JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :- Bhattacharya J.: On a writ petition by the detenu petitioner praying for a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus the validity of the order of detention made by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, detaining him under section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, is challenged. The detenu was put to detention pursuant to an order dated 6th March, 1975 with the avowed object of preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Detention rests upon two grounds served upon the detenu on 8.3.75 together with a Hindi translation of the same. Detention however commenced on the date of the order i.e., 6.3.75. The grounds are set out hereunder: On 22.12.74 at about 19.30 hrs. you and your associates, being armed with swords, pipe-guns and bombs raided the house of one Parbati Lala of 110/IF, Cossipore Road with a view to kill his son Apurba Lala out of existing rivalry with the group of which Apurba Lala is a member. As a result of this violent attack in which the doors of the said house were damaged and bombs were exploded in and around the said premises, the inmates of the said house were panicked and the entire neighbourhood was seized with serious apprehension of similar violent attacks affecting public order. On 18.2.75 at about 21.00 hrs., there was a violent clash between two groups miscreants on Cossipore Road near its junction with K.L. Das Road (P.S. Chitpore). One group was comprised of Basanta Lal Shaw of 110, Cossipore Road, Nagendra Pandey of 6, Cossipore Road and others while the other group was composed of Tarak Shaw of 6/14, Cossipore Road, yourself and others. In the clash members of both the groups exploded bombs and hurled brickbats and sodawater bottles at each other leading to serious disturbances affecting public order. As a result, local people and shopkeepers of the said locality were terrorised to pursue their normal avocation for a considerable period of time. 2. In the writ petition the order of detention has been impugned on several counts mainly on the point that the detenu was not involved in the incident in as much as, he had been on duty at 19.30 hrs. 2. In the writ petition the order of detention has been impugned on several counts mainly on the point that the detenu was not involved in the incident in as much as, he had been on duty at 19.30 hrs. On 22nd December, 1974 which is the date and hours of the incident alleged in the ground No.1. He was similarly on duty in his factory at East India Electricals at 21.00 hours on 18.2.74 i.e., the date and hour of the incident alleged in ground No.2. A certificate purported to have been granted by Personnel Manager, East India Electricals, has been annexed to the writ petition to the same effect certifies to the above facts alleged in the writ petition. This is a plea of alibi categorically taken by the detenu petitioner in the writ petition. It bas been further contended that the detenu being an illiterate person could not read or write English or Hindi so that be could not understand the contents of the grounds served upon him as the same had not been explained to .him in his mother tongue Hindi at the time of service. 3. The rule is contested by the State and an affidavit-in-opposition bas been sworn by the Commissioner of Police, the detaining authority. The relevant allegations in the writ petition with regard to the plea of alibi bas been controverted in paragraph 9 of the affidavit by saying that the correctness of the certificate was denied and that the complicity of the detenu was established on reliable materials on record collected in course of investigation of the two criminal cases. These materials disprove the plea of alibi set up by the detenu. It was further stated that the said plea was raised by the detenu before the Advisory Board and the Advisory Board found the said plea of alibi untenable and recommended in favour of detention. 4. With regard to the service of the ground, the claim of the detenu has been controverted by saying that the contents were duly explained to the detenu by the Sub-Inspector, D.R. Dutta in Hindi and the detenu had admitted to have understood the same. 5. 4. With regard to the service of the ground, the claim of the detenu has been controverted by saying that the contents were duly explained to the detenu by the Sub-Inspector, D.R. Dutta in Hindi and the detenu had admitted to have understood the same. 5. At the time of hearing of the rule the main contention raised on behalf of the detenu is that a written representation in which the plea of alibi was taken in the same manner as in the writ petition was submitted to the Jail Authorities on 18.3.75 and received by the Government on 21.3.1975 and rejected on 1.4.75. Thereafter, the said representation was sent to the Advisory Board on 2.4 75 along with the reference. It will appear from the Home File that the State Government rejected the representation on 1.4.75 without making any investigation or waiting for the result of any such investigation into the plea so raised by the petitioner in the representation. The plea so raised was capable of investigation by reference to records of the factory, particulars of which have been furnished by the detenu in his representation. The Home File shows the following : "The representation was put up with an office note on 31.3.75 stating that comments of D.C., D.O., Calcutta, on the representation might be invited. The order follows next date; Representation duly considered and rejected. 