K. C. AGRAWAL, J. This is a landlords writ petition directed against the judgments of the learned District Judge, Saharanpur, dated November 30, 1973, and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer of that place, dated August 16, 1973. The facts are as follows: - The petitioner is the owner of a big house bearing No. 912829, in which on the first floor the petitioner is residing, on the ground floor there are a number of shops and in the back row of the shops, the dis puted shop No. 8 is situated. The petitioner is the proprietor of Hin dustan Chemical Industries and is carrying on business in one of the shops of this building. This shop is, however, situate behind shop No. 8, which is in dispute in this writ petition. This shop No. 8 was previously in the tenancy of one Jaswant Rai Bhalla. A suit for ejectment was filed by the petitioner against him. This suit was com promised on May 30, 1972, and the possession was delivered to the pe titioner. On September 25, 1972, Hansraj, respondent No. 3, filed an application for allotment of this shop alleging that the same was ly ing vacant since the time of eviction of Jaswant Rai Bhalla. The ap plication was contested by the petitioner on the ground that the shop was within the municipal limits of Saharanpur and was assessed for the first time after March, 1963 and hence was not covered under the provisions of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the new Act ). It was also claimed that the shop was not vacant and was in his occupa tion and, therefore, Section 16 of the new Act did not apply. These pleadings of the parties gave rise to two questions before the Prescrib ed Authority. The first was about the time when the shop had been constructed, and if the said question was answered in favour of res pondent No. 3, the other question which arose for decision before the Prescribed Authority was whether the same was vacant for allotment. These pleadings of the parties gave rise to two questions before the Prescrib ed Authority. The first was about the time when the shop had been constructed, and if the said question was answered in favour of res pondent No. 3, the other question which arose for decision before the Prescribed Authority was whether the same was vacant for allotment. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not discuss the evidence of the parties on the question of vacancy and merely confining himself to the determination of the time of its construction found that the same having been let out in October, 1962 should be deemed to have been constructed in 1962. In the alternative, the Rent Control and Eviction Office, 1 also held that as the property was assessed on March 31, 1963, the shop must be deemed to have been covered by the provi sions of the new Act. Being dissatisfied with the judgment of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the District Judge. The appeal was dismissed on November 30, 1973 on the ground that the same was not maintainable. Aggriev ed the petitioner has filed this wait petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the learned Dis trict Judge committed an error in holding that the appeal against the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not lie before him He reliled upon Section 18 of the new Act in support of his contention and urged that the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer being one under Section 16 of the new Act could be appealed against under Section 18 of the said Act before the District Judge. It may be noted that by the order dated August 16, 1973, the Rent Con trol and Eviction Officer only disposed of the preliminary issue and found that the shop came within the purview of the Act. He further directed that the vacancy be notified and applications for allotment be invited. It is, therefore, clean that he had not allotted the premises by the said order. Section 16 of the new Act contemplates several orders in its various sub-sections which can be passed against or in favour of one or the other party. Under sub-section (1) of Section 18, an order passed under Section 16 has been made appealable. It is, therefore, clean that he had not allotted the premises by the said order. Section 16 of the new Act contemplates several orders in its various sub-sections which can be passed against or in favour of one or the other party. Under sub-section (1) of Section 18, an order passed under Section 16 has been made appealable. Sub section (1) of Section 18 runs as under: - "any person aggrieved by an order under Section 16 or Section 19 may, within fifteen days from the date of the order prefer an appeal against it to the District Judge, and in other respects, the provisions of Section 10 shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to such appeal. " A reading of Section 18 (1), therefore, shows that an order pass ed under Section 16 alone has been made A reading of Section 18 (1), therefore, shows that an order pass ed under Section 16 alone has been made appealable. Such an order, in my opinion, is that which is contemplated by Section 16. It can not be that all sundry, miscellaneous or interlocutory orders made from time to time by the Prescribed Authority during the pendency of the proceedings under Section 16 of the new Act have been made appealable under Section 18 of the said Act. Reverting to Section 16, the following are the orders which are contemplated by Section 16, (i) an order of allotment under Section 16 (1) (a); (ii) an order of release under Section 16 (1) (b); (iii) an order of eviction under Section 16 (4); (iv) an order awarding special costs, under Section 16 (5); and (v) an order directing the allottee to pay the landlord an ad vance, under Section 16 (9 ). The Legislature while using the word order in Section 18 should be presumed to have intended to use the same with reference to these orders and not others. There is an obvious rationable behind the same as making of all orders appealable passed during the progress of a case would hamper the proceedings inordinately and defeat the very object of the Act. It is true, as argued by the learned counsel vacancy is a pre-requisite for making an order of allotment and is of for the petitioner, that a decision relating to the declaration of a great importance for the said purpose. It is true, as argued by the learned counsel vacancy is a pre-requisite for making an order of allotment and is of for the petitioner, that a decision relating to the declaration of a great importance for the said purpose. But, I do not agree with his submission that if this order is held not to be appealable under Sec tion 18 of the new Act, the same is likely to prejudice the right of the person affected by the same to the extent that