Judgment :- SETHURAMAN, J. The Tribunal has referred for our opinion the following question :- "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the matter fell within the exceptions contemplated in S. 150(1) of the IT Act, 1961." * 2. One Visalakshi Achi held shares in Maragathavalli (P) Ltd., a company in which the public were not substantially interested. On 30th August, 1945 she borrowed from it a sum of Rs. 70, 000. She died in April, 1947 and these shares were inherited by her son Manickvasagam Chettiar, the assessee herein. He undertook to discharge the liability to the company. The sum of Rs. 70, 000 alongwith the interest due appeared in the name of Visalakshi Achi till her death in the company's books. During the year ended 31st March 1948 the sum due in her account was transferred to the account of Manickvasagam Chettiar, the assessee herein, and interest was being paid by him. As on 31st March, 1955, the amount due by him in this account was Rs. 49, 994. 3. By the Finance Act of 1955, S. 2(6A)(e) and S. 12(1B) were introduced into the IT Act, 1922, S. 2(6A)(e) defined a 'dividend' as including any payment by a company, not being a company in which the public were substantially interested within the meaning of S. 23-A of the Act, of any sum by way of advance or loan to a share-holder or any payment by such company on behalf or for the individual benefit of the shareholder to the extent to which the company in either case passed accumulated profits. The obvious intendment of the provision was to tax loans granted to a shareholder in a closely held company as dividends. As this provision was introduced into the IT Act only w.e.f. 1st April, 1955, it would have enabled taxation only of loans or advances made to a shareholder of a closely held company during the relevant previous year. In order to being into the net of taxation even the loans and advances made in the earlier years, S. 12(1-B) of the Act was introduced and it runs as follows :- "12(1-B). Any payment by a company to a shareholder by way of advance or loan which would have been treated as a dividend within the meaning of cl. In order to being into the net of taxation even the loans and advances made in the earlier years, S. 12(1-B) of the Act was introduced and it runs as follows :- "12(1-B). Any payment by a company to a shareholder by way of advance or loan which would have been treated as a dividend within the meaning of cl. (3) of sub-s. (6-A) of S. 2 in any previous year relevant to any assessment year prior to the assessment year ending on the 31st March, 1956, had that clause been in force in the year, shall be treated as a dividend received by him in the previous year relevant to the assessment year ending on the 31st March, 1956, if such loan or advance remained outstanding on the first day of such previous year." * 4. If this provisions was to be literally administered then whenever any loan was granted, so long as it was outstanding on the first day of the relevant previous year, it would have to be assessed. In order to alleviate the hardship that would result in assessees being taken unawares by the introduction of this provisions, the Minister for Finance gave an assurance on the floor of parliament that it, the loans outstanding on the first day of the previous year were repaid before the 30th June, 1955, then S. 12(1-B) would not be brought into operation in respect of such opening balances. 5. As in the present case, the assessee had not so repaid the loan of Rs. 49, 041-8-6 as shown by the accounts of Markathavalli (P) Limited as on 1st April, 1954, the ITO sought to apply S. 12(1-B) of the Act. The assessee contended before him that it was not a loan advanced to him (Manickavasagam Chettiar) on 30th August, 1945 and that S. 12(1-B) of the Act had not discharged the loan before the extended time limit of 30th June, 1955 it had, therefore no application. The ITO held that inasmuch as the assessee had to be treated as a dividend within the meaning of S. 12(1-B) of the Act. He took into account the accumulated profits as on 30th June, 1954, which he determined to Rs. 12, 842. He brought to tax this amount. That assessment was confirmed by the AAC. The ITO held that inasmuch as the assessee had to be treated as a dividend within the meaning of S. 12(1-B) of the Act. He took into account the accumulated profits as on 30th June, 1954, which he determined to Rs. 12, 842. He brought to tax this amount. That assessment was confirmed by the AAC. In the appeal to the Tribunal one of the contentions was that payment by the company to the shareholder by way of advance or loan should have been capable of being treated as a dividend in the year in which such payment was made and that in 1945 it could not have been so treated, so that S. 12(1-B) of the Act did not apply. It is not clear as to how the Tribunal understood the contention so advanced, and in a brief order it sustained the assessment. The assessee brought the matter on reference to this Court on the following question :- "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. 