JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :- In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioners are challenging the validity of a Notification dated 25th September, 1974 passed in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the 1948 Act.) 2. The facts of this case may be shortly set out as follows: The petitioners are stated to be the owners of plots of land appertenant to 21.81 acres of lands of Mouza Arakpur, P.S. Jadavpur, District24 Parganas, the particulars of which are given in the schedule to the petition. By an order dated 12th of November, 1941 vast area of land at Mouza Arakpur was requisitioned for and on behalf the then British India. Such requisition was made for a public purpose, namely, for securing the Defence of British India, Public Safety, the maintenance of public order and the efficient prosecution of war and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. Such requisition was made under Rule 79 (1), (2) and (3) of Defence of India Rules, 1939 framed under the Defence of India Act, 1939 and continued under the amended Rule 75A thereof (hereinafter referred to as the 1939 Rules). The possession of the reqisitioned lands including the lands of the petitioners was handed over to the Military Estate Officer, the respondent No.5 in the Writ petition. After the war came to an end the requisition continued under the Requisitioned Land (Continuance of Powers) Ordinance, 1946 and thereafter by the Requisitioned Land (Continuance of Powers) Act, 1947. Such requisition was thereafter continued by the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the 1952 Act). Under the said 1952 Act all these lands became deemed to requisitioned under the 1952 Act. Thereafter on the 31st of August, 1948 a notification was issued which was published in the Calcutta Gazette on the 2nd September, 1948. The said notification was issued in exercise of powers conferred under Section 4 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Ordinance, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the 1948 Ordinance) which was replaced by the said 1948 Act. The said notification was issued in exercise of powers conferred under Section 4 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Ordinance, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the 1948 Ordinance) which was replaced by the said 1948 Act. The said Notification stated that the lands specified therein, which included the lands of the petitioners, were likely to be needed for a public purpose, namely, for the settlement of the migrants from outside the Province of West Bengal, the establishment of a satellite town and the creation of better living condition in urban areas. On the 17th of June, 1949 the District Rehabilitation Officer, Alipore, 24-Parganas, submitted his report wherein he stated, inter alia, that if the lands specified there were acquired it would cause hardship to a large number of people and he was of the opinion that the said lands should be excluded from this scheme. It is stated that these included the lands of the petitioners. By another notification dated 15th September, 1949, declaration under Section 6 of the said 1948 Act was issued in respect of certain lands specified therein. The admitted position is that the petitioners lands were not included therein. Thereafter a series of correspondence took place between the Military Estate Officer and the Land Acquisition Collector (hereinafter referred to as the Collector) on the one hand and the petitioners on the other. The sum and substance of which was that on the one hand the Military Estate Officer and the Collector were willing to release the lands to the petitioners if the petitioners were willing to accept the same without insisting the eviction of unauthorised occupiers who had encroached on the said land meanwhile. The petitioners refused to accept such offer and they wanted release of the requisitioned lands without these unauthorised persons. On the 10th of March, 1970, the petitioners made an application under Article 226 of the Constitution in this Court praying for issue of appropriate writs commanding the respondent to release the said properties and to restore the same to the owners in as good condition as it was when the possession of the same was taken under the 1939 Rules. A Rule Nisi was issued on the said application, being Civil Rule 1768 (w) of 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the earlier writ petition) After the completion of the affidavits the 5aid Rule was heard by Chittatosb Mookerjee J. who by his judgment and Order dated 23rd of March, 1973 made the Rule absolute. A writ of Mandamus was directed to be issued commanding the respondents therein to release the said properties and to restore the same to the owners in as good a condition as things were when possession thereof was taken under Rule 75A of the 1939 Rules. The said respondents were directed to forbear from imposing a condition that the said release shall be made provided that the owners of the lands accept possession with the squatters thereon. Mookerjee J. granted the respondents therein 18 months' time to act and proceed in term of the said mandate. It was however made clear that nothing in the said Order would preclude the respondents therein from exercising their power to acquire the5e lands in accordance with law. On the 6th of September, 1974 an application was made by the Military authorities for extensions of time for complying with the said direction given by Chittatosh Mookerjee J. On the 11th of September, 1974 an order was passed in the said application whereby the time for giving vacant possession to the petitioners was extended till 30th of November, 1974. On the 25th of September, 1974 the impugned notification under Section 4 (1) of the 1948 Act was issued. The present application was made, Rule was issued by this Court on the 25th of November. 