Judgment :- 1. The petitioner applied to the third respondent-the District Collector, Calicut, on 13121971 for the grant of a licence under Clause.3 and 4 of the Kerala Food Grains Dealers Licensing Order, 1967 for carrying on business as a dealer in food grains. While the application was pending consideration before the District Collector, the business premises of the petitioner who was already carrying on trade in groceries was inspected by the Additional Sub-Inspector of Police, Calicut Town Police Station along with the City Rationing Officer,Calicut on 15-12-1971 and it was found that the petitioner had stored in the said shop 53 bags of rice. The said quantity of rice was thereupon seized by the officers and the petitioner's shop was locked and sealed by them. Thereafter, the third respondent issued a notice to the petitioner under S.6 of the Essential Commodities Act,1955(herein-after referred to as the Act) directing the petitioner to show cause against confiscation of the seized quantity of rice under S.6A of the Act. The petitioner submitted an explanation before the third respondent wherein he contended that the rice stored in his shop was not intended to be sold before obtaining the licence for which he had applied and that the petitioner had purchased the rice in anticipation of the grant of the licence. The third respondent by his proceedings evidenced by Ext. PI dated 22nd February, 1972 held that there was a clear violation by the petitioner of sub-clauses (1), and (2) of Clause.3of the Kerala Food Grains Dealers' Licensing Order, 1967 read with S.3 of the Act and hence it was ordered that the quantity of f 3 bags of rice seized from the petitioner's shop will be confiscated to Government under S.6A of the Act. 2. Against the said order passed by the third respondent, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Kozhikode under S.6C of the Act. That appeal was dismissed by the District Judge as per the judgment evidenced by Ext. P2 dated 8th October, 1973. The learned District Judge took the view that by virtu: of sub-clause (2) of Clause.3 of the Kerala Food Grains Dealers' Licensing Order, 1967 any person who is found to have stored two quintals or more of any one of the food grains has to be deemed to be deemed to be carrying on business as a dealer unless the contrary is proved. In the opinion of the District judge the petitioner who was found to have stored 53 bags of rice in his shop a quantity far exceeding the limit of two quintals mentioned in Clause.3(2) had not adduced any acceptable evidence for rebutting the presumption created by sub-clause (2) and that hence he must be held to have contravened the provisions of Clause.3 of the Food Grains Dealers' Licensing Order read with S.3 of the Act. The direction given by the District Collector for confiscation of the seized quantity of food grains was therefore held by the District Judge to be fully justified and valid in law. This writ petition has been brought by the petitioner seeking to quash Exts. P-1 and P-2. 3. On behalf of the petitioner it was argued by Shri. Karunakaran Nambiar, his learned Advocate, that action can be taken for confiscation of the foodgrains under S.6A of the Act only if it is established that a person has knowingly, deliberately or intentionally contravened any provision of an Order made under S.3 of the Act. In support of this contention reliance was placed by the learned advocate on a decision of the Supreme Court in Nathulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR. 1966 S.C. 43) and also Kishori Lal v. Addl. Collector, Kanpur (AIR. 1969 Allahabad 159). In Nathulal v State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR. 1966 S.C. 43) it was held that an offence under S 7 of the Act as it then stood for breach of S.3 of the Madhya Pradesh Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1958 involves mens rea as an ingredient of the offence and that therefore such an offence under S.7 can be said to have been committed by a person only if be intentionally contravenes any order made under S 3 of the Act. This decision was followed in Kishori Lal v. Additional Collector, Kanpur (AIR. 1969 Allahabad 159) where an order had been passed for confiscation of a certain quantity of foodgrains under S.6A of the Act. The Allahabad High Court took the view that the expression'contravention' occurring in S.6A must be given the same meaning and content as has been given to it by the Supreme Court in the ruling reported in Nathulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1966 S C. 43) while considering the scope of S, 7 occurring in the Act. The Allahabad High Court took the view that the expression'contravention' occurring in S.6A must be given the same meaning and content as has been given to it by the Supreme Court in the ruling reported in Nathulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1966 S C. 43) while considering the scope of S, 7 occurring in the Act. In Nathulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR. 1966 S.C. 43) their Lordships were dealing with a case of criminal prosecution launched against a per on under S.7 of the Act and it was in that context that the Supreme Court observed that there is a sound rule of construction which has been applied in England and adopted in India to construe a provision which creates an offence in conformity with the common law principle that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence unless there is clear indication in the Statute of an intention to exclude the elements of mens rea. The said principle is not attracted in construing the provision in S.6A of the Act which empowers the Collector to pass an executive order for confiscation of the food-grains. Hence with great respect I entertain serious doubts about the correctness of the view expressed in Kishori Lal v. Addl. Collector, Kanpur (AIR. 1969 Allahabad 159) that the element of mens rea has to be imported into S.6A because the Supreme Court while dealing with a case arising under S.7 of the Act has said that the expression "contravenes" occurring in that section must be taken to involve wilful intention or conscious contravention. It is however unnecessary for me to dilate further on this aspect because shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Nathulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR. 1966 SC. 43) the Parliament amended S.7 of the Act by substituting the words " If any person contravenes, whether knowingly, intentionally or otherwise any order made under S.3" for the following words which originally occurred in the section "if any person contravenes any order made under S.Y. The obvious intention underlying the amendment is to exclude mens rea in respect of offences dealt with by S.7. The search and seizure with which I am concerned in this case took place only on 15-12-1971 long after the aforementioned amendment to S.7 had come in to force. The search and seizure with which I am concerned in this case took place only on 15-12-1971 long after the aforementioned amendment to S.7 had come in to force. Hence even if the view expressed by the Allahabad High Court that the expression "contravention" occurring in S.6A must be given the same construction as the word 'contravenes" occurring in S.7 of the Act is to be applied in the present case the petitioner is not in any better position, because, in order to attract the penalties under S.7 as it stood at the time when the impugned search and seizure took place it was wholly 'unnecessary to establish any element of mens rea. The contention advanced by the petitioner that no confiscation can be ordered without proving mens rea on his part is devoid of merit and will stand rejected. 