Judgement CHANDRASEKHARAN MENON, J.:- This appeal arises out of an application filed for dissolution of marriage under the provisions of the Travancore Nair Act II of 1100 (hereinafter referred to as the ACT). The wife who was the counter-petitioner in the Court below is the appellant herein, the Court below having allowed the application filed by the husband for dissolution of the marriage under Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Regulation. 2. The parties who belong to the Nair community governed by the Act were married on 13-12-1953. At that time the respondent was employed in an oil company at Kuwait; he was there from 1947 onwards. After the marriage the appellant was also taken to Kuwait where they lived together till September, 1962 and three children were born to them. At the tame of filing the petition for dissolution the children were aged 15, 14 and 13 respectively. 3. The appellant and the respondent returned to Kerala in September, 1962. By that time the respondent had deposited Rs. 20,000/- in bank in the name of the appellant. The husband also alleges that she had been given ornaments worth about Rs. 30,000/-. The husband's contention in his application for dissolution of marriage was that in spite of repeated requests the appellant refused to join him at Kuwait, after they returned to Kerala in 1962. It is also alleged that the appellant refused to treat the respondent with love and affection. On the other hand, she was treating him with habitual cruelty even when she was living with him in Kuwait. It is also alleged that the appellant refused to treat the respondent with love and affection. On the other hand, she was treating him with habitual cruelty even when she was living with him in Kuwait. The acts alleged in the petition for dissolution as example of cruel behaviour are the following:- "(1) She used to abuse the petitioner and hit relatives in the most vulgar and abusive language; (2) She inflicted serious wounds on the petitioner with a weapon; (3) She arranged a stranger to man-handle the petitioner; (4) She refused to give food to the petitioner for days together; (5) She abused her own mother in the presence of the petitioner for serving food to him when she refused to do so on a visit to their house; (6) She burnt the valuable cloths purchased by the petitioner for his relations; (7) She sent false petitions to the police against the relatives of the petitioner; (8) She threw boiled dirty water when he was neatly dressed to go out; (9) She trespassed into a building rented out by the petitioner to a tenant and thus caused nuisance to the tenant and trouble to the petitioner. She was also causing nuisance to the persons who were entrusted with the cultivation of the paddy field belonging to the petitioner; (10) She was living alone in a separate house at Trivandrum without the consent and against the wishes of the petitioner and leading a bad and adulterous life. It is also alleged that the respondent is not looking after the children properly. She is threatening the petitioner with the institution of proceedings against him. She sent petitions against the petitioner to the authorities in Kuwait." 4. The grounds alleged for divorce are:- (a) The habitual cruelty of the appellant is grave and unbearable and the respondent fears danger to the security of his person to be in the company of the appellant; (b) The incompatibility of temperament between the respondent and the appellant is such that it is impossible to live together as husband and wife; and © The appellant is continuously living in adultery with persons whose names and addresses could not be known to the respondent in spite of diligent enquiry. 5. The appellant filed detailed objections to the application for dissolution. 5. The appellant filed detailed objections to the application for dissolution. According to her, herself and her husband were residing together happily as husband and wife from the date of their marriage till 1962 at Kuwait. In 1961 her elder brother, who has married a cousin sister of the respondent and who was at that time employed at Kuwait wanted her to sign a partition deed of her family properties, which was drafted without her knowledge and consent. She declined to sign the document, because according to her the partition was not made properly and she was not allotted her due share in the properties. Therefore, her brother - Velappan Nair (C.V. Nair) - became enraged at her and wanted to teach her a lesson. It was at his instance that the appellant was taken to her house by the respondent in 1962. The respondent is alleged to have left Kerala towards the end of 1962 leaving her with her mother and sister at her house at Vengannur. The appellant alleges that from that date onwards the respondent had refused to give anything for the maintenance of the appellant or her three children who are residing with her. At the instance of her father she sent a petition to the Indian Embassy at Kuwait claiming maintenance. She claims that she has no illwill against the respondent. The allegation made against her in regard to adultery and habitual cruelty are stoutly and totally denied. Nor does she agree that there is incompatibility of temperament between her and the respondent. The respondent is alleged to be residing in the house of the wife of C.V. Nair and the petition is alleged to have been filed due to the instigation of the relatives of the respondent including C.V. Nair. The appellant also claims that if the petition is allowed the respondent should be directed to pay Rs. 5,000/- as compensation to her. Besides, she prayed that the husband should be directed to pay Rs. 500/-per month for the maintenance of herself and her children. 