Judgment :- 1. The petitioner who is a member of the Kodiyathur Panchayat challenges Ext. P3 order dated 4 61975 whereby the Government have ordered the bifurcation of the Panchayat into two with effect from 16 6 1975. The Kodiyathur Panchayat consisted of three villages called Kumaranellur, Kakkad and Kodiyathur. The new Panchayat is to be called the Karassery Panchayat consisting of the first two villages, viz., Kumaranellur and Kakkad. The old Kodiyathur Panchayat is reduced to the area of Kodiyathur village. According to the petitioner, Ext. P3 was issued mala fide and in violation of the principle of audi alteram partem as embodied in the proviso to subsection (1) of S.3 of the Kerala Panchayats Act, 1960 (Act 32 of 1960). The petitioner therefore seeks a writ of certiorari to quash Ext. P3 and a writ of mandamus to direct the 2nd and 3rd respondents to refrain from dissolving the Panchayat in terms of Ext. P3. 2. We shall first deal with the question of mala fide. It is alleged that the 1st respondent, who was the President of the Kodiyathur Panchayat prior to Ext. P3, is a close relative of the Minister for Local Administration, the 4th respondent in this petition. The Minister and the 1st respondent belong to the official group of the Muslim League whereas the petitioner belongs to the rebel group of the Muslim League. As a result of the rivalry between these two groups of the Muslim League, the relationship between the 1st respondent on the one hand and the petitioner and his supporters on the other has become strained. The petitioner and two other persons belonging to the rival group supported by three other members of the Panchayat had issued Ext. P1 notice dated 27 51975 of intention to make a motion expressing want of confidence in the first respondent as President of the Kodiyathur Panchayat. Pursuant to this, Ext. P2 notice dated 30 51975 was issued by the 2nd respondent, the District Panchayat Officer, Calicut, giving notice that a meeting of the Panchayat would be held at 3 p.m. on 23-61975 at the Panchayat office for considering Ext. P1 motion. While matters stood thus, Ext. P3 dated 4 61975 was issued by the Government ordering the bifurcation of the Panchayat. According to the petitioner, Ext. P3 was issued at the instance of the 1st respondent who has the support of the Minister. P1 motion. While matters stood thus, Ext. P3 dated 4 61975 was issued by the Government ordering the bifurcation of the Panchayat. According to the petitioner, Ext. P3 was issued at the instance of the 1st respondent who has the support of the Minister. Ext. P3 was issued by the Government under orders of the Minister for the purpose of salvaging the 1st respondent from being removed from his office of President of the Panchayat as a result of the proposed no-confidence motion. This is pointed out by the petitioner as political machination with a view to furthering the interest of the official group of the Muslim League. 3. In answer to these allegations the 5th respondent, the State of Kerala, says in its affidavit dated 20 6 1975 that the decision to bifurcate the Panchayat was taken on the basis of a resolution passed by the Panchayat as early as 5 21972, and the subsequent resolutions and representations of the Panchayat, requesting the Government to bifurcate the Panchayat into two. The Panchayat was originally created by the Government by notification No. G.O. MS.196/61/DD dated 23121961. The Panchayat comprising three villages, covering an area of 361/2sq. miles with a population of 35,600, and residential houses numbering 7000, was found to be too large and unwieldy for efficient administration Owing to this fact and also the popular demand for the division of the Panchayat, the Government ordered bifurcation of the Panchayat as early as 12121972. However, this order had to be kept in abeyance as the Election Commission of India had directed that Panchayats in existence as on 111973 should be taken into account for purposes of de-limiting the Assembly and Parliamentary Constituencies in the State on the basis of the 1971 census. It was therefore decided by the Government that bifurcation of the Panchayat was to await the completion of the de-limitation work. When this decision to keep in abeyance the order of bifurcation was taken, all necessary steps for dividing the Panchayat into two had already been completed by the Government as shown in letter No. EL (1) 45891/72 dated 16-51973 sent by the Director of Panchayats to the Government. As soon as the de-limitation work was completed, the question of bifurcation was again taken up by the Government. As soon as the de-limitation work was completed, the question of bifurcation was again taken up by the Government. The Panchayat made a further representation to the Government on 20 81974 drawing its attention to the earlier resolutions and representations requesting for the division of the Panchayat and to the difficulties caused to the public on account of the delay in giving effect to the order of bifurcation. A month later, the Government received a letter from the President of the Panchayat again referring to these resolutions and representations. In view of all this, the Government