MOHAMMED SHAFI v. STATE OF KERALA — 1975 DIGILAW 315 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. The petitioners were at the time of filing the Original Petition employees of the Kerala Financial Corporation, the 2nd respondent (hereinafter called the Corporations.) The Corporation is one established under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 (Central Act 53 of 1951). They were in service at the time from twelve to eighteen months as Assistants and Typists. The appointments were made provisionally through the Employment Exchange. This according to the petitioners is the usual method of appointment and the temporary appointments so made used to be confirmed in due course. The Managing Director had made the appointments. It is alleged that ever since its inception the appointment of the staff of the Corporation was being mad by the Managing Director for classes B and C consisting of Assistants, Clerks, Stenographers, Typists and subordinate staff as per powers conferred on him by the Act and Regulations framed thereunder. It is asserted by the petitioners in this proceedings that all members of the staff who like the petitioners were originally appointed on a temporary basis up to and inclusive of 24th July 1970 have been made permanent and with respect to others whose appointments were between 24th April 1970 and 16th June 1972 Corporation has initiated steps for making them permanent. The dates of appointment of the petitioners are from 16th June 1972. 2. The petitioners approached this Court with this Original Petition on the allegation that in violation of the established practice, the Corporation is subjecting the petitioners to hostile discrimination and are taking steps to terminate their provisional appointment. These steps are being initiated on the basis that the Corporation is bound to implement the direction contained in a recently enacted legislation'the Kerala Public Service Commission (Additional Functions as respects certain Corporations and Companies) Act, 1970 (Act XIX or 970)' which came into force on 30th November 1970, which provides that the Kerala Financial Corporation may consult the Kerala Public Service Commission on all matters relating to recruitment of its employees. The said Act was preceded by an Ordinance of the same name, namely the Kerala Public Service Commission (Additional Functions as respects certain Corporations and Companies) Ordinance, 1970 (IV of 1970) which came into force on 25th April 1970. 3. The said Act was preceded by an Ordinance of the same name, namely the Kerala Public Service Commission (Additional Functions as respects certain Corporations and Companies) Ordinance, 1970 (IV of 1970) which came into force on 25th April 1970. 3. It is pointed out in the petition that out of ten persons appointed on temporary basis like the petitioners after promulgation of the said Ordinance, six have already been made permanent and the remaining four are awaiting orders of permanency as referred to earlier. The Managing Director had recommended to the Government by letter No. S.I. (A) (P) 4631, dated 9th July 1973 to make permanent the petitioners also. The petitioner's complaint is that the first respondent, the State of Kerala is assuming an illegal jurisdiction over the Corporation and forcing the Corporation to terminate the services of the petitioners and to appoint candidates selected by the Public Service Commission and advised for appointment in pursuance of Kerala Act XIX of 1970 Petitioners bring to the notice of the Court that S.23 of the State Financial Corporations Act, (the Corporation being one constituted under S.3 of the said Act) enjoins that appointment of staff should be nude by the Corporation itself and that the conditions of appointment and service must be determined by regulations framed thereunder. Under such delegated legislation, staff regulations had been framed in 1967 which consequently have the force of law and are statutory in character. Clause.9 of the said regulations provides that all employees under the categories of classes B and C roust be appointed by the Managing Director. 4. Petitioners' contention is that the State Act cannot make any provisions compelling the KFC. to make appointments through the Public Service Commission and thus abdicate its statutory functions. As per the Central Act and the regulations framed thereunder the Managing Director is the statutory appointing authority. All appointments to classes B and C have to be made by him and cannot be delegated to any other agency. His powers in the matter cannot be fettered by the Kerala State Government which has no jurisdiction whatsoever to interfere in the matter of appointments. The petitioners urge that if there are any provisions in the State Act which encroach upon the powers conferred on the Managing Director by the Central Act, the State Act to that extent is ultra vires. The petitioners urge that if there are any provisions in the State Act which encroach upon the powers conferred on the Managing Director by the Central Act, the State Act to that extent is ultra vires. It is also the petitioners' plea that the fact that the appointments of the petitioners are said to be provisional will not be of any legal consequence, particularly because till now in the history of the Corporation all appointments were to begin with called temporary but made permanent in due course. It is also pleaded that the action of the State and the Corporation in forcing out the petitioners are illegal and discriminatory because ten others similarly appointed after the State Ordinance and Act and after the selection of the new hands by the Public Service Commission have been made permanent. The Managing Director who alone has the sole voice in the appointment has expressed himself unequivocally in favour of appointing the petitioners regularly as per his letter marked as Ext. P-1 in the case. 5. The prayers in the form originally