6. The petition was enquired into with the help of 7 delegates who were selected as per the rules under the Nair Act by order dated 1-9-1972. 7. The respondent was examined as P. W. 1, while the appellant was examined as C. P. W. 1 and the eldest son was examined as C. P. W. 2. 6. The petition was enquired into with the help of 7 delegates who were selected as per the rules under the Nair Act by order dated 1-9-1972. 7. The respondent was examined as P. W. 1, while the appellant was examined as C. P. W. 1 and the eldest son was examined as C. P. W. 2. After the evidence was recorded and the counsel appearing on both sides were heard, the delegates were charged by the Court as provided in Rule 35 under the Act. After finishing the charge the delegates were asked to pronounce their verdict on the question of fact to be decided in the case. The verdict of the delegates was conveyed to the Court by their foreman which was recorded by the Court. The verdict of the majority of the delegates on the question whether the appellant was treating the respondent with habitual cruelty was that the respondent had proved that the appellant had so treated him. The delegates also unanimously gave the opinion that the respondent has not been able to prove that the appellant was living in adultery as alleged. On the question of incompatibility of temperament between the parties the delegates by a majority gave the verdict that the evidence on record proves that the temperaments of the appellant and the respondent are incompatible with each other. In accordance with the verdict recorded the Court declared the marriage between the parties dissolved. As regards the quantum of maintenance allowance allowable the Court was of the view that the respondent had to pay compensation of Rs. 5,000/- to the appellant. During the pendency of the enquiry on a petition filed by the appellant the Court had ordered that the respondent should pay a monthly allowance at the rate of Rs. 100/- to the first child and at the rate of Rs. 75/- each to the other two children. In the final order that was passed in the case the Court found that there is no reason to change the quantum of maintenance allowance to be given by the respondent for the upkeep and education of the children as long as they are in the custody of the mother. The children were minors at the time. It is from this order of dissolution of marriage that the wife has come up in appeal. 8. The children were minors at the time. It is from this order of dissolution of marriage that the wife has come up in appeal. 8. A Memorandum of Cross Appeal has also been filed by the respondent as regards the compensation and the maintenance that has been directed to be paid by him. Objection has also been taken to the finding entered by the delegates in respect of the point whether the appellant was living in adultery. 9. It is strongly contended by Sri. K. Sudhakaran, learned counsel for the appellant that the verdict of the majority of the delegates in regard to the points decided against the petitioner is unsupported by evidence. It is alleged"/>that they have returned the verdict under misapprehensions and mistaken notions. It is pointed out that the cruelty alleged is in regard to what happened 10 years before the filing of the petition and which the husband had either condoned or put up with. It is also argued that habitual cruelty mentioned in the Act can only be as defined in the case of Russel v. Russel, viz., conduct of such a character as to have caused danger to life limb or health or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of danger. The delegates were not clearly explained about what amounts to legal cruelty. According to the learned counsel nothing alleged in the petition would amount to legal cruelty. Mr. Sudhakaran urges that the delegates were also under the mis-apprehension and mistaken notion regarding what is incompatibility of temperament in the Act. The verdict of the majority of the delegates it is said is absolutely without any support of evidence. Another point that Mr. Sudhakaran put forth is that the learned Munsiff failed to observe the provisions of Rule 35 of the Nair Act Delegates Rules. The learned Munsiff ought to have laid down the law by which the delegates are to be guided as provided in Rule 35. It is finally argued that the verdict of the delegates is vitiated by fraud as some of them were influenced by the husband and his people. A point was also taken in the arguments on behalf of the appellant that as after the Hindu Marriage Act Nairs are brought within the purview of the term 'Hindu', dissolution can only be effected if the grounds specified under the Hindu Marriage Act for divorce are available. A point was also taken in the arguments on behalf of the appellant that as after the Hindu Marriage Act Nairs are brought within the purview of the term 'Hindu', dissolution can only be effected if the grounds specified under the Hindu Marriage Act for divorce are available. 