GULATI, J. This petition arises out of proceedings under the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (herein after referred to as the Act ). The petitioners are brothers. Their family consists of them selves, their 3 brothers, one of whom is married and their parents. The father of the petitioners, Sardar Ishar Singh, along with his wife and 5 sons, had been living in a flat of abuilding known as kunj Bihari Palace situated in Kaushalpuri, at Kanpur, for the last about 15 years. This accommodation, according to the petitioners, was neither enough nor suitable for their requirements and when one of their brothers, Jaspal Singh, get married, he had to hire a separate flat in Swaroopnagar at Kanpur at a rental of Rs. 200/- per month. Sardar Ishar Singh purchased House No. 71164 Swaroop Nagar, Kan pur. It was in the occupation of U. P. Financial Corporation. It is stated that Sardar Ishar Singh pursuaded the Corporation to vacate the house so that he could live there with his family. The Corpora tion eventually purchased a building of its own. As it was likely to shift its office to its own building, the petitioners made an application to the District Magistrate, Kanpur for the release of the house in their favour. This application appears to have been passed on to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for disposal. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer without deciding the release application and without notice to the petitioners allotted the house to respondent No. 4, the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Kanpur (hereinafter referred to as the allottee ). The allotment was made on the orders of the District Magistrate to whom the allottee had addressed a letter. The petitioners moved an application before the District Magistrate pro testing against the manner in which the house had been allotted to another person without considering their release application. The petitioners fearing that they may not be able to get redress at the hands of the District Magistrate because the allottee it was a senior I. A. S. Officer who had been a Commissioner of Lucknow Division, filed a Writ Petition in this Court (Civil Misc. Writ No. 4397 of 1971 ). While this petition was pending the District Magistrate, Kanpur can celled the allotment order as a result the petition was dismissed as having become infructuous. Writ No. 4397 of 1971 ). While this petition was pending the District Magistrate, Kanpur can celled the allotment order as a result the petition was dismissed as having become infructuous. Thereafter the release application of the petitioners was taken up for consideration by Sri G. K. Tandon, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur. The allottee filed an objection and the petitioners filed rejoinder-affidavit stating inter alia that the house in dispute had been purchased for their personal occupation as was mentioned in the sale-deed itself and that the land lord of the flat in Kunj Bihari Palace, where they had been residing had filed a Civil Suit for their ejectment on the ground that they had made unauthorised constructions Arguments were heard on Septem ber 7, 1972 on behalf of the petitioners and the allottee and Septem ber 17, 1971 was fixed as the date for judgment. In the meantime on September 16, 1971 Mr. Tandon sent a note to the District Magistrate asking him to transfer the case to the District Supply Officer, Kanpur. On the same date the District Magistrate accepted this request and transferred the case to the file of District Supply Officer. The Dis trict Supply Officer heard the arguments and passed order dated Sep tember 30, 1971 rejecting the application of the petitioners for the re lease of the house in their favour. The petitioners thereupon filed the present writ petition and a Bench of this Court passed an art interim order directing the respondents not to allot the house until further orders. In the meantime the Financial Corporation vacated the house and its possession was delivered to the petitioners. It has been alleged that at about mid night on that very day a large number of policemen along with P. A. C. came and tried to dislodge the peti tioners forcibly. The petitioners have challenged the order of the District Supply Officer dated September 30, 1971 rejecting their re lease application. The impugned order has been challenged on a large number of grounds. It is said that the allotment order in favour of the 4th res pondent was a mala fide order which had been passed to oblige the allottee ignoring completely the merits of the case. The impugned order has been challenged on a large number of grounds. It is said that the allotment order in favour of the 4th res pondent was a mala fide order which had been passed to oblige the allottee ignoring completely the merits of the case. In my opinion, it is not necessary to record a finding this point even though the way in which proceedings have been conducted does smack of favouritism because this petition can succeed on another ground. The District Supply Officer has been at pains to demonstrate now the rented accommodation in possession of the petitioners fami ly is large enough for their needs. He was also tried to balance the need of the petitioners against the need of the allottee. He has al ready relied upon the objection filed by the allottee. Clearly he was not entitled to do either. He had no jurisdiction to reject the appli cation of the petitioners on the ground that the accommodation in their possession was sufficient for their need nor was he entitled to take into consideration the need of the allottee. It is well settled that an application for release under Rule 6 of the Rules framed under the Act is made by a landlord at a time when there is no sitting ten ant and the accommodation is vacant or is likely to fall vacant. All that the District Magistrate has to do is to satisfy himself that the ap plication of the landlord is bona fide. The word