Judgment :- V. RAMASWAMI, J. The respondent-assessees were dealers in hides and skins. They were unlicensed dealer. In the view that unlicensed dealers were not liable to pay sales-tax, the Dy. CTO, Ambur held that the entire turnover of Rs. 5, 17, 337.36 was exempt from taxation and made an order accordingly on 13th June, 1958. Subsequent to this order the Supreme Court reversing the decision of this Court held that unlicensed dealers in hides and skins are liable to be taxed at multi point on their purchase turnover. The Dy. CIT, therefore, invoking his powers under s. 32 of the Tamil Nadu General ST Act, 1959 (hereinafter called the Act) issued a notice to the assessees calling upon them to show cause as to why the taxable turnover should not be revised including the entire turnover exempt as taxable. After a consideration of the objections filed by the assessees, by an order dt. 3rd July, 1961, the Dy. CIT, Coimbatore, refixed the taxable turnover at Rs. 5, 17, 337.36. The assessees preferred an appeal to the Tribunal under s. 36 of the Act. Though the Tribunal confirmed the view that the turnover of unlicensed dealers in hides and skins were not exempt and that therefore liable to pay sales-tax allowed the assessees to raise a new contention for the first time before the Tribunal that some of the transaction were export sales or sales in the course of export and therefore not liable to sales-tax under the Act. Since the consideration of this question involved permitting the assessees to adduce further evidence and a consideration of the same on merits, the Tribunal remanded the case to the Dy. CIT with a direction to consider the question of sales in the course of export. This order of the Tribunal was made on 24th July, 1963. While the proceedings were at this stage, the Joint CTO, Ambur, purported to consider the issue by an order dt. 3rd June, 1966 and held that the transactions were not liable to be taxed. The Dy. CIT considered that this order of the Joint CTO, was without jurisdiction as the mater was not remanded to the Joint CTO, by the Tribunal. Holding that the Joint CTO's, order dt. 3rd June, 1966 was without jurisdiction and null and void, the Dy. CIT set aside that order by his order; dt. 14th Dec., 1966; thereafter the Dy. CIT considered that this order of the Joint CTO, was without jurisdiction as the mater was not remanded to the Joint CTO, by the Tribunal. Holding that the Joint CTO's, order dt. 3rd June, 1966 was without jurisdiction and null and void, the Dy. CIT set aside that order by his order; dt. 14th Dec., 1966; thereafter the Dy. CIT proceeded to consider the case in pursuance of the Tribunal's order of remand. After issuing notice to the assessees and hearing them, by an order dt. 3rd Jan., 1967 the Dy. CIT held in the remanded proceedings that none of the turnover was in the course of export and that the entire turnover was therefore taxable. The assessees referred an appeal to the Tribunal. 2. The main contention of the appellants before the Tribunal was that the order dt. 3rd Jan., 1967 of the Dy. CIT was made beyond the period prescribed under s. 32(2) and that therefore, it is illegal. This point found favour with the Tribunal. The State has filed this Revision Petition. 3. There can be no dispute that the order of the Joint CTO, , dt. 3rd June, 1966 was without jurisdiction. The order of remand by the Tribunal was to the Dy. CIT had therefore the mater could not have been dealt with by the Joint CTO, . The Dy. CIT was therefore right in taking up the remanded case himself and dealing with it. The only question therefore in this Revision Petition also is as to whether the order of the Dy. CIT dt. 3rd Jan., 1967 was made beyond the period of limitation. Under. s. 32, the Dy. CIT may of his own motion call for and examine the order passed by the appropriate authority and pass such order thereon as he thinks fit. The provision which prescribed the period of limitation is contained in s. 32(2) and that reads as follows :- 32(2) The Dy. CIT shall not pass any order under sub-s. (1), if-a) the time for appeal against the order has not expired ; (b) the order has been made the subject of an appeal to the AAC or the Tribunal, or of a Revision in the High Court; or (c) more than five years have expired after the passing of the order ; It is not in dispute that the original order of the Dy. CIT, dt. CIT, dt. 3rd July, 1961 was made within the period prescribed. Against this order under s. 32 an appeal is provided under s. 36. Sec. 36(3) which deals with the powers of the Tribunal reads as follows :- 36(3) In disposing of an appeal the Tribunal may, after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity of being heard, (a) in the case of an order of assessment -(1) confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or penalty or both; (ii) set aside the assessment and direct the assessing authority to make a fresh assessment and direct the assessment after such further enquiry as may be directed ; or (iii) pass such order as it may think fit; or (b) in the case of any other order, confirm, cancel or vary such order ; We have omitted the provisions as they are not relevant for the point under consideration. There could be no doubt that under s. 36(3) the Tribunal has the power to remand the matter for a fresh consideration even in a case where the appeal is against an order of the Dy. CIT made under s. 32. This, power could clearly be found in s. 36(3)(a)(iii) which enables the Tribunal to pass such orders as it may think fit while disposing of an appeal. Similar provisions contained in s. 254 of the IT Act, 1961 had been construed by this Court consistently as enabling the appellate authority to remand the matter to the authority from whom the appeal is preferred and even to the original authority. If any reference is needed reference may be made to Gajalakshmi Ginning Factory vs. CIT. Therefore, in disposing of an appeal preferred against an order under s. 32 the Tribunal has jurisdiction to remand the matter to the Dy. CIT for fresh consideration. 4. Now the question is, for an order to be made in the remanded proceedings does the limitation prescribed under s. 32(2) apply? We have no doubt that the period prescribed under s. 32(2) is applicable only for an order made by the Dy. CIT in his suo motu proceedings but it will not apply to a case where he was dealing with it in pursuance of the directions of the Appellate or Revisional authority. In fact, if it to be otherwise, it will lead to a very absurd result. CIT in his suo motu proceedings but it will not apply to a case where he was dealing with it in pursuance of the directions of the Appellate or Revisional authority. In fact, if it to be otherwise, it will lead to a very absurd result. For instance, if an order was made almost at the end of the period, the Tribunal would have not right to remand the proceedings as his order of remand could not be given effect to. If the Dy. CIT is expected to make an order taking into account the time that may be required for disposal of any appeal that may be preferred so that in case an order of remand is made he will be in a position to make the order within the period of four year prescribed under s. 32(2), it will be unduly limiting his jurisdiction to act within the period of four years as provided in the Act. Further, the language used in s. 32 itself shows that it is intended to apply only to an order that has to be made by it when it exercises its powers originally. The requirement as to the expiry of the time for appeal, the order being not subject matter of appeal to the Asstt. CIT or the Tribunal or the Revision referred to in cl. (2) of s. 32 and giving of opportunity before making an adverse order under s. 32(2) would all be inconsistent with the view that even after the remand the period prescribed under s. 32(2)(c) would have to be complied with. The matter is also not res integra. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider a similar limitation prescribed in s. 132(5) of the IT Act. Under the provision, the ITO had to make an order within a period of 90 days. Such an order made by the ITO in a particular case within the period of go days. The assessee filed a Writ Petition in the Delhi High Court which set aside that order on the ground that the principles of natural justice had been violated and directed the ITO to reconsider the matter afresh. When a fresh order was made after complying with the principles of natural justice, the assessee challenged it on the ground that the latter order was made beyond period of 90 days prescribed under s. 132(5). When a fresh order was made after complying with the principles of natural justice, the assessee challenged it on the ground that the latter order was made beyond period of 90 days prescribed under s. 132(5). The Delhi High Court accepted this contention and said that the order would have to be made within the period of 90 days and that the assessee was not estopped from contending against its validity. The Supreme Court in Dir. of Inspection of IT vs. Pooran Mall & Sons held that if once an order was made within a period of 90 days the subsequent order made in pursuance of an order of remand or direction by the High Court could be at any time. The Learned Judges pointed out that an appeal is provided under s. 132(11) against an order under s. 132(5) and the appellate authority could make such order as it thinks fit. If even after a remand the order will have to be made within a period of 90 days, in the words of the Supreme Court "it would make sub-ss. (11) and (12) of s. 132 ridiculous and useless". We have therefore no doubt that the period prescribed under s. 32(2) of the Tamil Nadu General ST Act would not apply to a fresh order to be made by the Dy. CIT in pursuance of a remand order made by the Tribunal. The Tax Revision case is accordingly allowed and the order of the Tribunal is set aside. The Petitioners will be entitled to their costs. Counsel fee Rs. 250.