ORDER : M.P. Mehrotra, J. This revision has been preferred against the award if the Tribunal constituted under the U.P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the 'said Act'). Section 76 of the said Act lays down as under: 76. Award not appealable - The award of a Tribunal shall be final and conclusive and binding upon the parties concerned and the award shall nave the force of decree and it shall neither be questioned nor appealed against in any court of law; Provided that the High Court may, in its discretion, at any time suo mom or on the application of the Board or of any person aggrieved, call for and examine the record of any case for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any award made under this Act and pass such orders as it deems fit. 2. The brief facts are these. 3. The applicants in the revision moved a petition u/s 8 of the said Act in the court of the District Judge, Muzaffarnagar who was acting as the Tribunal constituted under the said Act. The following reliei's were sought in the petition: It is prayed that the waqf known as Waqf Masjid Bibi Jhabbo constituting Masjid, well and trees land situated in plot No. 447 area 3 bigha 18 biswas Pukhta according to settlement of 1325 Fasli and situate in plot No. 268 according to Chakbandi of the village Morns and other property subsequent acquired two and two houses be declared as a Shia Waqf. 4. The claim was set up on the ground that Smt. Jabbo, daughter of Nawab Saadat Ali, was a Shia in the reign of King Mohammad Shah and in 1725 A.D. she created this Waqf. According to the directions of the Waqf, the Mutwalli was to be from amongst the male descendants of Nawab Saadat Ali and Manzoor Hasan son of Mohammad Ahuzaffar had been the last Mutwalli for the last 30 years. The Petitioners claimed that they were also some of the descendants of Nawab Saadat Ali and were Shias and were thus interested in the waqf in question and were entitled to maintain the petition. It was further alleged that the opposite parties Nos. 1 to 14 were Sunnis and they sought to interfere in the management of the waqf. The Petitioners claimed that they were also some of the descendants of Nawab Saadat Ali and were Shias and were thus interested in the waqf in question and were entitled to maintain the petition. It was further alleged that the opposite parties Nos. 1 to 14 were Sunnis and they sought to interfere in the management of the waqf. They constructed a School in the land appurtenant to the mosque. A report was lodged regarding the said construction by Manzoor Husain as the Mutwalli of the Waqf. The dispute was, however, compromised between the two sects of Shias and Sunnis. In December, 1965, a few months before the petition was preferred, the said opposite parties again began to create trouble. Paragraph 11 of the petition is relevant and reads as under: 11. That now again the opposite parties 1 to 14 began to create troubles. In December, 1965, they represented that they have got the Waqf entered as a Sunnis Waqf in the Sunnis Waqf Board though there had not yet been any proceedings or notification in the official Gazette u/s 6 of U.P. Act 16 of 1960. They have no right to do so. It is not a Sunni Waqf and for the reasons it has become necessary that this point be decided. 5. In paragraph 13 of the petition, it is stated as under: 13. That the cause of action arose in December, 1965 from illegal assertions of the Opposite parties. 6. The opposite parties Nos. 1 to 14 filed a written statement wherein they denied the allegations made in the petition and maintained that the Waqf was a Sunni Waqf. The pedigree set up by the Petitioners was denied and the right to maintain the petition was questioned. It was further denied that Manzoor Husain had been acting as the Mutwalli of the Waqf. It was contended that the Waqf was being managed by the Sunni sect and the Mutwalli on the date of the petition wag Haji Bhura and prior to him one Mulla Bundu son of Kala was the Mutwalli. It was further denied that Manzoor Husain had been acting as the Mutwalli of the Waqf. It was contended that the Waqf was being managed by the Sunni sect and the Mutwalli on the date of the petition wag Haji Bhura and prior to him one Mulla Bundu son of Kala was the Mutwalli. It was also asserted that the Waqf and its property had been in the possession and management of Sunnis for the last more than 50 years and the nature of the said possession was adverse to claim and interest of Shia and by adverse possession, the Sunni had acquired the right over the said Waqf and the rights of the Shias, if any, became extinct by the adverse possession of the Sunnis stretching over a period of more than 12 years. There were certain other pleas in the written statement which it is not necessary to notice. It may be stated that the opposite party No. 15 in the petition was the Sunni Central Board, Lucknow and the opposite party No. 16 was the Shia Central Board, Lucknow. A separate written statement was filed by the Sunni Central Board but the pleas were almost identical to those taken by the opposite parties Nos. 1 to 14. 