10. We have no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's contention that the marriage could be dissolved only if the grounds specified under the Hindu Marriage Act for divorce are available. This contention ignores the provision in the said Act, viz., Section 29 (2) which states that 'nothing contained in the Act shall be deemed to affect any right recognised by custom or conferred by any special enactment to obtain the dissolution of a Hindu marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commenceent of the Act. The relevant provisions in the Act relating to dissolution of marriage is a right conferred by a special enactment to obtain the dissolution of a Hindu marriage in respect of parties governed by that Act. The provisions are, therefore, saved by Section 29 (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act and the marriage will have to be dissolved in accordance with the provisions in the Act. 11. Before going into the various other questions that have been raised by the appellant it would be advantageous if we refer to the relevant provisions in regard to dissolution of marriage under the Act. Under Section 4 of the Act a marriage may be dissolved in one of the following ways, that is to say :- (i) by the death of either party; or (ii) by mutual consent evidenced by a registered instrument; or (iii) by a formal order of dissolution. Under Section 4 of the Act a marriage may be dissolved in one of the following ways, that is to say :- (i) by the death of either party; or (ii) by mutual consent evidenced by a registered instrument; or (iii) by a formal order of dissolution. Under Section 5, 'a husband or wife may, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Courts Regulation, present a petition for dissolution of the marriage, under Section 4, clause (iii), in the Court of the District Munsiff within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the respondent resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain, or, if the respondent resides, carries on business or personally works forgain in any place outside Travancore, in the Court of the District Munsiff within whose jurisdiction the petitioner resides, on any of the following grounds, namely insanity, incurable disease, impotency, incompatibility of temperament, habitual cruelty, adultery or change of religion: Provided that the wife shall herself be competent to apply for divorce if she has completed sixteen years of age.' Under Section 6 of the Act 'a copy of such petition as aforesaid shall be served on the respondent at the expense of the petitioner, and in the manner provided for the service of summons on a defendant in the Code of Civil Procedure.' Section 7 may be quoted in extenso: "7 (1) (a) Where the petitioner alleges adultery as the ground for dissolution and where the respondent opposes the prayer for dissolution, the petition shall be dismissed unless the person with whom adultery is alleged to have been committed is impleaded as co-respondent : Provided such person is known and alive and his whereabouts can be ascertained on a diligent enquiry : Provided also that, in cases where the petitioner is the wife, the co-respondent need not be impleaded. (b) If the petition is not dismissed, copy of the petition shall be served, in the manner aforesaid, also on the co-respondent if any. © Notwithstanding anything contained in the previous paragraphs, the Court may, if it is not satisfied with the good faith of the allegation contained in the petition mentioned therein or that the petitioner has not been in"/>any way necessary or has not connived at or not condoned the adultery set forth in the petition or that there has been no unnecessary or improper delay in presenting the petition, dismiss the same. (2) Three months after the service of the copy as aforesaid, if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, and (a) If the petition is not opposed with respect to any of the grounds mentioned in Section 5, or if the respondent, while denying the allegations contained in the petition, agrees to the dissolution, the Court shall, without going into the grounds alleged, declare in writing the marriage dissolved; (b) If the respondent does not agree to the proposed dissolution and denies the allegations in the petition, the Court shall enquire into the allegations in the petition and after, considering the evidence adduced by the parties, shall order the dissolution of the marriage if the grounds set forth in the petition are made out, and shall dismiss the same in case they are not made out. (3) At the time of passing the order referred to in sub-section (2). (a) If the petitioner is the husband and his prayer is granted, the Court shall, except where the respondent lives in adultery or has changed her religion, award to the wife such compensation not exceeding Rs. 5,000 or such monthly allowance till her re-marriage as would be proper under the