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Allahabad High Court · body

1975 DIGILAW 394 (ALL)

SOHAN SINGH v. MAIKU LAL

1975-08-11

K.C.AGRAWAL

body1975
K. C. AGARWAL, J. By this petition Sohan Singh, who was the tenant of shop in premises No. 19 Johnstonganj, Allahabad has challenged the orders of the Prescribed Authority dated July 19, 1973 and April 17, 1974. By these orders the Prescribed Authority reject ed the applications made by Sohan Singh for permission to serve interrogatories on respondent No. 1 for discovery of certain facts. The facts are these: Premises No. 19 Johnstonganj, Allahabad belongs to Maiku Lal, respondent No. 1. It was allotted to the petitioner in 1948 under U. P-Act No. III of 1947. The petitioner is carrying on the business of Chemist and Druggist in the said premises since 1948. On coming into force of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the -new Act), the respondent No. 1 filed an application under Section 21 of the said Act against the petitioner for his eviction from the shop. Respondent No. 1 alleged that he had to support a big family and as the earnings made from the small shop run by him on the foot path, and the staircase was not sufficient for the livelihood of his family members hence he was intending to open a new shop in the premises in the tenancy of the petitioner. The application was resisted by the petitioner. He denied that the shop was needed by respondent No. 1 for his personal use alleging that the application was filed by respon dent No. 1 on frivolous, fabricated, manufactured and mala fide alle gations. Being advised that further facts were required to be brought to the notice of the Prescribed Authority for a proper and correct deci sion of the application made by respondent No. 1, the petitioner filed an application and sought leave of the Prescribed Authority to serve the interrogatories attached to the application. According to the pe titioner, the interrogatories were with regard to the facts peculiar to the special knowledge of respondent No. 1 having vital and important bearing on the facts of the case. According to the pe titioner, the interrogatories were with regard to the facts peculiar to the special knowledge of respondent No. 1 having vital and important bearing on the facts of the case. The Prescribed Authority rejected the application on July 19, 1973 holding that Section 34 (1) (d) of the new Act gave power to the court to take steps as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure requir ing the discovery and production of documents and that it did not con fer any power on a party to serve interrogatories of certain facts. The petitioner filed an appeal before the District Judge against the afore said order of the Prescribed Authority. The learned II Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal on December 22, 1973. He, how ever, made certain observations in the judgment to the effect that the word discovery used in Section 34 (1) (d) did not necessarily mean discovery of documents alone, but it included discovery by interroga tories as well. Emboldened by the aforesaid observation of the learned District Judge, the petitioner filed another application for leave to serve interrogatories on respondent No. 1. This application was also rejected by the Prescribed Authority on April 17, 1974. Ag grieved by the aforesaid two orders of the Prescribed Authority, the petitioner has come to this Court. The question which arises for decision in the present case is about the scope and ambit of Section 34 (1) (d) of the new Act. Sec tion 34 (1) (d) reads as under: - the District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or any ap pellate authority shall for the purposes of holding any inquiry or healing any appeal under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when trying a suit in respect of the following matters namely: - (d) requiring the discovery and production of documents. " Two other provisions which have bearing on the controversy in issue, are contained in Rules 22 and 23 of the Rules framed under the new Act. Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the discovery and inspection. After the issue have been framed each party is re quired to prove his case. " Two other provisions which have bearing on the controversy in issue, are contained in Rules 22 and 23 of the Rules framed under the new Act. Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the discovery and inspection. After the issue have been framed each party is re quired to prove his case. For the purpose of proving his case each party has been made entitled by Order II of the Code of Civil Proce dure to serve questions on the adversary for the purpose of knowing their answers from him. This has been permitted by the Code of Civil Procedure as the facts required to be answered are within the exclusive knowledge of the other party. Service of questions by a party on his adversary is known as discovery by interrogatories. is dealt in Rules 1 to 11 of Order XI of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is another kind of discovery which is with regard to documents. This is known as discovery of documents. Discovery of documents has been provided in Rule 12 of Order XI of the Code of Civil Proce dure. Procedure to discover documents has been, thereafter, provid ed in various other rules of the same Order. Discovery of documents is followed by inspection and production of documents which has also been dealt with in this very Order. The net result of the above dis cussion is that Order XI of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with two types of discoveries; one discovery by interrogatories, and the other discovery by documents. The question before me in this case is whether Section 34 (1) (d) of the new Act provides for the discovery by interrogatories as well. The argument of the learned counsel for the contesting respondents was that Section 34 of the new Act dealt with discovery and produc tion of documents alone and as