6. It does appears clear that the State Government did not enter into or investigate into the plea of alibi raised by the detenu and rejected the representation without consideration thereof. Now the question is whether this is due compliance of the provision of section 8(1) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. Mr. Chowdhury appearing for the State contends that there is no such oblig1tion on the part of the State Government to investigate into the plea of alibi raised by the detenu. According to him this is a matter which was to be investigated by the Advisory Board on the materials to be placed before the Board and the Board in the instant case had enquired into the matter and expressed its opinion in favour of detention thereby negativating any such plea of alibi. This leads us to the question as to the extent of obligation of the State Government to consider the representation under section 8(1) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. Mr. This leads us to the question as to the extent of obligation of the State Government to consider the representation under section 8(1) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. Mr. Chowdhury relies upon certain observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (1) Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1974 SC 2154 . He refers to para 24 in particular which runs thus: "The representation of a detenu is to be considered. There is an obligation on the State to consider the representation. The Advisory Board has adequate power to examine the entire materials. The Board can also call for more materials. The Government considers the representation to ascertain essentially whether the order is in conformity with the power under the Law. The Board on the other hand considers whether in the light of the representation there is sufficient cause for the detention." 7. On the above observations, Mr. Chowdhury submits that the essential function of the State Government in considering the representation of the detenu is to a certain whether the order of detention is in conformity with the power under the law. So the plea of alibi raised by the detenu in the representation does not fall within the above consideration and that it is for the Board to consider the same. We are unable to accept this contention of Mr. Chowdhury. From the observation of the Supreme Court itself as quoted above, the duty of the State Government is to consider whether the detention order was in conformity with the power under the law i. e., whether the order is within the sanction of section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. If the plea of alibi finds favour with the State Government on investigation the grounds would be non-existent and as such they will not furnish valid foundation for the satisfaction of the detaining authority and therefore, would be beyond the sanction of Section 3 of the Act. It is well settled principle of law that the obligation to consider the representation cast upon the State Government is altogether different from the obligation of the Advisory Board to consider the representation later at the time of hearing of the reference. It is well settled principle of law that the obligation to consider the representation cast upon the State Government is altogether different from the obligation of the Advisory Board to consider the representation later at the time of hearing of the reference. The Supreme Court had earlier expressed their view on the point of such consideration by the Government in a case reported in (2) AIR 1969 SC 1028 - Abdul Karim v. State of West Bengal, under the Preventive Detention Act., 1950. Towards the middle of para 11 at page 1033, it has been observed by the Supreme Court as follows: "Take for an instance a case of detention of a person on account of mistaken identity. If the order of detention has been made against 'A' and a different person 'B' is arrested and detained by the police authorities because of similarity of names or some such cause, it can not be reasonably said that the State Government should wait for the report of the Advisory Board before releasing the wrong person from detention. It is obvious that apart from the provision of reference to the Advisory Board, the State Government has ample power under Section 13 of the Act to revoke any order of detention at any time. If the right of representation in such a cause is to be real and not illusory there is a legal obligation imposed upon the State Government to consider the representation and to take appropriate action thereon. " 8. Similarly unless the plea of alibi is considered by the State Government when such a plea was taken in the representation the State Government would not be in a position to understand that the powers under the Act had been property exercised by the detaining authority. The duty cast upon the State Government cannot be said to have been duly discharged unless such an investigation is made while disposing of the representation of the detenu. This aspect of the case has been elaborately discussed in the Supreme Court decision reported in (3) AIR 1975 SC 775 , John Martin v. State of West Bengal. It has referred to and considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Haradhan Saha's case on which Mr. Chowdhury relies. This aspect of the case has been elaborately discussed in the Supreme Court decision reported in (3) AIR 1975 SC 775 , John Martin v. State of West Bengal. It has referred to and considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Haradhan Saha's case on which Mr. Chowdhury relies. At page 778 of the reported decision it has been elaborated thus: "Section 8, subjection (1) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, lays down in the clearest terms which admit of no doubt that the opportunity which is to be afforded to the detenu is to make a representation against the order of detention to the appropriate Government. Therefore, it is indisputable on a plain reading of Section 8 subjection (1) that the representation that may be made by the detenu is to the appropriate Government and it is the appropriate G0vernment which has to consider the representation." It follows from the decision in (4) Jay Narayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1970 SC 675 ). It has been pointed out that appropriate Government is to exercise its opinion and a judgment on the representation before sending the case along with the delenu's representation to the Advisory Board. Thereafter in John Martin's case reference was made to Haradhan Saha's case and the relevant portion