1974. On the same date another application was made by the Military Authorities for further extension of time to comply with the order passed in the earlier writ petition. On the 23rd of May, 1975 the application of Military authorities dated 25th of November, 1974 was disposed of by Chittatosh Mookerjee J. whereby the time to deliver vacant possession of the disputed lands was extended till 30th September, 1975. On 22nd of September, 1975 an application was made on behalf of the Collector for extension of time to comply with the order dated 23rd of March, 1973, till six months after the disposal of the present Rule. On 22nd of September, 1975 an application was made on behalf of the Collector for extension of time to comply with the order dated 23rd of March, 1973, till six months after the disposal of the present Rule. On the 23rd of September, 1975 there was another application by the Military Authorities for the further extension of time to comply with the order dated 23rd of March 1973 till the disposal of the present Rule. The said two applications are pending before Chittatosh Mookerjee J. 3. The first submission made by Mr. Chakrabarti, appearing in support of the Rule was that the notification in question was wholly without jurisdiction. It was submitted that the State Government had no authority or jurisdiction to issue any such notification under the 1948 Act in respect of the lands in question. In this context Mr. Chakrabarti drew my attention to the provisions of the 1952 Act. He submitted that Section 24 of the 1952 Act repealed the Requisitioned Land (Continuance of Powers) Act 1947, the Delhi Premises (Requisition and Eviction) Act, 1941 and the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Ordinance. 1952. However, it was provided that any property which immediately before such repeal was subject to requisition under provisions of either of the said Acts or the said Ordinance shall, on the commencement of the 1952 Act, be deemed to be property requisitioned under Section 3 of the 1952 Act, and all the provisions of the 1952 Act shall apply accordingly. He pointed out that, admittedly, the lands in question were, immediately before such repeal, subject to requisition under the 1952 Act and accordingly the said lands will be deemed to be requisitioned under section 3 of the 1952 Act. He next relied on Section 6(1) of the 1952 Act which provides that where the purposes for which any requisitioned property is being used, cease to exist, the Central Government shall, unless the property is acquired under Section 7 of the said Act, release that property from requisition. It further provides that where the property is to be released it must be restored in as good a condition as it was when possession, thereof was taken subject to reasonable wear and tear. Mr. Chakrabarti further drew my attention to Section 7 of the 1952 Act which confers power on the Central Government to acquire a property which is subject to requisition. Mr. Chakrabarti further drew my attention to Section 7 of the 1952 Act which confers power on the Central Government to acquire a property which is subject to requisition. In view of the aforesaid Mr. Chakraborti submitted that when released from requisition, the property must be restored in as good a condition as it was when the possession was taken and accordingly it was not open to the Military Estate Officer to insist that the petitioners should accept the release from requisition with the squatters. Secondly he submitted that when the purpose for which it was originally acquired has ceased to exist there is no option but to release the properties from requisition unless the property is acquired under Section 7 of the 1952 Act. In this case, the admitted position is that there has been no acquisition under Section 7 of the 1952 Act and no step has been taken for any such acquisition. He further pointed out that there is already an order of the Court holding that the property was no longer required for the original purpose and they must be returned to the petitioners free from the squatters. Having regard to the same, Mr. Chakrabarti submitted that the State G0vernment has no authority or jurisdiction to issue such notification under the 1948 Act in respect of such lands. He submitted that any acquisition in respect of this land could be made only under section 7 of the 1952 Act and not under any other provisions of any other Act. The second submission of Mr. Chakrabarti was that the order was passed mala fide in order to circumvent the provisions of the 1952 Act and the Writ issued by this Court in the earlier