7. The Tribunal framed the necessary issues and issue No. 6 was as follows: 6. Whether the petition is maintainable u/s 8 of the Act and whether the Act envisages adjudication of a Shia Waqf? 8. The Tribunal held that the Petitioners had failed to substantiate their claim and the opposite parties Nos. 1 to 14 had succeeded in showing that the Sunnis in any case were in adverse possession of the Waqf for a period lasting more than 12 years prior to the institution of the proceedings before the Tribunal. Therefore, the rights of the Shias, if any, were extinguished by lapse of time and the Sunnis, in any case, had perfected their title to the ownership and possession of the Waqf by adverse possession. The Petitioner were held to have failed in proving that they were interested in the Waqf. Therefore, the rights of the Shias, if any, were extinguished by lapse of time and the Sunnis, in any case, had perfected their title to the ownership and possession of the Waqf by adverse possession. The Petitioner were held to have failed in proving that they were interested in the Waqf. Issue No. 6, however, was decided against the opposite parties and it was held that the petition was maintainable u/s 8 of the said Act and it was decided that the said Act does "envisage the adjudication of the question as to whether a Waqf is a Shia Waqf or a Sunni Waqf." 9. The Petitioners felt aggrieved with the award of the Tribunal and have come up in the instant revision to this Court. In support of the revision, I have heard the learned Counsel for the applicants Sri B.L. Gupta. In opposition, the learned Counsel for the opposite parties, Sri Basheer Ahmad, has made his submission. 10. Shri Basheer Ahmad raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition u/s 8 of the said Act. Counsel invited attention to the averment in paragraph 11 of the petition where it has been said that there had been no proceedings or notification in the Official Gazette u/s 6 of the said Act. Paragraph 11 of the petition has been reproduced above. In view of the said averment, Shri Bashir Ahmad contended that the petition was not maintainable u/s 8 of the said Act. Counsel placed reliance on an unreported decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Hafiz Mohammad Zaffar Ahmad v. U.P. Sunni Central Board of Waqf Sp. A. No. 604 of 1964 D/- 25th March, 1966 (Alld.). 11. Sri B.L. Gupta in reply asserted that Section 8 was wide enough to justify the maintainability of the petition and the said provision was, in no way, connected with or dependent upon the issuance of any notification u/s 6 of the said Act. Section 8 was an independent provision and was purposely phrased in such a manner that its ambit was large. Section 8 was an independent provision and was purposely phrased in such a manner that its ambit was large. Next, it was contended by the learned Counsel for the applicants that the preliminary objection which was sought to be raised was never raised before the Tribunal and it did not find a place in the written statement filed before the Tribunal and hence it was not open to the opposite parties to raise the said objection. 12. It is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the said Act to adjudicate upon the preliminary objection. Section 3 deals with definitions and in Clause (10), 'Tribunal' has been defined to mean the Tribunal constituted u/s 70. Chapter I of the Act contains Sections 4 to 9. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 are relevant and are reproduced below: (His Lordship then quoted Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 and proceeded on to observe) ***** 13. u/s 73, the Tribunal pronounces its award in the dispute referred to it for adjudication. Section 75 provides for a bar to suits in the matters to be decided by Tribunals and lays down as under: 75. Bar to suits in matters to be decided by Tribunals - No person shall institute any suit or other proceedings in any civil court with respect to any dispute or question or matter which is required or permitted under this Act to be referred to a Tribunal for adjudication. 14. Section 76 has already been reproduced above. 15. Here, certain corresponding provisions of the repealed U.P. Muslim Waqfs Act of 1936 may also be noticed. No Tribunal was set up under the provisions of the 1936 Act. Chapter I in the Act of 1936 dealt with survey of Waqfs and Central Boards of Waqfs. Section 4 laid down as under: (His Lordship then quoted Section 4 and proceeded on to observe) ***** Section 5 laid down as under: (His Lordship then quoted Section 5 and proceeded on to observe) ***** 16. Looking to the said provisions, it will be noticed that there was no ambiguity or scope for dispute in respect of the said provisions. Section 5(2) made it clear that the cause of action to bring a suit in a civil court of competent jurisdiction was dependent upon the determination by the Commissioner of Waqfs. Looking to the said provisions, it