of para 24 of the said decision as hereinbefore referred was quoted. Relying upon those decisions it was held in John Martin's case that under Section 8 (1) of the Act, it is the appropriate Government that is required to consider the representation of the deteu. The judgment proceeds to say: "This, however, does not mean that the appropriate Government can reject the representation of the detenu in a casual or mechanical manner. The appropriate Government must bring to bear on the consideration of the representation unbiased mind. There should be as pointed out by this Court in Haradhan Saha's case a real and proper consideration of the representation by the appropriate Government. The appropriate Government must bring to bear on the consideration of the representation unbiased mind. There should be as pointed out by this Court in Haradhan Saha's case a real and proper consideration of the representation by the appropriate Government. We cannot over emphasis the Deed for the closest and most zealous scrutiny of the representation for the purpose of deciding whether the detention of petitioner is justified,” Upon the above observation of the Supreme Court, there is no room for doubt that it is the obligation of the State Government to consider a plea of alibi taken by the detenu with all particulars therein on proper investigation and rejection of the representation without consideration of the above plea would be a mechanical act and not a proper consideration on the merits of the representation. It is true that in John Martin’s case the Supreme Court observed that the order of the State Government rejecting the representation need not be a reasoned order. That point of Course stands concluded by the decision in Haradhan Saha's case that there need not be a speaking order and that 'here is also no failure of justice by the order not being a speaking order. All that it necessary is that there should be a real and proper consideration by the Government. Nevertheless, the fact of non-consideration of the plea of alibi raised by the detenu is patent from the record itself and is also conceded by the State Government from the materials placed before us. This is not proper consideration of the representation and due compliance of the obligation imposed upon the State Government by Section 8. sub-section (1) of the Act. The representation must, therefore, be held as not been duly considered by the State Government and as such the obligation under Section 8. subsection (1) of the Act, has not been discharged by the State Government. This violation will vitiate the continued detention and this conclusion alone we are compelled to hold that the continued detention is not in accordance with law being in violation of the mandatory provision of section 8 sub-section (1) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. 9. The writ petition, therefore, succeeds and we make the Rule absolute directing that the detenu be set at liberty forthwith. 9. The writ petition, therefore, succeeds and we make the Rule absolute directing that the detenu be set at liberty forthwith. Sen, J. I agree with My Lord that this Rule should be made absolute as the continued detention has been rendered invalid because of the failure on the part of the State Government to fulfil its obligation under section 8(1) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act 1971. But in view of the importance of the point which has arisen for consideration on tile plea raised by Mr. Chowdhury appearing on behalf of the respondents, I desire to express my own views on the said point which is also in agreement with the views expressed by My Lord. 11. On the facts set forth in the judgment of My Lord it is evident that the detenu in his representation to the State Government raised a substantial plea in his defence which, if accepted, would have rendered the ground non-existent and the detention illegal. The official minutes drawn up while processing such a representation for consideration by the appropriate authority indicate that the plea so raised merited and called for an enquiry on verification. An enquiry was accordingly directed but very strangely even before any such enquiry could be made, the said representation was rejected, by the appropriate authority with an endorsement to the effect: 'that the representation had been duly considered and is rejected'. The respondents have not explained to us how the appropriate authority could have done so and what was the reason therefor. Evidently, the authority disposing of the representation did not do so honestly. It did it with a foregone conclusion that there presentation made by the detenu is only to be rejected irrespective of the merit of the plea raised in his defence. This is in my opinion, no compliance with the obligation to consider the representation as imposed by Section 8 (1) of the said Act. 12. Now, Mr. Chowdhury faced with the aforesaid fact had raised a point to the effect that the State Government is not required to consider the issues of facts raised in a representation. According to Mr. Chowdhury, the State Government while considering the representation is required only to consider whether the detention is in accordance with law or not. It is difficult to appreciate the true import of Mr. Chowdhury's contention. According to Mr. Chowdhury, the State Government while considering the representation is required only to consider whether the detention is in accordance with law or not. It is difficult to appreciate the true import of Mr. Chowdhury's contention. After all, the question as to whether detention in a particular case is in accordance with law or not may necessitate investigation of facts, so that it is difficult to differentiate between issues of fact and law in adjudging the validity of such detention. Therefore, it is difficult to conceive how the facts can be totally excluded in the matter of consideration of a representation made by a detenu as against the grounds. But that apart, this contention of Me. Chowdhury should be rejected on more fundamental grounds. It is now well