This revision is directed against the decree passed by the lower appellate court in an appeal against a compromise decree passed by the trial court. The lower appellate court dismissed the appeal and the plaintiff-appellant feeling aggrieved, has come up in the instant revision. 2. The brief facts are these: There was a dispute between the parties in respect of a piece of land which was claimed to be the Sahan land by the plaintiff-appellant. It was alleged that the defendant- respondent interfered with the possession of the plaintiff over the said piece of land and wanted to enclose the same. Therefore, the suit was filed by the plaintiff claiming a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from acting in the said manner. The defendant-respondent disputed the plaintiffs claim and claimed the land to belong to himself. During the pendency of the suit the parties referred their dispute to some arbitrators without the intervention of the court. An award was made by the arbitrators which was accepted by both parties and in token of their acceptance the parties signed the award. Thereafter, the defendant treating the award as a compromise moved the court to pass a decree in its terms. The plaintiff, however, filed objections and raised two grounds. He denied that the award was in the nature of a compromise between the parties. He further contended that the award if treated as a compromise was too vague to be acted upon. The trial court overruled both these contentions of the plaintiff and treating the award to be a compromise between the parties passed the decree thereon. The plaintiff felt aggrieved with the trial courts decree and went up in appeal to the lower appellate court. Two questions were raised before the said court. Firstly, it was contended that the consent spoken of in the proviso to Section 47 of the Arbitration Act is to be confined only to such consent as is given before the court and not a consent given outside the court. Secondly, it was contended that the award was very vague and no executable decree could be passed in its terms. Both these contentions were repelled by the lower appellate court and the trial courts decree was confirmed. Secondly, it was contended that the award was very vague and no executable decree could be passed in its terms. Both these contentions were repelled by the lower appellate court and the trial courts decree was confirmed. The plaintiff applicant has now come up in the instant revision and his learned counsel has again contended that the consent outside the court to an award will not be a good consent. Reliance has been placed on the following cases on behalf of the plaintiff-applicant: Zeauddin v. Abdur Rafique, ( AIR 1952 Pat 66 ); Raghunandan Rai v. Sukhlal Rai, ( AIR 1952 Pat 258 ); ( AIR 1957 Pat 656 ); Sitaramji Maharaj v. Ramnath Singh, ( AIR 1961 Pat 448 ); Jumman Khan v. Mujibul Hasan Khan, (1957 All LJ 192); Moradwaj v. Bhudar Dass, (AIR 1955 All 353) (FB); Jugal Das Damodar Modi and Co. v. Purshottam Umedbhai, ( AIR 1953 Cal 690 ); Kissan Gopal Nathani v. Murlidhar Chowdhury, ( AIR 1962 Cal 581 ) Salima Bibi v. Mohd. Ibrahim Sahib, (AIR 1962 Andh Pra 123); Bisnath v. Bastimal, (AIR 1968 Madh Pra 208 ). 3. The learned counsel for the defendant-opposite party has contended that the revision is not maintainable in law as no jurisdictional error was committed by the courts below in passing their orders. 4. It was next contended that as the suit was in respect of the Sehan land and by the award the said land was divided between the parties the acceptance of the award by the parties would mean that they accepted the division effected by the arbitrator. The division of land having been accepted by the parties, the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code were clearly attracted and it was not necessary to consider the effect of the proviso to Section 47 of the Arbitration Act. In other words, it was submitted that the arbitration proceedings were separate from the act of the parties in accepting the division of land. The compromise was not illegal nor beyond the scope of the suit. Hence a decree was bound to be passed on its basis in terms of Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code. In other words, it was submitted that the arbitration proceedings were separate from the act of the parties in accepting the division of land. The compromise was not illegal nor beyond the scope of the suit. Hence a decree was bound to be passed on its basis in terms of Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code. Reliance was placed on the following cases: Dular Koeri v. Fayag Koeri, (AIR 1942 All 145) (FB); AIR 1955 All 353 (FB); Abdul Rahman Saheb v. Mohammad Siddiq, AIR 1953 Mad 781 (FB): Salima Bibi v. Md. Ibrahim Saheb. (AIR 1962 Andhra Pra 123 ). 5. In my view, the contention raised on behalf of the plaintiff-applicant is correct. In the Full Bench decision of our court reported in AIR 1955 All 353 (FB) (Supra), it has been laid down as under:- "i am, therefore, of opinion that an award obtained without the intervention of court in respect of matters which are the subject-matter of a proceeding pending in a court of law can only be given effect to as an adjustment under Order 23, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code or under Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code if all the parties interested give their consent to this being done and not otherwise. " 6. These observations clearly mean that the consent must be given to the court when the award is taken up by it and is sought to be treated as an adjustment or compromise under Order 23. (sic) (Order 21 ?- Ed.) Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code or under Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code. The antecedent consent outside the court, even if it is given after the delivery of the award, is not contemplated by the proviso to Section 47 of the Arbitration Act. This interpretation of the said Full Bench is also supported by the fact that in the earlier part of the judgment the following observations of Ray, C, J. , in AIR 1950 Orissa 169 were approved:- "but the proviso also requires in terms, the consent of all the parties interested as a condition precedent for the exercise of the power to take the matter into consideration. It is to be noticed that the award cannot be taken into consideration on the application of one only of the parties, nor by court itself suo motu. It is to be noticed that the award cannot be taken into consideration on the application of one only of the parties, nor by court itself suo motu. The context indicates that the consent specified in the proviso is a consent given at the time when the matter is to be taken into consideration. " 7. It should also be noticed that the said Full Bench also approved the law laid down in AIR 1952 Pat 258 , AIR 1953 Cal 690 and AIR 1953 Mad 781 (FB ). In AIR 1952 Pat 258 , a Division Bench of the Patna High Court laid down as under:- "therefore, apart from any authority, it is clear that under this proviso it is not open to the court to record any arbitration award under Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code if objection to the recording of it is made by any party. " 8. In AIR 1953 Cal 690 , it was laid down as under: "the proviso to Section 47 applies to all arbitration awards obtained otherwise than under the provisions of the Act and enables the consideration of the award as a compromise or adjustment of the suit with the consent of all the, parties interested, by the court before which the suit is pending and by no other court. The consent of the parties to the submission is not sufficient if there are other parties interested. The joint consent of all the parties interested is necessary at the point of time when the court is to take the award into consideration as a compromise or adjustment. The antecedent consent is immaterial just as antecedent invalidity does not debar the court from recognising it as compromise by common consent. The proviso does not render the award valid nor does it make it enforceable as an award proprio vigore. The proviso enables the recognition of the award for a limited purpose by consent. Where such consent is withheld, it cannot be recognised even for that limited purpose. " 9. The learned counsel for the defendant-opposite party placed reliance on Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 1942 All 145 (Supra ). The proviso enables the recognition of the award for a limited purpose by consent. Where such consent is withheld, it cannot be recognised even for that limited purpose. " 9. The learned counsel for the defendant-opposite party placed reliance on Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 1942 All 145 (Supra ). The said Full Bench has been distinguished in the later Full Bench decision reported in AIR 1955 All 353 (FB) (Supra) on the ground that the reference to arbitration in the earlier Full Bench case was made before the commencement of the Arbitration Act of 1940 and, therefore, the case fell to be decided under the old law. It is well known that the proviso to Section 47 was added to resolve the conflict which prevailed under the old law on the point whether an award obtained otherwise than as laid down could be treated as compromise or adjustment under Order 23 (sic), Rule 2 or under Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code. As a single Judge I am, bound by the law laid down in the latter Full Bench decision of this Court. 10. In view of the aforesaid interpretation of the said Full Bench decision of our court, it is not necessary to consider the law laid down in the decisions of other courts on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the defendant-opposite party. It may, however, be observed that AIR 1953 Mad 781 (FB) (Supra) is, in no way, against our aforesaid Full Bench. In the Madras decision, it was laid down as under: "under the proviso to Section 47, an arbitration award obtained otherwise than in proceedings taken in accordance with the act cannot without more be recognised as a compromise or adjustment of the suit; no decree can be passed thereon under proviso of Order 23, Rule 3, Civil procedure Code. But if, after an award is made the parties thereto agree to accept it, that will be a compromise and a decree passed thereon can be passed under Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code. That the parties had consented to the reference is not such a consent. " 11. AIR 1962 Andh Pra 123 undoubtedly supports the contention put forward on behalf of the defendant-opposite party. That the parties had consented to the reference is not such a consent. " 11. AIR 1962 Andh Pra 123 undoubtedly supports the contention put forward on behalf of the defendant-opposite party. However, it is a single Judge pronouncement and it is not of any avail in view of the contrary pronouncement of the aforesaid Full Bench of this Court. 12. In my view, the preliminary objection about the maintainability of the revision is untenable. If a court of law treats an award to be a compromise or adjustment under Order 23 (sic) (Order 21 ?-Ed.) Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code or Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code without the consent of the parties, then the court should be deemed to be acting illegally and without jurisdiction. In my view, the revision would be maintainable as the court below should be deemed to have acted against the mandatory provisions of the law laid down in the proviso to Section 47. 13. The revision is accordingly allowed and the orders passed by the courts below are (set) aside. The application moved on behalf of the defendant-opposite party under O. 23, Civil Procedure Code praying that the award be treated as compromise or adjustment between the parties shall stand rejected and the trial court shall proceed with the trial of the suit. In the circumstances of the case. I make no order as to costs. Revision allowed. .