brought forward were for issue of a writ of mandamus to the respondents (among whom besides the State and the Corporation, is the Public Service Commission of the State) to forebear from terminating the services of the petitioners to give place for the candidates recruited by the Public Service Commission as per the Stats Act the validity of which is attacked and in respect of which a declaration is sought for that it is ultra vires to the extent it affects the Corporation and also for a writ of mandamus for directing the Managing Director of the Corpoation not to implement the provisions of the said Act namely the Kerala Public Commission (Additional Functions as respects certain Corporations and Companies) Act, 1970 in so far as recruitment to the categories of classes B and C of the employees of the Corporation is concerned or directions from the Kerala Government in this regard. 6. Along with the Original Petition the petitioners had filed a petition for interim injunction for restraining the Corporation from terminating the services of the petitioners pending disposal of the Original Petition. 6. Along with the Original Petition the petitioners had filed a petition for interim injunction for restraining the Corporation from terminating the services of the petitioners pending disposal of the Original Petition. This Court in its order on this petition dated 1st January 1974 directing notice to the respondents had also said that any appointment that may be made in the place of petitioners will be subject to the result of the Original Petition. 7. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State, the competency of the State Legislature to pass the Kerala Public Service Commission (Additional Functions as respects certain Corporations and Companies) Act, 1970 is stressed. It is stated therein that under entry 41 of List 2 of the Constitution, State Public Services and State Public Service Commission are Legislative heads within the competence of the State Legislature. It is also submitted by the State that under Art.321 of the Constitution of India, an Act made by the Legislature of the State can provide for the exercise of the Additional Functions by the State Public Service Commission as respects the services of any local authority or other body corporate constituted by law or if any public institution. According to the State, the Corporation can come within the ambit of these three-local Authority, Body corporate constituted by law and public institution. Under S.3 of the Act, the State Government is empowered to establish a Financial Corporation for the State. It is by virtue of such powers, the State Government has constituted the Corporation. The State Government is invested with very extensive powers regarding the functioning of the Corporation. Under S.4 of Act 63 of 1951 (Central Act), the authorised capital of the Corporation is to be fixed by the State Government. The authorised capital has to be divided into shares as determined by the State Government, the shares are to be distributed between the State Government, Reserve Bank and other public institutions like the Scheduled Banks, Insurance Companies, etc., as provided in S 4(3). Three members of the Board of Directors have to be nominated by the State Government. The Managing Director is to be appointed by the State Government. S.17 confers powers on the State Government to remove the Managing Director. The notice of resignation of the Managing Director has to be served on the State Government. Three members of the Board of Directors have to be nominated by the State Government. The Managing Director is to be appointed by the State Government. S.17 confers powers on the State Government to remove the Managing Director. The notice of resignation of the Managing Director has to be served on the State Government. Under S 39 powers are conferred on the State Government to issue directions to the Corporation and the Board of Directors of Corporation has to discharge its functions guided by the State's instructions on questions of policy. The rule making power is conferred under S.47 on the State Government. The counter-affidavit also points out that the power of the Board of Directors to frame regulations under S.48 of the Act is subject to the previous sanction of the State Government. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that the question whether the Public Service Commission should be directed to exercise Additional Functions as respects the services of the various Corporations including the 2nd respondent had been considered by the State. After considering various aspects including the representations from the public in that behalf, the Government decided that the services of the 2nd respondent besides the other Corporations and institutions should be the subject matter of the exercise of functions by the Public Service Commission. Therefore in the first instance Ordinance 17 of 1970 was promulgated which was later replaced by the Kerala Public Service Commission (Additional Functions as respects certain Corporations and Companies) Act, 1970. Under the enactments the term Corporation is defined to include the 2nd respondent also. The State further submits in the counter that the Act does not conflict in any way with the provisions of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. 