JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :- This rule is directed against Order No. 21 dated 18th March, 1972/28th March, 1972 made in a proceeding under section 33(2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 being Case No. 66 of 1970 by the 8th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal. By the said order the Tribunal was pleased to allow the application under section 33(2) (b) of the Act and consequently granted approval of the action taken by the respondent company against the petitioner. 2. Section 33 of the Act requires that the conditions of service etc., of an employee would remain unchanged under certain circumstances during the pendency of the proceeding and section 33(2) (b) requires that during the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in any such dispute alter. (a) ………… ………….. ……………. ……….. (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman; Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceedings is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. 3. The petitioner, at all material times, was employed as CTC Dafadar in the New Doors Tea Estate which is owned by Messrs Banarhat Tea Company Limited, a Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956. It is an admitted position that the terms of service and conditions of employment of the employees of the said Tea Estate are governed by a set of rules incorporated in the Standing Orders and at the relevant time a dispute was pending before the respondent Tribunal under Government Order Reference No. 639/I.T. /LR./9L-22/66 dated February 21, 1967 and the petitioner and the respondent Company were concerned in the said dispute. 4. It appears that for allegations of habitual absenteeism, the petitioner was chargesheeted on June 25, 1970, which according to clause 13 (c) (v) of the Standing Orders is an act of misconduct. 4. It appears that for allegations of habitual absenteeism, the petitioner was chargesheeted on June 25, 1970, which according to clause 13 (c) (v) of the Standing Orders is an act of misconduct. The respondent Company in terms of the requirements of the Standing Orders asked the petitioner to file his written explanation on the said chargesheet but as no reply was filed by him, an enquiry was held on June 29, 1970 and the same had to be conducted ex parte because of the aforesaid failure of the petitioner either to appear or to file any written explanation. It further appears that on the basis of the recommendations of the Enquiry Officer made in the said ex parte enquiry, an order of dismissal was passed against the petitioner and thereby terminating his services with effect from July 19, 1970. 5. Since the proceedin2s as mentioned hereinbefore was pending, so on July 19, 1970, an application under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act was addressed to the respondent Tribunal under registered post with acknowledgment due and it appears that the said application was received by the said Tribunal through post on July 18, 1970. From a reference to the said application it would further be apparent that apart from mentioning the relevant facts as mentioned herein before, it was also contended that in terms of clause 13J of the Standing Orders, (vide letter of June 30, 1970), the petitioner was given a further opportunity of having his case represented by an official of his registered Trade Union and even then the petitioner took no steps. This must however be recorded that the aforesaid facts of giving the petitioner due opportunity to have his case represented in the manner as stated hereinbefore finds no support from the evidence and documents on record before the respondent Tribunal. However, by the said application the respondent Company prayed for approval of the action taken by them under section 32(2) (b) of the Act against the petitioner. The petitioner in his turn filed his written objection to the said application and he con tended therein that the entire proceeding was vitiated not only for the violation of the principles of natural justice but also because of the fact that the necessary ingredients of section 33 (2) (b) of the Act in the instant case were not complied with. He further alleged that the domestic enquiry which was purported or alleged to have been held was not a proper one and in fact in view of the fact that he did neither receive the charge sheet nor a notice of the enquiry, the entire proceeding was void abinitio. Apart from this he contended that the enquiry which was initiated in the name of the Manager of the Tea Estate for and on behalf of the Tea Estate was also improper and consequently the application under section 33 (2) (b) which !1as been filed by him was also bad. He further submitted that since the order of dismissal in the instant case was passed on July 19, 1970 and the application was filed before the respondent Tribunal on July 18, 1970 and as he was not given or offered one month's wages simultaneously to the action which was taken the application in question should also be held and found to be not maintainable and in form. 6. The respondent Tribunal after placing reliance on Exhibits 2 and 24 viz., the postal acknowledgment receipt and an endorsement in the Peon Book respectively, showing services of the charge-shed and the notice of enquiry to the petitioner, came to the conclusion, after overruling the points as were sought to be made by the petitioner that the respondent Company succeeded in establishing its case for approval under section 33(2)(b) of the Act and consequently made the impugned order. While making the said order it furl her appears that the respondent Tribunal on consideration of the relevant materials on record came to the conclusion that there was no delay in filling the application under section 33 (2)(b) and also overruled the contentions of the petitioner on that account. 