Judgment :- 1. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal by the Employees State Insurance Corporation arises out of a petition under S. 75 of the Employees State Insurance Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The petition was filed by the Kwality Spinning Mills (P.) Ltd., which is the respondent before me. The Mills wanted a declaration that (1) the workers employed in building work and (2) the apprentices are not employees as per the definition of the term ‘employee’ in the Act and for a direction that the Corporation should desist from collecting the contribution in respect of them. The Insurance Court (District Judge, Coimbatore) upheld the contention of the Mills, holding that neither the workmen employed for Construction of expansion of the factory building, nor the apprentices are employees as defined under the Act and that in respect of them no contribution is payable. Hence the appeal by the Corporation. 2. As far as the workers engaged in construction work, the learned counsel for the Corporation stated that he was not pressing the appeal. It is common ground that the mills in order to expand has been putting up additional buildings and for such construction work there were several persons working. In respect of such workers engaged in the construction of the additional building, no contribution can be claimed because they are not employees employed by the principal employer on any work of, or incidental or preliminary to or connected with the work of, the factory or establishment. It has been so held in several earlier cases and therefore the learned counsel for the Corporation rightly conceded that the appeal cannot be maintained as far as the building workers are concerned. Therefore, the only question is whether the apprentices who were working in the Mills are employees as defined in S. 2(9) of the Act. 3. There is no dispute that the apprentices bad been taken by the Mills under a contract, the proforma of which is marked as Ex. A.3. Admittedly as per the terms of the agreement between the Mills and the apprentices, the latter had no right of being absorbed in the Mills after the period of apprenticeship. However, during the apprenticeship period, they do work in the Mills and it is not disputed that the work they would be doing is one connected with the Mills which is a factory. However, during the apprenticeship period, they do work in the Mills and it is not disputed that the work they would be doing is one connected with the Mills which is a factory. It is also not in dispute that the apprentices were being paid stipends during the period of apprenticeship. Now the question is whether, on the above admitted facts, the apprentices can be called employees as defined under S. 2(9) of the Act. 4. The definition of the word ‘employee’ begins as follows— “‘Employee’ means any person employed for wages in or in connection with the work of a factory or establishment to which this Act applies.” The word ‘wages’ is defined under S. 2(22) of the Act and that makes it clear that all remuneration paid or payable in cash to an employee, if the terms of the contract of employment were fulfilled, would be wages. There is also the inclusive definition with which one is not concerned in the present case. It is to be noted that while the word ‘employee’ is defined as a person employed for wages in or in connection with the work of a factory, the word ‘wages’ is defined as remuneration paid or payable in cash to an employee on his fulfilling the terms of contract of employment. 5. What is contended on behalf of the Corporation is that the apprentices being persons who admittedly do work in the factory and also receive remuneration therefor, they would be employees as defined in the Act. It is also contended that the Act is a social enactment and a wide meaning should be given to the word ‘employee’ contained in the Act. In Central Railway Workshop Jhansi v. Viswanath A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 488 it has been pointed out that Factories Act is a social enactment to achieve social reforms and must receive liberal construction to achieve legislative purpose without doing violence to language. In N.E.L.P. Co. v. E.S.I. Corporation A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1364 it has been pointed out that the definition of the word ‘employee’ in the Employees State Insurance Act is wider than that of a ‘worker’ in the Factories Act. These aspects were stressed by the learned counsel for the Corporation. 6. In N.E.L.P. Co. v. E.S.I. Corporation A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1364 it has been pointed out that the definition of the word ‘employee’ in the Employees State Insurance Act is wider than that of a ‘worker’ in the Factories Act. These aspects were stressed by the learned counsel for the Corporation. 