8. A counter-affidavit an and additional counter affidavit have been filed on behalf of the Corporation, the 2nd respondent. The substance of the contentions therein are as follows: The petitioners' appointment was only provisional. Initially the appointment was for a period of three months. They were re-appointed subsequently for further periods of three months after effecting one day's break in service after the expiry of every three months. Employees under classes B and C were provisionally being appointed by the Managing Director but after Kerala Act XIX of 1970 the selection of candidates to those classes was entrusted to the Public Service Commission. They were re-appointed subsequently for further periods of three months after effecting one day's break in service after the expiry of every three months. Employees under classes B and C were provisionally being appointed by the Managing Director but after Kerala Act XIX of 1970 the selection of candidates to those classes was entrusted to the Public Service Commission. However, the power of appointment still vests in the Managing Director. Whatever may have been the practice in the past, provisional hands like the petitioners cannot claim permanency once Act XIX of 1970 came into force. Hence no question of the petitioners being discriminated against arises. 9. The Board of the Corporation met on 10th September 1970 and decided that selection for all appointments in classes B and C shall be made through P. S. C. Second respondent points out that no temporary hands appointed thereafter have been made permanent. The petitioners were appointed after the Board had taken the decision to hand over the selection and advice of candidates to classes B and C to the P. S. C. It is true that the 2nd respondent initiated steps for making permanent the persons appointed on temporary basis between 24th July 1970 and 16th June 1972. These steps were taken as the appointment of the persons concerned were made before selection of the candidates was handed over to the P. S. C, It is denied in the counter-affidavit that Kerala Act XIX of 1970 is in any way in conflict with the provisions of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. Even though the advice of the P. S. C. is sought the appointments arc still made by the Managing Director. The allegation of pressure and extraneous force from interested quarters and political circles on the 2nd respondent in the matter of termination of service of the petitioners are denied. 10. Some of the additional respondents impleaded who are persons advised by the P. S. C. for appointment to the Corporation have refused the contentions raised by the petitioners and have sought to uphold the validity of the provisions of the Kerala Public Service Commission (Additional Functions as respects certain Corporations and Companies) Act, 1970. So also the Secretary of the Kerala Finance Corporation Employees' Association, Trivandrum, which is a registered association recognised by the Corporation. Secretary of the Association has also been impleaded as an additional respondent. So also the Secretary of the Kerala Finance Corporation Employees' Association, Trivandrum, which is a registered association recognised by the Corporation. Secretary of the Association has also been impleaded as an additional respondent. One K. V. Peter who supports the petitioners' contentions has also been impleaded as an additional respondent in the O.P., as per order in C.M.P. No. 9547 of 1975. He is said to be in the same position as the petitioners in the O.P. He contends that the termination of his services was illegal on the same grounds as the petitioners have taken in the O.P. 11. The first question that arises for consideration in this O.P. is whether there is any conflict as regards the provisions in the regulations framed under the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 and the Kerala Public Service Commission (Additional Functions as respects certain Corporations and Companies) Act, 1970 which came into force on 30th November, 1970. The State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (Central Act 63 of 1951) is a statute enacted by Parliament. S.48 of the Act provides that the Board may, after consultation with the Reserve Bank and with the previous sanction of the State Government make regulations not inconsistent with the Act and the rules made thereunder to provide for all matters for which provision is necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Act. The said section also provides that all regulations under the section shall be published in the Official Gazette and any such regulation shall have effect from such earlier or later date as may be specified in the regulations. S.23 of the Central Act provides that the Financial Corporation may appoint such officers, advisers and employees as it considers necessary for the efficient performance of it functions, and determine, by regulations, their conditions of appointment and service and the remuneration payable to them: Provided that the State Government may, in consultation with and after obtaining the advice of the Reserve Bank, specify the class or categories of posts in respect of which appointments may be made by the Board on such remuneration and other conditions of service as the Board may determine, and no regulation made under the Act shall apply to such posts in respect of matters so determined by the Board. Staff Regulations have been framed by the Board in 1967. Staff Regulations have been framed by the Board in 1967. Naturally they have the force of law and are statutory in character. Clause.9 of the staff regulations provides that all employees under the categories of classes B and C must be appointed by the Managing Director. The Managing Director is therefore the statutory appointing authority. Under the Kerala Public Service Commission (Additional Functions as respects certain Corporations and Companies) Act it is provided that the Kerala Financial Corporation among other institutions may consult the Kerala Public Service Commission on all matters relating to recruitment of its employees. In the rules framed thereunder it would appear that it had been made mandatory that the Corporation should consult the Public Service Commission on all matters relating to recruitment of its employees. The petitioners contend that therefore there is conflict between the statutory provisions contained in the Central Act and the State Act in relation to the appointment of the Corporation employees Item No. 43 in