M. P. SAXENA, J. This is defendants second appeal against the judgment and decree dated August 23, 1966 passed by Shri B. D. Gupta, the then Additional Civil Judge, Jhansi decreeing the plaintiff-respondents suit for possession over the houses in dispute and for the recovery of damages at the rate of Rs. 7/- per month from January 31, 1964 upto the date of the delivery of possession. The parties were made to bear their own costs of both the courts. The plaintiffs respondents are the owners of the two houses in suit situate in Mohalla Narsingh Rao in the City of Jhansi. They were let out to one Rasool Khan on a monthly rent of Rs. 7/ -. The tenancy was from month to month and used to expire on the 15th of the English calendar month. According to the plaintiffs respondents Rasool Khan sub-let portions of the said house to defendant Nos. 2 to 4 without their consent. They also caused substantial damage to the roofs and the walls of the houses. Therefore, on both these grounds, the plaintiffs respondents sought eviction of Rasool Khan from the houses in suit. A requisite notice to quit was served on him on January 31, 1963 as he did not vacate it on the expiry of the period given in the notice, the plaintiffs sued for his ejectment along with the defendant Nos. 2 to 4 and for the recovery of damages for use and occupation at the rate of 50 P. per day. It may be stated here that Rasool Khan died during the pendency of the suit and his widow, defendant No. 1|1 and his sons defendants Nos. 1|2 to 1 (4 were substituted in his place. Rasool Khan contested the suit, inter alia, on the grounds that no portion of the house was ever sub-let to defendants Nos. 2 to 4. According to him, Shakoor Khan, defendant No. 2 lived with him as his close relation and defendants Nos. 3 and 4 never occupied any portion of these houses. He also denied that he had caused any dam age much less substantial to the roofs and walls of the house. After the death of Rasool Khan, defendants Nos. 1/1 to 1/4 raised the same pleas as taken by Rasool Khan. 3 and 4 never occupied any portion of these houses. He also denied that he had caused any dam age much less substantial to the roofs and walls of the house. After the death of Rasool Khan, defendants Nos. 1/1 to 1/4 raised the same pleas as taken by Rasool Khan. After going through the evidence on the record, the learned Munsif held that Rasool Khan had riot sub-let any portion of the house to defendants Nos. 2 to 4, nor had caused any damage to the house in suit. Accordingly the suit for ejectment and mesne profits was dismissed. The plaintiffs filed an appeal. The learned first appellate court also agreed with the learned Munsif that there was no sub-letting of any portion of the house by Rasool Khan to defendants Nos. 2 to 4, nor any damage was caused by him to the walls and roofs. He fur ther held that after determination of his tenancy by mean of the notice under Sention 106, Rasool Khan became statutory tenant As the tenancy was determined in his life time, his right as statutory incant did not devolve on his widow and sons (defendant Nos. 1/1 to ) and they were liable to be evicted in that very suit. Accordingly and the suit for ejectment of the defendants from the two houses and for the recovery of Rs. 7/- per month as damages for use and occupation from January 31, 1964 was decreed. The defendants have now come up in second appeal mainly on the ground that the learned first appellate court was wrong in hold ing that Rasool Khan has become a statutory tenant and his rights did rot devolve on defendants Nos. 1/1 to 1|4. It has also been argued that the notice to quit served on Rasool Khan was invalid and his tenancy was not terminated by means of it. Rasool Khan continued to be a contractual tenant and his rights were inherited by his heirs, namely, defendants Nos. 1/1 to 1|4. I have heard the learned counsel for both sides at great length and have given my anxious consideration to the whole matters. So far as the second point is concerned, it is important to note that no plea of invalidity of notice was raised by Rasool Khan or by defendants Nos. 1[1 to 1|4 in their written statements. I have heard the learned counsel for both sides at great length and have given my anxious consideration to the whole matters. So far as the second point is concerned, it is important to note that no plea of invalidity of notice was raised by Rasool Khan or by defendants Nos. 1[1 to 1|4 in their written statements. Therefore, no issue was struck on this point nor the parties advised any evidence on it. This notice to quit was given on December 28. 