JUDGMENT Dutt, J. : This appeal is at the instance of the plaintiffs and it arises out of a suit for recovery of possession of a fishery, of permanent injunction, mesne profits etc. 2. The case of the plaintiffs is that they are the owners of a tank fishery known as Nalbon Fishery, measuring 191.08 acres within P. S. Bhangore, in the District of 24-Parganas. They have retained the tank fishery by filing returns in Form 'B' as provided under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Sometime in the month of Magh 1356 B. S. the plaintiffs granted licence for pisciculture, that is, the right to rear and catch fish in the water of the tank fishery to Dhirendra Nath Safui, the father of the defendant Sushil Kumar Safui for one year commencing from Falgoon 1, 1356 B. S. till the last day of the month of Magh 1357 B. S. on condition of payment of Rs. 18,000/- as licence fee. On the death of Dhirendra Nath Safui, the defendant was permitted to continue as the licensee in respect of the tank fishery for the said purposes till the end of Magh 1357 B. S. on some terms and conditions. Since Falgoon 1357 B. S. up to the end of Magh 1358 B. S. a similar licence was granted to the defendant on a licence fee of Rs 20,000/-. Thereafter, the defendant was granted licences for the year commencing from Falgoon 1357 B. S. till Magh 1361 B. S. on a licence fee of Rs. 22,000/-. In short the plaintiffs case is that every year the defendant was granted licence to rear and catch fish in the tank fishery on fresh terms. On the expiry of Magh 1361 B S the plaintiffs served upon the defendant a notice dated Falgoon 3, 1361 B. S. calling upon him to vacate the tank fishery and to deliver possession of the same to the plaintiffs. The defendant filed a Suit, being Title Suit No. 42 of 1955. in the 7th Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore against some of the plaintiffs and the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs nos. 4 to 7, 9 and 10 for a declaration that he had a permanent tenancy right in the tank fishery and for a permanent injunction restraining the plaintiffs from evicting him from the fishery. in the 7th Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore against some of the plaintiffs and the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs nos. 4 to 7, 9 and 10 for a declaration that he had a permanent tenancy right in the tank fishery and for a permanent injunction restraining the plaintiffs from evicting him from the fishery. The said Title Suit, however, was decreed by the Trial Court, but it was ultimately dismissed by this Court in Second Appeal on a tecnical ground that the suit was not maintainable in view of section 46 of the Act. The defendant also filed another suit, being title suit No. 82 of 1958, of the said Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore, but ultimately did not proceed with the same. 3. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the leave and licence in respect of "Bhasa Jalkar" every year, was for one year only, commencing from Falgoon till the expiry of the month of Magh next and that, the last of such licences was for the year ending with Magh 1361 BS. The defendant was never granted any right to the land or any lease of the land underneath the tank fishery. Alternatively, it is contended that in any event, if the leave and licence be construed as letting out of the Jalkar, the last of such lettings was for the year commencing from Falgoon 1360 BS till Magh 1361 BS, and on the expiry of the month of Magh 1361 BS the defendant became a trespasser in respect of the tank fishery on and from Falgoon 1361 BS. On the aforesaid allegations, the plaintiffs have prayed for the ejectment of the defendant from and recovery of possession of the fishery or Jalkar, for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from exercising any right of Jalkar and fishing in the property in suit, for mesne profits and for damages tentatively fixed at Rs. 20000/-. 4. The defendant has contested the suit. His defence is that in 1356 BS he took a bemeadi settlement of the property in suit at an annual rental of Rs. 20,000/- from some of the plaintiffs and the predecessor-in-interest of the other plaintiffs in the benami of his father Dhirendra Nath Safui, who died in 1357 BS. 20000/-. 4. The defendant has contested the suit. His defence is that in 1356 BS he took a bemeadi settlement of the property in suit at an annual rental of Rs. 20,000/- from some of the plaintiffs and the predecessor-in-interest of the other plaintiffs in the benami of his father Dhirendra Nath Safui, who died in 1357 BS. and has since then been in continuous possession of the property in suit, partly by rearing fish and partly by cultivation of paddy. He has denied that he was ever granted a licence for pisciculture or for rearing fish in the water of the disputed tank fishery. It is alleged that as the disputed tank fishery had been in his possession under a lease on the date of vesting under the Act, he became a tenant under the State of West Bengal in respect of the same upon the vesting of the intermediary interest of the plaintiffs and that, he has been possessing the same as such tenant. It has been asserted by him that as the interest of the plaintiffs had vested in the State, the suit is not maintainable and the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of the property in suit including the tank fishery. 