writ petition whereby the respondents were directed to restore the property to the petitioners without squatters. He submitted that the main reason for this was that if any acquisition was made under the 1952 Act, the rate of compensation would be higher than if it is acquired under the 1948 Act. In this context Mr. Chakrabarti also drew my attention to the events which have taken place before and after this Rule in this Writ petition was issued. In this context Mr. Chakrabarti also drew my attention to the events which have taken place before and after this Rule in this Writ petition was issued. He submitted that after before the Rule was made absolute by Mookerjee J, the authorities concerned were refusing to hand over the possession without the squatters and after the Rule was made absolute they made applications more than one for extension of time to comply with the Court's order. However, he submitted, it is clear that there was no intention to hand over the possession of the property and on the other hand this impugned notification was issued malafide in colourable exercise of power in order to circumvent the provisions of the 1952 Act and the order passed by this Court. In this context, he also referred to the earlier notification under the 1948 Act in respect of these lands which was, as already stated, not proceeded with later so far as the petitioners lands are concerned. 4. During the reply Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee (appearing with Mr. N. C. Chakravarti) submitted that in any event as the lands are still under requisition under the 1952 Act, the proceedings under the 1948 Act was illegal. In this connection Mr. Mukherjee relied on the decision of a single Judge of this court in the case of (1) Dhone Gopal Mukherjee & Ors. v. Secretary, Land and land Revenue Department, Government of West Bengal reported in AIR 1966 Cal 348 . The admitted position is that the land in question is deemed to be requisitioned under the provisions of the Section 3 of the 1952 Act. The further admitted position is that once the purpose for which the requisition was made ceased to exist, the property must be released from requisition under the 1952 Act and the property restored in a condition as good as it was when the requisition was made. The further admitted position is that the Central Government has power to acquire under Section 7 of the 1952 Act such requisitioned properties but the said power has not been exercised in this particular case. The admitted position further is that in the earlier writ petition Mookerjee J. directed restoration of property. But does it follow that no other body or authority has any power or jurisdiction to acquire such land under any other provision of any other Act? The admitted position further is that in the earlier writ petition Mookerjee J. directed restoration of property. But does it follow that no other body or authority has any power or jurisdiction to acquire such land under any other provision of any other Act? That is the basic question which is to be decided in this application. 5. The 1952 Act makes it clear that requisition under the said Act are requisitions by the Central Government and the duty to release and restore the property is also the duty of the Central Government. The power to acquire under Section 7 of 1952 Act has also been conferred on the Central Government. These are the powers and duties of the Central Government. But the State Government has also certain powers to acquire lands including those conferred by the 1948 Act. The validity of the 1948 Act is not challenged before me. In my opinion this power of the State Government under the 1948 Act can be exercised even if it is not exercised by the Central Government under the 1952 Act. The State Government cannot be prevented from exercising power under an Act merely because the Central Government has not chosen to exercise its power under some other Act. It may also be that the purpose for the acquisition is not an Union purpose but a State purpose. It is true that by virtue of the provisions of the 1952 Act, the Central Government h bound to release the property in its original condition because the original purpose of requisition is no longer there but that does not and cannot prevent the State Government from exercising its right, under the 1948 Act. It is also true that Mookerjee J. directed the release of the property in its original condition but the said order did not prevent the State Government from taking steps to acquire the said property under the 1948 Act. As a matter of fact as already stated, it was expressly made clear that nothing in the said Order would however preclude respondents from exercising their power to acquire those lands in accordance with law. "In accordance with law" could not have meant in accordance with the 1952 Act alone. It meant in accordance with any law whether the 1952 Act or some other Act. "In accordance with law" could not have meant in accordance with the 1952 Act alone. It meant in accordance with any law whether the 1952 Act or some other Act. A faint submission was sought to be made that Mookerjee J. gave such liberty only to the "respondents" therein and that the State of West Bengal not being a respondent in the earlier