circumstances, having regard to the position, means and circumstances of the parties; (b) If the petitioner is the wife and her prayer is granted on the ground of adultery, habitual, cruelty, or change of religion, the Court shall also decree in her favour such compensation not exceeding Rs. 5,000 or such monthly allowance till her remarriage as would be proper under the circumstances having regard to the position, means and circumstances of the parties. Explanation: `Habitual cruelty' shall include wilful desertion for a period of two years or more and shall also include presistent neglect on the part of the husband to maintain the wife. (4) Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the rules framed by Government under sub-section (8) of this Section, and the provisions of the Limitation Regulation applicable to appeals from original decrees, an appeal shall lie to the High Court at the instance of any aggrieved party from any decision of the District Munsiff relating to dissolution, or award, or both, except when it relates exclusively to costs; and when an appeal is preferred court-fee shall be levied on the value of the subject-matter in appeal under the Court-fees Regulation. Provided that no appeal shall lie against a decision of the District Munsiff relating to the dissolution of marriage except on the ground of the decision being contrary to some law or usage having the force of law, or of some substantial error or defect in the procedure or investigation of the case, which may have produced error or defect in the decision of the case. (5) In so far as it awards payment of compensation or costs, an order of the District Munsiff or an order passed on appeal shall, subject to the provisions of the Limitation Regulation relating to the execution of decrees be executable as a decree. Provided, however, that an order of the District Munsiff awarding compensation shall become executable only on payment of court-fee on the sum adjudged. (6) Save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anthing contained in this section or with rules framed by Government under sub-section (8) of this section, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the trial of a suit shall apply to all proceedings under this section: Provided that all proceedings under this section either before a Court or before a commissioner appointed by a Court shall be held in camera and that publication of any account of such proceedings except the final order and the decree thereon, shall be punishable with simple imprisonment for a term of six months, or with fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000 or both :- Provided also that the parties may give evidence against each other by means of affidavits and may be compelled to appear to give oral evidence only for cross-examination on the affidavits. (7) The costs decreed in favour of the petitioner may be made payable by the co-respondent to the proceedings, if any. (8) (a) The Government shall, in accordance with rules to be framed, appoint persons within the jurisdiction of each district munsiff to be delegates to aid in an enquiry under this chapter. (7) The costs decreed in favour of the petitioner may be made payable by the co-respondent to the proceedings, if any. (8) (a) The Government shall, in accordance with rules to be framed, appoint persons within the jurisdiction of each district munsiff to be delegates to aid in an enquiry under this chapter. The persons so appointed shall be Nairs, males or females and their names shall be published in the Government gazette."/>The delegates to aid in an enquiry shall be selected by the Court in rotation from the delegates appointed for each Court, and the decision on the facts in respect of the grounds for dissolution shall be the decision of the majority of the delegates before whom the trial is held, questions of law and procedure alone being determined by the presiding Munsiff. (b) The Government may also frame rules providing for the qualifications of the delegates, the number of delegates required for each trial, the choosing of the delegates, the duties of the Munsiffs and of the delegates other than those specifically provided for; the procedure to be followed in case of difference of opinion among the delegates, the interference by the High Court with the verdict of the delegates, and generally for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of paragraph (a) of this sub-section. (9) During an enquiry for dissolution of a marriage under this chapter, the Court may, from time to time, pass such interim orders and make such provisions in the final order as it may deem just and proper with respect to the custody, maintenance, education and marriage of the minor children the dissolution of the marriage of whose parents is the subject of such enquiry." 