the law laid down by the Full Bench it is clear that it is open to a workman to either make an application under Section 6-H (2) of the State Act or under Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act as both the Acts are operating simultaneously in the State of Uttar Pradesh. In this view of the matter, the contention that the petitioner's application was not maintainable is untenable. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that since the application was made under Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act, the Labour Court which entertained and decided the workman's claim should have been constituted in accordance with Section of the Central Act. It was further urged that the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to entertain or decide the workman's claim under Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act, firstly, be- cause the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court did not possess the necessary qualification as laid down by the Central Act, and, secondly, because the Labour Court was not empowered by the State Government to entertain or decide applications relating to claims made under Section 33-C (2) of the Act. Section 7 (3) of the Central Act lays down that no person shall be qualified for appointment as Presiding Officer of it Labour Court unless he is, or has been a Judge of a High Court, or has, for not less than three nears. been a District Judge or Additional District Judge, or has held the office of the Chairman or any other member of the Labour Appellate Tribunal or of any Tribunal for a period of not less than two years. or he has held any judicial office in India for not less than seven years, or be has been the Presiding Officer of a labour Court for not less than five years. It is asserted by the petitioner that Sri S. N. Singh, the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, who decided the work- man's claim in the instant case, did not possess any of the aforesaid qualifications as laid down in Section 7 (3) of the aforesaid Act, therefore, he had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. I do not find any sub- stance in this contention. If a Labour Court is constituted by the State Government under Section 7 of the Central Act it would be necessary that the Presiding Officer should possess the qualifications as enumerated in sub-section (3) of the Act. But in the instant case, the Labour Court at Allahabad was not constituted under Section 7 of the Central Act, instead it was constituted under Section 4-A of the U. P. Act. The qualifications prescribed for appointment as Presiding Officer of a Labour Court under Section 4-A are quite different than those contained in the Central Act. Sub-section (3) of section 4-A of the U. P. Act lays down that a person would be qualified for appointment as Presiding Officer of a Labour Court if he held any judicial office in India for not less than seven years or if his name is included in the list of persons prepared by the State Government for appointment as Presiding Officer of a Labour Court. The procedure for preparation of the list is contain- ed in Section 4-E of the Act. It is conceded by the respondents that Sri S. N. Singh. Presiding Officer of the Labour Court. The procedure for preparation of the list is contain- ed in Section 4-E of the Act. It is conceded by the respondents that Sri S. N. Singh. Presiding Officer of the Labour Court. Allahahad, did not possess the qualifications prescribed under sub-section (3) of section 7 of the Central Act but he possessed the qualifications laid down under Section 4-A of the State Act and that he had been appointed Presiding Officer of the Labour Court under a notification issued by the State Government under Section 4-A of the Act. 8. The Parliament while amending Section 33-C of the Central Act by Act 36 of 1964 added an Explanation to Section 3-C which is in the following manner : "Explanation : In this section Labour Court includes any Court constituned under any law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State." The enactment of the above Explanation was considered necessary by the Parliament be- cause it was aware that the different States had prescribed different qualifications for appointment of Presiding Officer of a Labour Court. The Parliament intended that the benefit of the amended Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act should be available to the workmen of all the States and for that purpose it conferred jurisdiction under the said provision on the Labour Courts constituted by the State Governments in accordance with the State law. The Parliament was aware that in the country there were two kinds of Labour Courts. one constituted under and in accordance with the provisions contained in the Central Act and the other in accordance with the provisions contained in the State Laws. It was further aware that a question may arise as to whether a Labour Court constituted tinder the State Act could entertain a claim made under the amended Section 33-(2) of the Central Act. In order to remove that ambiguity Parliament enacted the above noted Explanation. The explanation lays down that the expression "Labour Court" occurring in Section 33-C means a Labour Court constituted under any law which may include a law made by the State legislature. The Explanation thus makes it clear that the Labour Court constituted by the State Government under the State law for the investigation and settsment of industrial disputes is competent to enter lain application and to exercise jurisdiction under Section 33-C of the Central Act. The Explanation thus makes it clear that the Labour Court constituted by the State Government under the State law for the investigation and settsment of industrial disputes is competent to enter lain application and to exercise jurisdiction under Section 33-C of the Central Act. As already noted the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court at Allahabad Sri S. N. Singh had been appointed by the State Government tinder Section 4-A of the U. P. Act to adjudicate and settle industrial disputes. Sri S. N. Singh possessed necessary qualifications prescribed under the State Act to act as Presiding Officer of a Labour Court. In this view of the matter the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court at Allahabad had full jurisdiction to entertain and decide the work- man's claim under Section 33-C of the Central Act. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that according to the well settled principles of interpretation of Statutes an Explanation to a section cannot be interpreted to add or enlarge the scope of the section and thus the Explanation to Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act cannot enlarge the scope of the section so as to confer power on the Labour Courts constituted under the State Act if he did not fulfil the necessary qualifications laid down by Section 7 of the Central Act. He placed reliance on Ram Kishore Tandon v. Shayaur Sundar Lai, ( AIR 1951 All 155 ). In re V. Jagdesh. (AIR 1966 Andhra Pradesh 35) and Bihta Co-operative Development and ('one Marketing Union v. Bank of Bihar, ( AIR 1967 SC 389 ) in support of his contention. It is true that these rises support the petitioner's contention, but the material question which arises for consideration is whether the Explanation to Section 3-C is directed to add or enlarge the scone of the section. As already discussed, the Parliament enacted the Explanation to explain the meaning of the expression "Labour Court" The Explanation so added became a hart and parcel of the enactment and the language of the Explanation shows a purpose. The construction that I have placed is consistent with that purpose which can reasonably be placed upon it. In the absence of the Explanation a doubt could arise as to whether the Labour Court constituted under the State Act had jurisdiction to entertain applications under Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act. The construction that I have placed is consistent with that purpose which can reasonably be placed upon it. In the absence of the Explanation a doubt could arise as to whether the Labour Court constituted under the State Act had jurisdiction to entertain applications under Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act. The Parliament took care to remove that doubt in declaring that the Labour Courts constituted under the State Law have jurisdiction. Any other construction as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner would defect the very purpose of the Explanation. It is well accepted that an Explanation should normal- Is' be so read as to harmonise and clear up any ambiguity in the main section and should not he so construed as to widen the ambit of the section. (See Bihta Co-operative Development and one Marketing Union v. Bank of Bihar. AIR 1967 SC 389 ). Sometimes an Explanation may be added to include some- thing within or to exclude something from the ambit of the main enactment or the con- notation to some word occurring in it. In Hira Lal Ratan Lal v. Sales Tax Officer, ( AIR 1973 SC 1034 ) the Supreme Court laid down that if the intention of the legislature in adding the Explanation is to widen the scone of the main section, then effect must be given to that intention. I have already dis-' cussed the purpose of the Explanation and the interpretation which I have placed to the' Explanation is quite consistent with the legislative intent and purpose. 10. The petitioner's contention that) the Labour Court at Allahabad was not empowered to entertain applications under Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act is again without any substance. A perusal of Annexures 12, 13, 16 and 17 to the writ petition shows that the Labour Court at Allahabad was constituted under Section 4-A of the U. P. Act by a notification dated July 4, 1964 (Annexure No. 12). By a notification dated August 4, 1964 (Annexure 16) the State Government conferred power on the Labour Court, Allahabad, to determine money value of any benefit referred to in sub-section (2) of section 6-H of the U. P. Act a ; well as to exercise powers under sub-section (2) of section 33-C of the Central Act. By a notification dated May 25. By a notification dated May 25. 1967, (Anncxure 17) the State Government empowered the Labour Court to exercise the powers of the Labour Court under sub-section (2) of section 33-C of the Central Act for computing money value of any benefit or the amount of money due to a workman. These notifications read with the averments made in paragraph 32 f the counter-affidavit make it amply clear that originally the Labour Court was constituted under Section 4-A of the State Act and it was empowered to exercise powers under Section 6-H (2) of the State Act as well as under Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act. Later on, after the amendment of the Central Act by Act 36 of 1964 the State Government issued another notification and confer- red power on the Labour Court at Allahabad to exercise powers under the amended Section 33-C (2) including the power to compute the amount of money due from the em- plover to a workman. In view of these facts I am of opinion that these notifications read with the Explanation to Section 33-C of the Central Act leave no manner of doubt that the Labour Court at Allahahad was fully empowered to entertain and decide the claim of the respondent - workman. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the petitioner Mills had been closed and further as the respondent workman had attained the age of superannuation, he was not entitled to any salary or allowance. The petitioner did not raise these questions before the Labour Court. These are essentially questions of fact which can- not be raised in the present proceedings for the first time. The petitioner's contention that the Mill had been closed and for that reason the petitioner was not entitled to any salary was rejected by Lokur, J. That finding is binding on the petitioner. Moreover, the Labour Court has recorded a finding that even after the alleged closure of Mills the respondent workman was treated as in service and for that purpose disciplinary proceedings were taken against him and order of dismissal was passed and employers them selves sought approval of that order under Section 6-E of the Act. In view of these findings the petitioner's contention cannot be upheld. In view of these findings the petitioner's contention cannot be upheld. The question that since 'the respondent workman had attained the age of superannuation, he was not entitled to arrears of salary awarded by the Labour Court cannot be decided in the present proceedings, as the petitioner did not raise this question before the Labour Court. 12. Lastly, it was urged that since the respondent's application under Section 6-H (2) of the State Act had been dismissed by the Labour Court, the findings recorded therein operated as constructive res judicata and the petitioner was not entitled to file another application under Section 33-C on the same facts. It is true that the respondent workman's application under Section 6-H (2) of the State Act was dismissed by the Labour Court on 29th March, 1972. but a perusal of that order. Annexure IX to the writ petition shows that the Labour Court had not rejected the workman's claim on merits. Instead the application was dismissed on the ground that the workman's claim for arrears of salary was not within the scone of Section 6-I-I (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. That finding was given on the construction given by the Supreme Court in Kays Construction case AIR 1965 SC 1488 (supra). The Labour Court did not reject the workman's claim on merits. Instead it held that the claim was not maintainable under Section 6-H (2). Thereafter the workman filed another application under Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act claiming arrears of salary and other allowances which was entertained by the Labour Court. There is no prohibition in either of the two Acts against filing of a second application if the first application is rejected on technical grounds. Moreover, the doctrine of constructive res judicata is not applicable to the present application as the earlier application under Section 6-H (2) was not decided on merits. I, therefore, find' no merits in the petitioner's contention. 13. In view of the above discussion I find no illegality in the impugned order of the Labour Court. The petition fails and accordingly it is dismissed with costs. The respondent-workman is entitled to the money awarded to him by the Labour Court under its order dated 20th September, 1972