JUDGMENT : H.N. Kapoor, J. These nine petitions have been filed by the firm Moti Lal Ram Kishan through its karta Moti Lal for quashing nine separate prosecutions u/s 276C of the income tax Act, 1961 for failure to file returns of the income of the Hindu Undivided Family for nine assessment years, that is, 1963-64 to 1971-72, inspite of notice having been served on the Petitioner u/s 148 read with Section 139(2) of the income tax Act. The Hindu Undivided Family did not file the returns for all the nine assessment years inspire of the notices which were duly served. Hence the joint family firm was prosecuted through its karta on the basis of nine separate complaints lodged by the income tax Officer after having been authorised by the Commissioner of income tax. An objection was raised before the learned Magistrate on behalf of the Petitioner that the Hindu Undivided Family was not an individual but a legal entity and as such it could not be prosecuted. This objection was rejected by the Magistrate. Nine revisions were then filed which were dismissed by Sri H.C. Lal VI Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur by his order dated 16-7-1974. 2. Sri Deoki Nandan, learned Counsel for the opposite party has raised a preliminary objection that these petitions should not be entertained because the effect would be circumventing the provisions of Section 379 Code of Criminal Procedure (New) which bars the filing of a second revision. In my opinion, these revisions should not have been at all entertained by the learned Sessions Judge as they were against interlocutory orders. This Court can certainly go into the question u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure whether no case is made out against the Petitioner on the basis of the complaint or the prosecution of the Petitioner is illegal on the face of it. 3. Sri Rajeshwari Pd., learned Counsel for the Petitioner has argued the oases at length on the assumption that Mohan Lal himself was not being prosecuted as karta of the Hindu Undivided Family. He has placed reliance on the case of Kapurchand Shrimal Vs. 3. Sri Rajeshwari Pd., learned Counsel for the Petitioner has argued the oases at length on the assumption that Mohan Lal himself was not being prosecuted as karta of the Hindu Undivided Family. He has placed reliance on the case of Kapurchand Shrimal Vs. Tax Recovery Officer, Hyderabad and Others, AIR 1969 SC 682 in which it was held that the manager of the Hindu Undivided Family cannot be sent to prison u/s 222 of the income tax Act during recovery proceedings for default of the Hindu Undivided Family, as the Assessee was the Hindu Undivided Family and not the manager. He has argued that u/s 276C of the Act the word "person" in fact refers to the word "Assessee" as the Assessee alone can be required to submit the returns u/s 139(1) and (2) of the Act. In my opinion, for the purpose of these cases it is not necessary to go into the question and to decide whether the manager of the Hindu Undivided Family can be prosecuted u/s 276C or not. In the present case the Hindu Undivided Family firm known by the designation 'Moti Lal Ram Kishan' is being prosecuted though, no doubt, through its karta. It does not mean that the manager can be sent to prison or himself punished in his individual capacity simply because the firm is being prosecuted through him. Sri Deoki Nandan has also conceded that the fair reading appears to be that the Hindu Undivided Family is being prosecuted and not the karta. In case Moti Lal was himself prosecuted, he could have been made another accused along with the firm. 4. Learned Counsel for' the Petitioner next argued that the prosecution for default in respect of eight assessment years except the assessment year 1971-72 (which is the subject-matter of Cr. Misc. Case No. 4359 of 1974) is illegal and is against the provision of Section 276C as the proviso to the section is that a person will not be proceeded against in case he has failed to furnish returns u/s 139 of the Act for any assessment year commencing prior to the first day of April, 1971. It would be proper to reproduce the entire Section 276C. It would be proper to reproduce the entire Section 276C. 276-C. If a person wilfully fails to furnish in due time the return of income which he is required to furnish under Sub-section (1) of Section 139 or by notice given under Sub-section (2) of Section 139 or Section 148, he shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine equal to a sum calculated at a rate which shall not be less than four rupees or more than ten rupees for every day during which the default continues or with both: Provided that a person shall not be proceeded against under this section for failure to furnish in due time the return of income under Sub-section (1) of Section 139: (i) for any assessment year commencing prior to the 1st day of April, 1971; or (ii) for any assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April 1971, if- (a) the return is furnished by him before the expiry of the assessment year; or (b) the tax payable by him on the total income determined on regular assessment, as reduced by the advance tax, if any, paid, and any tax deducted at source, does not exceed three thousand rupees. The plain reading of the section is that the provision is applicable only to a case falling under Sub-section (1) of Section 139 of the Act and not to a case falling under Sub-section (2) of Section 139 of the Act or u/s 148 thereof. The complaint case is that the Petitioner failed to submit returns inspite of the notice issued u/s 148 read with Section 139(2) of the Act requiring it to submit the returns within thirty days. There is thus no force in this contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. 