settled that Section 8 (1) in providing for and opportunity to the detenu to make a representation casts an obligation on the State Government to consider the representation. This is what has been held to be flowing from the provision itself by the Supreme Court in the case of (4) Jayanarayan Sukul v. The State of West Bengal, AIR (970) SC 675. The provision itself nowhere speaks of or contemplates any limitation in the matter of consideration of such a representation. The obligation imposed is not limited in any manner. Or in other words, in Section 8 (1) there is nothing to support the contention put forward by Mr. Chowdhury that while considering the representation the State Government should only consider the issues of law and flow issues of fact. If the limitation does not flow from the provision itself it being a provision providing for a safeguard in cases of preventive detention it will not be proper for us to read into the Section a limitation which is not only not there on the language used but is also not consistent with the principles underlying the provision itself. It is not consistent with principles underlying the provision, because if the statute meant to provide a remedy in cases of illegal detention, why should it make a distinction between cases where such illegality arises on law and where such illegality arises on facts. In both cases the detention is illegal and the detenu deserves a remedy which the statute wanted to provide. In both cases the detention is illegal and the detenu deserves a remedy which the statute wanted to provide. Secondly, when the detenu is given an opportunity to make a representation obviously he is given the said opportunity to meet the order of detention and the grounds on his own defence including defence on facts. If the law merely requires the State Government to ascertain only whether the detaining authority bad complied with the provision of the statute and that he is legally authorised to make the order and nothing else at that stage, the same could be done on the records and there would be no necessity of calling for a representation from the detenu. But the statute provides otherwise and calls for a representation obviously to provide an open opportunity to the detenu that his detention is not justified either in law or on facts or on both. It this view, I am unable to accept the contention so put forwarded by Mr. Chowdhury. No doubt Mr. Chowdhury relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Haradhan Saha's case as pointed out by My Lord upon a complete misreading of the true import of the said decision. That decision is no authority for the proposition contended for by Mr. Chowdhury and this position would be quite evident in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of John Martin as pointed out by My Lord. 13. Mr. Chowdhury had next contended that in any event when the said plea raised in the representation was gone into by the Advisory Board and was overruled there had been no material prejudice to the detenu so that the continued detention should not be held to be invalid by the failure indicated hereinbefore. For more reason than one such a contention is, in my view, misconceived. Firstly, neither the State Government nor the Advisory Board is required to give any reason or make any speaking order so that it is not possible to adjudge how far the failure on the part of one of the authorities to consider the issues raised in the representation, is cured by the findings made by the other. Firstly, neither the State Government nor the Advisory Board is required to give any reason or make any speaking order so that it is not possible to adjudge how far the failure on the part of one of the authorities to consider the issues raised in the representation, is cured by the findings made by the other. Secondly, the statute provides for two independent safeguards in favour of a person put to preventive detention one is the consideration by the appropriate Government of his representation and the second is the consideration by the Advisory Board of his case including his representation. The Advisory Board is not in the position of an appellate tribunal from the appropriate Government so that we can hold that even if the appropriate Government bad failed to consider the representation on issues of facts raised thereto that failure is cured by the findings or the decision arrived at by the Advisory Board, It had been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Jayanarayan Sukul's case that on the mandatory provisions of Sections 8 and 10 what is required is that both the authorities, namely, the appropriate Government and the Advisory Board must bring to bear Oil the consideration of the representation an independent and unbiased mind of its own. These are the only safeguards as against an order of detention without trial in respect of a person based on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. There arises a material failure as soon as one of these authorities fail to discharge its obligation. As a matter of fact in Jayanarayan Sukul's case the Supreme Court observed: "It, therefore, follows that the appropriate authority is to consider the representation of the detenu uninfluenced by any opinion Or consideration of the Advisory Board,," .., ...The logic behind this proposition is that the Government should immediately consider the representation of the detenu before sending the matter to the Advisory Board and further that such action will then have the real favour of independent judgment." This is necessarily one of the important safeguards against illegal detention and a failure on the part of the State Government resulting in a denial of this safeguard, in my opinion, amounts to material prejudice which would invalidate the detention. For reasons aforesaid, I entirely agree with My Lord that on the facts of the present case there bad been a total failure on the part of the State Government to consider the representation in accordance with Section 8 as a result whereof the continued detention has been rendered invalid.