Writ petition, the State Government cannot take advantage of such liberty given. There is no merit in this contention. The Collector of 24-Parganas and the First Land Acqui5ition Collector were party respondents therein. Moreover, if we proceed on the basis that the State was not a party respondent and therefore cannot take advantage of that liberty, that would not make the issue of the impugned order bad. In that event the State not being a party would not be bound by that order and accordingly the order made in the earlier writ petition could not be set up against an exercise of power by the State Government under the 1948 Act. For the aforesaid reasons, I reject this contention of Mr. Chakrabarti. I hold that merely because property in question was not acquired by the Central Government under Section 7 of the 1952 Act, it did not prevent the State Government from exercising its power of acquisition under the 1948 Act. 6. It is convenient at this stage to dispose of the submission of Mr. Mukherjee in reply relying on the decision of Dhone Gopal Mukherjee (Supra). In that case the Notification and Declaration under sections 4 and 6 of the 1948 Act were chal1enged. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that since the initial order of requisition original1y made under Rule 75A of the 1939 Rules was still subsisting, it was Dot competent for the State Government to acquire the lands under the 1948 Act without first derequisitioning the lands and restoring them to petitioner. It was held in that case that the original purpose for which the land had been requisitioned had ceased and it was incumbent on the respondents to release the land. It was held in that case that the original purpose for which the land had been requisitioned had ceased and it was incumbent on the respondents to release the land. It was observed that it was not open to the respondent No. 5 to contend that he did not comply with his legal; duty under one statute because there was another statutory power provided for by another Legislature and for another purpose which could be used in respect of the same property. In my opinion, this decision has no application in the present- case. In Dhone Gopal's case the initial order of requisition was subsisting when the orders were made under Sections 4 and 6 of the 1948 Act. In the present case it cannot be said that the initial order of requisition was subsisting when the impugned notification was issued under the 1948 Act. The requisition under the 1952 Act was declared to be no longer good in the earlier Writ petition, because the original purpose was no longer there. Accordingly it was directed that the property' was to be released in its original condition, that is, without the squatters. Accordingly it cannot be said that at the time of the issue of the notification under 1948 Act the initial order of requisition under 1952 Act was still subsisting merely because possession had not been restored pursuant to the order of Mookerjee J. There is another aspect of this matter. In DhonegopaI's case there was a Notification under Section 4 and also a Declaration under Section 6 of the 1948 Act. In the present case there is only a Notification under section 4 of the 1948 Act. There is still no Declaration under section 6 of the 1948 Act. Accordingly it cannot be said that there has been any acquisition under the 1948 Act uptil now. Accordingly the decision in Dhonegopal' Case had no application in the facts of the present case. In this context it may be pointed out that an appeal is pending against the aforesaid decisions. For the aforesaid reasons, I reject the contention of Mr. Mukherjee. 7. Before I express my opinion about the allegation of malafide it is necessary to set out some additional facts relevant for the same. This would appear from the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the petitioners herein. For the aforesaid reasons, I reject the contention of Mr. Mukherjee. 7. Before I express my opinion about the allegation of malafide it is necessary to set out some additional facts relevant for the same. This would appear from the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the petitioners herein. In the said affidavit-in-reply the applications made by the Military authorities and the Collector have been annexed. As already stated the first application, that is, the application or the Union of India and Military Authorities, was for modification of the order dated 23rd March, 1973 by extending the time to comply with the said order. In this application it was staled as follows : "That in obedience to the said order the Military authorities at Calcutta sub-area started taking steps to comply with this Hon'ble Court's order but they were faced with difficulties. There are 160 civilians who have encroached upon the land and they refused to give their names and other particulars. But finally their names etc was obtained and issuing of show cause Notices to them was started. A copy of the said letter dated 17.7.73 written by the General Officer Commanding, Head-quarter Bengal Area to the Head quarter, Eastern Command is annexed herewith as Annexure A to this petition. That the Military Authorities at Calcutta carried on the said process of eviction