Judgment :- 1. The petitioner in this original petition is the person in possession of R.S. 23/3 of Kariyoor Desom in Chokli Amsom in which the kudikidappu of the 1st respondent was situated. The grievance of the petitioner is against Ext. P-2 order of the 2nd respondent by which the petitioner's application O. A. No. 39 of 1974 for shifting the kudikidappu of the 1st respondent was dismissed. The questions that arise for consideration in this original petition are: (1) Whether the pendency of an application for shifting the kudikidappu under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, for short the Act, be a bar for the issue of the certificate of purchase under S.80C(2) of the Act; (2) Can an application for shifting filed after the order of the Land Tribunal allowing the application for purchase of kudikidappu under S.80B(3) arrest the further proceedings in the purchase of kudikidappu; and (3) when will the order of the Land Tribunal allowing an application for purchase of kudikidappu become final for the issue of the certificate of purchase and in the absence of a stay order issued by the appellate authority the mere fact that an appeal is pending can prevent the issue of of the certificate of purchase by the Land Tribunal. 2. The short facts of the case are as follows: The 1st respondent filed O. A. No. 402 of 1972 before the 2nd respondent-Land Tribunal under S.80B of the Act for the purchase of his kudikidappu. The petitioner on 28 61973 tiled O. A. No. 448 of 1973 under S.77 of the Act for shifting the kudikidappu of the 1st respondent. This application for shifting was dismissed for default on 4 91973. The 1st respondent's application for purchase, O. A. No. 402 of 1972, was also allowed by the 2nd respondent on 4 9 1973. On 7 91973 the petitioner filed I. A. No. 45 of 1973 before the 2nd respondent for restoration of O.A. No 448 of 1973. The 2nd respondent restored O.A.No. 448 of 1973 to file even though the 2nd respondent had no power to restore an application dismissed for default. But O.A. No. 448 of 1973 was again dismissed for default on 24-1-19/4. Thereupon, the petitioner filed O. A. No 39 of 1974 a fresh application for shifting on 24-1-1974 itself, which was posted for appearance of the parties on 25-2-1974. But O.A. No. 448 of 1973 was again dismissed for default on 24-1-19/4. Thereupon, the petitioner filed O. A. No 39 of 1974 a fresh application for shifting on 24-1-1974 itself, which was posted for appearance of the parties on 25-2-1974. In the meanwhile, in pursuance of the order allowing the application for purchase O A. No. 402 of 1972 the 1st respondent remitted the first instalment of purchase money on 29 11974. Accordingly the 2nd respondent issued the certificate of purchase under S.80C(2) of the Act on 4 21974. Thereafter, on 3151974 the 2nd respondent dismissed O.A. No. 39 of 1974 by Ext. P-2 order. There is an averment in Para.2 of the original petition that the petitioner has preferred an appeal against the order of the 2nd respondent allowing the 1st respondent's application for purchase O. A. No. 402 of 1972. This is not denied in the counter-affidavit filed by the 1st respondent. Shri Govind Bharathan, learned counsel for the petitioner, refers to S.80B and 80C of the Act and contends that once an application for shifting is filed under S.77 of the Act all action in pursuance of an application for purchase of kudikidappu has to be stayed, otherwise there will be a conflict between S.75(2) and 77 on the one part and S.80A, 80B and 80C on the other part. According to the learned counsel, the issuance of the certificate of purchase before disposing of the application for shifting is against the mandatory provisions of the Act. Learned counsel also refers to Thomas v. Punnoose (1973 K.L.T. 1000) wherein my learned brother Viswanatha Iyer J. has said: "The certificate of purchase has not been so far issued to the kudikidappukaran and so the bar under S.77(2) proviso will not apply and the application to shift the kudikidappu is maintainable." Learned counsel then refers to S.80C(1) and (2) of the Act and points out that the deposit of purchase price and the issue of certificate of purchase can only be after the order of the Tribunal under S.80B(3) allowing the application for purchase became final. Learned counsel then contends that the finality of the order under S.80B can only be after the appeal under S.102 from the order is disposed of by the appellate authority. Learned counsel then contends that the finality of the order under S.80B can only be after the appeal under S.102 from the order is disposed of by the appellate authority. Learned counsel also refers to S.80B(3) proviso and contends that the 2nd respondent ought not to have issued the purchase certificate when the petitioner's application for shifting, O.A. No. 39 of 1974, was pending. 