Order.- This is a revision petition seeking to revise the order of the First, Class Magistrate, Alampur in C.C.No 18 of 1972, on his file, under section 494 Criminal Procedure Code (old), granting permission to the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution. 2. The petitioner herein is the de facto complainant. He gave a written complaint to the Police, alleging that the accused an Advocate and sitting member of the Legislative Assembly who was looking after the lands of the petitioner, unauthorisedly raised Government loan, on security of the lands of the petitioner forging the signatures of the petitioner and misappropriated the same. After investigation the Police filed the charge-sheet for offences under sections 419 and 465, Penal Code. The First Class Magistrate, Alampur took cognizance of the offence in C.C.No. 18 of 1972 against the accused. The accused filed Cr. M. P. Nos. 794 of 1972 and 2061 of 1972 before this Court for quashing the criminal proceedings against him. This Court dismissed both the petitions. Subsequently under the instructions of the Government the A. P. P. O. filed a petition on 9th July, 1974 before the learned Magistrate praying for consent for withdrawal from the prosecution of the accused in the case. The learned Magistrate granted permission and acquitted the accused. The de facto complainant has filed this revision petition. 3. The main submission of the learned counsel for the de facto complainant, Sri R. Ramalinga Reddy is that the petition filed by the A. P. P. O. under section 494, Criminal Procedure Code, praying for consent of the Court for withdrawal does not disclose the grounds which prompted the Government and the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the prosecution, and that even the Government Order passed by the Government directing withdrawal of the prosecution does not disclose any ground and the permission granted therefore was improper. 4. On the. other hand the learned Additional Public Prosecutor relying upon a decision of this Court in Chandrasekhara Reddy v. Ramanuja Reddy1submits that the Revision petition itself is not maintainable as this is a case where the charge-sheet has been filed by the Police. 5. I do not think the decision relied upon by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor is of any relevance. 5. I do not think the decision relied upon by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor is of any relevance. In that case the learned Judge held that the petitioner was not the aggrieved party as he was not a complainant in the case and that such a person should not be permitted to take the role of a prosecutor and proceed against the accused. But in the instant case the petitioner is the de facto complainant and at his instance the case was registered and the charge-sheet was filed. He is undoubtedly an aggrieved person. 6. The Supreme Court dealing with the scope of section 494, Criminal Procedure Code (old), observed in M.N. S. Nair v. P.V. Balakrishnan.2 " .... The section does not however indicate the reasons which would weigh with the Public Prosecutor to move that Court for permission nor the grounds on which the Court will grant or refuse permission. Though the section is in general terms and does not circumscribe the powers of the Public Prosecutor to seek permission to withdraw from the prosecution the essential consideration which is implicit in the grant of the power is that it should be in the interest of administration of justice which may be either that it will not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the charge or that subsequent information before prosecuting agency would falsify the prosecution evidence or any other similar circumstances which it is difficult to predicate as they are dependent entirely on the facts and circumstances of each case. Nonetheless the duty of the Court also to see in furtherance of justice that the permission is not sought on ground extraneous to the interest of justice or the offences which are offences against the State go unpunished merely because the Government as a matter of general policy or expediency unconnected with its duty to prosecute offenders under the law, directs the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution and the Public Prosecutor merely does so at its behest." 7. In this case the memo, filed by the Public Prosecutor reads as follows: "Under the instructions the prosecution wants to withdraw the above case which stands posted to this day for evidence. The prosecution having taken into account the implications involved in trial of the case has decided to withdraw the case in the interest of the administration of justice." 8. The prosecution having taken into account the implications involved in trial of the case has decided to withdraw the case in the interest of the administration of justice." 8. Crime is essentially a public matter. It is a ‘delicata publica’ and a criminal trial is ‘judicial publica’. The criminal trial can be nullified only in furtherance of public interest. Grounds that induce the Government to nullify the criminal trial should be made public. A reading of the memo filed by the Public Prosecutor in this case reveals that the memo, is very vague. Even the Government Order issued by the State Government instructing the prosecution to withdraw the prosecution is equally vague and imprecise. The vagueness in the law is the twin of arbitrariness. The Prosecutor cannot be permitted deliberately to withhold the precise grounds that prompted him to withdraw the prosecution. It is the duty of the criminal Courts to check any such arbitrary action and see grave offences against the public do not go unpunished, last public should be compelled to resort to lynch law. As observed by the Supreme Court in the ruling referred to above it is not possible for the Court to decide, without mentioning the grounds on which permission is sought, whether such grounds are extraneous to the interest of justice and by giving consent for the withdrawal would be allowing offences against the State go unpunished. 9. In an unreported decision of this Court in Criminal R. C. No. 620 of 1972 in similar circumstances my learned brother Ramachandra Raju, J., observed as follows: "Neither in the Government order nor in the memo. filed by the Public Prosecutor into Court on the basis of the Government Order any grounds were furnished which prompted them to apply to the Court for granting consent to withdraw from the prosecution. In those circumstances the order of the lower Court granting consent to the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution is set aside and the case is restored to file and remitted to the lower Court to deal with it in accordance with law. This however does not prevent the public prosecutor, if so advised to apply to the Court afresh for granting consent to withdraw from the prosecution after furnishing the necessary grounds which prompted him to withdraw from the prosecution." The facts and circumstances in this case are also similar. This however does not prevent the public prosecutor, if so advised to apply to the Court afresh for granting consent to withdraw from the prosecution after furnishing the necessary grounds which prompted him to withdraw from the prosecution." The facts and circumstances in this case are also similar. Therefore the order of the learned Magistrate, Alampur granting permission to the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution of the accused in C.C.No.18 of lo72 is set aside. The learned Magistrate is directed to restore the case to file and proceed with it expeditiously according to law. It should however be made clear that this order does not preclude the prosecution, if so advised, to file a fresh petition seeking consent to withdraw from the prosecution of the accused at any stage of the trial after furnishing the grounds relevant to the furtherance of justice. 10. The Criminal R.C. is ordered accordingly.