12, 842 was liable to be treated as dividend within the meaning of S. 2(6-A)(e) r/w S. 12(1-B) of the Indian IT Act ?" * The reference was answered on 2nd March, 1962 and the decision on this reference is reported in T. Sundaram Chettiar vs. CIT. Sundaram Chettiar is the assessee's brother. Common Contention were advanced, in the cases of the two brothers. The facts in the other case were identical except that the borrowal was from a different company and that the shares in that company had been inherited by the assessee's brother. The High Court was unable to agree with the contention urged on behalf of the assessee that inasmuch as no sum of money was received in cash or in specific by the assessee from the company, there could be no payment within the meaning of S. 12(1-B) of the Act. The substantial requirement to attract the applicability of S. 12(1-B), it was held, was that there should be the jural relationship of debtor and creditor between the share-holder and the company and that was satisfied. 6. At that stage another contention was raised which pertained to the relevant date with reference to which the accumulated profits had to be calculated so as to find out how far the loan or advance was liable to be treated as dividend. 6. At that stage another contention was raised which pertained to the relevant date with reference to which the accumulated profits had to be calculated so as to find out how far the loan or advance was liable to be treated as dividend. On the facts there were three dates which would have been relevant for this purpose viz., (1) the date on which the loan was advanced to Visalakshi Achi i.e., 30 August, 1945, (2) the date on which the loan was taken over by the assessee and adjusted in the books of the leading company i.e., 31st March, 1948 and (3) the opening date of the relevant previous year i.e., 1st April, 1954. The ITO had taken the last of the three dates in coming to the conclusion that a sum of Rs. 12, 842 represented the accumulated profits. The assessee's attempt was to show that one of the other two dates was the relevant date. 7. The High Court went into this question and observed at p. 292 as follows :- "The ITO has proceeded on the basis that the relevant date to ascertain the accumulated profits of the company would be the commencement of the previous year relating to the asst. yr. 1955-56. This however is not the correct view of the matter. It is the date of payment by the company to the shareholder of the loan or advance that should be taken into account for the purpose of ascertaining the extent of its taxability in relation to the accumulated profits of the company..........The question that has now to be determined is whether the date of payment in these cases should be taken as the date when Visalakshi Achi first obtained the loan from the two companies (the company relevant to the assessee herein and the company relevant to the assessee's brother) or the date when the assessee themselves undertook to discharge that debt to the company after here demise. This question is not free from difficulty..........We would therefore hold on the special features of this case that the relevant date, the date of payment, to be taken into account for the purpose of ascertaining the accumulation of the profits of the companies is the date on which each of the assessees made himself personally liable to the companies." * After the reference was answered, the matter went back to the Tribunal for passing orders under S. 66(5) of the Act. The Tribunal passed such an order on 31st August, 1962 on the following terms :- "As required under S. 66(5) of the Indian IT Act and in confirmity with the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dt. 2nd March, 1962 in T.C. Nos. 185 and 186 of 1959, we direct that in this case, the relevant date of payment of the loan or advance by the Company to the shareholder to be taken into account for the purpose of ascertaining the accumulated profits of the Company shall be the date on which the assessee made himself personally liable to the company. We further direct that the amount of loan due by the assessee to the Company on the date when he undertook to discharge that loan to the extent of accumulated profits of the company on that date shall be treated as Dividend within the meaning of S. 2(6A)(e) r/w S. 12(b) of the IT Act. The assessment shall be modified accordingly." * 8. In giving effect to this order it was noticed that in the case of the assessee's brother a reduction of Rs. 14, 190 was necessary as to that extent there had been a declaration of the dividend before the relevant date. The Tribunal directed the ITO to amend the assessment accordingly in the case of Sundaram Chetiar. In the case of the assessee herein, the Departmental Representative pointed out that there would be an enhancement of the assessment as a result of the order made under S. 66(5) of the Act. The counsel for the assessee agreed that the assessment might be confirmed (without being enhanced). It was accordingly confirmed by an order of the Tribunal dt. 27th August, 1963. 9. The ITO, thereafter took proceedings in February 1964 under S. 147 of the IT Act, 1961, which had come into force by that time. The counsel for the assessee agreed that the assessment might be confirmed (without being enhanced). It was accordingly confirmed by an order of the Tribunal dt. 27th August, 1963. 