7. Against the said Order, the petitioner on October 4, 1972 moved and obtained this Rule and at the time of the hearing of the same, Mr. 7. Against the said Order, the petitioner on October 4, 1972 moved and obtained this Rule and at the time of the hearing of the same, Mr. S.R. Ghose, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, after taking the Court through the pleadings of the parties before the respondent Tribunal and the documents on record contended in addition to the submissions made before the respondent Tribunal as mentioned hereinbefore that the respondent Tribunal was wrong in granting in the facts and circumstances of the case the approval of the action which was taken by the respondent Company and he further contended that the respondent Tribunal should have held even on the basis of the said Exhibits 2 and 24 that there was no proper and effective or due service of the notices on the petitioner. He further submitted that since neither any notice of enquiry nor the chargesheet was duly served on the petitioner, the holding of the exparte enquiry was improper and in view of the fact that the respondent Tribunal has overlooked the same and has misconstrued and mis-appreciated the said Exhibits 2 and 24, the order as made by him should be set aside, as such wrong consideration of the said two exhibits would mean error, apparent on the face of the record. Mr. Ghose at the time of the hearing of the case on July 9, 1974 produced the certified copies of the said Exhibits for the purpose of showing that neither the chargesheet nor the notice of enquiry was ever served duly on the petitioner because from the said respective Exhibits it would appear that the petitioner was not present, as a result whereof the notices in question were not received by him. From Exhibit 2 it appears that as the addressee left without intimation so that letter or notices were returned to the sender on 27th June, 1970 and from Exhibit 24 it would appear that Soma, the Peon of the respondent Company, who went to serve the notice through Peon Book, himself has made an endorsement "absent". From Exhibit 2 it appears that as the addressee left without intimation so that letter or notices were returned to the sender on 27th June, 1970 and from Exhibit 24 it would appear that Soma, the Peon of the respondent Company, who went to serve the notice through Peon Book, himself has made an endorsement "absent". When the matter was heard on 9th July, 1974 and these facts were brought to the notice of the Court and the respondent Company in its turn denied the validity of such submissions and contended that 'the notices in question were duly served and that has been properly recorded by the respondent Tribunal in the impugned order viz., to the effect that the postal acknowledgment Ext. 2 read with the postal acknowledgment receipt and the subsequent conduct of the employee has made it abundantly clear that the chargesheet was received by him and the endorsement in the Peon Book Ext. 24 also established that there was proper service on the petitioner. At-that time, as the original records were not before the Court, so after the hearing was over an order was made directing the respondent Tribunal to send the records to this Court for the purpose of verifying the validity of the claims and counter claims as raised by the parties. From a reference to the originals in the record of the respondent Tribunal it appears that certified copies of the said Exhibits 2 and 24, which were produced by Mr. Ghose, do correctly reproduced and reflected the exact picture and there 1S no ambiguity. 8. The basic object of section 33 as has been found in the case of (1) Air India Corporation v. V. A. Revellow, reported in 1972 (1) LLJ 501 ; 1972 SC 1343 appears to be to protect the workmen concerned in the disputes which form the subject-matter of pending conciliation proceedings or adjudication proceeding, against victimisation by the employer on account of raising or continuing such pending disputes and to ensure that those pending proceedings are brought to expeditious termination in a peaceful atmosphere, undisturbed by any subsequent cause tending to further accelerate the already strained relations between the employer and the employee. So it appears that the periods of prohibition contained in section 33 is of two fold. So it appears that the periods of prohibition contained in section 33 is of two fold. On the one hand, they are designed to protect the workmen concerned during the course of industrial conciliation, arbitration and adjudication, against employers and harassment and victimisation "on account of their having raised the industrial dispute or for continuing the pending proceeding", on the other hand they seek to maintain status quo by prescribing management conduct which may give rise to "fresh dispute which further accelerated the already strained relation between the employer and the workmen. In all cases, where industrial disputes are pending before the Tribunal it was thought necessary that such dispute should be conciliated or adjudicated upon by the concerned authority in a peaceful atmosphere, undisturbed by any subsequent cause for bitterness or unpleasentness. To achieve this object a ban has been imposed upon the employer exercising its common law, statutory or contractual right as has been found in the case of (2) Tata Iron & Steel Company v. Modak. reported in 1965 (2) LLJ 128 : 1966 SC 380: 1965 (3) SCR 411 which has subsequently been affirmed in the case of (1) Air India Corporation v. V. A. Revellow (supra), to terminate the services of his employees according to the contract or the provisions of law governing such