JUDGMENT M.P. Savxena, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 20-8-1974 passed by the learned District Judge, Dehradun. 2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to this appeal are that the plaintiff-appellant was appointed as Designer and was posted in the Design and Drawing Section of the Indian Institute of Petroleum, post Office Mohkampur, district Dehradun. He joined service on 23-4-1969. Sri M.G. Krishna is the Director of Indian Institute of Petroleum at Mohkampur and Sarvasri K.P. Rao and P.P. Ohri are in-charge Scientific section and Head of the Department and Immediate Officer of Scientific Section respectively. 3. Shortly after the appellant was appointed as Designer complaints of culpable misconduct and misbehaviour towards his seniors and subordinates started pouring in against him. The Director of the Indian Institute of Petroleum was apprised with those complaints and on one occasion the appellant even offered an apology and promised to behave properly in future but in vain. On 9-7-1971, Sri K.C. Rastogi, Section Officer, sent a report (Ex. Ka. 21) to the Director detailing the instances of misconduct and misbehaviour on the part of the applicant. It was also stated that if the action was delayed some unpleasant incident may take place. After considering all the allegations and arriving at the conclusion that they were prima facie correct and serious, the Director (Sri Krishna) passed an order on the same day (i.e. 9-7-1971) suspending the appellant with immediate effect as disciplinary inquiry was contemplated against him. This suspension order is Ex. 1. 4. On 24/28-7-1971 the Administrative Officer fixed subsistence allowance payable to the appellant. He was to get this allowance equal to leave salary admissible to him had he been on leave on half average pay plus usual allowances as admissible under the rules with effect from 13-7-1971 (fore-noon). This order is Ex. 2. 5. On 27-9-1971 the Director served a charge-sheet on the appellant requiring him to file his written statement within the time allowed. It is Ex. 3. 6. On 11-3-1972 the appellant filed a suit for declaration that the suspension order (Ex. 1) and the charge-sheet (Ex, 3) are illegal, void, without jurisdiction and are liable to be quashed. The validity of the suspension order and the charge-sheet were impugned on the ground of mala fides, illegalities and irregularities. 7. It is Ex. 3. 6. On 11-3-1972 the appellant filed a suit for declaration that the suspension order (Ex. 1) and the charge-sheet (Ex, 3) are illegal, void, without jurisdiction and are liable to be quashed. The validity of the suspension order and the charge-sheet were impugned on the ground of mala fides, illegalities and irregularities. 7. The defendants respondents denied the allegations made in the plaint and gave out that there was no malice or conspiracy nor the suspension order and the charge-sheet suffered from any illegality or irregularity. Certain other pleas were also taken. 8. After going through the material on the record the learned trial court held that there was no malice on the part of the defendants-respondents nor there was any illegality or irregularity in suspending or charge-sheeting the plaintiff. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed with costs. 9. The plaintiff filed an appeal reiterating the same pleas. After examining the contentions carefully the first appellate court negatived them and dismissed the appeal with costs. Hence this second appeal. 10. The only point canvassed before this Court is that the suspension order and the charge-sheet were given as a result of conspiracy and malice on the part of Sri Rao and Sri Ohri. Besides it, they suffered from certain illegalities and irregularities also. The first question which arises for consideration is whether the suspension order (Ex. 1) was the result of malice. It is important to state that the suspension order was issued by the Director of the Indian Institute of Petroleum at Dehradun who is the appointing authority of the plaintiff appellant. In the entire plaint no allegations of malice on his part were made. All that was set out in it was that Sarvasri Rao and Ohri bore grudge towards him for certain reasons and they manipulated to have him suspended and charge-sheet served upon him. There is not an iota of material on the record to show that Sri Rao or Sri Ohri had any hand in the suspension of the appellant. Therefore, there is no force in the contention that Mr. Krishna, Director, suspended him on account of malice or prejudice. 11. Secondly, the malice, if any, was alleged on the part of the Immediate Officers, namely, Sri Rao and Sri Ohri. No malice was imputed to the Director. Hence intentions and actions of the Director could not be considered. Therefore, there is no force in the contention that Mr. Krishna, Director, suspended him on account of malice or prejudice. 11. Secondly, the malice, if any, was alleged on the part of the Immediate Officers, namely, Sri Rao and Sri Ohri. No malice was imputed to the Director. Hence intentions and actions of the Director could not be considered. In support of this contention the case of Kedarnath Bahl v. State of Punjab, ( AIR 1972 SC 873 ) = (1972 Lab IC 433) can be cited. Besides it, if the statute itself confers a power on an authority and imposes a duty on it which may have the effect of making him a judge in his own cause or to decide the dispute in which he may be having an official bias, the doctrine of bias stands qualified to the extent of the statutory authorisation. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Laxmi Chand v. State of U.P., ( AIR 1962 All 117 ). Therefore, it is clear that the (sic) (suspension order issued by the?) Director neither suffered from any malice or prejudice nor it can be taken advantage or by the appellant, 12. So far as malice on the part of Sri Rao and Sri Ohri are concerned, the plaintiff made three allegations in this connection. In the first place it was stated that he had designed certain machines and plants which had the potentiality of saving foreign exchange to the country but Sarvasri Rao and Ohri wanted to take the credit of that work to the detriment of the appellant. As the latter exposed this intention on their part they became inimically disposed towards him. Secondly, that he prevented his immediate superiors viz. Sri Ohri and Sri Rao from perpetrating certain irregularities. It further annoyed them. Lastly, that he was a hard-task master and used to extract maximum of work from his subordinates with the result that they got displeased and formed a clique against him, The defendants respondents categorically denied all these allegations. A lot of evidence appears to have been adduced at the time of the trial on these points but to no useful purpose. The learned trial court and the learned first appellate court have made a proper appraisement of that evidence and I see no reason to take a different view. A lot of evidence appears to have been adduced at the time of the trial on these points but to no useful purpose. The learned trial court and the learned first appellate court have made a proper appraisement of that evidence and I see no reason to take a different view. Therefore, no malice even on the part of Sri Rao and Sri Ohri was made out and in its absence it cannot be said that both of them had prevailed upon the Director to suspend the plaintiff-appellant. 13. Another contention put forward is that the Director did not make objective approach inasmuch as no preliminary inquiry was made to satisfy himself that there exists sufficient material to justify suspension of, and disciplinary enquiry against, the appellant. The preliminary question which arises for consideration is whether for objective satisfaction preliminary inquiry is a must. It may be stated here that the appellant's case is governed by the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, because they were adopted by the Commission. Rule 10(1) of these rules relates to suspension order and the relevant portion of it reads as follows : "The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the President by general or special order may place a Government servant under suspension: (q) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending..'' 14. Obviously the said rule nowhere lays down that preliminary inquiry must be conducted in all cases in order to decide whether the allegations are prima facie correct or serious enough to justify suspension of the delinquent employee. Analogies, cannot be drawn from the rules relating to certain All India Services viz. All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules and Rule 49 of the C. C. S. (C. C, and A) Rules as they are all different. Both the lower courts have discussed this aspect of the matter at great length and I see no reason to disagree with them. 15. There is also no force in the contention that an inquiry will be deemed to be contemplated only when it is pending. The word used between 'contemplated' and 'pending' in the said rule is 'or' which separates one from the other. 15. There is also no force in the contention that an inquiry will be deemed to be contemplated only when it is pending. The word used between 'contemplated' and 'pending' in the said rule is 'or' which separates one from the other. It simply means that suspension order can be passed if disciplinary inquiry is either contemplated or pending. The word 'contemplated' came up for interpretation in certain cases. At first reference may be made to the case of P.R. Nayak v. Union of India ( AIR 1972 SC 554 ) = (1972 Lab IC 313), It was a case governed by All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, where suspension during disciplinary proceedings could be ordered if such proceeding had been initiated and not as in the present case where such proceeding was under contemplation. It was observed in para 15: "The legislative scheme underlying rule 3' is thus clearly indicative of the intention of the rule making authority to restrict its operation only to those cases in which the Government concerned is possessed of sufficient material whether after preliminary investigation or otherwise and the disciplinary proceedings have in fact commenced and not merely when they are contemplated................ Again the fact that in other rules of service an order of suspension may be made when 'disciplinary proceedings were contemplated' should not lead us to take the view that a member of an All India Service should be dealt with differently". It was further observed in paragraph 19 : "But independently of this consideration we think that the plain language of Rule 3 (1) (a) and (b) which concerns us does not authorise suspension when disciplinary proceedings have not been initiated but are only contemplated." 16. Again in State of U.P. v. Jai Singh Dixit (1974 All LJ 862) (FB) this question came up for consideration before the Full Bench. After a review of all the cases and dictionary meaning of the word 'contemplated', it was held that the proper meaning which can be assigned to the word 'contemplate' is, to have in view, to expect, to take into account as a contingency. Therefore, when it is in the mind of the appointing authority that in due course a formal departmental inquiry shall be held or there exists contingency for such an inquiry one can say that a formal departmental inquiry is contemplated. Therefore, when it is in the mind of the appointing authority that in due course a formal departmental inquiry shall be held or there exists contingency for such an inquiry one can say that a formal departmental inquiry is contemplated. It was further observed that all that is necessary is that there should be application of mind, in the eye of law, in good faith, and not arbitrarily. 