List I of Schedule.7 of the Constitution (which is a list containing items with respect to which the Parliament has got the exclusive power to legislate) is "Incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations, including banking, insurance and financial corporations but not including cooperative societies". In the State List namely List II, item 41 is "State Public Services"; State Public Service Commission, Art.321 provides: "321. Power to extend functions of Public Service Commission. An Act made by Parliament or as the case may be, the Legislature of a State may provide for the exercise of additional functions by the Union Public Service Commission or the State Public service Commission as respects the services of the Union or the State and also as respects the services of any local authority or other body corporate constituted by law or of any public institution". A question will arise whether with regard to the prescription of the conditions of service of the corporation employees who has got the power to legislate on the same, the Central Legislature or the State Legislature. 12. It is the petitioner's contention that item 43 in List I as it takes in incorporation and regulation of financial corporations would empower Parliament to legislate on the service conditions of the corporation employees. 12. It is the petitioner's contention that item 43 in List I as it takes in incorporation and regulation of financial corporations would empower Parliament to legislate on the service conditions of the corporation employees. That power of Parliament is exercised by providing in the State Financial Corporations Act, provisions empowering the Board of Directors to frame regulations regarding conditions of service of such employees. Special emphasis is laid on S.23 of the Act. It is the petitioners' further contention that Parliament having occupied the field by such legislation the State Legislature has no power at all to frame any law regarding service conditions of corporation employees. On the other hand the Government Pleader and the counsel for the respondents supporting him have taken up the position that in view of Art.321 read with item 41 in the State List the State Legislature was perfectly competent to pass the Act The Kerala Public Service Commission (Additional Functions as respects certain Corporations and Companies) Act, 1970. 13. As Mr. Seervai in his well-known commentary on the Constitutional Law of India points out "the basic scheme for distribution of legislative power contained in our Constitution has been taken from the Government of India Act, 1935 and Art.245 and 246 correspond to Ss 99 and 100 of that Act. Similarly the distribution of legislative power with reference to the three lists has also been taken over from the Government of India Act, 1935 in which the three lists disclose almost all the features which can be rioted in the Indian Constitution. The distribution of legislative power with reference to the three lists was considered by Gayer, C. J. in Subramanyan v. Muthuswami AIR. 1941 F. C. 47 where he said that in enacting the provisions the British Parliament had the provisions of S.91 and 92 of the British North America Act, 1867, as interpreted by the Judicial Committee in mind, and the B. N. A. Act presented an exact analogy to the Indian Act even to the overriding provision of S.100 (i) G I. Act, 1935. Accordingly he held that the doctrine of pith and substance evolved by the Privy Council with reference to the Canadian Constitution can be applied to India. This view has been approved by the Privy Council in Profulla Kumar v. Bank of Commerce, Khulna AIR. 1947 P. C. 60. Accordingly he held that the doctrine of pith and substance evolved by the Privy Council with reference to the Canadian Constitution can be applied to India. This view has been approved by the Privy Council in Profulla Kumar v. Bank of Commerce, Khulna AIR. 1947 P. C. 60. There Lord Porter said in Para.34 to 39 Pages 64 and 65. "It is not possible to make so clean a cut between the powers of the various legislatures: they are bound to overlap from time to time. Subject must still overlap and where they do the question must be asked what in pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which complaint is made and in what list is its true nature and character to be found. If these questions could not be asked, much beneficent legislation would be stifled at birth, and many of the subject entrusted to provincial legislation could never effectively be dealt with. ...........the extent of the invasion by the provinces into subjects enumerated in the Federal List has to be considered. No doubt it is an important matter, pot, as Their Lord ships think, because the validity of an Act can be determined by discriminating between degrees of invasion, but for the purpose of determining what is the pith and substance of the impugned Act. Its provisions may advance so far into Federal territory as to show that its true nature is not concerned with provincial matters, but the question is not, has it trespassed more or less, but is the trespass, whatever it be, such as to show that the pith and substance of the impugned Act is not money-lending but promissory notes or banking? Once that question is determined the Act falls on one or the other side of the line and can be seen as valid or invalid according to its true content. This view places the precedence accorded to the three lists in its proper perspective. No doubt where they come in conflict List I have priority over Lists III and II and List III has priority over List II, but the question still remains, priority in what respect? This view places the precedence accorded to the three lists in its proper perspective. No doubt where they come in conflict List I have priority over Lists III and II and List III has priority over List II, but the question still remains, priority in what respect? Does the priority of