4. Shri P.V Madhavan Nambiar, learned counsel for the 1st respondent refers to S.80C(1) and (2) of the Act and contends that once the certificate of purchase is issued, shifting of the kudikidappu cannot be ordered and that is the reason why the proviso is there to S.77 (2) of the Act. If as a matter of fact the certificate of purchase was wrongly issued by the 2nd respondent it is for the petitioner to get it quashed in appropriate proceedings. Learned counsel points out that there is no prayer in the original petition for quashing the certificate of purchase issued in O.A. No. 402 of 1972. According to the learned counsel, as long as the order allowing O.A. No. 402 of 1972 stands, the issue of purchase certificate made long after that order cannot be said to be illegal or irregular. Learned counsel refers to Thattamuttathu Puthiyaparayil Nabeesumma v. The Land Tribunal, Cannannore (O.P. No. 5531 of 1974) wherein my learned brother Bhaskaran J. has held: "I find no merit in the contention that it is open to the petitioner in this writ petition to state that thought the purchase certificate has been granted, it has been granted illegally and without properly complying with the relevant provisions of the Act. If the petitioner is aggrieved of the purchase certificate already granted, he should have taken up the matter before the authorities concerned for getting it set aside. In this writ petition it is not possible to probe further into the matter as to whether a purchase certificate granted has been so granted in compliance with the provisions of the Act. There is no prayer for quashing the purchase certificate also." Learned counsel points out that the appeal against the order under S.80B (3) on the application for purchase was actually filed only on 7 21974 while the certificate of purchase was issued on 4 21974 and hence when the certificate of purchase was issued, no appeal was even pending. There is no prayer for quashing the purchase certificate also." Learned counsel points out that the appeal against the order under S.80B (3) on the application for purchase was actually filed only on 7 21974 while the certificate of purchase was issued on 4 21974 and hence when the certificate of purchase was issued, no appeal was even pending. It is also pointed out that when the application for purchase was ordered on 4 91973 no application for shifting was pending, as O.A. No. 448 of 1973, the first application for shifting was already dismissed for default on that day. Learned counsel contends that the pendency of an application for shifting filed after the application for purchase was ordered under S.80B(3) cannot be a bar for the issue of the certificate of purchase. Learned counsel then points out that under S.80C(2) the certificate of purchase can be issued if the order on the application for purchase under S.80B(3) has become final. Learned counsel then contends that as far as the 2nd respondent is concerned, the order under S.80B(3) on the first respondent's application for purchase, O.A. No. 448 of 1973, made on 4 91973 has become final and hence the issue of the certificate of purchase under S.80C(2) on 4-21974 was perfectly legal. In support of his contention learned counsel relies of Venkata Reddy v. Pethi Reddy (A.I.R.1963 S.C. 992) wherein the Supreme Court has said: "A decision is said to be final when, so far as the Court rendering it is concerned, it is unalterable except by resort to such provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as permit its reversal, modification or amendment. Similarly, a final decision would mean a decision which would operate as res judicata between the parties if it is not sought to be modified or reversed by preferring an appeal or a revision or a review application as is permitted by the Code. A preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a tentative decree but must, in so far as the matters dealt with by it are concerned, be regarded as conclusive. No doubt, insults which contemplate the making of two decrees a preliminary decree and a final decree the decree which would be executable would be the final decree. No doubt, insults which contemplate the making of two decrees a preliminary decree and a final decree the decree which would be executable would be the final decree. But the finality of a decree or a decision does not necessarily depend upon its being executable The legislature in its wisdom has thought that suits of certain types should be decided in stages and though the suit in such cases can be regarded as fully and completely decided only after a final decree is made, the decision of the court arrived at the earlier stage also has a finality attached to it. S.97, Civil P.C. clearly indicates that as to the matters covered by it, a preliminary decree is regarded as embodying the final decision of the court passing that decree." Learned counsel concludes by saying that the right to shift the kudikidappukaran under S.75(2) is from the holding and when the certificate of purchase is issued, the holding ceases to exist as the kudikidappukaran has become the proprietor of the site in which the kudikidappu was situated. 5. Shri Govind Bharathan, learned counsel for the petitioner in his reply to the arguments of the learned counsel for the 1st respondent contends that the certificate of purchase can be issued only after the order on the application for purchase becomes final, after the order in appeal under S 102 and the order in revision under S.103 are passed. Learned counsel points out that under S.102(4) the order of the Tribunal has to be modified when there has been a modification in appeal by the appellate authority. Learned counsel has also referred to Ithonamma v. Karappan (1975 KLT.152). 