JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - This is an application for the review of our judgment dated April 2, 1974. 2. Respondent Raghunath Singh was the Secretary of the State Soldiers, Sailors and Amirmens Board, U.P. Lucknow. By an order dated February 16, 1972, he was placed under suspension pending inquiry. He challenged the suspension order by way of a writ petition. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petit on, following the decision of a Division Bench of this court. The Division Bench had taken the view that, normally, a suspension order could be passed only after the charge sheet had been served on the officer concerned and, if it was passed without framing charges, the onus was upon the State Government to show why it was not possible to frame charges against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the State Government filed a special appeal. In the meantime, a Full Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava, 1974 ALJ 282 (FB) took the view that the word inquiry in Rule 49-A (1) of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules referred to the formal disciplinary inquiry and, therefore, a suspension order could be passed only when a decision had been taken to start a formal disciplinary inquiry under the aforesaid Rules and not before it. The Full Bench did not approve of the Division Benches view that an order of suspension passed before service of charge sheet could be upheld if it was shown that it was not possible to serve the charge sheet before the aider of suspension was passed. Since it was not established that any decision had been taken to start the formal disciplinary inquiry, we, relying upon the Full Bench judgment, held that the suspension order could not be sustained. We accordingly dismissed the appeal. After this, the same question came up for consideration before a larger Full Bench in the State of U.P. v. Jai Singh Dixit, 1974 ALJ 862 (FB). This Full Bench held that suspension pending inquiry under Rule 49-A can be ordered at any stage prior to or after the framing of charges, when, on an objective consideration, the authority concerned is of the view that a formal departmental inquiry under Rules 55 and 55-A of the U.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules is expected or when such an inquiry is proceeding. It further held that the stage and the time when the power under the above rules can be exercised depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The review petit on was argued on the ground that, since the decision, on which the Division Bench relied, has now been overruled, it is a fit case for reviewing our earlier judgment and passing a fresh judgment in the light of the latest Full Bench decision. 3. The question that we have to consider, is whether on the facts and circumstances of this case, a review petition is maintainable. 4. That a decision given by the High Court in a special appeal is open to review was finally settled by a Full Bench of five Judge of this Court in Jwala Prasad v. Jwada Bank Ltd., 1961 ALJ 172 (FB). On the question whether the ground, on which review is sought in this case, is a proper ground for review or not, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Mohammad Azmat Azim Khan v. Raja Shatrunjit, AIR 1963 All 541 (FB) : 1963 ALJ 92 and on the decision of the Supreme Court in an appeal against the judgment of the Full Bench reported in Raja Shatrunjit v. Muhammad Azmat Azim Khan, AIR 1971 SC 1474 . In this case, review was sought on the ground that, after the date of the judgment of this Court, there had been a retrospective amendment of the law. The majority of the Judges constituting the Full Bench held that review could be granted as there was an error of law apparent on the face of the record in the judgment pronounced earlier. Desai, C.J., who delivered the majority judgment, observed : "I do not see any substance in the argument that if a judgment, which was correct on the date on which it was pronounced, could be reviewed because the law on which it was based was amended with retrospective effect, it would mean reopening of all judgments. As was pointed out by Sri Naziruddin, it would mean reopening of only those judgments which could be reopened either on an appeal or on a review application, for both of which there is a prescribed period of limitation. As was pointed out by Sri Naziruddin, it would mean reopening of only those judgments which could be reopened either on an appeal or on a review application, for both of which there is a prescribed period of limitation. A judgment is liable to be reopened only if the period for filing an appeal from it or for applying for a review of it has not expired. So long as an appeal can be filed or an application for review can be filed, it can be reopened in view of the amended law and the amended law can and must be given its retrospective effect. In this very case, if the applicant files an appeal in the Supreme Court, it is not disputed that the appeal will be allowed at once shows that it is a case of apparent error on the face of the record. There cannot be a clearer case of an error apparent on the face of the record than that, in which the appellate court could set aside the judgment as soon as the appeal is filed without any discussion of the law." Against the decision of the Full Bench, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court but the Supreme Court dismissed the same with the following observation:- "Counsel for the appellant submitted that when the High Court decided the matter, the High Court applied the law as it stood and a subsequent change of law could not be a ground for review. The appellant's contention is not acceptable in the present case for two principal reasons; first, it is not a subsequent law. It is the law which all along was there from 1952. The deeming provision is fully effective and operative as from 25 May, 1953, when the 1952 Act came into force. The result is that the Court is to apply the legal provision as it always stood. It would, therefore, be error on the face of the record. The error would be that the law that was applied was not the law which is applicable." 