12. Rules have been framed under Section 7 of the Act called the Nayar Act Delegates Rules. Rules have been framed under Section 7 of the Act called the Nayar Act Delegates Rules. Under Rule 37, it is the duty of the Munsiff- "(a) to decide all questions of law arising in the course of the trial and especially all questions as to the relevancy of facts which it is proposed to prove and the admissibility of evidence or the propriety of questions asked by or on behalf of the parties, and in his discretion to prevent the production of inadmissible evidence whether it is or is not objected to by the parties; (b) to decide upon the meaning and construction of all documents given in evidence at the enquiry; © to decide upon all matters of fact which it may be necessary to prove in order to enable evidence of particular matters to be given; (d) to decide whether any question which arises is for himself or for the delegates, upon which point his decision shall bind the delegates." Under Rule 38, "The Munsiff may, if he thinks proper, in the course of his summing up, express his opinion upon any question of fact or upon any question of mixed law and fact relevant to the proceedings." Rule 39 deals with duties of delegates: "39. It is the duty of the delegates- (a) to decide which view of the facts is true and then to return the verdict which under such view ought according to the direction of the Munsiff to be returned; (b) to determine the meaning of all technical terms (other than terms of law) and words used in an unusual sense which it may be necessary to determine, whether such words occur in document or not; © to decide all questions which according to law are to be deemed questions of fact; (d) to decide whether general indefinite expressions do or do not apply to particular cases unless such expressions refer to legal procedure or unless their meaning is ascertained by law, in either of which cases it is the duty of the Munsiff to decide their meaning." 13. After the Munsiff has finished his charge, the delegates may retire to consider their verdict; and, except with the leave of the Court, no person other than a delegate for that trial shall speak to or hold any communication with any delegate. After the Munsiff has finished his charge, the delegates may retire to consider their verdict; and, except with the leave of the Court, no person other than a delegate for that trial shall speak to or hold any communication with any delegate. When the delegates have considered their verdict, the foreman shall inform the Munsiff what is their verdict or what is the verdict of a majority. The Munsiff shall record the verdict in this own hand. If the verdict is not clear or complete, the Munsiff may ask the delegates such questions as are necessary to ascertain what their verdict is and in all such cases the questions and the answers to them shall also be recorded. 14. Rule 44 provides for amending the verdict: 'when, by accident or mistake, a wrong verdict is delivered, the delegates may, before or immediately after it is recorded, amend the verdict and it shall stand as ultimately amended; provided that in all such cases the Munsift shall clearly record the circumstances that led to the amendment. If the verdict given does not disclose the decision by a majority of the delegates on any fact or facts necessary for the disposal of the enquiry before the Court, the Court may discharge the delegates and hold a fresh trial with other delegates. 15. If the verdict of the delegates or the majority of the delegates in any rules having the force of law, is vitiated by fraud or material defect or mistake or is unsupported by any evidence, the High Court may set aside their"/>verdict and order a fresh trial. Except in cases mentioned in Rule 46, no verdict of the delegates or of a majority of the delegates in any enquiry shall be set aside for any irregularity error, or omission, in the course of the enquiry except when such irregularity, error or omission has, in the opinion of the High Court, materially prejudiced the party or parties and occasioned a failure of justice. 16. We will now examine the decision that has been rendered in the case. It was the verdict of the majority of the delegates who considered the evidence on the issue that the respondent has proved that the appellant treated him with habitual cruelty. Therefore, the Court recorded that finding in favour of the respondent. 16. We will now examine the decision that has been rendered in the case. It was the verdict of the majority of the delegates who considered the evidence on the issue that the respondent has proved that the appellant treated him with habitual cruelty. Therefore, the Court recorded that finding in favour of the respondent. The delegates by a majority of 5 to 2 gave the verdict that the evidence on record proves that the temperament of the appellant and the respondent are incompatible with each other. Therefore, the Court found that the respondent had proved the ground. 