JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows : This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of Order No. 20 dated June 23, 1963 passed by the learned Judge, Second Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal. 2. The facts as appear from the petition are that an alleged industrial dispute between the petitioner, a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, and its workmen represented by Jenson and Nicholson Staff Association has been referred to the Second Industrial Tribunal by he Government of West Bengal, Labaur Department, under the Order of Reference No. 3830-IR IR/11 L-188/(c/64) for adjudication and the same is pending for decision. On January 6, 1966 the respondent No. 3 Kalipada Sharma, an unskilled workman employed in the petitioner's factory, while going out of the factory was detected by the Durwan at the gate of the factory to be in unlawful possession of a big glass jar belonging to the petitioner concealed in bag. The respondent No. 3 was served with a charge-sheet charging him with gross misconduct under Rule 14 (III) of the Standing Orders and asking him to submit his explanation within 24 hours of the receipt of the charge-sheet. The respondent No.3 on January 10, 1966 submitted his explanation excerpts from which are set out hereunder : "On 6.1.66 I saw a rejected and unusable glass jar lying in the heaps of garbages of the factory. I collected that one and in order to take mustard oil from the co-operative. I carried the jar which was visible from outside as the bag in which the jar was a kept was a small one. I confessed my fault that I had taken the thing from the rejected dump. Only the impression which worked in my mind that the jar was lying useless and as I had forgotten to bring any oil container from house I took it away, I beg to be pardoned for this offence......" 3. On January 15, 1966 the Works Manager of the petitioner company sent a letter to the respondent No. 3 intimating that in his explanation he clearly admitted his guilt and so enquiry was deemed unnecessary. There had been a gross misconduct under Rule 14 (III) of the Standing Orders for which dismissal was the proper punishment. On January 15, 1966 the Works Manager of the petitioner company sent a letter to the respondent No. 3 intimating that in his explanation he clearly admitted his guilt and so enquiry was deemed unnecessary. There had been a gross misconduct under Rule 14 (III) of the Standing Orders for which dismissal was the proper punishment. The respondent No.3 was therefore dismissed from service with effect from the date of the order and he was asked to come to the office of the company on that day to take payment of one month's wages. As the said industrial dispute is pending the petitioner on February 2, 1966 made an application before the Second Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal seeking for its approval to this action of the petitioner. 4. A written statement has been filed by the respondents stating that the workman did Dot admit his guilt as alleged. No enquiry had ever been held giving the workman any opportunity of hearing and as such there has been a violation of principles of natural justice. The workman has not committed any misconduct and the order of dismissal is bad being not in conformity with the provisions of Rule 14 (III) of the company's Standing Orders. The order of dismissal was not made bonafide as such no approval should be accorded to the said order. 5. On June 23, 1973 the Judge, Second Industrial Tribunal, held that the workman did not confess his guilt to the charge levelled against him and so the company on the basis of his alleged admission alone could not have found him guilty of the charge framed against him. The conclusion drawn by the company on the basis of the written explanation could not be said to be the conclusion of a reasonable man. The order of dismissal was passed without holding any enquiry and as such the company violated the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal therefore refused to accord its approval to the said action of the petitioner company. 6. It is against this order this Rule has been obtained and an interim order of stay of operation of the said order was granted. 7. Mr. The Tribunal therefore refused to accord its approval to the said action of the petitioner company. 6. It is against this order this Rule has been obtained and an interim order of stay of operation of the said order was granted. 7. Mr. R.N. Das, learned Advocate for the petitioner, has submitted that the Tribunal was wrong in refusing approval to the order of dismissal made by the company on a consideration of the merits of the case as a Court of appeal. The employee admitted his guilt in his explanation to the charge-sheet and as such the employer was justified in passing the order of dismissal. The Tribunal should have accorded approval to the action of the company as prima facie case bas been made out for dismissal of the employee and the proposed order of dismissal does not amount to victimisation or unfair labour practice. There ha5 been no violation of principles of natural justice. 