will be noticed that there was no ambiguity or scope for dispute in respect of the said provisions. Section 5(2) made it clear that the cause of action to bring a suit in a civil court of competent jurisdiction was dependent upon the determination by the Commissioner of Waqfs. Therefore Section 5 in the Act of 1936 was dependent for its working on Section 4 where under the Commissioner of waqfs acted and gave his decision. The short point for consideration in the instant revision is whether the position as it subsisted under the Act of 1936 is still in subsistence or due to the change in the language of Section 8 of the new Act, the Law has undergone a change. It is not disputed that there is nothing in Section 8 itself which would show that its working is dependent upon Section 6 of the said Act. However, that cannot be held to be conclusive inasmuch as in accordance with the well known rules of interpretation, a provision of law has to be read in its context. Now, Section 8 occurs in the Chapter which deals with the survey of waqfs. That undoubtedly supports the contention that this provision is not a self contained or independent provision but has a relationship or nexus with the survey of waqfs conducted by the Commissioner under Chapter I. Further, Section 8 is preceded by Section 6 which lays down in its Sub-section (2) that the Commissioner of Waqfs shall, after making such enquiries as he may consider necessary, ascertain and determine the various details and particulars which are quoted in the various clauses of the said Sub-section. The fact that Section 8 follows Section 6 lends a strong support to the contention that 'dispute' referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 8 is a dispute which arises in consequence of the determination made by the Commissioner u/s 6(2) of the said Act. Lastly, the proviso to Section 8(1) again suggests that the dispute has to come before the Tribunal only after the notification in the Official Gazette u/s 6(4) of the said Act. In other words, the notification is the starting point of limitation and provides the cause of action for the reference to the Tribunal u/s 8. Lastly, the proviso to Section 8(1) again suggests that the dispute has to come before the Tribunal only after the notification in the Official Gazette u/s 6(4) of the said Act. In other words, the notification is the starting point of limitation and provides the cause of action for the reference to the Tribunal u/s 8. Learned Counsel for the applicants contended that the proviso to Section 8(1) has limited application in so far as it lays down that whenever there is a notification u/s 6(4), then the dispute must be brought before the Tribunal with in one year from the date of the notification. However, the proviso, according to him, cannot be interpreted to lay down that whenever there has been no notification u/s 6(4), the dispute between the parties cannot be referred to the Tribunal u/s 8(1). In my opinion such a contention is not tenable in view of the totality of the circumstances in which the provisions of Section 8 have to be construed. I have already referred to the relevant circumstances in this connection and, in my opinion, the proviso to Section 8(1) not only lays down the rule of limitation but it by implication, also provides that the cause of action for a reference to the Tribunal is provided by the notification u/s 6(4) of the said Act. 17. It should be noticed that the Tribunal constituted under the U.P. Muslim Waqf Act is a Tribunal of a limited jurisdiction. It can entertain only such disputes or question or matter which under the said Act can be referred to it. Section 75 bars a Civil Court from entertaining any suit or other proceeding with respect to any dispute or question or matter which is required or permitted under the said Act to be referred to the Tribunal for adjudication. The award of the Tribunal has been made final and conclusive and binding upon the parties concerned and the some, cannot be questioned in any court of law. No appeal lies against the said award though a revision is provided for under the proviso to Section 76. The award of the Tribunal has been made final and conclusive and binding upon the parties concerned and the some, cannot be questioned in any court of law. No appeal lies against the said award though a revision is provided for under the proviso to Section 76. In this connection, the following observations of the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench relied upon by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties are material: Under Section 4 of the Act provision is made for appointment of Commissioners and Additional or Assistant Commissioners of Waqfs for the purpose of survey of Waqfs properties and u/s 6 it is laid down that the Commissioner, after making such enquiries as he may consider necessary, must ascertain and determine various matters relating to each waqf. One of the matters to be determined is whether the waqf is one of those exempted from the application