1953 and was served on Rasool Khan on December 31, 1983. He gave its reply on January 23, 1964. It is true that in this reply he had stated that the notice was invalid but he gave no reasons for it. The contesting defendants did not even adduce any oral evidence to show that the notice was defec tive. The learned counsel for the appellants has not referred to any infirmity in the said notice and it cannot be held to be invalid. On a plain reading, the notice appears to be perfectly valid and-by means of it, the contractual tenancy of Rasool Khan came to an end in his life time. Now I may examine the merit of the first contention. As dis cussed above, Rasool Khan was originally a contractual tenant. After the service of notice dated December 28, 1963 on him, his contractual tenancy came to an end and he became a statutory tenant. Of course, as a statutory tenant also, he could not be evicted unless one of the grounds contemplated by Section 3 of the erstwhile Act No. Ill of 1947 was made out. During the pendency of the suit Rasool Khan died and the question is whether after his death, the defendants Nos. 1|1 to 14 became statutory tenant or they did not acquire such right. The learned counsel for both sides have alluded to a number of cases in support of their contentions but the matter is set at rest by the case of Chaudharan Smt. Bhartoo v. Smt. Asha Devi and another 1966 A. W. R. 55. That was also a case in which the defendant was a contractual tenant for a fixed period of five years. By efflux of time his tenancy came to an end but he remained in possession of the premises obviously as a statutory tenant. That was also a case in which the defendant was a contractual tenant for a fixed period of five years. By efflux of time his tenancy came to an end but he remained in possession of the premises obviously as a statutory tenant. A suit for eviction was filed against him and during the pendency of the suit, he died and his widow contested the suit on the ground that she had become a statutory tenant and was not liable to eviction. Their Lordships referred to the following observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Anand Niwas Pvt. Ltd. v. Anand Ji Malyan Ji Pedhi and others Civil Appeal No. 168 of 1963 decided on September 5, 1963. "such a person is not a tenant at all; he has no estate or inte rest in the premises occupied by him. He has merely the pro tection of the statute in that he cannot be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and per forms the other conditions of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession after the termination of the contractual tenancy is per sonal; it is not capable of being transferred or; assigned and de volves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute. " By applying this principle to the case before them, their Lordships held that even if Mitter Sen, the contractual tenant, had continued to be a tenant for the purpose of Section 3 of the Act after the termina tion of his tenancy, his right to remain in possession was personal and it was not capable of being transferred or assigned and could devolve on his death only in the manner provided by the statute which gave him the protection from eviction. It was further held that in the Act No. Ill of 1947 which was applicable to the case, there was no provision at all for devolution of such a right to remain in possession. It was further held that in the Act No. Ill of 1947 which was applicable to the case, there was no provision at all for devolution of such a right to remain in possession. In the absence of any specific provision making such a right of tenant heritable, it had to be held that the respondent No. 1, that is, the widow of Mitter Sen did not acquire the status of even a statutory tenant for the purposes of Section 3 of the Act and she was, therefore, in any case liable to be ejected in that very suit. This observation applies on all fours with the facts of the present case. The contrac tual tenancy of Rasool Khan was determined in his life time and he had become a statutory tenant. Surely he could be evicted only if one of the grounds contemplated by Section 3 of Act III of 1947 was made out. The suit for eviction was filed against him on two- grounds but during the pendency of the suit, he died leaving behind defen dant No. 1/1 as his widow and defendants Nos. 1:2 to Ij4 as his ions, in the light of the observations made above, the statutory tenancy rights enjoyed by Rasool Khan should not devolve on these defendants because the contractual tenancy of Rasool Khan was determined in his life time. Therefore, these defendants acquired no right to remain in possession of the premises in suit and were liable to be evicted in that suit. The learned counsel for the appellants has further argued that after the death of Rasool Khan when his heirs were brought on re cord, the plaintiffs did not get their plaint amended by alleging that these legal representatives had no right to remain in possession of the premises and were liable to ejectment. According to him, in the ab sence of such a case, the defendants could not be evicted. I am un able to subscribe to this view. The defendants Nos. 1/1 to 1|4 were brought on the record merely as legal representatives of defendant No. 1. They acquired no legal status. The question whether they could be evicted in this suit was a pure question of law which could very well be pressed in the first appeal even if ii was not agitated be fore the trial court. 1/1 to 1|4 were brought on the record merely as legal representatives of defendant No. 1. They acquired no legal status. The question whether they could be evicted in this suit was a pure question of law which could very well be pressed in the first appeal even if ii was not agitated be fore the trial court. It may also be mentioned here that in view of Section 43 (s) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Bent and Eviction) Act, 1972 this appeal has to be disposed of in the light of the provisions of Act III of 1947. Upon a careful consideration of the entire material. I am in judg ment that the appeal has no force and is accordingly dismissed with costs to the plaintiffs-respondents. .