the Federal Legislature prevent the Provincial Legislature from dealing with any matter which may incidentally affect any item in its list or in each case has one to consider what the substance of an Act is and, whatever its ancillary effect, attribute it to the appropriate list according to its true character? In Their Lordships' opinion the latter is the true view." 14. The view of the Privy Council has repeatedly been followed by the Supreme Court both with reference to the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935 and with the provisions of the Constitution since Art.24 is substantially the same as S.100 of the Government of India Act. See Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan MR. 1955 S. C 504, State of Bombay v R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala AIR 1957 S. C 699 and .4. S. Krishna v Madras State AIR. 1957 S. C. 297. In the latter decision the Supreme Court said: "It is of the essence of a Federal Constitution that there should be a distribution of the legislative powers of the Federation between the Centre and the Provinces. The scheme of distribution his varied with different Constitutions, but even when the Constitution enumerates elaborately the topics on which the Centre and the States could legislate, some overlapping of the fields of legislation is inevitable. For this reason the constitutionality of the laws made by the Centre and the State come up for decision time and again and therefore to decide whether an impugned legislation is intra vires the doctrine, that regard must be had its pith and substance, was evolved. That is to say if a statute is found in substance to relate to a topic within the competence of the Legislature, it should be held to be intra vires, even though it might incidentally trench on topics not within its legislative competence. That is to say if a statute is found in substance to relate to a topic within the competence of the Legislature, it should be held to be intra vires, even though it might incidentally trench on topics not within its legislative competence. The extent of the encroachment on matters beyond its competence may be an element in determining whether the legislation is colourable that is, whether in the guise of making a law on a matter within its competence, the Legislature is, in truth, making a law on a subject beyond its competence. But where that is not the position, then the fact of encroachment does not affect the views of the law even as regards the area of encroachment. To ascertain the true character of the legislation which is impugned on the ground that it is ultra vires the powers of the Legislature which enacted it, one must have regard to the enactment as a whole, to its objects and to the scope and effect of its provisions. It would be quite an erroneous approach to the question to view such a statute not as an organic whole, but as a mere collection of sections, then disintegrate it into parts, examine under what heads of legislation these parts would severally fell, and by that process determine what portions thereof are intra vires, and what are not." Bat then where the law made by a State Legislature is in pith and substance within its jurisdiction and incidentally trenches on a matter in the Union list, such a law would be entirely intra vires the State Legislature. But there is an exception to this principle which is known as the doctrine of "occupied field". According to this principle the validity of the State Law in the above case as regards its incidental encroachment on matters in the Union List will defend on the con-existence of any Union Law on such matter, that is, in other words on the field being unoccupied by a Union Law. If the field is occupied or subsequently becomes occupied by any Union Law the State Law will become void to that extent. See in this connection A. G. of Saskatchwan v. A. G. of Canada AIR. If the field is occupied or subsequently becomes occupied by any Union Law the State Law will become void to that extent. See in this connection A. G. of Saskatchwan v. A. G. of Canada AIR. 949 P. C. 190 where Viscount Simon said: "Secondly, can the remaining argument be upheld that this interference with the topic of interest none the less remains valid because it is merely incidental to the exercise of a valid power to legislate for a modification of principal debts? On this, it is to be observed that there is not only an exclusive power to legislate in relation to interest vested in the Dominion Parliament, but that such legislation has been enacted in the Interest Act. Viscount Maugham laid it down on behalf of this Board in A. G. for Alberta v. A. G. for Canada 1943 at P. 370; [AIR. (30) 1943 P. C. 76], that "Since 1894 it has been a settled proposition that, if a subject of legislation by the province is only incidental or ancillary to one of the classes of subjects enumerated in S.91 and is properly within one of the subjects enumerated in S.92 then legislation by the province is competent unless and until the Dominion Parliament chooses to occupy the field by legislation.' Viscount Maugham's reference to the year 1894 points to the decision of this Board in A. G. for Ontario v. A. G. for Canada, 1894 A.C. 189: (63 L J.P.C. 59)" In Subramanyan v. Munuswami AIR. 1941 F.C. 47 Sulaiman, J. said: "But if it does also fall within List I, then it must be deemed as if it is not included is List II at all. Similarly, if it also falls in List III, it must be deemed to have been excluded from List II. The dominant position of the Central Legislature with regard to matters in List I and List III is thus established. But the rigour of the literal interpretation is relaxed by the use of the words 'with respect to" which as already pointed out only signify 'pith and substance,' and do not forbid a mere incidental encroachment. But, even if such an incidental encroachment may be ordinarily permissible, the field may not be clear. There may be competency and yet repugnancy also. But, even if such an incidental encroachment may be ordinarily permissible, the field may not be clear. There may be competency and yet repugnancy also. The question is how to prevent a clash if the trespass is on a field already occupied by a Central Legislation." 