17. The question was analysed further and it was held: "That there can be summary investigation to find out if the allegations made against the Government servant have any substance. Such investigation or inquiry is followed by a detailed preliminary or fact-finding inquiry where after final decision is taken whether to initiate disciplinary proceedings. The first preliminary inquiry may be in the shape of secret inquiry and the other of an open inquiry. In the alternative, when complaints containing serious allegations against a Government servant are received, the authority may peruse the records to satisfy itself if a more detailed preliminary inquiry be made. In many instances the appointing authority will be in a position to form an opinion after the summary investigation, secret inquiry or inspection of records that the allegations made against the Government servant have substance and in due course formal departmental action shall be taken against him. These all would be cases where formal departmental inquiry is contemplated. In a few cases it may be possible for the appointing authority to form such an opinion at an earlier stage also, i, e., at the stage of receiving or entertaining a complaint. It was, therefore, held that the suspension order can be passed when an inquiry is contemplated. It makes it clear that the word 'contemplated' does not necessarily mean that there should be an inquiry pending nor can it be construed to mean that a preliminary inquiry must be made. The objective satisfaction can be had from a perusal of the records. For all these reasons the contention of the appellant has no force. 18. The question, however, which arises for consideration is whether there was sufficient material before the Director from which he could have objective satisfaction that a disciplinary inquiry be initiated against the appellant and he should be suspended forthwith. For all these reasons the contention of the appellant has no force. 18. The question, however, which arises for consideration is whether there was sufficient material before the Director from which he could have objective satisfaction that a disciplinary inquiry be initiated against the appellant and he should be suspended forthwith. In this connection it would e necessary to refer to certain papers on the record as they will show the appellant's conduct which unfortunately culminated in this inquiry. On 4-2-1970 Sri R.A. Garg draftsman working under the appellant complained that when he was taking his lunch the appellant asked him to leave the office and on his refusal locked him from outside. On this Sri Krishna, the Director, passed an order that complaints against the appellant were received even before. A strict warning should be given to him to behave properly in future. He went to the extent of cautioning him that in case he was not prepared to conduct himself property, he would do well by leaving them. The appellant's explanation was also called for. In the opinion of the Director the appellant had shown very bad and undesirable tendencies in his dealings with his colleagues (Ex. A-2). 19. On 6-2-1970 Sri Garg made another report stating that after his return from leave Sri Dudiala (Plaintiff-appellant) was not assigning him any work (Ex. A-3). 20. On 19-2-1970 Sri Garg came forward with another complaint (Ex, A-4) alleging that Sri Dudiala was showing rude behaviour towards him as well as towards other persons working in the drawing section. He prayed for necessary action. On this complaint the Director passed an order that the affair was becoming intolerable : Sri Dudiala was behaving in an irresponsible manner. 21. On 7-4-1970 Sri Garg gave an application (Ex, A-6) to the in-charge of Design and Drawing Section stating that highly objectionable words were uttered towards him and Sri Dudiala was constantly showing rude behaviour to him as well as to the officers of the Department. On 18-4-1970 Sri Ohri sent a report to the Director stating how the plaintiff-appellant was indulging in abusing, threatening and even misbehaving with his seniors as well as subordinates. According to him, an unmanageable stage had reached and authorities must take a serious note of the situation. On 18-4-1970 Sri Ohri sent a report to the Director stating how the plaintiff-appellant was indulging in abusing, threatening and even misbehaving with his seniors as well as subordinates. According to him, an unmanageable stage had reached and authorities must take a serious note of the situation. He even prayed that either he should be transferred from the Design Section or Sri Dudiala be posted in another section. On this report Sri Rao made his own endorsement. He also wrote that the appellant was misbehaving in various ways towards his colleagues and had become highly in-disciplined. It is Ex. A-7, 22. On 16-5-1970 Sri Banerjee, Senior Foreman, made a request to the Director that security measures for his life be taken as serious threats were being held out to him. On this Mr. Ohri gave a report stating that the appellant's conduct was highly undesirable. The Director warned the appellant. 23. It appears that the appellant was caught red handed doing a personal blue printing job in the drawing section of the Institute during office hours on 4-6-1970. When he was asked about it, he misbehaved with Sri Ohri. On 8-6-1970 the Director called upon the plaintiff-appellant to explain his conduct. On this office memorandum the appellant made the following endorsement : "I am sorry. I apologise, I shall not give any chance of complaint in future." The aforesaid makes it clear that the appellant had admitted his mistake and tendered an apology for it. It is Ex. A. 11. 24. On 10-6-1971 four persons had made a complaint against the appellant as highly objectionable language was used against them as well as against their superiors. It is Ex. A-17. 