5. In our opinion, the case before us stands on the same footing. The law declared by the Full Bench in 1974 A.L.J., 862, must be deemed to have always been if the law. The error would be that the law that was applied was not the law which is applicable." 5. In our opinion, the case before us stands on the same footing. The law declared by the Full Bench in 1974 A.L.J., 862, must be deemed to have always been if the law. Therefore, the law that was applied by us that is to say, the law laid down by the earlier Full Bench was not the correct law. Thus, in the words of the Supreme Court, the error n our judgment was that the law, which we applied, was not the law which was applicable to the case. That being so, the applicant is entitled to get our earlier judgment reviewed. We accordingly grant the review and recall our earlier judgment dated April 2, 1974. 6. We have heard learned counsel on the merits of the special appeal in the light of the law laid down by the subsequent Full Bench. 7. The facts and circumstances in which the order of suspension came to be passed are these. Certain serious complaints were received against the appellant by the Government. On November 3, 1971, the Government set up a committee under the chairmanship of Sri J. D. Shukla, Chairman, Board of Revenue, to make a preliminary inquiry into the complaints. The appellant was on leave and ill his place Brigadier K.C. Sharma was appointed who took over on December 21, 1971. Government called for a report from Brigadier Sharma and Brigadier Sharma sent his report. Thereafter the suspension order was passed on February 16, 1972. The suspension order, a copy of which is Annexure 12 to the writ petition, stated that the appellant was suspended pending inquiry. Sri Chand Kishore, learned counsel for the appellant, urged that the word inquiry in Rule 49-A means a formal disciplinary inquiry and that, since no such inquiry was pending at the time the order of suspension was ultra vires Rule 49-A. Rule 49-A permits Government to place a Government servant under suspension in two contingencies, namely:- (i) when an inquiry is contemplated against his conduct; and (ii) when an inquiry is proceeding against his conduct. In the present case, the impugned order of suspension stated that the order of suspension was passed pending inquiry. It did not state that the order was passed as an inquiry was contemplated against the officer. In the present case, the impugned order of suspension stated that the order of suspension was passed pending inquiry. It did not state that the order was passed as an inquiry was contemplated against the officer. The learned Standing Counsel has strenuously contended that the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that the order of suspension was passed as an inquiry was contemplated against the appellant. We do not think that the learned Standing Counsel is justified in raising this contention. In paragraph 35 of the writ petition, it was stated :- "That in about the month of May, 1972, the case of the petitioner was entrusted to the vigilance establishment for inquiry. The aforesaid fact clearly shows that at the time of the passing of the impugned order of suspension, no inquiry against the conduct of the petitioner was either contemplated or was proceeding." In reply to paragraph 35, it was stated in paragraph 31 of the Counter-affidavit: "That in reply to the contents of paragraph 35 of the writ petition, it is contended that the inquiry against the petitioner was entrusted to the vigilance on 1st July, 1972, but before that a preliminary departmental inquiry was being conducted against the petitioner by Sri J.D. Shukla, Chairman of the Board of Revenue. The allegation that at the time of suspension no inquiry was pending against the petitioner is absolutely wrong." The petitioner had specifically asserted in paragraph 35 that no inquiry was contemplated against him and this assertion was not denied in the counter-affidavit. It was not stated anywhere in the counter-affidavit that a regular departmental inquiry was in contemplation when the order of suspension was passed. Therefore, it is not permissible for the learned Standing Counsel to justify the order of suspension on the ground that a regular departmental inquiry was in contemplation when the order of suspension was passed. 8. The only ground, on which the order of suspension was sought to be justified in the counter-affidavit, was that an inquiry was, in fact, pending at the time, when the order of suspension was passed. It was asserted in several paragraphs of the counter-affidavit that the inquiry that was pending was the preliminary inquiry before the committee under the chairmanship of Sri J.D. Shukla. 9. It was asserted in several paragraphs of the counter-affidavit that the inquiry that was pending was the preliminary inquiry before the committee under the chairmanship of Sri J.D. Shukla. 9. The question, which then arises for consideration is whether the words an `inquiry is proceeding in Rule 49-A, a preliminary inquiry of the type which was pending against the appellant or a full-fledged departmental inquiry. This matter has been set at rest by the Full Bench in State of U.P. v. Jai Singh Dixit, 1974 ALJ 862 (FB). The Full Bench has held that the inquiry referred to in Rule 49A, is the full-fledged departmental inquiry and not the preliminary inquiry. Admittedly, the full-fledged or regular enquiry was not proceeding at the time when the order of suspension was passed and the pendency of the preliminary inquiry by the committee set up by Government, did not attract the application of Rule 49-A. 10. We are, therefore, of opinion that neither of the two contingencies, in which an order of suspension under Rule 49-A could be passed, existed on the date of the order. That being so, the impugned order is ultra vires Rule 49-A and must be held to be illegal. The impugned order was rightly quashed by the learned Single Judge. 11. The appeal is without merits and is dismissed with costs. Tile parties will bear their own costs of the review application.