services. In other words, as has been found in the said case of (1) Air India Corporation v. V. A. Revellow (supra) the ordinary right of toe employer to alter the terms of his employees' service to their prejudice or to terminate their services under the general law governing the contract of employment has been banned subject to certain conditions. The said ban, is designed to restrict the interference with the general rules and liabilities of the parties under the ordinary Jaw within the limits truly necessary for achieving the object of the provisions. Thus the employer is left free to deal with the employees when the action against the concerned workman is not punitive or mala fide or does not amount to victimisation or unfair labour practice. Thus the employer is left free to deal with the employees when the action against the concerned workman is not punitive or mala fide or does not amount to victimisation or unfair labour practice. From the overall scheme of the section it is clear that the real intention is to achieve industrial peace and harmonious relationship without prejudicing the cause of either the employer or the employee and for that purpose the legislature devised a formula for reconsidering the need of the employer to have liberty to take action against his employees and the necessity of keeping the atmosphere cairn and peaceful pending adjudication or conciliation of industrial dispute. 9. The jurisdiction of a Tribunal in a proceeding under section 33 is of a very limited nature and is neither appellate nor revisional but the same is supervisory. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit as a Court of Appeal, over the decision of the employer arrived at after holding the domestic enquiry with the object of reappraising the evidence in order to come to a finding as to whether the charge has been proved. Section 33 bars alterations in the conditions of service and taking an action 'prejudicial to the workman concerned in the dispute when the same is connected with a pending industrial dispute, save with the permission of the authorities before which the proceeding is pending or where the disciplinary action is for any misconduct not connected with the pending industrial dispute, without the approval of such authority. The scope of discretionary jurisdiction of the Tribunal in sub section 2 in according 'approval' to the disciplinary action taken by the employer is also the same and to the extent of making up a prima facie case by holding a fair and proper enquiry and acting bonafide. In connection with the according 'permission' or 'approval', there are certain questions on which the Act as well as the Central Rules are silent. the Tribunal under the present determination can interfere with the disciplinary action of the employer only : (i) when there is want of good faith (ii) When there is victimisation or unfair labour practice (iii) when the management bas been guilty of a basic error or violation of the principles of natural justice, and (iv) when on the materials the finding is completely baseless or perverse. On the basis of determinations in the cases of (3) Atherton West & Company Limited v. Suti Mill Masdoor Union, reported in (1953) 2 LLJ 321: AIR 1953 SC 241 : 1953 SCR 780 and (4) Lakshmi Debi Sugar Mills v. Ram Swarup, reported in (1957) ILLJ 17 : AIR 1957 SC 82 : 1956 SCR 916 it appears that in order to be entitled to "permission" in an application under section 33 (1) or approval under section 33 (2) the employer should : (1) make out a prima facie case (2) act bonafide (3) hold a fair enquiry and in case of section 33 (2) (b) further comply with the requirements of the proviso thereto. When the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the employer has made out a prima facie case by holding a fair and proper enquiry in accordance with the rules of natural justice and has acted bonafide without being motivated by the spirit of victimisation or unfair labour practice, the Tribunal is to give "permission" or "approval" as the case may be and it would have no jurisdiction as has been found in the case of (5) Bangalore Woolen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. v. Dasappa. reported in (1960) 2 LLJ 35 : AIR 1960 SC 1352 which has later on been followed and approved in the case of (6) Caltex India Limited v. Ugene Pernandis reported in (1957) I LLJ 1: AIR 1957 SC 326 to refuse "permission" or 'approval' of an application made by the employer. It has further been judicially pronounced that if the enquiry does not comply with the rules of natural justice, that is to say, does not give reasonable opportunity to the employee of being heard and to lead evidence and cross-examining the witnesses of the opposite parties or he himself is biased against the employee, the enquiry will be invalid. The question about the application of the rules of natural justice in a proceeding like this came up for consideration in this Court in the case of (7) Saxby & Farmer (India) Limited v. 3rd. The question about the application of the rules of natural justice in a proceeding like this came up for consideration in this Court in the case of (7) Saxby & Farmer (India) Limited v. 3rd. Industrial Tribunal, reported in (1962) 2 LLJ 52 : 47LR 307, where B. N. Banerjee J has observed that the principle of natural justice, in its journey through the centuries, has shed much of its glory and has now crystallized into 4 principles of justice viz., (i) opportunity for both the contesting parties to be heard; (ii) hearing before an industrial Tribunal so that no man can be a judge of his own cause; (iii) decision made in good faith; and (iv) an orderly course of proceeding. His lordship has further held that apart from all those mentioned hereinbefore there is no other principle of natural justice which is unknown in modern Jurisprudence. 