9. The ITO, thereafter took proceedings in February 1964 under S. 147 of the IT Act, 1961, which had come into force by that time. The assessee contended before him, while submitting the return on 19th March, 1964, that this case was not governed by the eight year time-limit, which would be applicable only to cases where there was an omission or failure on the part of the assessee to furnish fully or truly material particulars relating to the assessment. The reopening was outside the four year limit and it was therefore pointed out that the reopening was barred by time. The assessee claimed also that s. 150 of the Act of 1961 was not applicable, as the High Court had gone beyond its jurisdiction in deciding the method to arrive at the quantum of a accumulated profits. The ITO felt that he was not competent to say any thing on the jurisdiction of the High Court in the manner exercised by it. He considered that the income had escaped assessment and brought a sum of Rs. 51, 683 to tax instead of Rs. 12, 842 which had been originally taxed. He rejected the contention of the assessee that the assessment, having been confirmed by the Tribunal, could not be enhanced. He pointed out that there was provision in the IT Act i.e. S. 150 r/w S. 147 enabling him to take action for assessing escaped income. 10. This re-assessment made on 11th June, 1964 set in motion appeals to the AAC and then to the Tribunal. The AAC while confirming the re-assessment in principle found that the accumulated profits had to be recomputed in the light of further dividend that had been declared earlier. As against Rs. 38, 116 which the ITO had calculated as income that had escaped assessment, the AAC determined the escaped income to be Rs. 18, 022. The AAC while confirming the re-assessment in principle found that the accumulated profits had to be recomputed in the light of further dividend that had been declared earlier. As against Rs. 38, 116 which the ITO had calculated as income that had escaped assessment, the AAC determined the escaped income to be Rs. 18, 022. The Tribunal held that the observations of the High Court in regard to the relevant date to be taken into account for the purpose of ascertaining the taxability of the dividend in relation to the accumulated profits of the company amounted to a 'finding' as contemplated under S. 150(1) of the IT Act, 1961, as it was necessary for the disposal of the appeal in respect of the assessment year in question. In its view the observation of the High Court could not be taken to be obiter dicta. The definition of 'dividend' was linked with the extent of the accumulated profits of the company and without determining what in law would be the correct date to adopt for the purpose of determining the extent of the accumulated profits of the company it was not possible to arrive at the correct conclusion in regard to the applicability of the provision of S. 2(6A)(e) r/w s. 12(i)(B) of the IT Act. As this was a finding within the meaning of s. 150(1) of the IT Act, 1961, the Tribunal held that the period of limitation referred to in S. 149(1) of the IT Act did not apply in this case and that the benefit of the extended period of limitation was available to the Department. The assessment as modified by the AAC was therefore, confirmed. Against this order of the Tribunal was the assessee has obtained a reference of the question set out already. 11. The learned counsel for the assessee contended broadly in the present reference that the scope of the question referred to the High Court on the previous occasion did not comprehend any jurisdiction to go into the relevant date for the purpose of applying S. 12(1-B) r/w S. "2"(6-A)(e) of the IT Act of 1922 and that the observation of the High Court being only in the nature of obiter dicta could not be construed as findings coming within the scope of S. 150. In the submission of the learned counsel the observations of the High Court could, if at all, be taken only as an information so as to enable the ITO to take proceedings under S. 147(b). As the period of 4 years contemplated by S. 147(b) r/w ss. 149 and 153 had already elapsed, the present re-assessment was said to be bad in law. 12. The learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the portion of the High Court's judgment determining the relevant date for application of S. 12(i)(B) was invited by the assessee, as arguments were advanced on it and that there was a finding of the High Court on the legal contention taken before it. The re-assessment made in consequence of the finding was, it was said saved by S. 150 of the Act. 13. We have first find out the nature of the observations made by the High Court in T. Sundaram Chettiar vs. CIT (supra) which we have already extracted to the extent necessary. If the High Court had made the observations when the parties were not in issue on it, the it would not be a 'finding'. In the question before the High Court, as already extracted, there is reference to the sum of Rs. 12, 842. The mention of the sum is a short-hand expression or symbol, as it were, so as to indicate that it takes in all the facts relating to that sum. The parties were on issue as to the construction of S. 2(6A)(e) and not with reference to the amount as such. According to the assessee s. 2(6A)(e) could never apply where the person to whom the loan had been granted had died, even though the said loan had been taken over by the successor or the legal representative. The