the discovery by interrogatories had been deliberately excluded, therefore, the discovery by interrogatories could not be permitted in the instant case. The heading of Order XI of the Code of Civil Procedure itself is discovery and Inspection. It appears to me that the word discovery has not been used in the ins tant case for the purpose of confining the discovery by documents alone. The word discovery was used in Section 34 in a wide sense covering discovery by interrogatories and discovery by documents. It appears to me that the word discovery has not been used in the ins tant case for the purpose of confining the discovery by documents alone. The word discovery was used in Section 34 in a wide sense covering discovery by interrogatories and discovery by documents. It was for the sake of convenience that in Section 34 (1) (d) of the new Act the word discovery alone was mentioned instead of specifying the same by providing for discovery by documents and discovery by interrogatories. The legislature applied the Code of Civil Procedure given in Order XI in the present proceedings. It may be relevant to point out that the proceedings under the new Act are generally of a nature where the discovery by interrogatories are likely to serve more purpose than the discovery by production of documents inasmuch as from the very nature of the disputes raised under the new Act are not those where much of the documents would be required to be looked into or considered. The scheme of the Act indicates that the legisla ture intended to provide for a summary and expeditious remedy given by the Act. The object of the Act of providing summary remedy can be achieved by finding that the word discovery used in Section 34 (1) (d) of the new Act should not be given a restricted or narrow meaning and that it should not be confined to discovery by documents alone. It is needless to point out that the purpose of providing the procedure of discovery by interrogatories is to shorten the litigation and to save the expenses. It enables a party to obtain an admission from his opponent, which makes his burden of proof easier. Looking at the scheme of the Act and taking the context in which Section. y 34 (1) (d) has been enacted. I find that the discovery provided for by Section 34 (1) (d) of the new Act has to be given a wider meaning including discovery by interrogatories as well. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that the word and used in clause (d) of sub- section (1) of Section 34 of the new Act necessarily means that discovery is meant for documents alone, does not impress me. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that the word and used in clause (d) of sub- section (1) of Section 34 of the new Act necessarily means that discovery is meant for documents alone, does not impress me. It is true that the word and is nor mally used in conjunctive sense, but there have been occasions when the word and have been used in a disjunctive sense whereas the word or has been used in a conjunctive sense. The rule of interpretation requires that the words should be given the meaning which makes the provisions workable and not absurd. In order to give effect to the manifest intention of the legislature, as disclosed from the context in the present case, it is necessary to find that the word and should be read or in the instant case. The Supreme Court had to deal with the above controversy on two occasions in A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras A. I. E. 1950s. C. 27, and S. Krishnan and others v. State of Madras and another A. I. R. 1951 S. C. 301. The Supreme Court held that the word and used in Article 22 of the Constitution being an enabling provision should be understood in a disjunctive sense. In order to give correct meaning to clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the new Act it is therefore, neces sary to read the word in a disjunctive sense in the present case. It may, however, be made clear that the whole of the provisions of Order XI of the Code of Civil Procedure would become ipso facto applicable to the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority once it is held that the discovery by interrogatories is permissible in the pro ceedings under the new Act. This would empower the Prescribed Au thority to scrutinise the questions which are served by a party on his opponent for being answered by the latter. The Prescribed Authority would be entitled to grant leave to serve only those questions on the opponent which are relevant for deciding the controversy. In this context it was pointed out that the procedure of service of interroga tories is often abused and results in delaying the proceedings. The Prescribed Authority would be entitled to grant leave to serve only those questions on the opponent which are relevant for deciding the controversy. In this context it was pointed out that the procedure of service of interroga tories is often abused and results in delaying the proceedings. The Prescribed Authority, however, has ample power under Order XI, C. P. C. to strike off irrelevant or useless questions which may not have been any bearing on the controversy involved in the case. In the present case as well, I find that the list of questions served by the petitioner on respondent No. 1 contains 40 questions. On being asked, learned counsel for the petitioner conceded that some of these ques tions might not be relevant. But, as it is not possible for me to go into the relevancy of the questions in these proceedings, I have re frained myself from doing so. Learned counsel for the petitioner has-however, gave me to understand that the petitioner would reduce the number of interrogatories sought to be sei-ved on respondent No. 1 to the minimum. I have no doubt that he would carry out the under taking. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The or ders of the Prescribed Authority dated July 19, 1973 and April 17, 1974 are quashed. The stay order is discharged. The parties to bear their own costs. .