its correctness cannot be subsequently challenged. An order determining the vacancy or (refusing to do so has to be followed by another order, granting or re jecting the application for allotment. Such an order of allotment or refusal to do so is indisputably appealable under Section 13 of the new Act. In the appeal preferred against the order of allotment or refusal to do so, the finding regarding vacancy can also be challeng ed. When an order contemplated by Section 16 is appealed from any error, defect or irregularity in any other interlocutory or miscellane ous order affecting the decision of the case, the same may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. It is, fore, not correct that if an order determining the vacancy is not ap pealable under Section 18 it would cause any prejudice to the interest of the person affected by the same. The proposition that the right of, appeal inhers in no one does not admit of any doubt. Therefore, an appeal for its maintainability must have a clear authority of law. If there is no provision of law providing for the same, the court cannot indirectly find it in favour of a person. It may also be observed that Section 18 does not only apply to positive orders made undeir1 Section 16 of the Act, but also takes within its ambit a negative order, as re fusal to allot the premises as well. Therefore, in my opinion, the ap peal filed by the petitioner against the order declaring vacancy and inviting applications for allotment was not appealable before the learned District Judge under Section 18 of the new Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that as the order of the Prescribed authority suffered from an apparent error, the High Court might quash the said order. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that as the order of the Prescribed authority suffered from an apparent error, the High Court might quash the said order. He submitted that the said finding was in the teeth of the provisions of Section 2 of the new Act. It is true that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition, and as in the instant case I find that the question raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is one of law and does not require me to go into the questions of fact and to record a finding thereon, I propose to decide the writ petition on merits. As pointed out above, the Prescribed Authority found that the construction of the house was completed in October, 1962. In the al ternative, he also found that as the assessment of the said house was made for the first time on March 31, 1963, therefore, the house was allotable under Section 18 of the new Act. The question for deter mination, therefore, is whether the shop in dispute is one which can be said to be a building to which the provisions of the new Act could apply. Section 2 of the new Act deals with the exemptions from the operation of the Act. In its various sub-sections it gives the classes of buildings which are exempt from the operation of the new Act. Sub section (2) of Section 2 along with the Explanation reads as under: "except as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 24 or sub section (3) of Section 29 nothing in this Act shall apply to a build ing during a period of ten years from the date on which its cons truction is completed. Sub section (2) of Section 2 along with the Explanation reads as under: "except as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 24 or sub section (3) of Section 29 nothing in this Act shall apply to a build ing during a period of ten years from the date on which its cons truction is completed. Explanation-For the purposes of this sub-section,- (a) the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of a building subject to assessment the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates and different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction or guard ing the building under construction) for the first time. " From sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the new Act it is clear that the period of ten years has to be computed from the date on which the construction is completed. It is, however, possible in some cases that there may not be definite evidence available on record for the aforesaid purpose. In order to avoid that controversy, the legislature has provided for a legal fiction in the Explanation. As a result of this fiction, the following dates are relevant: (i) the date on which the completion of the construction is reported or otherwise recorded by the local authority, (ii) in case of a building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment comes into effect, (iii) where dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, (iv) in the absence of any such record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied. Keeping the above provisions in mind, the view of the Prescrib ed Authority that as the shop was let out in October, 1962, therefore, the same was covered by the new Act is obviously wrong. Comput ing the period of ten years from October 1962, it would have expired in September, 1972. The shop, therefore, could come within the pur view of the new Act after September, 1972. Comput ing the period of ten years from October 1962, it would have expired in September, 1972. The shop, therefore, could come within the pur view of the new Act after September, 1972. The Prescribed Autho rity was, therefore, called upon to decide whether the shop in ques tion was vacant in October, 1972, for being covered under the new Act. It, however, appears that the Prescribed Authority did not de cide the question of the applicability of the new Act with reference to the date on which the possession of the shop was obtained by the petitioner in May, 1972. It may be observed that the new Act came into force with effect from July 15, 1972. It could not possibly, therefore, apply to the shop in question which fell vacant in May, 1972. The Prescribed Authority was, therefore, not right in applying the provisions of the new Act to the shop simply by finding that the same was let out for the first time in October 1962. The other finding of the Prescribed Authority that it was assessed for the first time on March 31, 1963 would also not be of any assistance to respondent No. 3. As the Prescribed Authority did not give any finding that the shop was lying vacant in October, 1972, I have no alternative but to hold that the order passed by the Prescribed Authority was without jurisdiction. For the reasons given above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders of the District Judge dated November 30, 1973 and that of the Prescribed Authority dated August 16, 1973 are quash ed. The stay order is discharged. No order as to costs. .