High Court held, in effect, that there was a payment by the Company to the assessee herein as and by way of loan when he took over the liability and when the jural relationship of debtor and creditor was created between him and the company. In view of the fact that the loan was taken to have been advanced to the assessee in 1948 when he took it over, naturally only two dates were relevant viz., the date of the advance to the assessee and (ii) the opening date of the relevant previous year. In view of the fact that the loan was taken to have been advanced to the assessee in 1948 when he took it over, naturally only two dates were relevant viz., the date of the advance to the assessee and (ii) the opening date of the relevant previous year. The relevance of the second date was rejected. The result of S. 12(1B) was (1) to deem the loan as dividend to the extent that there were accumulated profits at the time of the loan, and (2) to bring it to the tax in the assessment for 1955-56. In view of the High Court based on the language of S. 12(1B) was that the loan could be treated as dividend only to the extent to which the company possessed accumulated profits at the time when the loan or advance was made. (see p. 291). It is this view which was reiterated in the closing part of the judgment, which we have already extracted. Further having regard to the fact that the year in which the loan was advanced was put in issue, the matter as to when the loan was actually advanced, had also to be determined. It is in dealing with these issue that the High Court came to the conclusion that the loan was advanced at the time when the assessee took it over, and that the accumulated profits had to be determined in relation to that date. In our opinion, the High Court was invited to give a finding on (1) the date of the loan and (2) the date with reference to which the accumulated profits had to be determined. When once a finding was invited and given, then as to how far that finding could be given effect to would have to be considered. If the findings was favourable to the assessee, he would have no objection to it. In fact, this was what happened in the assessee's brother's case who took the benefit of refund of tax consequent on this finding. However, when it came to the assessee's own case, it was apparently not realised till the Departmental Representative brought the matter to the notice of the Tribunal in or about August 1963 that there was a scope for enhancement of the assessment. However, when it came to the assessee's own case, it was apparently not realised till the Departmental Representative brought the matter to the notice of the Tribunal in or about August 1963 that there was a scope for enhancement of the assessment. At that stage, the assessee agreed that as far as the appeal, which had been the subject of reference was concerned it had only to be dismissed. The assessment was, therefore, accordingly confirmed on 27th August, 1963. 14. It is thereafter that the ITO took proceedings under S. 147 r/w s. 150 of the Act, Sec. 150(1) runs as follows :- "Notwithstanding anything contained in S. 149 , the Notice, under s. 148 should be issued at any time for the purpose of making an assessment or re-assessment or re-computation in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order passed by any authority in any proceeding under this Act by way of appeal, reference or revision." * 15. This provision is in material particulars identical with the second proviso to S. 34(3) of the IT Act, 1922. The scope of the said provision came up for consideration by the Supreme Court in the ITO, A Ward, Sitapur vs. Murlidhar Bhagwan Das 1964 LII ITR 335. The majority judgment delivered by Subba Rao, J., as he then was, has gone into the construction of this provision in extenso. A best judgment assessment was made in that case for the asst. yr. 1949-50 under s. 23(4) on the ground that the relevant notices issued under the Act had not been complied with. This assessment was cancelled on 27th September, 1955 under S. 27 of that Act. Before its cancellation the ITO found that the assessee was liable to be taxed on Rs. 88, 737 being interest from certain bonds. When he remade the assessment after the earlier one was cancelled under S. 27 of the Act, the ITO brought to tax the said sum of Rs. 88, 737 also. The assessee appealed to the AAC, who held that the said sum should be deleted from the assessment for 1949-50. The period of 8 years within which a reassessment could be made for 1948-49 had expired by 31st March, 1957. The ITO took up proceedings after the AAC's order only in December 1957. 