10. It has been held in the case of (8) Sur Enamel Stamping Works Ltd v. Their Workmen, (1963) 2 LLJ 367 : 1963 SC 1914 that when the enquiring officer bases his conclusion against the workmen on the report by other employees, behind the back of the workman concerned, without giving him copies of such report and without making them available for cross examination at the enquiry, the enquiry must be held to be unfair and in violation of the principles of natural justice. Similarly, in the case of (9) Sinny Ltd v. Their Workmen, (1972) 1 LLJ 478 : AIR 1972 SC 1975 it has been held that where in a domestic enquiry a witness was not examined in the presence of the workman concerned nor was he produced for cross examination at such enquiry and his statement was taken into consideration in passing the order of dismissal, the enquiry was held to be vitiated for non-compliance with the rules of natural justice. Thus in the instant case the Respondent Tribunal had the jurisdiction so also this Court has to find out if there was any violation of principles of natural justice. Lack of confidence plays a very important part in industrial law and such deficiency may vitiate the entire action. In the case of (3) Atherton West & Co. Thus in the instant case the Respondent Tribunal had the jurisdiction so also this Court has to find out if there was any violation of principles of natural justice. Lack of confidence plays a very important part in industrial law and such deficiency may vitiate the entire action. In the case of (3) Atherton West & Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union (supra) which has been repeatedly followed in various other determinations of the Supreme Court till the case of (10) Murugan Mills Limited v. Industrial Tribunal, reported in (1965) 1 LLJ 422 : 1965 SC 1496 it has been held that the test of bonafides is an essential condition for 'permission' or 'approved' under section 33 of the Act. Thus in terms of the above decisions and in terms of the decision in the case of (11) Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1959) 2 LLJ 666 : AIR 1960 SC 160 , if the discharge or dismissal of a workman is a colourable exercise of the power to discharge or dismiss a workman in accordance with the Standing Orders or is a result of victimisation or unfair labour practice, the Industrial Tribunal will intervene by refusing to grant 'permission' or 'approval'. As has been found in the cases starting from that of (12) Assam Oil Co. Ltd v. Their Workmen, (1960) 1 LLJ 557 : 1960 SC 1264 and upto the case of (10) Murugan Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal (supra). the form of the 1rder is not conclusive and the Tribunal can go behind the order to find reasons which led to the order and then consider for itself whether the termination was a colourable exercise of the power under the Standing Orders or was the result of victimisation or unfair labour practice and if the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the termination was a colourable exercise of power or was the result of victimisation or unfair labour practice it would be within its jurisdiction to refuse to grant the 'permission' or 'approval'. Dealing with the question of 'acting bonafide' in the case of (5) Bangalore Woollen, Cotton & Silk Mills Co. Dealing with the question of 'acting bonafide' in the case of (5) Bangalore Woollen, Cotton & Silk Mills Co. Ltd, v. Dasappa (supra), it bas been observed by the Supreme Court that permission should be refused if the Tribunal is satisfied that the management's action is not bona fide or that the principles of natural justice have been violated or that the materials on the basis of which the management came to a certain conclusion could not justify any reasonable person in corning to such a conclusion. In other words, when the materials are such that no reasonable person could have come to the conclusion as regards the Workman's conduct, the action of the management would not be bonafide. A finding that the management has acted bonafide would ordinarily not be reached if the materials are such that a reasonable man could not have come to the conclusion which the management arrived at. Thus in every case as has been observed in the case of (13) Central Bank of India Ltd v. Prakash Chandra Jain (1969) 2 LLJ 377 : 1969 SC 983 it would be proper for the Tribunal to decide the question, after ascertaining that the principles of natural justice have not been violated, whether on the materials on which the management had reached the conclusion adverse to the workman or a reasonable person could have reached at such conclusion. The enquiry proceeding, report of the enquiry officer and the order of punishment can be challenged on the grounds of perversity, malafides, victimisation and unfair labour practice. Although these are questions of facts and the onus lies on the employee who alleges, in order to establish that an employee has a right to lead evidence before the Tribunal if he satisfies that either he did not know the facts on which be relies or that he was prevented by sufficient reason to lead the evidence when the enquiry was pending. The questions as to whether in the case of the petitioner there was a proper enquiry or not, involved a further enquiry into the question such as whether he was duly notified of the charges and whether he was given proper opportunities to submit to his explanation, whether he had opportunity to cross examine witnesses examined, on behalf of the management and whether he could lead evidence in his defence as has been held on the basis of the determinations as mentioned hereinbefore may properly be considered by the record of the enquiry relied on by the