15. On the principles laid down in those decisions, when we look at the legislations, the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (Central Act 63 of 1951) and the Kerala Public Service Commission (Additional Functions as respects certain Corporations and Companies) Act, 1970 (Act XIX of 1970) we would find that they are only occupying the fields which they could legitimately occupy in accordance with distribution of legislative powers as per the Constitution. Under Item 43 in List I of Schedule.7 of the Constitution, incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations including banking, insurance and financial corporations but not including co-operative societies is an exclusive Central subject. It is in accordance with these that the State Financial Corporations Act has been passed by the Parliament. According to me laying down of conditions of service of employees in the corporation would come within the said list. The expression "regulation would take in what S.23 of the Central Act provides for making of regulations as regards conditions of service of the employees or the Corporation. Taking into account Item 41 in List II read with Art.321 the State Legislature may provide for exercise of additional functions by the State Public Service Commission as respects the service of a body corporate, which functions within its sphere. It is in accordance with this that the State Act mentioned above has been passed. By the State Act the Public Service Commission is enabled to give advice in regard to recruitment only if the Corporation so requires. When we look at the legislations from this angle there cannot be any doubt that both legislations as such are valid and really no conflict arises in the case. 16. A contention has been taken up by Sri. When we look at the legislations from this angle there cannot be any doubt that both legislations as such are valid and really no conflict arises in the case. 16. A contention has been taken up by Sri. Rajamony, learned counsel for the petitioners that the State Public Service Commission cannot advise the Corporation which is a creature of a Central statute; but then it is clear from the provisions of the Central statute itself that State Financial Corporation really comes within the State's sphere in its activities and Art.321 enables the Legislature to give such additional functions to the State Public Service Commission in respect of recruitment of the pers6nnel to the State Financial Corporation. No doubt the provision in the rule framed under the State Act, that the corporation is bound to consult the Public Service Commission in matters of appointment of its employees may not be valid as such. In case of conflict of a Parliamentary Law with a State Law even in respect of spheres which both could legitimately occupy the Parliamentary Law is to prevail. But the Corporation can certainly take the advice of the Public Service Commission if the corporation so desires which desires can be expressed in a properly framed regulation. In the instant case subsequent to the Original Petition a regulation has been framed by the corporation which had been brought to the notice of the court in the additional counter-affidavit filed by the corporation which regulation directs that all direct appointments within the purview of the Public Service Commission under the provisions of the Kerala Public Service Commission (Additional Functions as respects certain Corporations and Companies) Act, 1970 shall be made by the appointing authority from the list of candidates prepared by the said Commission based on the general conditions prescribed for such recruitment. Therefore by the regulations themselves, the Managing Director is bound to take the advice of the Public Service Commission at present. 17. After the Original Petition was filed the services of the petitioners had been terminated. Therefore for the Managing Director to appoint the petitioners now or regularise their service has become an impossibility as he can act only in accordance with the newly framed regulation. His powers are circumscribed by the regulation, and he is bound to act in accordance with that. Therefore for the Managing Director to appoint the petitioners now or regularise their service has become an impossibility as he can act only in accordance with the newly framed regulation. His powers are circumscribed by the regulation, and he is bound to act in accordance with that. Though at the time of terminating the services of the petitioners, the Managing Director of the Corporation might have acted under a misconception as to his power under the regulations as they then stood because they did not require the Managing Director to accept the advice of the Corporation in the light of the subsequently framed regulation the Managing Director cannot ignore the advice given by the Kerala Public Service Commission and appoint the petitioners again to the posts on his own choice. Nor could he regularise their provisional appointments even if they had continued in their posts. Therefore whether the court takes note of subsequent events or not for the court to issue a writ declaring that the Managing Director's termination of the petitioners' services in the then circumstances was wrong and illegal will not entitle the petitioners to get real and adequate relief in the matter. When conditions came into existence on account of which the reliefs prayed for by a party cannot serve a useful purpose and even if the relief is granted it would not be of any avail to the parties, there is no point in issuing a writ or granting a declaration. It is no doubt true