17. In Manomony Pillai v. Velayudhan Pillai, ((1933) 23 Trav LJ 512) a Division Bench of the Travancore High Court had considered the scope of the relevant rules framed under the Act in regard to dissolution of marriage. There in a well considered judgment, if I may say so, with respect Justice Sivasankara Pillai speaking for the Bench stated that: "On an enquiry in matrimonial causes, with the help of delegates, under Chapter 2 of the Nair Regulation, the Court, in a proper summing up must, as in the analogous case of a trial by jury elsewhere formulate and specify simple issues for consideration and collate the evidence pro and con bearing upon the issues in order to assist the delegates to arrive at the correct decision thereon. The Judge in charging the delegates shall endeavour to speak in manner simple and direct. The charge must not be involved and in extravagant language." His Lordship further stated: "The grounds on which dissolution of marriage could be ordered are given in Section 5 of the regulation. Section 7, clause 8 (a) makes mention of 'the decision on the facts in respect of the grounds for dissolution' and enacts that the decision of the majority of the delegates on them shall prevail. Rule 35 is slightly different from Section 297 of the Criminal P. C. in that in the former the Muntiff is directed to specify the points on which the verdict is required in his charge to the delegates. No doubt the law does not prescribe any particular form in which the jury ought to return the verdict, and they are at liberty to deliver it in any form which they think fit. No doubt the law does not prescribe any particular form in which the jury ought to return the verdict, and they are at liberty to deliver it in any form which they think fit. But instead of being satisfied with what is called a 'general verdict' it may perhaps be better if the opinion of the delegates is taken about the principal facts in respect of the grounds for dissolution. I do not however propose to express a decisive opinion on this matter which is not without some importance." 18. In Narayana Pillai v. Janaki Amma, ((1934) 24 Trav LJ 451) the restricted powers of the Court of appeal under Rule 46 is clearly indicated. It is specifically stated therein that it is not for the appellate Court to weigh the evidence in golden scales and determine whether the verdict is sustainable. The Court cannot interfere when there is only some mere irregularity, error or omission. 19. In Sankaran Nair v. Bhargavi Pillai, 1953 Ker LT 700 = (AIR 1954 Trav Co 158) a Division Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court, Chief Justice Koshi and Justice T.K. Joseph pointed out, following (1934) 24 Trav LJ 451, that a conjoint effect of Section 7 (4) and Rules 46 and 47 is that the powers of the High Court hearing appeals under the Nair Act are very limited. It is not open for the High Court to go behind the verdict and see whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the same. 20. On the basis of these decisions when the case on hand is examined it is clear that it is difficult for this Court to interfere with the verdict of the delegates which had been accepted by the lower Court. No doubt as pointed out in (1933) 23 Trav LJ 512, instead of being satisfied with what is called a 'general verdict' it may perhaps be better if the opinion of the delegates is taken about the principal facts in respect of the grounds for dissolution. However it cannot be said that the charge made to the delegates is in any way erroneous, in this case. We have been taken through the notes of the charge and we have to state that the Munsiff was very fair and cautious in charging the delegates. However it cannot be said that the charge made to the delegates is in any way erroneous, in this case. We have been taken through the notes of the charge and we have to state that the Munsiff was very fair and cautious in charging the delegates. We have some doubt whether the acts attributed to the appellant in the case, taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances, have been proved and they would amount to habitual cruelty on her part. However, it is not necessary for us to go into that question in detail, because we have absolutely no hesitation in concluding that the delegates have correctly held that there"/>is incompatibility of temperament between the appellant and the respondent. What is incompatibility of temperament has been considered by a Division Bench of the Travancore High Court in Karunakaran Nair v. Saraswathi Amma, (1947 Trav LR 379). There Justice Sankaran, as he then was, speaking for the bench said :- "But the question as to what would amount to incompatibility of temperament was not considered even in those cases. It is necessarily a mixed question of law and fact. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the meaning of the word 'temperament' is given as constitution or habit of mind. The meaning of the word 'incompatible' is given as incapable of being held together, mutually intolerant, discordant, incongruous, inconsistent, unable to get on together, at variance, irreconcilable. Differences between the husband and the wife in their habits, manners, tastes or outlook on life may be said to constitute incompatibility of temperament as between them in the liberal sense of the expression. But it is clear that such differences cannot be a ground for dissolution of their marriage unless such differences are so serious and grave as to make their conjugal life impossible. Extremely grave and serious situations arising out of the insanity, incurable disease, impotency, habitual cruelty, etc., of any of the parties to the union are alone recognised by Sec. 5 of the Nair Act, as justifying a dissolution of marriage. In compatibility of temperament being put on a par with the other grounds it is clear that the incompatibility contemplated is of such an extreme limit as to make the continuance of the conjugal life impossible. Due weight has also to be attached to the position and status of the parties in considering their alleged incompatibility." 