KAN SINGH, J.—This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of certain acquisition proceedings taken under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, hereinafter to be referred as "the Act". 2. The petitioner is a Co-operative Society, hereinafter to be referred as "the Society". On 12-5-60, the Government had published a notification in the Rajasthan Raj patra in exercise of their powers under section 4 of the Act. The notification was as follows— ------------HkkxA ¼[k½ jktLFkku jkt i= twu 1960A LFkkuh; Lok;r kklu ¼l½ foHkkx foKfIr;ka t;iqj ebZ 13] 1960 la[;k ,Q 2¼117½ ,y- ,l- th@1959 pwafd jktLFkku ljdkj dks ,slk izrhr gksrk gS fd ljdkj }kjk lkoZtfud O;; ij ,d lkoZtfud dk;Z vFkkZr~ t;iqj uxj fodkl ;kstukc} gsrq ekStk ekstiqjk o pd lqnkZuiqjk esa eqrfly LVsfM;e o U;w gkbZ dksVZ fcfYMax ds fy, Hkwfe ds fy, tkus dh vko;drk gksus dh lEHkkouk gS vr% blds }kjk foKfIr fd;k tkrk gS fd fuEr of.kZr LFkku dh Hkwfe dks mi;qDr dk;Z ds fy, ysus dh lEHkkouk gSA ;g foKfIr jktLFkku Hkwfe vokfIr vf/kfu;e 1953 dh /kkjk 4 ds izko/kkuksa ds vUrxZr blls lEcU/k j[kus okys leLr O;fDr;ksa ds fy, fudkyh x;h gSA mijksDr /kkjk }kjk iznr kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs gw, jktLFkku ljdkj bl le; bl dk;Z esa yxs gq, inkf/kdkfj;ksa dks muds lsodkssa o Jfedksa lfgr ml iznsk esa fLFkr fdlh Hkh Hkwfe esa izosk djus vkSj mldh isekbk djus rFkk mDr /kkjk }kjk visf{kr ;k vkuqer leLr vU; dk;Z djus ds fy;s izkf/kd`r djrh gSA ifjfk"V la[;k 418 ekStkiqjk o pd lqnkZuiqjk ftyk rglhy ekStk [kljk ua- {kS=Qy ch?kk fcLok 1 2 3 4 5 By the above notification the land covered by Khasras Nos. 230, 233, 236, 235/511 and 233/509 was, inter alia, sought to be acquired. On 3rd May, 1961, the Government issued a further notification under section 6 of the Act. 230, 233, 236, 235/511 and 233/509 was, inter alia, sought to be acquired. On 3rd May, 1961, the Government issued a further notification under section 6 of the Act. This notification ran as follows— LFkkuh; Lok;r kklu ¼l½ foHkkx foKfIr t;iqj ebZ 3] 1961 la[;k ,Q 2¼117½ Lok- kk- foHkkx@59%&pwafd jktLFkku ljdkj dks ,slk izrhr gksrk gS fd lkoZtfud iz;kstu vFkkZr~ t;iqj uxj fodkl ;kstukc} ekStk LVsfM;e ds ikl ds fy, ljdkj }kjk Hkwfe yh tkuk visf{kr gSA blfy, blds }kjk ?kks"k.kk dh tkrh gS fd uhps foLr`r fooj.k esa of.kZr Hkwfe mijksDr iz;kstu ds fy;s visf{kr gSA ;g ;kstuk jktLFkku yS.M ,Dohthku ,DV 1953 dh /kkjk 5 ds izko/kkuksa ds vUrZxr mDr ,DV dh /kkjk 4 dh mi&/kkjk ¼2½ ds vUrxZr mDr ,DV dh /kkjk 4 dh mi&/kkjk ¼2½ ds vUrxZr Hkwfe vokfIr vf/kdkjh t;iqj ls izkIr izfrosnu ij fopkj djus ds ipkr~ mu leLr O;fDr;ksa ds fy;s dh x;h ftuls blesa laca/k gks ldrk gS vkSj mDr ,DV dh /kkjk 7 ds izko/kkuksa ds v/khu Hkwfe vokfIr vf/kdkjh] t;iqj dks blds }kjk mDr Hkwfe dh vokfIr ds fy, vkHkko izkIr djus dk funsZk fd;k tkrk gSA Hkwfe ds uDkksa dk fujh{k.k Hkwfe vokfIr vf/kdkjh t;iqj ds dk;kZy; esa fd;k tk ldrk gSA foLr`r fooj.k ftyk rglhy ekStk [kljk ua- {kS=Qy ch?kk fcLok 1 2 3 4 5 One Smt. Laxmi Devi Sogani who claimed to be the Khatedar tenant of the land covered by the aforesaid Khasra numbers challenged the acquisition proceedings by a writ petition in this Court. It was D.B. Civil writ Petition No. 475 of 1961. On 18-4-63, the writ petition was partly allowed and it was ordered that acquisition proceedings be quashed regarding Khasra Nos, 235/510 and 236/512, as the proceedings were illegal, qua them but in respect of Khasra numbers mentioned above the acquisition procedings were held to be legal and the writ petition qua them was dismissed. On 15-1-67 Smt. Laxmi Devi Sogani sold this Sand to the Society by a registered sale deed. On 13-9-72, the society filed the present writ petition for quashing the acquisi-tion proceedings regarding the land covered by Khasras Nos. 230, 233, 236, 235/511 and 233/509, in village Bhojpura, and for commanding the respondents to drop the proceedings in respect of these Khasras. On 13-9-72, the society filed the present writ petition for quashing the acquisi-tion proceedings regarding the land covered by Khasras Nos. 230, 233, 236, 235/511 and 233/509, in village Bhojpura, and for commanding the respondents to drop the proceedings in respect of these Khasras. It was submitted that the public purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired had ceased to exist and as inspite of the decision of the High Court as back as 18-4-63 further proceedings under