and apprehended that the eviction of the affected persons may not be peaceful as the respondents of the Camp have got a Strong Union (refugee Union) and accordingly requests the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, by their letter dated 20.3.74 that a strong police force with an officer-in-charge including one Lady police may be detailed to report to this Head-quarters at Old Command Hospital Building in front of Race Course ground at 10 hours on 29.3.74. A copy of the same is annexed herewith as Annexure B to this petition. But on account of administrative reasons it was not possible to take the operation on 29.3.74 and instead thereof 29.4.74 was fixed as the date to carry out the eviction. A copy of the letter dated 17.4.74 is annexed herewith as Annexure C to this petition. That subsequently the said date was changed to 11th May, 1974 and the Military authorities wrote a letter to the Deputy Commissioner of Police (South) Calcutta for making suitable arrangement for necessary police force. A copy of the letter dated 17.4.74 is annexed herewith as Annexure C to this petition. That subsequently the said date was changed to 11th May, 1974 and the Military authorities wrote a letter to the Deputy Commissioner of Police (South) Calcutta for making suitable arrangement for necessary police force. A copy of the said letter dated 8.5.74 is annexed herewith as Annexure D to this petition. That in this state of circumstances, one K. Biswas I.A.S.. Joint Secretary to Government of West Bengal, R R. & R. Department, Govt. of West Bengal, Calcutta had a telephonic convenation with the Station Commander Calcutta wherein it was communicated by the said Joint Secretary to the Station Commander that the Government of West Bengal in the R.R. & R. Department shall endeavoure to receive the 24 squatting families within a period of 2 months from the plots of land in question by offering them alternative accommodation elsewhere and thereby release the land into the Military authorities. The said conversation was affirmed by a letter dated 13.5.7 written by the Joint Secretary aforesaid. A copy of the said letter is annexed herewith as Annexure E to this petition. In view of the aforesaid the removal could not be made on 11.5.74. That in the aforesaid state of circumstances the Military Authorities deputed two of its officers to ascertain as to the latest development regarding the disputed land. The refugee Rehabilitation Commissioner/Secretary intimated to Brigadiar D. Chand, Station Commander, Calcutta, that the Chief Minister of West Bengal bas recently sent a letter to the Deputy Defence Minister Sri J. B. Patnaik requesting him to see that 234 families in the Jodhpur K Site land Tollygunj are not driven away by force without first arranging for their alternative arrangements as the said families would be put to severe strain and trouble if they are uprooted. It was further stated by the Chief Minister that the State Government would now like to rehabilitate these families in situ, i. e. at their present place, on acquisition of these lands after derequisition by the Army Authorities. It was further stated by the Chief Minister that the State Government would now like to rehabilitate these families in situ, i. e. at their present place, on acquisition of these lands after derequisition by the Army Authorities. As however the process of acquisition of land is a very lengthy process the Chief Minister requested to the Deputy Defence Minister to arrange for moving the Hon'ble Court at Calcutta for extension of time, at least a year during which the State Government will acquire the subject land through the process of law. A copy of the letter written by the Chief Minister dated 12.6.74 and the letter dated 14/15 June, 1974 are annexed herewith as annexures F and F1 to this petition respectively. That on the undertaking as given by the Chief Minister, West Bengal, the local Military authorities were instructed to move this Hon'ble Court for extension of the period granted by the Hon'ble Court based on the advice of the Branch Secretariate, Ministry of Law at Calcutta. A copy of the said letter dated 20.6.74 is annexed herewith as Annexure Gitu this petition. That the confirmation of the decision taken by the Chief Minister, West Bengal, Deputy Secretary, Govt. of West Bengal lastly on 19.8.74, intimated to your petitioner that Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department of the Government of West Bengal is dealing with this matter with top most priority. A copy of the said letter is annexed herewith as annexure 'H' to this petition." As already stated, upon this applications this time was extended till 30th of November, 1974. As already stated a second application was made by the Union of India and Military Authorities, which was affirmed on 25th of November, 1974, for further extension of time, wherein it was stated as follows : That in obedience to the said order where the Military Authorities were taking steps to have the squatters removed from the disputed properties in State of West Bengal through it, Hon'ble Chief Minister proposed to acquire the disputed properties, under the Land Development and Planning Act (Act XXI of 1948), so as to prevent a large number of refugee