5. The State of West Bengal who was added as a party defendant no. 2. in the suit has also contested the same by filing a written statement. It has been denied by it that the defendant no. 1 was a licensee under the plaintiffs and its case is that at all material time the defendant no. 1 held the tank fishery under a lease as a result of which he became a direct tenant under it in view of the provisions of the Act. It has also challenged the legality and validity of the notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it is contended that in the absence of a proper notice, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 6. It has been held by the learned Subordinate Judge that no right to the sub-soil was granted by the plaintiffs to the defendant in respect of the property in suit including the disputed tank fishery but the defendant was granted a mere right of pisciculture for rearing fish in the disputed tank fishery unconnected with any right to the soil or the sub-soil. He has disbelieved the case of the defendant of bemeadi settlement and has held that the disputed rank fishery was originally settled with the defendant for a fixed term of one year and was thereafter renewed from year to year at varying rates of rent. Further, it has been held by him that the lease of the defendant of the tank fishery was not lawfully determined, for the notice to quit served by the plaintiffs upon the defendant was insufficient. He has found that there was no documentary evidence on record to show that the plaintiffs retained the property in suit and, as such, in view of the proviso to section 6(2) of the Act, the defendant became a direct tenant under the State of West Bengal. Regarding the notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he has held that it is insufficient and invalid as it suffers from want of material particulars as required to be given by that section. Upon these findings, he has dismissed the suit. Hence, this appeal. 7. Mr. Bankim Chandra Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants submits that the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that the defendant-respondent was a lessee and not a licensee in respect of the property in suit including the disputed tank fishery. It is contended by him that even assuming that the defendant was not a licensee but the tank fishery was settled with him, such settlement could not be a lease within the meaning of the proviso to section 6(2) of the Act. On the other hand, Mr. Pramatha Nath Mitter, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant-respondent has urged that the defendant was a lessee of the tank fishery and its sub-soil and also of the remaining portion of the property in suit consisting of agricultural lands. He submits that the plaintiffs being intermediaries, their interests had vested in the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the Act and the defendant being the lessee in possession of the property in suit became a direct tenant under the State of West Bengal. 8. In the instant case, there is no document of lease or licence in respect of the property in suit. 8. In the instant case, there is no document of lease or licence in respect of the property in suit. The learned Subordinate Judge has not accepted the case of the plaintiffs that the defendant was a mere licensee in respect of the Bhasa Jalkar, that is, the watery portion. In our view also, there is no satisfactory evidence in support of the plaintiffs' case that the defendant or his father was a mere licensee in respect of the suit property. The defendant has also failed to prove that he had taken a bemeadi lease of the property in suit either himself or in the benami of his father. The finding of the learned Subordinate Judge in that regard has not been assailed before us by Mr. Mitter. 9. It is now partinent to refer to the provisions of section 6(1) (e) of the Act which are as follows :– "6(1). The finding of the learned Subordinate Judge in that regard has not been assailed before us by Mr. Mitter. 9. It is now partinent to refer to the provisions of section 6(1) (e) of the Act which are as follows :– "6(1). Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 4 and 5, an intermediary shall, except in the cases mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (2) but subject to the other provisions of that sub-section, be entitled to retain with effect from the date of vesting– (e) tank fisheries, Explanation–"Tank fishery" means a reservoir or place for the storage of water, whether formed naturally or by excavation or by construction of embankments, which is being used for pisciculture or for fishing, together with the sub-soil and the banks of such reservoir or place except such portion of the banks as are included in a homestead or in a garden or orchard and includes any right of pisciculture or fishing in such reservoir or place ;" Sub-section (2) of section 6 provides as follows : "(2) An intermediary who is entitled to retain possession of any land under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to hold such land directly under the State from the date of vesting as a tenant, subject to such terms an conditions as may be prescribed and subject to payment of such rent as may be determined under the provisions of this Act, and as entered in the record-of-rights finally published under Chapter V except that no rent shall be payable for land referred to in clause (h) or (i) ; Provided that if any tank fishery or any land comprised in a tea-garden, orchard, mill, factory or workshop was held immediately before the date of vesting under a lease, such lease, shall be deemed to have been given by the State Government on the same terms and conditions as immediately before such date subject to such modification therein as the State Government may think fit to make.'' It has been held by the Supreme Court in (1) The State of West Bengal v. Shebaits of Ishwar Shri Saradiya Thakurani, AIR 1971 SC 2097 , that a mere right to rear and catch fish in a tank cannot be the subject matter of a lease within the meaning of proviso to sub-section (2) of section 6. That decision of the Supreme Court has been followed by a Special Bench of this Court in (2) Ahindra Nath Mukhapadhayya v. Manmotha Nath Kurani, AIR 1973 Cal 168 . 