Judgment 1. The petitioners have come up for quashing an order dated the 21st September, 1971, by which the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Chapra Sadar has initiated a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) against the petitioners, with respect to certain lands which were alleged to be in dispute between the parties. 2. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that in view of the fact that the possession of the petitioners had already been held in a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code in respect of the same land and between the same parties, the Magistrate was not competent to start a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code on 21-9-1971, only two days after the matter was disposed of by the District Magistrate in a revision arising out of the order dated 3-3-1970 of the Magistrate disposing of the proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code in favour of the petitioners. It was further contended that the order initiating the proceeding under S.145 of the Code was bad also because the Magistrate did not comply with the requirements of Sec.112 of the Code, as he simply stated in the order that a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code be started and that written statements etc. be filed by 18-10-1971. It was also contended that a fresh police report should have been called for before starting the proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code. 3. None of the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners appears to have any substance in it. I will deal with the last contention first. The law does not require that necessarily the Magistrate must call for or receive a report from the police before starting a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code. All that it required is that if the competent Magistrate is satisfied from a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or boundaries thereof, within the local limits of his jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, etc. It is, therefore, quite manifest that a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code may be started on information other than a police report. 4. It is, therefore, quite manifest that a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code may be started on information other than a police report. 4. It is true that a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code with respect to the same land between the same parties had been started on 12-1-1970 on a police report dated 9-1-1970 and that proceeding was disposed of on 3-3-1970, and it had been held therein that the petitioners were in possession. A revision was preferred against that order before the District Magistrate and the same was dismissed on 13-9-1971. But it is wellestablished that the finding of possession in a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code does not have any material evidentiary value, although it may be taken to be a circumstance in judging the question of actual physical possession, whenever such question arises before a Court. As soon as the Magistrate receives information and is satisfied on the basis thereof that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning land or water or the boundaries thereof, the law requires him to start a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code. It is significant that whereas Sec. 144 of the Code is in general terms and it gives a discretion to the Magistrate to start a proceeding thereunder, if he considers it necessary to do so, Sec.145 of the Code makes it obligatory on the Magistrate to start a proceeding under that Section. If he is satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace relating to land or water or the boundaries thereof exists. The legislature has advisedly made the provisions of Sec.145 so because in the very nature of things, unless the dispute relating to possession is finally disposed of and settled, so far as the Criminal Courts are concerned, an apprehension of breach of the peace is likely to arise again and again. It is, therefore, intended that in the interest of public peace such dispute should be settled once for all, so far as the Criminal Courts are concerned, by having recourse to a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Magistrate had acted without jurisdiction in starting a proceeding in the present case. On 21-9-1971, the proceeding under Sec.145 had been started on the basis of a fresh application made before the Magistrate by the opposite party. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Magistrate had acted without jurisdiction in starting a proceeding in the present case. On 21-9-1971, the proceeding under Sec.145 had been started on the basis of a fresh application made before the Magistrate by the opposite party. The application contained serious allegations with regard to an apprehension of the breach of the peace between the parties relating to the disputed lands. It was not that the Magistrate passed the impugned order in a casual way. He had also heard the counsel for the opposite party who had filed the application and then started the proceeding. In paragraph 19 of the fresh application, it was alleged that being emboldened by the order passed in revision by the District Magistrate on 13-9-1971, the petitioners were ready to cut bamboos and trees standing on the disputed land and that there had arisen a serious apprehension of the breach of the peace at the hands of the petitioners and that the police had also reported for action under Sec.107 of the Code which was pending before Sri S.N. Singh, Magistrate, First Class, Chapra. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision in the case of Sushila Devi V/s. Daibati Devi, reported in 1972 BLJR 705, in support of his contention that the order of the Magistrate initiating the proceeding in question should be quashed. It, however, appears that the facts of the said case were altogether different. In that case, the Magistrate had started a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code, and when it was about to expire, the same Magistrate extended it for a further period of sixty days. When, however, he, subsequently, realised that he did not have the power to extend the proceeding to a further period of sixty days and that it was a case of chronic land dispute, which could not be appropriately decided in a proceeding under Sec.144, he drew up a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code long after the expiry of two months from the date on which the proceeding under Sec.144 had been initially drawn up. It was in those circumstances that it had been held that after the expiry of the proceeding under Sec.144, there was no fresh material before the Magistrate for drawing up a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code. It was in those circumstances that it had been held that after the expiry of the proceeding under Sec.144, there was no fresh material before the Magistrate for drawing up a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code. It has already been pointed out that in this case a fresh application had been filed and the allegations in the application had been duly considered by the learned Magistrate, after hearing the counsel for the opposite party who had filed the petition. 6. I shall now consider the argument of the learned counsel that the impugned order of the Magistrate was void and without jurisdiction as it did not record the grounds of his satisfaction that there existed on account of the dispute an apprehension of the breach of the peace. It appears that on 21-9-1971, the Magistrate heard the opposite party and ordered that proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code be drawn up and that written statement, etc. be filed by 18-10-1971. After having recorded that order. the Magistrate realised that he did not state the grounds of his satisfaction and the other requirements for exercising his powers under Sub-Section (1) of Sec. 145 of the Code. Having so realised, he wrote out a further detailed order later, on the same day, in which he stated that he had read the petition of the opposite party and also heard their lawyer and on a perusal of the petition and from the arguments advanced by the learned lawyer of the opposite party, he believed that there was an apprehension of the breach of the peace and that preventive action was necessary. He further stated that because there was previously also a proceeding relating to the disputed land, as such it was necessary that the dispute should be set at rest finally. He also stated that he felt after glancing at the genealogy, etc. that the matter was of a complicated nature and that the same could not, therefore, be appropriately decided in a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code. Finally, he said that on the above grounds a proceeding was being started against both the parties under Sec.145 of the Code and the land was being attached under Sub-Section (4) of Sec.145 of the Code and that both the parties were being prohibited from going upon the land till the disposal of the proceeding. Finally, he said that on the above grounds a proceeding was being started against both the parties under Sec.145 of the Code and the land was being attached under Sub-Section (4) of Sec.145 of the Code and that both the parties were being prohibited from going upon the land till the disposal of the proceeding. He fixed 18-10-1971 for filing of written statements etc. by the parties. It is, therefore, manifest that the objection raised by the learned counsel has absolutely no substance in it. It is also clear that action in the proceeding had to be taken on the subsequent detailed order passed by the Magistrate on the same day. In these circumstances, to allow the contention of the learned counsel that the proceeding was void because of the one-lined order written by the Magistrate earlier on the same day, to prevail, would be to put the law and the process of the Court to ridicule. 7. There is no merit in this application which is, therefore, dismissed.