21. In compatibility of temperament being put on a par with the other grounds it is clear that the incompatibility contemplated is of such an extreme limit as to make the continuance of the conjugal life impossible. Due weight has also to be attached to the position and status of the parties in considering their alleged incompatibility." 21. In this case the verdict of the delegates on this question cannot be said to be vitiated by any material defect or mistake or unsupported by evidence. 22. Mr. Sudhakaran, learned counsel appearing for the appellant argued that before the Court could order dissolution of marriage the evidence regarding marital offence should be of such nature as to be accepted by a Criminal Court trying the criminal charge. The Court cannot act on preponderance of probabilities; the evidence could lead to no other conclusion than that the party concerned is guilty of the marital offence. The proof should be beyond all reasonable doubt. He referred us to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bipinchandra Jaisingbhai v. Prabhavati, (AIR 1957 SC 176); John White v. Olive White, (AIR 1958 SC 441) and Lachman Utamchand v. Meena, (AIR 1964 SC 40). According to these decisions Mr. Sudhakaran pointed out the law in India on the standard of proof in a matrimonial cause is proof beyond reasonable doubt. What the Court has to see in the proceedings is whether the respondent has proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the appellant is guilty of the marital offence. The decisions referred to by Sri Sudhakaran are decisions under the Hindu Marriage Act and the Indian Divorce Act. There as per the wording of the statute if the Court concerned is satisfied that any of the grounds for granting the relief exists in any such case the Court shall declare such reliefs. The word 'satisfied' was held to mean satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court was following the earlier decisions of the English Courts in Matrimonial Causes Act. There also the relief in regard to matrimonial offences were to be granted if the Court was satisfied on evidence that the case for the petitioner had been proved. The word 'satisfied' was held to mean satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court was following the earlier decisions of the English Courts in Matrimonial Causes Act. There also the relief in regard to matrimonial offences were to be granted if the Court was satisfied on evidence that the case for the petitioner had been proved. In a series of cases extending over a number of decades the English Courts said that though the proceedings under Matrimonial Causes Act are not criminal proceedings as such the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt was required in such proceedings; in divorce as in crime the Court had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. These decisions cannot, however have any application to the proceedings under the Act. It might be noted that under Section 7 (8) of the Act the decision on the facts in respect of the grounds for dissolution shall be the decision of the majority of the delegates before whom the trial is held. Under the Rules framed it is the duty of the delegates to decide which view of the facts is true and then to return the verdict which under such view ought according to the direction of the Munsiff to be returned. The verdict of the majority of the delegates has to be accepted by the Court. The appellate Court is also given the power to interfere with the verdict of the delegates only if it is vitiated by fraud or material defect or mistake or unsupported by evidence. No verdict of the delegates or majority of the delegates in an enquiry shall be set aside for irregularity, error or omission in the course of the enquiry except when such irregularity, error or omission has, in the opinion of the High Court, materially prejudiced the party or parties and occasioned"/>a failure of justice. According to us it will not be proper to import the considerations under the English law or under the Hindu law in regard to divorce under the Act. It might be noted that before the statute came to replace the customary law regarding divorce, divorce was rather free among Marumakkathayees. There was at that time no formality required for divorce; mere intention to separate being enough to effect dissolution of marriage. In Narayanan v. Kunjikutty Kutty, (20 Trav LR 65) it was held that no formalities are necessary to divorce a married woman. There was at that time no formality required for divorce; mere intention to separate being enough to effect dissolution of marriage. In Narayanan v. Kunjikutty Kutty, (20 Trav LR 65) it was held that no formalities are necessary to divorce a married woman. There, a Nair lady sued for maintenance against her husband. The husband denied the fact of marriage in the written statement. It was held that, that was enough to effect a dissolution of marriage. In