10. According to the Supreme Court decision and followed by the Special Bench of this Court, the right of pisciculture or fishing cannot be the subject matter of a lease within the meaning of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 6. Where under an intermediary a person holds a tank fishery having only the right to rear and catch fish, that is, the right of pisciculture or fishing, the proviso to sub-section (2) will not apply and the intermediary will be en titled to retain the tank fishery. This proposition of law has not been disputed by Mr. Mitter, but as stated already, it has been contended by him that the defendant does not hold the tank fishery only for the purpose of pisciculture or fishing, but he is a lessee of the tank fishery and its sub-soil and also of the banks and the surrounding agricultural land. In other words, his contention is that the defendant is a lessee of land. There can be no doubt that if the defendant is found to have a right to the soil and the sub-soil, in that case, it must be held that he became a direct tenant under the State of West Bengal by virtue of the provisions of section 6. In order to prove that the defendant was settled with an interest in land, reliance was placed on his behalf on the fact that he has been cultivating the land comprised in the disputed property. In this connection, it may be stated that out of 191.08 acres of the property in suit 49.65 acres and 1.02 acres consist of respectively Sali lands and embankments and the remaining area measuring 140.41 acres comprises the tank fishery. Although in the plaint, it is the case of the plaintiffs that the licence was granted to the defendant's father for the first time in the month of Falgoon 1356 B. S., the plaintiff no. 1 (P.W.1) Jnanendra Nath Basu has stated in his evidence that the defendant's father took settlement of the suit bheri for one year from Falgoon 1, 1355 B.S. to the last day of the month of Magh 1356 B. S. In view of the account, Ext. 1 (P.W.1) Jnanendra Nath Basu has stated in his evidence that the defendant's father took settlement of the suit bheri for one year from Falgoon 1, 1355 B.S. to the last day of the month of Magh 1356 B. S. In view of the account, Ext. 4(c), it seems that there was a mistake in the statement made in the plaint in that regard. According to the plaintiffs, the last of such settlement expired in Magh 1361 BS. The question whether or not the defendant was granted a right to the soil and the sub-soil is a question relating to the term of the contract between the parties. In his written statement, the defendant has not stated the terms of the contract. In paragraph 7 of the written statement, it has been stated by him that after taking settlement of the suit property in 1356 BS at an actual rental of Rs. 20,000/- from some of the plaintiffs and from the predecessor-in-interest of other plaintiffs in the benami of his father, he has been in continuous possession of the same, partly by rearing fish and partly by cultivation of paddy on the said lands. The defendant Sushil Kumar Safui who has examined himself as DW 2 does Dot also mention the terms of the settlement of the suit property. In his examination-in-chief, be says that he has been rearing fish and making paddy cultivation in the suit property and that, he had taken settlement of the same in 1356 BS in the benami of his father. He has no doubt denied that licence for one year or lease for one year in respect of the suit property was ever granted to him, but he has not specifically stated that the settlement was in respect of the land comprised in the property in suit including the sub-soil of the tank fishery. It has been elicited from him in his cross-examination that he personally went to take settlement in 1356 BS, along with his father and that the Naib of the plaintiffs intimated him that there would be settlement of the bheri. Further, he says that his father and his maternal uncle Krishna Chandra Mondal were present. He has not, however, examined his maternal uncle. Further, he says that his father and his maternal uncle Krishna Chandra Mondal were present. He has not, however, examined his maternal uncle. But the most significant fact is that although he was present at the time of settlement and took the settlement in the benami on his father, nowhere he has mentioned the terms of such settlement, namely, whether it was in respect of the watery portion or the sub-soil. Towards the end of his cross-examination, he has admitted that by 'bheri' is meant where fish is reared. The positive case of the plaintiffs is that no right or interest was granted to the defendant or to his rather in the land comprised in the property in suit. It has been noticed that the major portion of the suit property consists of the watery portion and it can be reasonably presumed, in the absence of any document in writing and satisfactory evidence, that only a right of fishing was granted to the defendant. 