4. The next argument that was advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that before ordering confiscation of the seized goods it was incumbent on the District Collector to come to a definite conclusion on the basis of the positive materials that there has been a contravention of an Order made under S.3 of the Act. According to the petitioner no order of confiscation of the food grains could be validly passed against him under S.6A unless it was established that the petitioner had actually stored the food-grains in question for purposes of sale in the course of his business as a dealer. It is argued that the provision contained in Clause.3 (2) does not give rise to a presumption that any storage by a person of food-grains in excess of the quantity specified in the said clause is for the purpose of sale. In support of this argument reliance was placed by the petitioner's counsel on the observations of the Supreme Court in Manipur Administration v. Nila Chandra Singh (AIR. 1964 SC. 1533) and in the decision of this Court in Moideen v. S.I. of Police, Calicut (1972 KLT. 64). Those decisions, however are clearly distinguishable. In Manipur Administration v. Nila Chandra Singh (AIR. 1964 SC. 1964 SC. 1533) and in the decision of this Court in Moideen v. S.I. of Police, Calicut (1972 KLT. 64). Those decisions, however are clearly distinguishable. In Manipur Administration v. Nila Chandra Singh (AIR. 1964 SC. 1533) the Supreme Court bad to deal with the scope of the presumption created by Clause.3 (2) of the Manipur Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing Order, 1958 which was in the following terms: "For the purpose of this clause, any person who stores any Foodgrains in quantity of one hundred maunds or more at any one time shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to store the foodgrains for the purpose of sale." Construing this provision the Supreme Court said that the presumption created therein amounted to nothing more than the stock found with a given individual of one hundred or more maunds of the specified food grains had been stored by him for sale. The Supreme Court pointed out that in a prosecution under S.7 of the Essential Commodities Act for violation of Clause.3(1) which laid down that no person shall carry on business as a dealer except under and in accordant with the terms of a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing authority, the prosecution will have to show that the storage of the food grains by the accused person was for the purpose of carrying on the business as a dealer in foodgrains and that the element of business which is essential to attract the provisions of Clause.3 (1) was not covered by the presumption raised in Clause.3 (2) and hence that part of the case would still have to be proved by the prosecution by other independent evidence. Likewise, in the ruling of this court reported in Moideen v S.1. of Police, Calicut (1972 KLT. 64) this court had to consider the scope of the presumption created by sub-clause (2) of Clause.3 of the Kerala Foodgrains Dealer's Licensing Order, 1964 whose wording was identical with that of the provision contained in Clause.3 (2) of the Manipur Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order which the Supreme Court had to deal with in Manipur Administration v. Nila Chandra Singh (AIR. 1964 S.C.1533). In the present case before me action has been taken for contravention of S.3(1) of the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing Order, 1967. 1964 S.C.1533). In the present case before me action has been taken for contravention of S.3(1) of the Kerala Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing Order, 1967. The wording of sub-clause (2) of the said clause is materially different from the wording of the corresponding provision which occurred in the Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing Order, 1964. Clause.3(2) of the Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing Order, 1967 reads as under: "For the purpose of this clause any person who stores in quantities of two (2) quintals or more of any one of the foodgrains or three (3) quintals or more of all the foodgrains taken together at any one time, shall unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to be carrying on business as a dealer." Unlike in the corresponding provision contained in Clause.3(2) of the 1964 Order the presumption created by Clause.3(2) of the present Order which is applicable to this case is much wider in its scope and its effect is that any person who is found to have stored any of the foodgrains in quantities of two quintals or more or all varieties of foodgrains aggregating to three quintals or more shall be deemed to be carrying on business as a dealer unless the contrary is proved. In a case where the said presumption is attracted and it is not successfully rebutted the contravention of S, 3 is automatically made out if the storage is found to be otherwise than under and in accordance with the terms of a licence issued by the licensing authority. Inasmuch as the petitioner was found to have stored in bis shop a quantity of rice far in excess of two quintals and he had not rebutted the presumption arising under sub-clause (2), the third respondent as well as the appellate authority were fully justified in holding that there was a contravention by the petitioner of the provisions of Clause.3(1) of the Order read with S.3 of the Act and that the foodgrains seized from his shop were liable to be confiscated under S.6A of the Act. In the light of the preceding discussion it must follow that the orders Exts. P-1 and P-2 call for no interference. The original petition therefore fails and it is dismissed, but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. Dismissed.