8. It has been submitted that in view of the admission of the employee in his written explanation to the charge-sheet and in the absence of any prayer for any hearing there was no necessity of holding any enquiry into the charges framed against the employee and the finding of the Tribunal that principles of natural justice had been violated is not correct. Reference has been made in this connection to the decision in (1) AIR 1963 Patna 177. It has a1so been submitted that the Tribunal after having found that the principles of natural justice had been violated ought to have allowed the parties to adduce evidence to prove that the order of dismissal was passed bonafide instead of refusing approval to the order of dismissal passed by the company. The decision in., (2) AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1900 has been cited at the bar in support of this submission. 9. Mr. P. K. Chatterjee, learned Advocate for the respondent No.3 has submitted that the Tribunal was perfectly justified in holding that the employee did not admit in his explanation his guilt alleged in the charge-sheet and the order of dismissal passed by the petitioner company could not be said to be a bonafide one. No enquiry has been held by the petitioner to substantiate the charges framed against the respondent No.3 and as such there bas been a violation of the principles of natural justice in passing (he order of dismissal. No enquiry has been held by the petitioner to substantiate the charges framed against the respondent No.3 and as such there bas been a violation of the principles of natural justice in passing (he order of dismissal. So approval to the said action of the petitioner company has been refused properly by the Tribunal. 10. In order to decide whether the Tribunal acted properly legally and within its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order it is necessary to consider the scope and extent of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In (3) AIR 1960 Supreme Court 1262, Calrex (India) Ltd v. Their Workmen it has been held by the Supreme Court that in exercising its jurisdiction under section 33 the tribunal has to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out by the employer for dismissal of the employee in question. "In (4) AIR 1960 Supreme Court 1352, Bangalore Woolen Cotton and silk Mills Company Ltd. v. B. Dasappa it has been observed : "In deciding whether permission to award the proposed punishment of discharge or dismissal should be granted or not, it becomes the duty of the Tribunal to see whether in holding the enquiry against the worker the management had been guilty of any unfair labour practice or victimisation, whether principles of natural justice were observed and ultimately whether a prima facie case was made out on the evidence taken in the enquiry and the management was acting bonafide." 11. In this case admittedly no enquiry had been held by the management to establish the charges mentioned in the charge-sheet nor any opportunity of hearing was given to the employee, the respondent No.3. management proceeded solely on the basis of the admission of the employee in his explanation to the charge-sheet and made the proposed order of dismissal. The only question that falls for consideration in this case is whether on the admission made in the explanation did make out a prima facie case for misconduct as provided in Rule 14 (III) of the Standing Orders of the company and the proposed order of dismissal as made by the company is one which a reasonable person could have arrived at on the materials mentioned before. 12. The respondent No.3 has been charged with gross misconduct under Rule 14(III) of the Standing Orders of the company. 12. The respondent No.3 has been charged with gross misconduct under Rule 14(III) of the Standing Orders of the company. Excerpts from Rule 14 are set out hereunder: "The company reserves the right to dismiss a workman, whether permanent or otherwise, without notice for disobedience to lawful orders, or for any gross misconduct. The following acts or omissions are included in the definition of ‘gross misconduct (iii) Theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the company's property" 13. In his written explanation the respondent No.3 stated that he saw a rejected and unusable glass jar lying in the heaps of garbages of the factory and he picked it up with the impression that the same was lying useless in order to take mustard oil from the shop. The employee also stated that be confessed his fault that he had taken the thing from the rejected dump. In this context he stated that he might be pardoned for this offence. This statement in his explanation of course, is an admission on the part of the employee of taking the glass jar lying in the heaps of garbages inside the factory compound. The employee stated in his explanation that be picked up the jar with the impression that the same was lying useless. Moreover, the employee, the respondent No.3, also stated that he kept the big jar in his small bag and the same was visible from outside. This admission, in my considered opinion, does not amount to an admission of the charges of misconduct provided in Rule 14 (iii) of the Standing Orders of the company. Such an act of taking the jar from inside the factory compound may be an act of impropriety but it docs not constitute an act of fraud or dishonesty or theft as there is no mensrea. There are no other materials for which it can be said that the company has made out a prima facie case for dismissal of the employee under Rule 14 (iii) of the Standing Orders. In other words it cannot be held on the materials aforesaid that the conclusion reached by the petitioner is one which a reason able person will arrive at. The impugned order of the Tribunal, therefore, is quite legal and valid. In other words it cannot be held on the materials aforesaid that the conclusion reached by the petitioner is one which a reason able person will arrive at. The impugned order of the Tribunal, therefore, is quite legal and valid. The decision in (1) AIR 1963 Patna 177 has no application to this case inasmuch as in that case the charge framed was admitted by the employee. The contention that the Tribunal in passing the impugned order went into the merits of the case as a court of appeal to find out if the charge framed against the respondent No. 3 had been proved to' the hilt fails. 