11. A number of documents have been relied on by the defendant to prove that he has been cultivating the lands comprised in the property in suit. The learned Subordinate Judge has considered each of these documents and he has come to the finding that these documents do not prove that the settlement was in respect of the right to the land or right to the sub-soil of the tank fishery. It is not necessary for us to refer to these documents which are a few letters of some authorities, Union Board notices, Panchayet receipts showing payment of rent to the Government, notices issued by the Agricultural Income-tax Officer, receipts granted by the Agricultural Income-tax Officer etc., for none of these documents show that the defendant ever cultivated the lands between the period from Falgoon 1355 BS and Magh 1361 BS, excepting that the defendant might have cultivated the land comprised in the suit property during the latter part of 1361 BS. These documents no doubt show that he has been cultivating the lands, but in our view, the nature of the present possession of he suit property will not justify a finding that the settlement was in respect of the land or that any right in the soil or the sub-soil was created in his favour. These documents no doubt show that he has been cultivating the lands, but in our view, the nature of the present possession of he suit property will not justify a finding that the settlement was in respect of the land or that any right in the soil or the sub-soil was created in his favour. In these circumstances, we agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that the defendant has failed to prove that he was granted a right to the land of the suit property. In view of the said Supreme Court decision and the decision of the Special Bench of this Court, the fact that the defendant had been granted a mere right of pisciculture or fishing will not stand in the way of the plaintiffs to retain the disputed tank fishery. 12. It is now necessary to refer to and dispose of the application of the defendant filed in this Court on September 29, 1975 praying for recording an order of abatement of the appeal and the suit out of which the appeal arises. It has been strenuously urged by Mr. Mitter that in view of clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (2) of section 57B as inserted in the Act by the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973, the suit including the appeal should be held to have abated. In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to refer to sub-sections (2) to (5) of section 57B which are as follows– "(2). In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to refer to sub-sections (2) to (5) of section 57B which are as follows– "(2). No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application concerning any land or any estate, or any right in such estate, if it relates to– (a) alteration of any entry in the record-of-rights finally published revised made, corrected or modified under any of the provisions of Chapter V, (b) a dispute involving determination of the question either expressly or by implication, whether a raiyat or an intermediary, is or is not entitled to retain under the provisions of this Act such land or estate or right in such estate, as the case may be, or (c) any matter which under any of the provisions of this Act is to be, or has already been, enquired into, decided, dealt with or determined by the State Government or any authority specified therein, and any such suit or application which is pending before a Civil Court immediately before the commencement of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973, shall abate so far as it relates to all or any bf the matters referred to in clause (a), clause (b) or clause (c) (3) Any dispute referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2) may be decided by a Revenue Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Settlement Officer, specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, who shall dispose of the same in such manner as may be prescribed : Provided that in deciding a dispute under this sub-section the Revenue Officer shall not re-open any matter which has already been enquired into, investigated, determined or decided by the State Government or any authority under any of the provisions of this Act. (4) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Revenue Officer made under sub-section (3) may appeal to the prescribed authority not below the rank of a Settlement Officer, within such time, in such manner and subject to payment of such fees as may be prescribed. (5) A decision made by the Appellate Authority under sub-section (4) shall be final. (4) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Revenue Officer made under sub-section (3) may appeal to the prescribed authority not below the rank of a Settlement Officer, within such time, in such manner and subject to payment of such fees as may be prescribed. (5) A decision made by the Appellate Authority under sub-section (4) shall be final. Explanation,–In this section– (i) suit includes an appeal and (ii) an authority includes an authority to hear an appeal." It has been argued on behalf of the defendant-respondent that as the dispute in the suit as also in the present appeal involves determination of the question of the plaintiffs' right to retain the property in suit as contemplated by clause (b), the appeal has abated in terms of clause (c) and accordingly, the dispute has to be referred to the Revenue Officer as required by sub-section (3). Much argument has been made on behalf of either party as to the scope of sub-section (2) of section 57B. But we do not think that in the facts and circumstances of the instant case before us we are called upon to lay down the scope of sub-section (2) of section 57B, for in our view, clauses (b) and (c) are inapplicable to the present case for reasons given hereafter. 