of the Act u/s 2. Two other matters which require determination are as to which particular properties are Waqf properties and whether the Waqf is a Shia Waqf or Sunni Waqf. This determination is to be reported to the Government by the Commissioner and is thereafter to be notified in the official Gazette. Section 8 of the Act lays down that on such notification being made if any dispute arises, whether a particular property is Waqf property or not or whether a Waqf is a Shia Waqf or Sunni Waqf the Board or the Mutwalli of the Waqf or any person interested therein, can refer the dispute for adjudication to the Tribunal. It is significant to note that u/s 8(1) the disputes that can be referred to the Tribunal are limited only to two questions one question is whether a particular property is Waqf property or not and the second question is whether a Waqf is a Shia Waqf or Sunni Waqf. The further question whether the Waqf is one to which u/s 2 the provisions of the Act do or do not apply, is not one about which, if a dispute arises, a reference can be made to the Tribunal. It thus appears that the determination made by the Commissioner u/s 6 that a particular waqf is one of those exempted from the application of the Act or not has not been made subject matter of a dispute to be referred and decided u/s 8. It thus appears that the determination made by the Commissioner u/s 6 that a particular waqf is one of those exempted from the application of the Act or not has not been made subject matter of a dispute to be referred and decided u/s 8. Apart from this point, u/s 6 a Commissioner is required to report on many other matters relating to each Waqf such as the nature and object of each Waqf, the gross income of the property comprised in each Waqf, the amount of revenue etc. payable and the expenses incurred in the realization of the income and the pay and other remuneration of the mutwalli of each Waqf. These are all matters which have to be determined but no dispute with regard to any such matter is referable u/s 8 to the Tribunal. The reference u/s 8 is confined to only two questions mentioned by us above. The intention of the legislature in these circumstances appears to be clear, that on these two matters the determination made by the Commissioner should have finality and not be open to challenge before any other court except by means of the reference to the Tribunal u/s 8(1). This is clear from the provisions of Section 76 which lays down that the award of a Tribunal shall be final and conclusive and binding upon the parties concerned and the award shall have the force of decree and it shall neither be questioned nor appealed against in any court of law, subject of course to the provision that a revision is provided against an award to the High Court. On matters other than those referable u/s 8, the Legislature, by omitting to provide for a reference, indicated that no finality is to be attached to those matters determined u/s 6. 18. In my opinion, the aforesaid observations are clear on the point that Section 8 is not an independent provision but is linked up with Section 6 of the said Act. In other words, the disputes which can be referred to the Tribunal u/s 8(1) are to be determined by the Commissioner u/s 6 out of several matters which are mentioned in the said section to be decided by the Commissioner. 19. In other words, the disputes which can be referred to the Tribunal u/s 8(1) are to be determined by the Commissioner u/s 6 out of several matters which are mentioned in the said section to be decided by the Commissioner. 19. As regards the maintainabilit of the preliminary objection, (sic) is correct that in the written statement filed by the opposite parties, the question was not raised in the manner in-which it has been urged before me by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties, still, it should be seen that the earlier part of issue 6 framed by the Tribunal can easily take in the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the opposite parties. Moreover, the central rule governing the pleadings is that the parties should not be taken by surprise. In the instant case, the opposite parties are relying upon the own admission of the applicants contained in the petition. As stated above, it was clearly recited in the petition that there had not been any proceeding or notification in the official Gazette u/s 6 of the U.P. Act 16 of 1960. If a party avails of the admission of the other party, then it cannot be said that the latter has been prejudiced by a contention raised by the former. In my view, therefore, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the opposite parties is maintainable and is upheld. 20. The revision is accordingly dismissed on the ground that the petition u/s 8 of the said Act was not maintainable before the Tribunal. It was, therefore, rightly dismissed by the Tribunal though on grounds different from the one on which I have held the petition to be liable to be dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.