88, 737 also. The assessee appealed to the AAC, who held that the said sum should be deleted from the assessment for 1949-50. The period of 8 years within which a reassessment could be made for 1948-49 had expired by 31st March, 1957. The ITO took up proceedings after the AAC's order only in December 1957. The assessee filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution questioning the said proceedings on the ground that they were initiated beyond the period of 8 years as contemplated under S. 34 of the Act. On behalf of the IT authorities, reliance was placed on the second proviso to s. 34(3) of the Act. The effect of the proviso was set out in p. 342 as follows :- "Under the proviso, the period of limitation will not apply to a reassessment made under S. 27 or to an assessment or re-assessment made on the assessee or any person in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order under S. 31, S. 33 S. 33B S. 66 or S. 66A of the Act." It was further pointed out at p. 343 as follows :- " The lifting of the ban was only to give effect to the orders that may be made by the appellate, revisional or reviewing Tribunal within the scope of its jurisdiction. In considering the question as to what kind of finding or direction that the appellate or other authorities could give the Supreme Court pointed out at p. 345 as follows :- "A" finding" * , therefore, can be only that which is necessary for the disposal of an appeal in respect of an assessment of a particular year. The AAC may hold, on the evidence that the Income for the relevant year and thereby exclude that Income for the relevant year and thereby exclude that income from the assessment of the year under appeal. The finding in that context is that the income does not belong to relevant year. The AAC may hold, on the evidence that the Income for the relevant year and thereby exclude that Income for the relevant year and thereby exclude that income from the assessment of the year under appeal. The finding in that context is that the income does not belong to relevant year. He may incidentally find that the income belongs to another year, but that it is not a finding necessary for the disposal of an appeal in respect of the year of assessment in question." With reference to the use of the word" direction", it was pointed out as follows :- " The expression "direction" in the proviso could only refer to the directions which the AAC or other Tribunals can issue under the powers conferred on him or them under the respective sections. Therefore, the expression "finding as well as the expression" direction can be given full meaning, namely that the findings is a finding necessary for giving relief in respect of the assessment of the year in question and the direction is a direction which the appellate or revisional authority, as the case may be, is empowered to give the under the section mentioned therein. "The above passage was reiterated in N. KT. Sivalingam Chettiar vs. CIT. In that case the AAC found that a certain sum was assessable for the asstt. Yr. 1946-47 and gave a finding to that effect the appeal relating to the asst. yr. 1947-48. The question was whether the re-assessment for 1946-47 was proper and valid even though it was made beyond the general periods of limitation prescribed in s. 34. It was held that it was not valid because there could be no" * direction with reference to a different year. This is not a case of a direction. The High Court's jurisdiction being advisory, it could not have given a direction. The Tribunal also did not give any direction as, if any direction was contemplated the assessment would not have been left in fact, but would have been set aside with a direction for being redone. 16. This Court had occasion to consider the effect of these two decisions and the scope of the second proviso to S. 34(3) in the CIT vs. S. Govindan Chettiar. In that case, as a result of the AAC's order, the total income had been determined to be Rs. 94, 905. 16. This Court had occasion to consider the effect of these two decisions and the scope of the second proviso to S. 34(3) in the CIT vs. S. Govindan Chettiar. In that case, as a result of the AAC's order, the total income had been determined to be Rs. 94, 905. The admitted income of the assessee was Rs. 40, 378. When the assessee appealed against the income as determined by the AAC, the Tribunal observed that there were un-explained cash credits to the extent of Rs. 60, 051. If the un-explained cash credits were to be added, as such then the total income would have amounted to Rs. 1, 00, 429 as against Rs. 94, 905 determined by the AAC. After observing that the total income would be Rs. 1, 00, 429 taking into account the unexplained cash credits, the Tribunal upheld the assessment as it emerged from the order of the AAC. The ITO thereafter took proceedings for bringing to tax the difference between Rs. 94, 905 and Rs. 1, 00429 by invoking S. 34(3) second proviso. The Tribunal held that the re-opening of the assessment for the asst. yr. 1951-52 under the second proviso to S. 34(3) was not justified in law. This Court had to consider the question as to whether this view of the Tribunal was right and it pointed out as follows :-"A" finding, "in the context, is the conclusion which the Tribunal has necessarily to reach so as to dispose of the appeal before it. We are of the view that the scope of the appeal not only with reference to what the appellant has asked for by way of relief but also the Tribunal's appellate powers with reference to it, and whether the assessee and the Revenue were at issue on a particular point in dispute a decision of which is also necessary for granting or denying the relief in such an appeal would govern the determination whether a disputed observation is a finding within the meaning of the second proviso. It should follow that every stip or reason or observation incidental to a finding cannot be mistaken for the finding itself." * It was held that in determining whether the sum of Rs. It should follow that every stip or reason or observation incidental to a finding cannot be mistaken for the finding itself." * It was held that in determining whether the sum of Rs. 94, 905 was taken as the proper income or not, the Tribunal had considered the cash credits and that the reference to the cash credits was only for the purpose of examining the total income as fixed by the AAC. It was, therefore, held that there was no finding on the facts, which could save the period of limitation. 