employer. As observed in the case of (14) Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 860 : (1961) 1 LLJ 211 and later on in the case of (13) Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chandra Jain, (1969) 2 LLJ 377 , even in holding an enquiry under section 33, if the authority is satisfied that the findings recorded at the domestic enquiry are perverse in the sense that it is not justified by any legal evidence whatsoever, the enquiry will be vitiated and the action based on it will be untenable. The test of perversity is that the findings are not supported by any legal evidence at an or are such that no reasonable man could have arrived at such findings on the basis of the materials before the Tribunal. Furthermore if the decision is arrived at by the Tribunal on no evidence or on evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and unacceptable then also such findings may be termed as perverse. If the Tribunal, in the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (14) Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen (supra) and (13) Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chandra Jain (supra), is satisfied that the findings recorded at the domestic enquiry are perverse in the sense that there is no legal evidence whatever, in such a case it may be entitled to consider whether permission or approval should be accorded to the employer or not. Following the determination of the Supreme Court in the said case of (13) Central Bank of India Ltd v. Prakash Chandra Jain (supra), we shall have to find out whether the enquiry in the instant case was properly held or not, as if the enquiry is otherwise held properly, the employer will be the sale judge of fact, and if there be some legal evidence on which the findings of the enquiry officer can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal. The above principle may also be applied in the case of High Court's power of interference in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The question about the adequacy of evidence or its sufficiency or satisfactory character as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of (14) Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen (supra) and (13) Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chandra Jain (supra), can be raised in a Court of facts and may be considered by an appellate Court which i, entitled to consider facts; but those consideration are irrelevant when the jurisdiction of the Court is limited as the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under section 33. 11. Thus on the face of the materials on record, we shall have to find out whether the findings of the Tribunal are proper or perverse. If the answer is in favour of the former and against the latter then this Court will have no jurisdiction to interfere. The admitted position in the instant case is that the Respondent tribunal, relying on the entries in Exhibits 2 and 24 has come to the conclusion that there was not only proper and due communication of the notice but there was also due service of the chargesheet. The said facts have been categorically denied by the petitioner and from the certified copies of the said two Exhibits, which also correspond with the original records, there could be no hesitation in holding that the petitioner had no opportunity at all to make a proper representation against the proposed charges. The service of the charge sheet which was sought to be effected by "Soma", the peon of the Company and through the Peon Book Ext. 24 depicts that "Soma" himself made the endorsement "absent". The service of the charge sheet which was sought to be effected by "Soma", the peon of the Company and through the Peon Book Ext. 24 depicts that "Soma" himself made the endorsement "absent". The said peon was not examined in the enquiry and it is not intelligible how the Respondent Tribunal considered and construed the said note by "Soma" as an evidence of proper service of the charge sheet on the petitioner. Then again the endorsement in Ext. 2 and the findings of the Respondent Tribunal or consideration of the same as proper service of the notice on the petitioner, is equally unsustainable. Since Ext. 24 was the endorsement by Soma in the peon book and not the postal acknowledgment receipt, it is very difficult to sustain the findings of the Respondent Tribunal on that point. Thus from the admitted evidence it appears that there was no proper and due service of the notice and the charge sheet on the petitioner and any contrary finding by the Respondent Tribunal is not only unjustified and baseless but they are perverse also, Since there was no proper and due service of the notice and the charge sheet, there was violation of principles of natural justice as the petitioner did not get due, proper and adequate opportunities to represent his case or to make proper representation in the domestic enquiry. The Respondent Tribunal has failed to access and consider the effect of such non• service of the notice and the charge sheet on the petitioner which prevented him from making effective representation and that has rendered the findings to be irregular and perverse and for such perversity alone, the impugned order is liable to he set aside. 