families being thrown in the street and their livelihood and accordingly requested the petitioner to this Hon'ble Court for modification of the order as passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chittatosh Mookerjee on 23-3-1973 and/or for extension of the time granted by his Lordship. Justice Chittatosh Mookerjee on 23-3-1973 and/or for extension of the time granted by his Lordship. That accordingly an application to the above effect was made by the present petitioner and his Lordship after hearing the parties including the State of West Bengal was pleased to extend the time as granted in the original order dated 23rd March, 1973 till 30th November, 1974. That subsequent to the order as passed on 9th of September, 1974 the State of West Bengal on 26th September, 1974 issued a Notification under Section 4 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act of 1948, which provide for clear 30 days time to file objection to the said Acquisition. A copy of the said Gazette Notification is annexed herewith as annexure I to this petition. That the Deputy Secretary of the Government West Bengal intimated that immediately on hearing objections, if any, the draft declaration under Section 6 of the said Act will be sent to Government by the Land Acquisition Collector, 24-parganas. A copy of the said letter addressed to the Senior Central Government Solicitor as given is annexed herewith as annexure 2 to this application. That it prima facie appears that the State Government has moved in the matter with the bonafide intention to complete the Acquisition proceedings as quickly as possible. But in view of the parapharnalias required to be observed as provided under the law, the acquisition cannot be completed with the extended time as granted by his Lordship, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chittatosh Mookerjee." As already stated, pursuant to this application time was extended till 30th of September, 1975. Thereafter Collector made an application, which was affirmed on 22nd of September, 1975, for further extention of time wherein it was stated as follows : "That his Lordship the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chittatosh Mookerjee was further pleased to hold that Nothing in this order will, however preclude the Respondents from exercising their power to acquire these lands in accordance with law." That the State of West Bengal, after carefully considering the facts and circumstances of the case, and in order to give settlement to a large number of immigrants who have migrated to the State of West Bengal on account of circumstances beyond their control decided to acquire the disputed properties under the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act. 1948 (West Bengal Act XXI of 1948) so that a large number of refugee families who have already settled in the disputed plots may not be uprooted again and thrown out in the streets. That in compliance with the order and liberty given by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chittatosh Mookerjee, your petitioner by a notification issued and published on September, 25, 1974 sought to acquire the disputed properties along with other properties for the settlement of immigrants who have migrated into the State of West Bengal on account of circumstances beyond their control. The said Notification was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1943. That your petitioner further states that on hearing the objection if any the declaration under section 6 of the Act will be sent to the Land Acquisition Dept. of Govt. so that the acquisition proceedings may be completed as quickly as possible. That the said notification dated 25th September, 1974 has been challenged by Sm. Kamala Bala Sen and 190rs. in this Hon'ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and a rule, being Civil Rule No. 6843 (w) of 1974 has been issued for rescinding/recalling/and/or setting aside the impugned notification and an interim order of injunction has also been issued restraining the Respondents therein from giving effect to or further effect to the said Notification dated 25th September, 1974 and restraining them from proceeding any further with the said notification and/or withholding payment of monthly compensation as payable under the order of requisition to the petitioner in the said rule. That your petitioner states that in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances prima facie it will appear that although the State Government has taken the aforesaid step with a malafide intention to complete the acquisition proceeding as quickly as possible it court to be completed in view of the subsequent injunction order passed in C.R. No. 6843 (W) of 1974 obtained by the petitioner in the main Rule against the notification issued by the Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, under section 4 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948. Your petitioner further states that they are trying their best to have the said rule, namely C. R. 6834 (W) of 1974 which is really for hearing heard out and the injunction be vacated but has not yet been successful in that matter, although the case was mentioned before the Hon'ble Justice Sabyasachi Mukherjee who was pleased not