14. Admittedly no enquiry bas been held by the petitioner and no opportunity of hearing was given to' the employee to prove his innocence. As such the principles of natural justice have been violated by the petitioner in passing the proposed order of dismissal. The Tribunal is justified in not according approval to the company's action. The contention after having held that the principles of natural justice had been violated the learned Judge, Second Industrial Tribunal, should have allowed the Management to adduce evidence to substantiate the charges framed is not sustainable for the simple reason that before making the proposed order no enquiry whatsoever had been held by the Management. The decision in (2) AIR 1975 SC 1900 , Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhe has no application to this case inasmuch as in that case there was an enquiry by the Management into the charge and the order of dismissal was passed an the basis of the report of the enquiry officer. It was held that in such case the question that the domestic enquiry violated the principles of natural justice was to be decided as a preliminary issue and after pronouncement of that decision it was for the Management to decide if it would adduce any evidence before Labour Court. If it would choose not to adduce any evidence it would not be permissible in any proceeding to raise the issue. There is thus no merit in this contention. 15. It appears that the order of dismissal of the respondent no. If it would choose not to adduce any evidence it would not be permissible in any proceeding to raise the issue. There is thus no merit in this contention. 15. It appears that the order of dismissal of the respondent no. 3 was made by the company on 15.1.66 with effect from the date of the order and the respondent no 3 was asked to receive his wages for one month on that day from the office of the petitioner. The application under Section 33 (2) (b) of the said Act was made before the Second Industrial Tribunal an February 2, 1966, i.e. 17 days after the passing of the order by the petitioner. It was contended that the Tribunal was wrong in holding that the delay could not be said to be inordinate. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondent no. 3 that it is imperative under Section 33 (2) (b) that the application has to be filed before the Tribunal for approval of the action of the company simultaneously with the order of dismissal. In this case the application was filed by the company 17 days after the passing of the order of dismissal and as such the application was not enteratinable by the Tribunal. The decisions in (5) AIR 1962 SC 1500 and (6) AIR 1963 SC 1756 have been cited in this connection. In AIR 1962 SC 1500 , Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Govind. it has been held by the Supreme Court that: "the Proviso to Section 33(2) (b) contemplates the three things mentioned therein, namely, (i) dismissal or discharge. (ii) payment of wages, and (iii) making of an application for approval, to be simultaneous and to be a part of the same transaction so that the employer when he takes action under Section 33(2) by dismissing or discharging an employee, should immediately pay him or offer to pay him wages for one month and also make an application to the Tribunal for approval at the same time." It was further held that "the employer's conduct should show that the three things contemplated under the proviso are parts of the same transaction or at the same time when the action was taken would be a question of fact and will depend upon the circumstances of each case." The said decision has been relied upon in (6) AIR 1963 SC 1756 . P. H. Kalyani v. M/s. Air France. 16. In this case an application under Section 33(2) (b) of the said Act was filed on 15.1.66, i.e on the date of passing of the order of dismissal by the company. But in the said application only the employee's unions were impleaded and not the employee, the respondent no. 3. Thereafter on February 2, 1966 the instant application under Section 33(2) (b) impleading the respondent no 3 was filed. This application thus, had been filed not simultaneously but 17 days after the passing of the order of dismissed by the company. As such, the approval to the action of the company cannot be given for non-observance of the imperative provision of the said section of the Act. The finding of the Tribunal that the delay in filing the application is not inordinate is not sustainable in law. 17. For all these reasons, all the contentions raised having failed the Rule is discharged. The interim order is vacated. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.