13. In this case, the dispute ultimately leads to the question as to the plaintiffs' right to retain the tank fishery. On the date the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973 came into force, the appeal was pending in this Court. Under clause (c) one of the conditions is that the suit or application must be pending before the Civil Court. The question naturally arises whether the High Court is a Civil Court. The words 'Civil Court' have not been defined in the Act or in the said amendment Act by which the provision of section 57B has been inserted in the Act. Ordinarily, a 'Civil Court' means only that Court which has been set up under the provisions of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. The term 'Civil Court', therefore, does not include the High Court unless the Act in which the term is used provides, either expressly or by necessary implication, that it includes the High Court. Ordinarily, a 'Civil Court' means only that Court which has been set up under the provisions of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. The term 'Civil Court', therefore, does not include the High Court unless the Act in which the term is used provides, either expressly or by necessary implication, that it includes the High Court. It has been already noticed that there is no express provision in the Act or the Amending Act with which we are concerned, that 'Civil Court' includes the High Court. It has now to be seen if there is any indication in the Act in that regard Section 57B uses the expression 'Civil Court' and not 'any Court' which undoubtedly comprises within it all Courts including the High Court. Sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Act inter-alia provides : ".........notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court or Tribunal or any other law, all rights and interests in mines and minerals of all intermediaries, being lessees and sub-lessees, in any notified area shall be deemed to have vested in the State with effect from the date of vesting... ... ... ". The proviso to sub-section (3) of section 9 uses the words 'the Court'. There can be no doubt that these terms, namely, 'any Court' and 'the Court' include any category of Court including the High Court. Sub-section (2) of section 20 inter-alia provides that an appeal shall lie to the 'High Court' from every order passed on appeal by a Special Judge under sub-section (1). It thus appears that whenever it is intended by the legislature to refer to all categories of Court, the expression 'any Court' or the Court has been used. So it is clear that the words 'Civil Court' in section 57B do not, by necessary implication, include within it or refer to the High Court. 14. At this stage, it is pertinent to refer to one Full Bench and one Special Bench decisions of this Court. (3) In Narsing Das Tansukdas v. Chogemnll, AIR 1939 Cat. So it is clear that the words 'Civil Court' in section 57B do not, by necessary implication, include within it or refer to the High Court. 14. At this stage, it is pertinent to refer to one Full Bench and one Special Bench decisions of this Court. (3) In Narsing Das Tansukdas v. Chogemnll, AIR 1939 Cat. 435 FB, it has been held by the majority of the Full Bench that the words 'Civil Courts' in sections 32 to 36 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1939, have the same meaning as they have in clause 16 of the Letters Patent and the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, namely, those Courts of civil jurisdiction in Bengal that are subordinate to the High Court and do not therefore include the High Court. Derbyshire CJ observed as follows :– "I cannot construe the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act as enacting something contrary to the Government of India Act, 1919, when another construction is possible and yet consistent with the purpose and meaning of the Act as a whole. If the two words in question were "Civil Court" (without the two initial capital letters) it might well be said that they mean all Courts in the Province exercising civil jurisdiction. But the words are "Civil Courts" (with initial capital letters) ; that would indicate that they mean a particular class of Court exercising .civil jurisdiction well understood when the words "Civil Court" are used. It is common in this Province to refer to "Civil Courts" as distinct from the High Court. Thus, there are "Civil Court" holidays quite distinct from "High Court" holidays. Clause 16 of the Letters Patent of 1865 provides that : The High Court shall be a Court of Appeal from the Civil Courts (capitals) of the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort-William and from all other Courts subject to its superintendence. That clearly recognizes Civil Courts as a class of Courts of Civil jurisdiction separate from and subordinate to, the High Court. That