ordered the bifurcation of the Panchayat on 215 1975, on which date Ext. P1 notice of intention to move the no-confidence motion had not been issued by the petitioner and his supporters. The Government was not aware of any such intention. Ext. P3 notification cancelling the earlier notification of 28121961, whereby the Kodiyathur Panchayat was originally constituted, and bifurcating the Panchayat into two Panchayats, was issued by the Government without any knowledge of either Ext P1 or Ext. P2. The allegations of mala fides and political motivations are totally denied by the State. The 4th respondent who is the Minister for Local Administration has also filed an affidavit dated 19 51975 denying the various allegations made against him personally. He denies that the 1st respondent is related to him. The allegation that the 1st respondent met him in Trivandrum subsequent to Ext. P1 notice is untrue. He did not meet the 1st respondent on any day between 27 51975 which is the date of Ext. P1 and 4-61975 which is the date of Ext. P3 notification. He has denied that Ext. P3 was issued by the Government with a view to furthering the interest of the 1st respondent or the Muslim League official group or for any other extraneous considerations. The Minister was not aware of the no-confidence motion or the meeting proposed to be convened on 23-6-197. The political and personal considerations alleged in the petition are totally denied in his affidavit. He points out that the decision to bifurcate the Panchayat was taken by the Government strictly for reasons of administrative efficiency and in deference to popular demand. But the implementation of the decision had to be delayed on account of the delimitation of the Assembly and Parliamentary Constituencies in the State which was in progress. He points out that the decision to bifurcate the Panchayat was taken by the Government strictly for reasons of administrative efficiency and in deference to popular demand. But the implementation of the decision had to be delayed on account of the delimitation of the Assembly and Parliamentary Constituencies in the State which was in progress. The 1st respondent also has filed a counter affidavit dated 18 61975 denying the allegations made against him personally. 4. We have carefully considered the various allegations in the petition. None of these allegations, or all of them put together, in our opinion, can be regarded as indicative of any mala fides on the part of the Government in issuing Ext. P3. As pointed out in the counter-affidavits of the 4th and 5th respondents, the decision to bifurcate the Panchayat bad been taken as early as 12121972 for reasons of administrative efficiency and in deference to popular demand expressed through resolutions and representations of the Panchayat. This decision could not be given effect to on account of the delimitation work. The final order of bifurcation was passed by the Government on 215 1975, on which date Ext. P1 notice had not yet been issued by the petitioner and his supporters. It was on the basis of this order dated 2151975 that the Government issued Ext. P3 dated 4 61975. Counsel for the petitioner was not in a position to point out to us what exactly was the alleged relationship between the 1st respondent and the Minister. In fact, this allegation has been completely denied by the Minister. In the light of the averments made in the affidavits filed by the 4th and 5th respondents, we are of opinion that the allegation of mala fides is totally unwarranted and unfounded. 5. We shall now consider the second contention of the petitioner, viz., the violation of the principle of audi alteram partem as embodied in the proviso to S.3 of the Kerala Panchayats Act. We shall extract the relevant portion of S.3: "3. 5. We shall now consider the second contention of the petitioner, viz., the violation of the principle of audi alteram partem as embodied in the proviso to S.3 of the Kerala Panchayats Act. We shall extract the relevant portion of S.3: "3. The Government's powers to create and alter Panchayat areas and to specify the name and headquarters of Panchayat areas: (1) The Government may by notification in the Gazette (a) declare any village or group of adjacent villages or portions thereof to be a Panchayat area for the purpose of this Act and specify the name and headquarters of the Panchayat; or (b) exclude from a Panchayat area any village or portion thereof comprised in it; or (c) include in a panchayat area any village or portion thereof; or (d) cancel a notification issued under clause (a) or alter the name and headquarters of the Panchayat as notified under the said clause: Provided that before issuing a notification under clause (b), clause (c) or clause (d) the Government shall give the Panchayat or Panchayats which will be affected by the issue of such notification a reasonable opportunity for showing cause against the proposal and shall consider the explanations and objections, if any, of such Panchayat or Panchayats. Ext. P3 notification was issued under sub-section (1) of S.3 and therefore the proviso is attracted. The learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents contended before us