the Act had not been taken for almost a period of 9 years and, therefore, the state shall be deemed to have abandoned the acquisition proceedings. As regards the non-existence of the public purpose it was submitted that although the land was sought to be acquired for the construction of the new High Court building at Jaipur and for the construction of the Stadium the two buildings have already been constructed on different sites and, therefore, the public purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired has vanished. Apart from this it was submitted that though acquisition proceedings were taken in respect of a number of properties which are mentioned in para-19 of the writ petition, the Government was continuing the present proceedings and this was discriminatory. 3. The writ petition has been opposed by the state. It was submitted that the land was agricultural one and the petitioner Society had taken this land avowedly for the purposes of constructing a residential houses and consequently the transfer in favour of the Society was illegal. As regards the ceasing of the so-called public purpose it was submitted that the petitioner is misreading the contents of the notification Anne-xure 2. It does not mean that the land was being acquired for the construction of the new High Court building or for the Stadium, but it was for the purposes of development of Abadi. As regards the delay in completion of the proceedings it was stated that the petitioner had been taking part in the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer and even if there was some delay in completion of the proceedings that cannot amount to abandonment of the proceedings. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Advocate General. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Advocate General. The notification has been set out by me in extenso and the argument about the public purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired centres round the Urdu word "Muttasal". The word "Muttasal" or "Mutasal" in Fallons New Hindustani English Dictionary has been defined as follows— "joined. Contiguous; adjoining; joined; adjacent." 3. In Urdu Hindi Shabda Kosh by Mohammad Mustafa Khan the word "Mutasal" has been defined as— ^^lehiorkZ] djhch] lehi] djhc] fujUrj] yxkrkj] feyk gqvk^^ Therefore, it follows that it is a mis-reading of the notification to say that the land was sought to be acquired for the purpose of construction of a new High Court building or a stadium for that matter. It is common knowledge that the Bench of the High Court that was functioning at Jaipur had been abolished in July, 1958 and the full High Court started functioning at Jodhpur. There could hardly be any question of constructing a new High Court building at Jaipur in the year of grace 1960. A building for the Bench had already been constructed and the reference in the notification is to that building and it is only for the purposes of location of the Khasra numbers that the two buildings namely, the High Court building and the Stadium are mentioned. The contention raised has, therefore, no substance. 6. Then as regards the dropping of the acquisition or its abandonment I may refer to section 48 of the Act. It lays down that except in the case provided for is section 36 the State Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. Further, whenever the State Government withdrawn from any such acquisition the Collector shall determine the amount of compensation due for the damage suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice or of any proceeding thereunder and shall pay such amount to the person interested together with all costs reasonably incurred by him in the prosecution of the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land. The provisions of Part III of the Act shall apply so far as may be to the determination of the compensation payable under this section. The provisions of Part III of the Act shall apply so far as may be to the determination of the compensation payable under this section. The Act, therefore, contemplates that it is open to the State Government to withdraw from the acquisition. This can, however, be only by a positive act namely, when the State manifests the intention by an order or by unequivocal conduct not to proceed with the acquisition. This does not appear to have been done. Apart from this for abandonment