clearly recognizes Civil Courts as a class of Courts of Civil jurisdiction separate from and subordinate to, the High Court. The Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, which repealed the Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1861, provides in Sec. 3 that : There shall be the following classes of Civil Court under this Act : (1) the Court of the District Judge ; (2) the Court of the Additional District Judge ; (3) the Court of the Subordinate Judge ; and (4) the Court of the Munsif. * * * * * In my view, the words "Civil Courts" in the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act have the same meaning as they have in Cl. 16 of the Letters Patent and in the Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1887, namely those Courts of civil jurisdiction in Bengal subordinate to the High Courts, to wit, the Courts of the District Judge, the Additional District Judge, the Subordinate Judge, and the Munsif. It follows that in my view the words "Civil Court" in the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1935, do not include the High Court .................." . The same view has been reiterated by a later Special Bench in (4) Khirode C. Ghose v. Narandra N. Sanyal, AIR 1939 Cal. 599 SB. The reasons given in these two decisions also apply to the instant case. In the context of what has been stated above and in view of the above Full Bench and the Special Bench decisions, we hold that the words 'Civil Court', in section 57B do not, either expressly or by necessary implication, include the High Court. Accordingly, as the appeal was pending before this Court and not before a Civil Court immediately before the commencement of the said Amendment Act, clause (c) will not apply. In view of the opening words of sub-section (2) and for the same reason that the High Court is not a Civil Court, the maintainability of an appeal in the High Court is not affected even though it involves matters mentioned in any of the clauses (a), (b) and (c). Sub-section (2) only seeks to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and not of the High Court. 15. For another reason also, which will be indicated presently, clause (c) is inapplicable to the present case. The plaintiffs have failed to prove that they retained the property in suit including the tank fishery. Sub-section (2) only seeks to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and not of the High Court. 15. For another reason also, which will be indicated presently, clause (c) is inapplicable to the present case. The plaintiffs have failed to prove that they retained the property in suit including the tank fishery. The question as to the plaintiffs' right to retain the suit property including the tank fishery is yet to be determined. Under clause (c), any matter which under any of the provisions of the Act is to be enquired into, decided, dealt with or determined by the State Government or any authority specified therein, any suit or application involving such matter shall abate. Therefore, clause (c) will apply inter alia in a case where any matter is to be enquired into, decided, dealt with or determined under any of the provisions of the Act. Here, we are concerned with the question as to the right of the plaintiffs to retain the tank fishery and the remaining land of the suit property. We are now to see whether the Act contains any provision for the determination of the question as to the right of retention of an intermediary of a tank fishery. The only provision to which we may refer to is sub-section (5) of section 6 which is us follows :– "(5). An intermediary shall exercise his choice for retention of land under sub-section (1) within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed. If no choice is exercised by him during the prescribed period, the revenue Officer shall, after giving him an opportunity of being heard, allow him to retain so much of the lands as do not exceed the limits specified in clauses (c), (d) and (j) of that sub-section : Provided that nothing in this sub section shall require an intermediary to exercise the choice if he has already done so before the date of coming into force of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1957. 16. Under sub-section (5) the choice for retention of land has to exercised by an intermediary within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed. 16. Under sub-section (5) the choice for retention of land has to exercised by an intermediary within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed. Under Rule 4A(1) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules, 1954, such choice has to be exercised by the intermediary by furnishing to the Settlement Officer or to the Revenue Officer authorized by the Settlement Officer in this behalf before the expiry of the 30th day of April, 1958, a statement in writing in Form ‘B’ appended to Schedule B to Rules or in a form substantially similar thereto and in the manner indicated therein. There is, however, no provision in the Act how the Settlement Officer or the Revenue Officer will deal with such a statement in Form ‘B’. Under sub-section (5) of section 6 if no such choice is exercised then the Revenue Officer shall, after giving the intermediary an opportunity of being heard, allow him to retain so much of the lands as do not exceed the limits specified in clauses (c), (d) and (j) of sub-section (1) of section 6. Clauses (c), (d) and (j) of section 6(1) relate to different classes of