bona fide has been used in contradiction to mala fide. So long as the application is not mala fide in the sense that the landlord, in fact, does not want to occupy the house himself but wants to let it out on a higher rent, the District Magistrate is bound to permit the landlord to occupy it. He has not option in the matter. Although the rule has been couched in permissive language yet in reality it is a mandatory provision. He has no jurisdiction to judge the extent of the need of the landlord nor is he entitled to take into consideration the need of a prospective tenant. He has not option in the matter. Although the rule has been couched in permissive language yet in reality it is a mandatory provision. He has no jurisdiction to judge the extent of the need of the landlord nor is he entitled to take into consideration the need of a prospective tenant. What is ment by a landlords needing the accommodation for his own occupation has been explained in Sukh Swaroop v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer Special Appeal No. 247 of 1957, decided on October 26, 1960 by Mootham, C. J. and A. P. Srivastava, J. where they have observed that all that a District Magistrate has to do under Rule 6 is to determine whether the application by the landlord is made in good faith and that unless he comes to the conclu sion that the landlord does not want the accommodation for his own personal occupation he is bound to hold that the landlords need is bona fide. In Abida Begam v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer 1959 A. L. J. 704 it has been observed that Rule 6 was made to preserve the right of the landlord if he has to occupy the house himself. It would hardly be a matter of right if he had to depend upon anothers will or discretion. A Full Bench of this Court in Ram Surat Singh v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer 1964 A. L. J. 412 has endorsed this view, where it has been held that the District Magistrate has no jurisdiction to judge the requirements or the extent of the landlords need nor is he en titled to take into consideration the need of a prospective tenant. It has further been held that the word need implies the necessity but the degree of necessity is not material except in so far as it may throw light that the landlords application has been made in good faith. It is not open to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to measure the landlords need. All that he has to determine is that the application has been made in good faith. A similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rent Control and Eviction Officer v. Dr. M. N. Kalaria A. I. R. 1972 Alld. 559. All that he has to determine is that the application has been made in good faith. A similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rent Control and Eviction Officer v. Dr. M. N. Kalaria A. I. R. 1972 Alld. 559. In that case the release application of the landlord was rejected on the ground that the accommodation already in his posses sion was sufficient for the need. This is what has been observed in paragrapht 6: - it is clear that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application for release only on the ground that the existing accommodation was sufficient for the need of the landlords. This according to the Full Bench, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to consider. " The District Supply Officer, Kanpur therefore, clearly misdirect ed himself in rejecting the release application on the ground that the accommodation in possession of the petitioners was sufficient nor was he entitled to take into consideration the objections filed by the allot tee because he had no locus standi to do so. The need of the allottee was also irrelevant. The only ground upon which he would reject the application was that the landlords did not want to occupy the house themselves and their application for release was a comaflage or a make-believe. There is no such suggestion much less a finding in the impugned order. Before parting with this case I may also mention that the allottee has not filed a counter-affidavit and has not contested the petitioner. He was the only person who could be interested in saving allotment order from the petitioners challenge. Curiously the counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the District Magistrate, Kanpur, Rent Con trol and Eviction Officer, Kanpur and the District Supply Officer, Kan pur and the State of Uttar Pradesh. None of them save any interest in the subject-matter in dispute. A similar situation arose in the case of Rent Control and Eviction Officer v. Dr. M. M. Laloraya and another (supra) and the Bench made the following observations: - "the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has not indicated any where in the appeal or otherwise as to what precisely in his in terest in the subject-matter in dispute. He never wanted occupa tion or allotment of the accommodation. M. M. Laloraya and another (supra) and the Bench made the following observations: - "the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has not indicated any where in the appeal or otherwise as to what precisely in his in terest in the subject-matter in dispute. He never wanted occupa tion or allotment of the accommodation. He merely disposed of the application for release and allotment. He passed suitable or ders under Section 7-A. His orders were judiciously adjudicated in the writ petition. He not having any interest in the subject matter was not an aggrieved person and had, in our opinion no locus standi to prefer an appeal. " In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the District Supply Officer, Kanpur dated September 30, 1971 rejecting the release application of the petitioners is quashed. The District Magistrate, Kanpur is directed to dispose of the petitioners release application afresh in accordance with law and the observations made hereinbefore. The petitioners are entitled to the costs. .