that the High Court can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression "nature" which expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs The High Courts are enabled to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. That apart High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs The High Courts are enabled to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution with that of English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of Government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction would defeat the purpose of the Article itself. See Dwarka Nath v. I. T Officer AIR. 1966 SC 81. But as said in that decision itself to say this is not to say that the High Court can function arbitrarily under this Article. Some limitations are implicit in the Article and others may be evolved to direct the Article through defined channels. It is a well established principle that if the court is satisfied that a writ issued would be ineffective in the circumstances it can reject the application on that ground alone because it is not the practice of the court to issue meaningless writs Guruswamy v. State of Mysore AIR 1954 SC. 592. In Lekhraj v. Mathur AIR. 1962 Kerala 152 this Court said that it is well settled that no writ would be issued where its effect would be nullified by properly constituted authority giving directions within its competence. There this court quoted the following passages from Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol XI, page 106. Para 199. "A mandamus will not go when it appears that it would be futile in its result. Accordingly, the court will not by mandamus, order something which is impossible of performance by reason of the circumstance that the doing of the act would involve a contravention of law, or because the party against whom the mandamus is prayed does not, for some other reasons, possess the power of obey A mandamus will not be granted if the party complained of has powers which would enable him to make the order inoperative; or when it seems that obedience to the commend would not be followed by any result different from that in respect of which complaint is made." and American Jurisprudence Vol. XXXIV, Page 831: "It is fundamental principle that courts will not employ their coercive process to compel the doing of a useless thing Particularly is this true with respect to such a summary and expeditious process as mandamus. This writ is invariably withheld where it would be unavailing, nugatory or useless and its issuance an idleact Thus, the court may well refuse to award the writ to compel the reinstatement of the petitioner in his office or employment where his term has almost expired, or has expired on the office itself has been abolished or where because of ineligibility or for other reason, he could, if restored to office, be at once removed or to compel submission to the electors of a city, of a proposed ordinance which if adopted would be unconstitutional." 18. I do not find any substance in the plea of discrimination also, raised by Mr. Rajamony. The Board of Directors of the Corporation met on 10th September 1970 and decided that selection for all appointments in classes B and C shall be made through the Public Service Commission. It is true that the Corporation initiated steps and made permanent the persons appointed on temporary basis from 24th July 1970 to 16th June 1972. But it is said that such steps were taken as these appointments were made before selection of the candidates were handed over to the Public Service Commission. It is the 2nd respondent's contention that the petitioners were appointed to vacancies reported to the Public Service Commission for making selection thereto. In such circumstances, it will be difficult to accept the petitioners' contention of discrimination. No doubt there is some injustice in the matter done to the petitioners because on the date of Ext. P-1, the Managing Director could have regularised the services of petitioners. The Managing Director at that time in accordance with law was the sole appointing authority He had a misconception of his powers because he thought because of the State Act his hands were tied. It might be noted that at that relevant time no regulation had been made by the Corporation enabling the Public Service Commission to give advice in regard to recruitment. That the Managing Director wanted to regularise the appointment of the petitioners is clear. However now it is difficult for the Managing Director to appoint the petitioners in view of the newly framed regulation. That the Managing Director wanted to regularise the appointment of the petitioners is clear. However now it is difficult for the Managing Director to appoint the petitioners in view of the newly framed regulation. It is for the Corporation, the Public Service Commission and the Government to consider whether in the circumstances the petitioners should be absorbed in the Corporation service. In view of the peculiar circumstances according to me they deserve such absorption because it the Managing Director had acted in accordance with law on the date of Ext. P-1 the petitioners would certainly have been in service now. In respect of this aspect the petitioners can make representations to the three authorities mentioned above and if such representations are made I am sure the matter will be considered in accordance with justice and equity by them. It might be noted that it might be difficult for the petitioners to get employed in other places. K.V. Peter, an additional respondent impleaded as per my order in C.M.P. No. 9747 of 1975 being similarly situated as the petitioners can also make a representation and he would be entitled to relief from the hands of the authorities in the same manner as the petitioners. In the light of the above discussion the Original Petition is dismissed subject to the observations made. There will be no order as to costs.