5. Lastly the learned Counsel for the Petitioner argued that the Hindu Undivided Family cannot be prosecuted u/s 276C of the Act because the section provides that the person proceeded against can be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year. The section also provides in the alternative that the person can be punished with fine only. He has also argued that there can be no mens rea in the case of a corporate body. The section also provides in the alternative that the person can be punished with fine only. He has also argued that there can be no mens rea in the case of a corporate body. He has placed reliance on certain observations made in the case of Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. A.R. Gonsalves Bunder Inspector Karachi Port Trust (1925) 26 CriLJ 137. It will suffice to say that that revision was ultimately dismissed although it was against the prosecution of the Punjab National Bank. The court itself observed that there may be cases in which mens rea is not essential and in which it is possible for the court to pass a sentence of fine only. He has laid great stress on the words "fine only" and has argued that this implies that the corporate body can be punished only for such offences in which the sentence of fine only is prescribed and not the sentence of imprisonment. In that case the Punjab National Bank was impleaded for infringement of certain bye-laws of the Port Trust. The relevant bye laws were not produced before me and it is not known whether imprisonment was also provided or not for the infringement of those bye-laws. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the opposite party has relied on two unreported cases of this Court in which it was held that a company can be prosecuted even u/s 276B under which the sentence of imprisonment is mandatory. These cases are; Atherton West Co. Ltd. Kanpur v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, income tax Cr. Misc. No. 4553 of 1972 decided by K.B. Asthana, J. (as he then was) dated 28-8-1974 (Alld.) and Laxmi Ratan Cotton Mills v. S.K. Bhatnagar Cr. Ref. No. 165 of 1974 connected with Cr. Reference Nos. 166 and 167 of 1974 D-/ 16-5-75 (Alld.) by Bakshi, J.. In the later case an authority of Delhi High Court was cited: D.C. Goel v. B.L. Verma 1974 (93) ITR 90. The Delhi High Court had held that the company cannot be prosecuted u/s 276B as the sentence of imprisonment was mandatory. In both the cases cited above decided by our High Court it was held that the company can be prosecuted and sentenced to a fine while the principal officer of the company can be sentenced to imprisonment. The Delhi High Court had held that the company cannot be prosecuted u/s 276B as the sentence of imprisonment was mandatory. In both the cases cited above decided by our High Court it was held that the company can be prosecuted and sentenced to a fine while the principal officer of the company can be sentenced to imprisonment. In those cases the learned Judges took Section 204 of the Act into consideration which clearly provided that the company including the principal officer was responsible for making the payment. It may be observed here that in both these cases the principal officer was also arrayed as one of the accused. Bakshi, J. has, no doubt, observed, "that when a company is impleaded as a party for an offence u/s 276B it should be made a party through its principal officer. In that event the sentence of imprisonment which is imposed upon the company acting through its principal officer would have to be undergone by the principal officer himself." As already stated above, in that case the principal officer was already arrayed as an accused. By those observations made by the learned Judge in that case, it should not be deemed that in every case when a company, firm or Hindu Undivided Family is made an accused through the principal officer, the managing partner or the Manager, that principal officer or the Manager is also liable to be convicted and sentenced apart from the company, or the firm or the Hindu Undivided Family, unless such a principal officer or the manager was also arrayed as one of the accused. 6. In the present case there is no difficulty whatsoever. Section 276C of the Act provides for a sentence of imprisonment or of fine only, and the Hindu Undivided Family can easily be punished with fine. 7. All these petitions have, therefore, no force and are accordingly dismissed subject to the observations made above. It is made clear that if at any stage Motilal is prosecuted separately as an accused, it would be open to him to take such legal pleas as are open to him which have not been decided in these petitions.