to pass any order for hearing." The Union of India and the Military Authorities moved their third application, which was affirmed on 23rd of September, 1975, for extension of time. 8. From this it is clear that there is no question of mala fides in issuing this notification. I have already held that the fact that the land in question was requisitioned under the 1952 Act and the fact that this Court had directed on the application of the petitioner for release of the said property requisitioned under the 1952 Act did not prevent the State Government from taking steps under the 1948 Act. If they had such authority or jurisdiction, I do not see how in the facts and circumstances of this case their action can be called as malafide. The original requisition was by the Central Government. They were directed to release the property because the original purpose of requisition had expired. But that did not prevent the State of West Bengal to exercise their powers of acquisition under the 1948 Act. It is true that in the present case there was an order by this Court directing restoration of the said property. It is also true that in view of that order that the impugned notification has been issued and steps, are being taken for acquisition of the said land under the 1948 Act but that would not make the impugned notification malafide. There is no malafide so far as the Central Government is concerned because they have clearly set out their positions in their applications. There is no mala fide so far as the State Government is concerned because, as set out in the application for extention and/or modification, they are taking the steps in view of the peculiar situation which has been created. It is not being challenged before me that the impugned notification is bad because the object of the intended acquisition was not for public purpose or for the purposes specified under the 1948 Act. It is not being challenged before me that the impugned notification is bad because the object of the intended acquisition was not for public purpose or for the purposes specified under the 1948 Act. As a matter of fact the object of acquisition is clearly for public purpose and within the object of the 1948 Act. That being so, if under the circumstances set out above, the State Government had decided to take steps as they have done, it cannot be said that they have acted malafide. It should also be pointed out that in his order Mookerjee J. while making the Rule absolute has clearly stated that nothing contained in the said order would however preclude the respondents from exercising their powers to acquire this land in accordance with law. Therefore, the question of malafide or circumventing the order of the Court or the provisions of 1952 Act cannot and does not arise. 9. It is true that on an earlier occasion the notification under the Land Development Ordinance in respect of these lands was withdrawn by the State Government. But that was as far back as the year 1949. Merely because 20 years earlier the then Government thought it fit not to proceed with the acquisition of the said land under the said Ordinance does not mean that the present Government cannot now come to a bonafide decision to acquire the said land. Such decision cannot be held to be malafide merely because of such on earlier action 26 years back. The object and circumstances under which the impugned notification was issued have been made clear in the said application referred to above. 10. The position remains that the Central Government was willing to hand over the properties with squatters which the petitioners refused to accept. This Court directed the respondents to restore the properties in its original condition. Attempts were made to give effect to the Court's Order. However, for the reasons stated hereinabove, the West Bengal Government thought it fit and proper that these families should be rehabilitated at their present place of residence, i.e. in these particular lands. The State Government has taken into consideration the fact if the squatters are removed from these properties, it would cause hardship to a large number of refugees and their families. Accordingly they have decided to acquire those lands under the 1948 Act. The State Government has taken into consideration the fact if the squatters are removed from these properties, it would cause hardship to a large number of refugees and their families. Accordingly they have decided to acquire those lands under the 1948 Act. It is true that this action of the State Government had been occasioned by an order of this Court but that would not, by itself, make such action illegal or mala fide. On the other hand, it can be said that the action of the State Government is very much bonafide having regard to the situation which has been created. For the aforesaid reasons I reject this contention of Mr. Chakrabarti. I bold that the petitioner had failed to show that the impugned notification has been issued malafide. 11. An the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners fail. Accordingly I dismiss this application and discharge the Rule. No order as to costs. The interim order, if any, stands vacated. 12.Mr. Banerjee prays for stay of the operation of the order. Such prayer is refused.