that the proviso in terms was satisfied. The proviso only laid down the principle that a reasonable opportunity should be given to the Panchayat to show cause against the proposed bifurcation. He pointed out that, if the Panchayat was unaware of the bifurcation, the Government would have had to give an opportunity to the Panchayat to show cause against the bifurcation and submit their explanations and objections, if any, and the Government would then have bad to consider them before issuing the notification. However, in cases such as this where the proposal for bifurcation emanated from the Panchayat itself, there was no further need to give them notice of bifurcation. He submitted that the facts of this case showed that the request for bifurcation came from the Panchayat and this request was continuously pressed by the Panchayat by means of resolutions and representations. However, in cases such as this where the proposal for bifurcation emanated from the Panchayat itself, there was no further need to give them notice of bifurcation. He submitted that the facts of this case showed that the request for bifurcation came from the Panchayat and this request was continuously pressed by the Panchayat by means of resolutions and representations. The Panchayat was not only aware of the proposal of the Government but was in fact clamouring for the implementation of the proposal. In the circumstances, to interpret the Section in such a way as to warrant a further show cause notice would be artificial and contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. All that the Section required was compliance with the rule of audi alteram partem, which had been fully satisfied in the present case. Petitioner's counsel, Mr. K P. Dandapani, however, contended that although the principle of bifurcation had been canvassed by the Panchayat for a considerably long time, the details of bifurcation had not been settled. In fact, in none of the resolutions had the Panchayat suggested any line of division of the Panchayat. Therefore these details were very important and the Government ought to have given the Panchayat an opportunity of being heard before taking a decision to include two villages in the new Panchayat and retain only one village in the old Panchayat. If sufficient opportunity had been given to the Panchayat, it could have brought to the notice of the Government their objections concerning the actual line of demarcation. He pointed out that Ext. P3 notification was vitiated by failure to observe the cardinal principle of natural justice and this vice was apparent on the face of the record. He therefore urged that the notification should be quashed. We are, however, of opinion that it is not necessary for us to deal with this question in the present case, as we propose to dispose of the petition on a shorter point, viz., the locus standi of the petitioner. It is specifically stated in the counter affidavit filed by the State as follows: "In any event, it is no: for the petitioner, a member of the Panchayat, to impugn Ext. P3 notification for want of notice to the Panchayat. It is specifically stated in the counter affidavit filed by the State as follows: "In any event, it is no: for the petitioner, a member of the Panchayat, to impugn Ext. P3 notification for want of notice to the Panchayat. Such a complaint could be laid by the Panchayat and none else, not even a member of the Panchayat." (paragraph 8) If this objection to the petitioner's locus standi is sustained by us, which we propose jo do, the petition has to be dismissed. It is nowhere stated in the petition that it has been filed by the petitioner for and on behalf of the Panchayat. The petition has been filed by him in his individual capacity as a member of the Panchayat. 6. In Durayappah v. Fernando (1967) 2 All England Law Reports 152, the Privy Council had considered the question whether the Mayor of a Municipal Council was entitled to maintain an action on his own to quash an order dissolving and superseding the Municipal Council. It was contended by the Mayor that the order of the Minister purporting to dissolve and supersede the Council was made in violation of the principle of audi alteram partem, and was therefore null and void. The Privy Council accepted the appellant's contention that no effective opportunity was given to the Council before the impugned order was made by the Minister. The Privy Council, however, addressed itself to the question whether the Mayor who did not represent the Council or sue on its behalf could challenge the action of the Minister and maintain the appeal. The Privy Council said: "This question is of some general importance. The answer must depend essentially on whether the order of the minister was a complete nullity or whether it was an order voidable only at the election of the council. The Privy Council said: "This question is of some general importance. The answer must depend essentially on whether the order of the minister was a complete nullity or whether it was an order voidable only at the election of the council. If the former, it must follow that the council is still in office and that, if any councillor, ratepayer or other person having a