12. On the next question of delay in filing the application under section 33(2)(b) of the Act and to appreciate the points as urged, the date of dismissal, i. e. July 9, 1970, the date when the application in question was sent under registered post, i e. July 9, 1970 and the date on which the said application was received by the Respondent Tribunal i. e. July 18, 1970 will have to be borne in mind. The proviso to section 33(2)(b) requires that no workman shall be discharged or dismissed unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before whom the proceeding is pending for the approval of the action taken by them. The interpretation of the said proviso and the exact meaning of the words unless he "has been paid" and "an application has been made" has been the subject matter of several decisions. In the case of (14) Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen (supra), the Supreme Court has indicated the possibility of two views being taken of the meaning of the said proviso and, after discussing those two possible views and the reasons which could be advanced in support thereof, the Court left the question as to when the employer is required to make an application, unanswered, as such answer was not required of their Lordship to make, in disposing of the matter. In the case of (15) Metal Press Works Ltd. v. Deb, (1962) 1 LLJ 75, this High Court took the view that payment of wages and the making of the application should be simultaneous with the order of discharge or dismissal. It was, however, pointed out that the word "simultaneously" must, of course, be taken reasonably and a notion of split-second timing should not be imported and has been held that the application should be done at once and without delay. A contrary view was taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of (16) Premier Automobiles Ltd v. Ram Chandra Bhimayya Polkam, reported in (1960) ILLJ. 443. The said tricky point came up for consideration in the case of (17) Straw Board Manufacturing Co. v. Govind, AIR 1962 SC 1500 : (1962) ILLJ 420 and it has been held that the proviso to section 33(2)(b) contemplate three things viz, (1) dismissal or discharge, (ii) payment of wages and (iii) making of an application for approval, to be simultaneous and to be part of the same transaction, so that the employer, when he takes the action under section 33(2) by dismissing or discharging an employee, should immediately pay him or offer to pay him wages for one month and also to make an application to the Tribunal for approval at the same time. It has also been held that the employer's conduct should show that the three things contemplated under the proviso, are parts of the same transaction. If that is done, there will be no occasion or fear that the employee's right under 'section 33A would be affected. The question whether the application was made as part of the same transaction or at the same time when the action was taken, would be a question of fact and will depend upon the circumstances of each case. 13. In this it appears that .immediately on the passing of the order of dismissal, the necessary application under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act was despatched to the Respondent Tribunal on July 9, 1970 by the New Dooras Tea Estate of the Banarhat Tea Co. Ltd., by registered post and the same, as appears from the endorsement on the said application, reached the office of the Respondent Tribunal on July 18, 1970. The said application and the endorsement was produced and looked into from the records of the Respondent Tribunal by consent of parties and from the averments in the said application it appears that in terms of the requirements of the proviso the petitioner was offered wages for one month. Thus it appears from the evidence on record and applying the necessary tests as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of (17) Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Govind (Supra) that there was due compliance with the requirements of the proviso to the section by the Respondent Company and the delay, if any, in receiving the said application by the Respondent Tribunal was perhaps due to postal delay. So on the question of the determination on the ground of delay in filing the necessary application, the findings as made by the Respondent Tribunal require no interference. 14. Mr. Ashoke Kumar Sengupta, following the arguments of Dr. Pal further argued that the petitioner because of his own conduct was estopped from contending that be had no knowledge or notice of the issue of the chargesheet in question and the notice of the enquiry and consequently to the holding of the exparte enquiry in the instant case and the more so when subsequently he was present in the proceeding and never informed or contended otherwise. He further submitted that apart from the said Exhibits 2 and 24 there has been the evidence on record that the notices in question were duly displayed in the Notice Board. To substantiate this, be relied on the evidence of Shri C. S. Karan and submitted that when all these facts were before the Respondent Tribunal, it should be presumed that the said Tribunal has duly considered that evidence and has come to a finding quite independent of Exhibits 2 and 24 on the question of service As such, be submitted that such findings cannot and should not be interfered with. Such submissions of Mr. Sengupta are, in my view, of no avail or assistance in the instant case and the more so when the Respondent Tribunal's determination is based mainly on Exhibits 2 and 24. In any event, I am of the view that subsequent appearance of the petitioner at the second stage of the purported enquiry would not operate as a bar in contending that the charge-sheet and the notice of enquiry were not duly served. 15. Thus the petition succeeds not on the grounds as urged on the question of delay in making the application under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act but on the other grounds as mentioned in this judgment. 16. In view of the above the Rule succeeds and the findings and determinations by the Respondent Tribunal, to the extent as mentioned hereinbefore are set aside. There will however be no order as to costs. Let appropriate writs be issued. 17. Let the records be sent down at an early date.