Kochukunju v. Ulakan Padmanabhan, (1914) 4 Tray LJ 17 the statement of law in 20 Trav LR 65 was approved. The Nair Act only prescribes certain formalities to effect dissolution of marriage. It might be noted that under the Act the husband and wife are at liberty to put an end to the marriage tie without assigning any reason for the same. The formalities are prescribed to check the abuse of the right of free divorce and the law is made stricter in the case of husbands who seek a divorce, their wives being entitled to compensation in such cases. Though as stated by P.R. Sundara Aiyar, in his well-known treatise on Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law, marriage has been recognised as a social institution in Malabar from early times and all evidence goes to show that the sexual relations there by no means compare unfavourably in point of fixity and purity with the sexual relations obtaining elsewhere in India, divorce was always free and easy. "The easy manner in which divorce could be obtained led to some mistaken notion that Malabar Law does not recognize marriage as a legal institution. It was indeed very difficult for English Lawyers steeped in notions and shibboleths of English Law to reconcile themselves to the idea that a sexual union, on which no rights of property or inheritance are founded, terminable at the will of either party, subject at best to certain conventional restraints among the more respectable classes such as a money payment and the control of the relations could constitute a valid legal marriage." This state of affairs was taken into consideration when the personal law was statutorily codified in the three jurisdictions, Travancore, Cochin and Malabar. Under the Madras Marumakkathayam Act and the Cochin Nair Act, no ground need be alleged for dissolution of a marriage. Under the Madras Marumakkathayam Act and the Cochin Nair Act, no ground need be alleged for dissolution of a marriage. Therefore, though under the Travancore Nair Act, if the marriage is to be dissolved, not by agreement, then there should be some grounds for the dissolution, it would be unreasonable to hold that such grounds should be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal proceedings; the proof need be as only in a civil case. 23. It might be noted in this connection that in England, there has been a re-thinking on the question whether so far as the grounds for divorce are concerned there should be proof beyond reasonable doubt. In Blyth v. Blyth, (1966-2 WLR 634) Lord Denning observed that in regard to grounds for divorce, the same like in a civil case may be proved by preponderance of probability but the degree of probability depends on the subject-matter, in proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear. 24. In 1948 the High Court of Australia refused to follow the dictum that adultery must be proved with the same strictness as is required in a criminal case. In Wright v. Wright, (1948) 77 CLR 191, Dixon, J., as he then was said- "While our decision is that the civil and not the criminal standard of persuasion applies to matrimonial causes including issues of adultery, the difference in the effect is not as great as is sometimes represented. This is because, as is pointed out in the judgments in Briginshaw v. Briginshaw, the nature and gravity of an issue necessarily determines the manner of attaining reasonable satisfaction of the truth of the issue and because the presumption of innocence is to be taken into account." No doubt, as far as cases under the Hindu Marriage Act and the Indian Divorce Act are concerned we are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to earlier. But that does not mean that we should now make applicable principles underlying those decisions to cases under the Nair Act, for the reasons we have stated earlier. 25. Therefore, we find that the judgment and decree of the Court below in directing dissolution of marriage is correct and the appeal will have to be dismissed. But that does not mean that we should now make applicable principles underlying those decisions to cases under the Nair Act, for the reasons we have stated earlier. 25. Therefore, we find that the judgment and decree of the Court below in directing dissolution of marriage is correct and the appeal will have to be dismissed. As regards the Cross-Appeal filed also nothing has been brought to our notice which could persuade us to differ from the view taken by the Court below on the findings canvassed against therein. It is most unfortunate that"/>the husband should in spite of the clear finding of the lower Court again raise his contention that the wife is guilty of adultery; to say the least it is indicative of an unbecoming attitude on his part. There is no proof whatsoever at all in regard to allegation of adultery made against his wife. We have no hesitation in stating that it is a false allegation. In regard to the compensation awarded and the maintenance directed to be paid, we see no reason to differ from the decision rendered on the same by the Court below. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal as well as the cross appeal but in the circumstances of the case without costs. Appeal dismissed.