legitimate interest in the conduct of the council likes to take the point, they are entitled to ask the court to declare that the council is still the duly elected council with all the powers and duties conferred on it by the Municipal Ordinance." Their Lordships deprecated the use of the word 'void' in distinction to the word 'voidable' in the field of administrative law and said that the words 'void' and 'voidable', although they had well-understood meanings when dealing with questions of proprietary or contractual rights, were imprecise and apt to mislead in administrative or constitutional law. For a criticism of the use of the expressions 'void' and 'voidable', see H.W.R. Wade "Unlawful Administrative Action: Void or Voidable?" L.Q.R. Vol 83 [1967] pp. 499 etceq. Their Lordships said: "It is better, in the field where the subject-matter of the discussion is whether some order which has been made, or whether some step in some litigation or quasi-litigation, is effective or not, to employ the verbal distinction between whether it is truly a 'nullity', that is to all intents and purposes, of which any person having a legitimate interest in the matter can take advantage or whether it is 'voidable' only at the instance of the party affected. On the other hand the word 'nullity' would be quite inappropriate in questions of proprietary or contractual rights; such transactions may frequently be void, but the result can seldom be described as a nullity." It was held that the dissolution and supersession of the Municipal Council in violation of the principle of audi alteram partem was a voidable act and not a nullity and it could be avoided only at the instance of the party affected. Their Lordships said: "While in this case Their Lordships have no doubt that in an action by the council the court should have held that (he order was void ab initio and never had any effect, that is quite a different matter from saying that the order was a nullity of which ad vantage could be taken by any other person having a legitimate interest in the matter. "Their Lordships therefore are clearly of opinion that the order of the Minister on May 29,1966, was voidable and not a nullity. Being voidable it was voidable only at the instance of the person against whom the order was made, that is the council; but the council has not complained. The appellant was no doubt mayor at the time of its dissolution, but that does not give him any right to complain independently of the council." (italics supplied) For these reasons it was held that the appeal of the Mayor was not maintainable, and it was dismissed. Their Lordships in this connection referred to, with approval, the following observation or Lord Evershed in Ridge v. Baldwin (1963) 2 All E. R.66 at 87: "Certainly in my judgment it cannot be asserted that the judgments in the case cited, or indeed any of them, support or involve the proposition that where a body, such as the watch committee in the present case, is invested by the express terms of a statute with a power of expulsion of any member of the police force and purport in good faith to exercise such power, a failure on their part to observe the principle of natural justice audi alteram partem has the result that the decision is not merely voidable by the court but is wholly void and a nullity." 7. As we have already stated, we do not find it necessary to decide in this case whether the principle of natural justice was violated in the circumstances of the present case. Even if we had held that the Panchayat had not been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in terms of the proviso to S.3, it would only have meant that the impugned order of the Government was, as pointed out by the Privy Council, voidable and not a nullity. It could then have been at the instance of the Panchayat avoided as void ab initio and of no effect. It could then have been at the instance of the Panchayat avoided as void ab initio and of no effect. But the action would still not have been a nullity in the sense that any other person, although having a legitimate interest but not directly affected, could have taken advantage of it. In other words, not being a "nullity", but only "voidable", the order could have been avoided only at the instance of the person against whom it was made. In the instant case, the notification was made against the Panchayat and it was the Panchayat which had the right to be heard. The Section does not say that any person having a legitimate interest has the right to be heard. All that the Section requires is an effective opportunity for the Panchayat and consequently the Panchayat alone could have challenged the order. This the Panchayat has not done. The petitioner cannot, albeit a member of the Panchayat having a legitimate interest in its affairs, maintain an action to set aside the impugned order. Accordingly we hold that the Original Petition is not maintainable. The petition itself not being maintainable, it has become unnecessary for us, as already stated, to pronounce upon the legality or otherwise of Ext. P3 notification. We therefore dismiss the Original Petition, but direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Dismissed.