of the proceedings something beyond a mere delay has to be shown. In Simpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd. vs. Hendon Corporation(1) it has been observed in respect of the law of compulsory purchase— "Secondly, abandonment. The learned judge held that the delay was not such of its own as to amount to evidence of abandonment. For the reasons already given, we prefer to deal with abandonment as something beyond mere delay. In this sense an intention no longer to carry out the notice to treat must be communicated to the owner either expressly or by conduct. Had the letter of Aug. 11, 1958, been written to Simpsons, it may well be that the latter could perfectly well then and there have accepted that as a clear intention to abandon and that that would have been an end of the matter. The corporation could not, we think have taken cover under the words "at present", for they are under a continuing duty to evince an intention to proceed under the notice to treat But, unhappily for Simpsons, that letter was not addressed to them but to the Central Land Board, When Sampsons put the matter to the corporation, the latter merely said that they would let Simpsons know of their decision, and Simpsons took no objection to this course. The corporations decision was to proceed. In our judgment, there has been no abandonment in this case." In the judgment observations of Lord Bramwell in Tiverton & North Devon Ry. Co. vs. Loosecrore [ (1884), 9 App. Cas. at p. 506] have been quoted with approval and I may usefully reproduce them— "I quite agree that they might abandon their notice to purchase. If they had said so in so many words and the respondent had assented, no doubt the notice would have ceased to have any effect. Co. vs. Loosecrore [ (1884), 9 App. Cas. at p. 506] have been quoted with approval and I may usefully reproduce them— "I quite agree that they might abandon their notice to purchase. If they had said so in so many words and the respondent had assented, no doubt the notice would have ceased to have any effect. It would have operated like an agreement to rescind a contract. And no doubt what can be done in words can be done by conduct ; and further it can be done unintentionally by conduct such that those to be affected by it reasonably infer the intention. But what is there here to show that the respondent could reasonably infer that the appellants had abandoned their notice to take? " 7. In the present case the writ petitioner has been participating in the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer. Order sheets dated 15-2-72, 15-3-72, 1-4-72, 10-4-72,20-4-72,4-5-72,15-5-72, 3-6-72, 27-6-72, 11-7-72, 28-7-72, 11-8-72, 28-8-72, 29-8-72, 2-9-72, 7-9-72, and 11-9-72 have been placed on record by the respondent collectively marked as Annexure-R/1. Perusal of the order sheets of the Land Acquisition Officer shows that the petitioner was participating in the proceedings for determination of compensation. The award made by the Land Acquisition Officer on 13 9.72 (Annexure-R/10) has also been placed on record. The writ petition was filed on 13.9.72. It cannot, therefore, be said that the acquisition proceedings had been abandoned by the State. No such intention to abandon the proceedings has been manifested either by any express order or by unequivocal conduct. There is, therefore, no substance in this contention either. 8. As regards the existence of the public purpose the notification issued under section 6 is conclusive of that. Sub-section (3) of section 6 lays down that the declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose and after making such declaration the State Government may acquire the land in the manner laid down in the Act. It is true, there has been some delay in proceeding further with the matter, but it has to be borne in mind that the acquisition had been held to be illegal by the High Court in respect of the two Khasra Numbers and the Government had to proceed afresh by issuing notification under sections 4 and 6 of the Act in respect of these Khasra numbers. It could, therefore, very well be that the proceedings regarding compensation were not proceeded with in anticipation of the fresh notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act. 9. The writ petition is, therefore, without any substance and I here by dismiss it. The parties are left to bear their own costs.