25. On 9-7-1971 seven persons made a complaint against the behaviour of the appellant and this is Ex. A-20. On the same day Sri Rastogi, the Section Officer, gave a detailed report (Ex. A-21) and brought all the facts to the notice of the Director. It may also be stated here that by means of Exs. A.12 to A.15 certain adverse entries were communicated to the appellant. A perusal of these documents including the complaints, the reports and the note of Sri Rastogi the Director arrived at the conclusion that there was prima facie material to show that the appellant was responsible for serious misconduct and indiscipline. Therefore, he passed an order that the plaintiff-appellant should be suspended forthwith. A perusal of these documents including the complaints, the reports and the note of Sri Rastogi the Director arrived at the conclusion that there was prima facie material to show that the appellant was responsible for serious misconduct and indiscipline. Therefore, he passed an order that the plaintiff-appellant should be suspended forthwith. It was clearly stated in the suspension order that the inquiry against him is contemplated. The aforesaid discussion makes it clear that there was host of material before the Director to which he had applied his mind and then arrived at the conclusion that inquiry should be made against the appellant and he should be suspended forthwith. I am reluctant to find favour with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the aforesaid complaints were procured by Sri Rao and Sri Ohri to serve their ends. On one occasion the appellant had himself tendered an apology without anywhere stating that he was innocent. There is not a single document on the record to show that he had represented to the Director that Sri Rao and Sri Ohri were encouraging other employees to make complaints against him. Therefore, there is no force in the contention that the complaints were procured. 26. The learned counsel for the appellant has also urged that in February 1971 the appellant was confirmed which shows that his work and conduct were found satisfactory. It is further argued that annual report about his work must have been sent by the end of April 1971 and as no adverse entry was communicated to him it can safely be said that nothing was found against his work or conduct. These facts, as a matter of fact, negative the appellant's contention that Sri Rao and Sri Ohri were actuated by malice and were the real brains behind the suspension order and the charge-sheet. If the appellant was confirmed and no adverse entry was given to him, it will go to show that Sri Rao and Sri Ohri bore no grudge towards him otherwise they would not have allowed him to be confirmed. In this connection it may be stated that a number of complaints were pouring in against the appellant from before the alleged confirmation. Adverse entries were communicated to him by Ex. A, 12 to A-15. The appellant was always apprised with those complaints and was warned. In this connection it may be stated that a number of complaints were pouring in against the appellant from before the alleged confirmation. Adverse entries were communicated to him by Ex. A, 12 to A-15. The appellant was always apprised with those complaints and was warned. He had himself tendered an apology and in these circumstances it may not have been considered fit to stop his confirmation or to give him an adverse entry in the hope that in future he would-show better conduct. 27. Another ground on which the suspension order has been assailed is that it was passed on 9-7-1971 and the appellant was suspended with immediate effect but on 24/28-7-1971 order fixing subsistence allowance was passed and in this order (Ex. A.2) it was stated that the appellant shall get subsistence allowance at the rate given from 13-7-1971. It is, therefore, urged that the operation of the suspension order was suspended and it rendered the suspension order ineffective. I cannot find favour with this contention because this ground was not taken in the plaint and the defendant got no opportunity to controvert it. There was no issue nor this point was pressed before the trial Court or the first appellate court. It was not taken even in the ground of appeal. Therefore, it cannot be considered. No illegality or irregularity has been pointed out in connection with the suspension order. 28. So far as the charge-sheet (Ex. 3) is concerned, it was served on 27-9-1971. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that according to the rules the charge-sheet should have been served shortly after the suspension order was passed. I have given my anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of this case and I find that there was absolutely no delay in serving the charge-sheet. 29. It is also argued that the charge-sheet was incomplete inasmuch as it did not contain all the enclosures and that the enclosures supplied to him did not bear signatures of the Director. This plea can very well be taken before the inquiry officer and on this score the validity of the charge-sheet cannot be attacked at this stage. The charge-sheet was served under rule 14 of the Rules and fulfils all its requirements. 30. No other point has been pressed in this connection. 31. This plea can very well be taken before the inquiry officer and on this score the validity of the charge-sheet cannot be attacked at this stage. The charge-sheet was served under rule 14 of the Rules and fulfils all its requirements. 30. No other point has been pressed in this connection. 31. Upon a careful examination of the entire material I find that there is no force in the appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. Since the appellant is under suspension the costs of appeal are made easy. Stay order dated 11-9-1974 is vacated.