section 6 does not relate to tank fisheries but to the section of land, but not to tank fisheries. So far as tank fisheries are concerned, there is no provision in the Act and the Rules laying down how the question of retention will be deal with or decided. Indeed, Mr. Mitter has admitted before us that he cannot lay his hands on any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules which provides for the determination of the question of retention of tank fisheries. Be that as it may, sub-section (5) of Section 6 does not relate to tank fisheries but to the classes of lands as specified in clauses (c), (d) and (j) of section 6(1). In these circumstances, it must be held that there is no provision in the Act under which the right of the plaintiffs to retain the disputed tank fishery can be enquired into, decided, dealt with or determined by the State Government or any authority specified therein. The result, therefore, is that clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 57B is inapplicable and accordingly, the appeal cannot be held to have abated. The result, therefore, is that clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 57B is inapplicable and accordingly, the appeal cannot be held to have abated. Needless to say that clause (b) also will not apply for the first reason, namely, that the appeal is pending not before a Civil Court but before the High Court. 17. As regards the plaintiffs' right to retain the area of the property in suit comprising agricultural land, the plaintiffs have failed to prove that they retained the same. They have not produced any return in Form 'B' showing that they retained the lands of the property in suit. In the absence of any satisfactory evidence and decision by the Revenue Officer under sub-section (5) of section 6, and in view of the fact that the plaintiffs are intermediaries, we are unable to hold that the plaintiffs have retained the lands. The plaintiffs have not produced sufficient materials for the Court to decide whether they are entitled to retain the lands. In these circumstances, while we bold that the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 6 is not applicable and the plaintiffs are entitled to retain the disputed tank fishery, they have failed to prove that they are entitled to retain the agricultural lands comprised in the property in suit. 18. Before we part with this appeal it may be recorded that the State of West Bengal has supported the case of defendant and contested the appeal. Mr. Ganendra Narayan Roy, learned Advocate appearing for the State has adopted the arguments of Mr. Mitter and it is contended by him that the notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is illegal and invalid. It has been held by the learned Subordinate Judge that the notice (Ext. 1) suffers from want of particulars as contemplated by section 80 and, as such, it is not valid in law. We are unable to accept the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge or the contention made on behalf of the State of West Bengal. It appears from the notice (Ext. 1) that a copy of the plaint was annexed to it. We fail to understand, when a copy of the plaint is enclosed with the notice, how it could be said that the notice suffers from particulars. It seems that the learned Subordinate Judge overlooked this fact in considering the validity of the notice. It appears from the notice (Ext. 1) that a copy of the plaint was annexed to it. We fail to understand, when a copy of the plaint is enclosed with the notice, how it could be said that the notice suffers from particulars. It seems that the learned Subordinate Judge overlooked this fact in considering the validity of the notice. We would, accordingly, hold that the notice under section 80 is quite legal and valid. 19. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge are set aside. The suit is decreed in part with proportionate costs. The plaintiffs shall be entitled to evict the defendant no.1 from the disputed tank fishery together with its embankments and recover khas possession thereof from the defendant. The defendant is permanently restrained from exercising any right of Jalkar and fishery in the disputed tank fishery. The defendant is granted two months time to vacate and deliver up peaceful possession of the disputed tank fishery to the plaintiffs ; in default, the plaintiffs will be entitled to evict the defendant and recover khas possession of the disputed tank fishery together with its embankments in execution of this decree. The plaintiffs will also be entitled to a decree for mesne profits in accordance with Order 20, rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure on an application made by them to the Trial Court in that regard. The claim of the plaintiffs in respect of the land comprised in the suit property as recorded in the record-of-rights (Ext. U) under the categories of Sali and Garlayek Patit lands only are disallowed, subject to this that for the purposes of proper and reasonable enjoyment and user of the disputed tank fishery and its embankments, the plaintiffs will have the right of easement over such Sali and Garlayek Patit lands. 20. The appeal is allowed with costs. 21. As prayed for by Mr. Rabindra Nath Mitra learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 1, the operation of the judgment will remain stayed for three months from date so as to enable the said respondent to file an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Sharma, J. : I agree.