6. In Regional Director E.S.I. Corporation v. Sriramulu Naidu 1960-2 L.L.J. 699; 73 L.W. 75 a Division Bench of this court observed that the definition of the term ‘employee’ in the Act will include within its scope clerical and labour workers engaged or paid through contractors and also part time workers and paid apprentices. Great reliance is placed on the above observation by the learned counsel for the Corporation, and the contention is that as admittedly in the present case, the apprentices are paid apprentices they should be held to be employees as defined under the Act. 7. But on a careful consideration I am of the view that the apprentices working as per the terms contained in Ex. A.3 cannot be held to be employees as defined under the Act. It is to be noted that in the case reported in Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation v. Sriramulu Naidu 1960-2 L.L.J. 699; 73 L.W. 75 the Division Bench was dealing with the definition of the word ‘factory’ in S. 2(12) of the Act. The definition of the word ‘employee’ in the Act did not fall for consideration in that case. In Employees State Insurance Corporation v. Ganapathia Pillai XIX F.J.R. 279 another Division Bench of this court has pointed out the above position. It was observed by the subsequent Bench— “There was a controversy whether any of these departments would come within the term ‘factory’ under the Act. The learned Judges held that it would. Therefore, the provisions of the Employees State Insurance Act would apply to it. In that case there was no question as to whether a person was or was not an employee”. Therefore, the observation by the earlier Division Bench is only obiter. 8. A perusal of Ex. A.3 and the admitted facts go to show that the apprentices though working in the Mills, were so doing only to learn work and not under any contract of employment. Therefore, the observation by the earlier Division Bench is only obiter. 8. A perusal of Ex. A.3 and the admitted facts go to show that the apprentices though working in the Mills, were so doing only to learn work and not under any contract of employment. It was already noticed that an ‘employee’ is a person who receives wages in connection with his work in the factory or establishment as the case may be and ‘wages’ are remuneration paid to employees on their fulfilling the terms of the contract of employment. Therefore, it is clear that there should be a contract of employment, the terms of which should be fulfilled in order to get remuneration. If a person works in the factory (or establishment) under a contract of employment and receives remuneration therefor, then certainly he would be an employee. In the present case, I am quite clear, that the apprentices though working in the mills (factory), are cot so working under any contract of employment. Therefore the mere fact, that they received stipend during the period of apprenticeship would not make them employees as defined under the Act. 9. The learned counsel for the Mills contended that ‘stipend’ paid to the apprentices is only a gratuitous payment and that therefore, in any event, the apprentices cannot be called employees as defined under the Act. Whether such a contention is correct or not, or, in other words, whether the stipend paid to the apprentices is a gratuitous payment or not for the reasons mentioned earlier, I am of the view that the apprentices are not employees as defined under the Act. Assuming stipend paid is remuneration for work done by the apprentices, that is not enough to bring them under the definition of the word ‘employee’ under the Act. Unless the remuneration for work is under a contract of employment, such remuneration would not be “wages” as defined under the Act. If a person is not receiving ‘wages’, he would not be an ‘employee’. 10. In Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Unless the remuneration for work is under a contract of employment, such remuneration would not be “wages” as defined under the Act. If a person is not receiving ‘wages’, he would not be an ‘employee’. 10. In Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Edn. (Simonds Edn.) Volume 25, p. 451, under the heading ‘Apprenticeship’ the following passage occurs: “By a contract of apprenticeship, a person is bound to another for the purpose of learning a trade of calling, the apprentice undertaking to serve the master for the purpose of being taught; and the master undertaking to teach the apprentice, Where teaching on the part of the master or learning on the part of the other person is not the primary but only an incidental object, the contract is one of service rather than of apprenticeship; but, if the right of receiving instruction exists, a contract does not become one of service because, to some extent, the person to whom it refers does the kind of work that is done by a servant, or because he receives pecuniary remuneration for work. The payment of a premium is strong, though not conclusive evidence that a contract of apprenticeship rather than of service was contemplated.” I have already indicated that in the present case the terms of contract under which the apprentices were working go to show that there was no contract of service between the Mills and the apprentices. The primary object of the apprentices joining the Mills is one of learning. Inc dentally, they no doubt do work in the Mills but that is for the purpose of learning work. 11. In Employees State Insurance Corporation v. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. A.I.R. 1965 Pat. 445 a Division Bench had to consider the specific question whether apprentices as in the present case are employees as defined under S. 2(9) of the Act. It was held they are not. It was pointed out in that case that in Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the word ‘workman’ has been defined as ‘including an apprentice’, while in the Employees State Insurance Act, which was brought on the statute book subsequently, the abovesaid inclusive definition including apprentices had been omitted in the definition of the word ‘employee’. 12. Under these circumstances, I agree with the conclusion of the Insurance Court that the apprentices are not employees as defined in the Act. 12. Under these circumstances, I agree with the conclusion of the Insurance Court that the apprentices are not employees as defined in the Act. The appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed, but there would be no order as to costs.