17. In the light of these decision, it follows that a finding is that which is necessary for the disposal of the proceedings before any IT authority or Tribunal or High Court or Supreme Court. There was some discussion before us as to whether the finding could include finding on a question of law. The Supreme Court, in ITO vs. Murlidhar Bhagwan Das (supra), has ascertained the meaning of the word "finding" by reference to the CPC. Order 13, R. 2 refers to issues both of law and of facts. It contemplates determination of the issue of law before deciding the issue of facts. The Allahabad High Court in Pt. Havari Lala vs. ITO 1960 XXXIX ITR 265 observed at p. 271 as follows :-" Issues are framed on material questions of fact or law and the decision of the Court recorded on such issues has been called a "finding". The decision of the Allahabad High Court was approved by the Supreme Court in the ITO vs. Murlidhar Bhagwan Das (supra). Therefore a finding on as issue of law would be a finding for the purpose of s. 150. 18. From the foregoing discussion it would follow that the word "finding" has to be understood as comprehending a finding on a question of fact, as well as of law. When, as in a reference a Court is concerned only with the legal issue, its determination thereof would be a finding within the scope of S. 150. If it was merely an incidental observation, or a mere reason leading to a particular conclusion, then the incidental observation or the reason could not be elevated to a finding. In the present case, the issue before the Court was one of construction of S. 12(1-B) r/w S. 2(6A)(e) of the Act. If it was merely an incidental observation, or a mere reason leading to a particular conclusion, then the incidental observation or the reason could not be elevated to a finding. In the present case, the issue before the Court was one of construction of S. 12(1-B) r/w S. 2(6A)(e) of the Act. The real question was as to whether there was a payment of advance or loan to the assessee herein and whether there were accumulated profits on the relevant date to cover the whole amount or any part thereof. The relevant date for the purpose of computing the accumulated profits had thus to be determined. This was done by the High Court. The assessee cannot try to escape from this finding by merely alleging it to be an observation without jurisdiction or obiter dicta. Having put the matter in issue, the assessee cannot get away from the effect of the finding by contending as if the High Court went out of its way, in determining on its own the relevant date for ascertaining the accumulated profits. In our opinion, the finding was necessary, invited and given for the purpose of disposal of the reference and it thus brought in S. 150. 19. In this view, it is unnecessary to examine the question as to whether the High Court went into any new ground which had not been argued before the IT authorities or the Tribunal. This is not a case where this Court framed any new question which was not in issue between the parties as happened in Agha Abdul Jabbar Khan vs. CIT (supra). As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the Revenue even assuming that the assessee had not specifically put the matter in issue before the Tribunal on the earlier occasions to what was the relevant date for the purpose of computation of the accumulated profits, still so long as the construction of S. 12(1B) r/w S. 2 (6A)(e) was before this Court, this Court had to go into all aspects of this construction. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Bhanji Bagwandas vs. CIT it would be an over-refinement to say that the High Court is confirmed to only those contentions which were actually urged before the Tribunal. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Bhanji Bagwandas vs. CIT it would be an over-refinement to say that the High Court is confirmed to only those contentions which were actually urged before the Tribunal. The scope of the jurisdiction of the High Court is not in other words confined as to what was actually argued before the Tribunal, but comprehends all aspects of a question that arose for determination of the Tribunal and that fell within the scope of the question referred. 20. In the view that we have taken viz., that it was a finding given by the High Court in the case of this very assessee for the same year, on a point of law which was in issue before it, it follows that the present case falls within the scope of S. 150(1) of the IT Act, 1961. There is not time limit covering the assessment of the escaped income determined in consequence of the aforesaid finding. The question of law is therefore answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The Revenue will be entitled to its Costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250.