6. There is some force in the contentions of Shri Madhavan Nambiar, learned counsel for the 1st respondent. S.77(2) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 reads: 77(2) The Land Tribunal, after such inquiry as it deems fit, and on being satisfied that the applicant has complied with all the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) or sub-section (4) as the case may be, of S.75, may pass an order requiring the kudikidappukaran to shift the kudikidappu before such date as may be specified in the order: Provided that no such order shall be passed in any case where a certificate of purchase has been issued under S.80C in respect of the kudikidappu." S. 80B(3) of the Act reads: "80B. (3) The Land Tribunal shall, after giving notice to the kudikidappukars in the land in which the kudikidappu is situate and other persons interested in the land and after such enquiry as may be prescribed, pass such orders on the application as it thinks fit; Provided that where an application under sub-section (1) of S.77 in respect of the kudikidappu is pending, the Land Tribunal shall not pass any order under this sub-section before the disposal of that application." S.80C (2) of the Act reads: "80(C)(2) On the deposit of the first instalment of the purchase price as provided in sub-section (1) or on the deposit of the purchase price in a lump as provided in sub-section (8) of S.80A or, where the kudikidappukaran is not liable to pay his share of the purchase price or, where no purchase price is due from the kudikidappukaran after set-off as provided in sub-section (5) of S.80B, after the order of the Land Tribunal under sub-section (3) of S.80B has become final, the Land Tribunal shall issue a certificate of purchase in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed, and thereupon the right, title and interest of the landowner, the intermediaries, if any, and the person in possession where he is not the landowner, in respect of the land allowed to be purchased, shall vest in the kudikidappukaran free from all encumbrances with effect from the date of such deposit, or, as the case may be, the date on which the order of the Land Tribunal under the said sub-section (3) has become final." Pendency of an application for shifting of a kudikidappu will be a bar only for the passing of an order under S.80B(3) of the Act on an application for the purchase of the kudikidappu occupied by a kudikidappukaran. Pendency of such an application will not be a bar for the issue of the certificate of purchase under S.80C(2) of the Act. It goes without saying that an application for shifting filed after the passing of the order under S.80B(3) allowing an application for purchase of kudikidappu cannot in any way arrest the further proceedings in the application for purchase. As tar as the Land Tribunal is concerned, its order in the purchase application becomes final when it is made. Of course, it can be modified or set aside in appeal or revision. As tar as the Land Tribunal is concerned, its order in the purchase application becomes final when it is made. Of course, it can be modified or set aside in appeal or revision. But till that is done, it continues to be final. So, if the kudikidappukaran complies with the conditions imposed by S.80C(1) and (2) the Land Tribunal has to issue the certificate of purchase as a matter of course. This can be prevented only if the order of the Land Tribunal allowing the application for purchase is stayed in appeal or revision. Pendency of an application for shifting has nothing to do with the issue of the certificate of purchase. On the issue of the certificate of purchase the kudikidappukaran becomes the monarch of all he surveys as far as the land allowed to be purchased by him as per the order of the Land Tribunal under S.80B(3). That is the reason why the proviso to S.77(2) insists that no order for shifting should be passed in a case where a certificate of purchase has been issued under S.80C. In this case, no application for shifting was pending when the Land Tribunal passed orders under S.80B(3) allowing the application for purchase by the kudikidappukaran on 4-9-1973.0. A. No. 39 of 1974 the second application for shifting filed after the above order under S.80B(3) cannot in any way prevent the issue of the certificate of purchase. If the order allowing the application for purchase was stayed in appeal or revision or set aside in appropriate proceedings the position would have been different. When the certificate of purchase was issued on 4-2-1974 the application for shifting could not be allowed under S.77(2). Hence Ext. P-2 order of the Land Tribunal dismissing the second application for shifting, O. A. No. 39 of 1974, is perfectly legal and valid. If in case the order of the Land Tribunal allowing the 1st respondent kudikidappukaran's application for purchase is set aside in appeal or other appropriate proceedings will the petitioner be left without a remedy? When the order goes, will not the certificate of purchase issued in pursuance of that order also go? In that case, if the petitioner comes forward with a fresh application for shifting cannot the Land Tribunal pass an order under S.77(2) if it is satisfied that the petitioner has complied with the conditions required under S.75(2) or (4)? When the order goes, will not the certificate of purchase issued in pursuance of that order also go? In that case, if the petitioner comes forward with a fresh application for shifting cannot the Land Tribunal pass an order under S.77(2) if it is satisfied that the petitioner has complied with the conditions required under S.75(2) or (4)? There are not questions which rise for consideration at this stage. 7. The original petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Dismissed.