JUDGMENT - N. B. NAIK, J.:---This is an application filed under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, challenging the order of the learned Executive Magistrate in case No. AB/HAS-SR-7 of 1974 refusing to cancel and to set aside his earlier order dated 28th June, 1974 whereby he had directed the sealing and attachment of a room. 2. The facts giving rise to this application in so far as they are material for deciding the point raised before us are briefly these : Admittedly flat No. 11-D on the 11th floor of Ananta building, Wardon Road, Bombay, consisting of 6 rooms and 4 bath-rooms is of the ownership of the petitioner Smt. Chandra Arjan Hiranandani. On 11th August, 1971, the said premises excluding one bed-room with an attached bath-room was purported to be given by way of leave and licence to M/s. Himdoot Weaving and Finishing Mills Pvt. Ltd., for housing its managing Director one Mr. Ramgopal Saraf. It may be mentioned that although admittedly the document of leave and licence specifically provides that the flat excluding one bed room with an attached bath room is the subject matter of the demise, it is the contention of the respondent that notwithstanding such recital in the agreement of leave and licence, the entire flat was the subject matter of leave and licence and it was in fact put in the possession of Ramgopal Saraf. The leave and licence agreement of August 1971 being continued from year to year, it was alleged by the respondent that on 30th May, 1974 at about 4 p.m., the applicant and her husband accompanied by some persons forcibly trespassed in bed room which was on the southern western side of the flat and forcibly occupied the same for the first time. On 31st May, 1974, between 8 and 9 p.m., an N.C. complaint regarding that alleged incident was made in the Gamdevi Police Station. On 5th of June, 1974, the licensee M/s. Himdoot Weaving and Finishing Mills Pvt. Ltd., filed suit No. 4727 of 1974 in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay for a declaration that the entire flat including the disputed room was the subject matter of the leave and licence and that subsequently by reason of the Maharashtra Act No. 27 of 1973 which came into force on the 1st February, 1974, the licence had become the tenant of the entire flat. A relief of mandatory injunction directing the petitioner before us to remove herself from the disputed room and a perpetual injunction restraining her from interfering with the right of peaceful enjoyment of the plaintiff in that suit in respect of the entire flat was claimed for. Ex parte interim orders being sought for, the Court was pleased to pass on order only prohibiting the petitioner from interfering with the plaintiffs right of peaceful enjoyment of the flat other than the disputed room. The relief of mandatory injunction which was prayed for was not granted. On 29th June, 1974, the petitioner moved the Court of Small Causes for orders directing the plaintiff in the pending suit not to part with the possession of the undisputed portion of the flat in his possession or to induct anybody therein. Affidavits in reply were filed in respect of both the applications which were field by the parties in the suit. When that was the position, on 24th June, 1974, the respondent started proceedings under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. He contended that the entire flat including the disputed room was in the possession of Ramgopal Saraf and he further alleged that along with Ramgopal and other he, the petitioner, also was residing in the premises along with his wife and children. He also referred to the alleged dispossession of the disputed room by the petitioner on the 30th May, 1974 and the infructuous N.C. complaint which was filed by Ramgopal. He made other allegations consistent with the requirements of section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code in a bid to secure the preliminary order in his favour. That order was in fact passed by the learned Magistrate on 27th June, 1974. On that very day, the respondent filed an applications for attachment of the disputed room under the provisions of section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code. By the application, the respondent having referred to the allegations in the main application, went on to state that the situation in the flat was provocative and was likely to create a breach of peace unless immediate order for sealing the disputed south-west room was passed by the Court. The learned Magistrate passed the said order on 28th June, 1974 and he further directed that the attachment which was ordered by him would continue till the question of actual possession was decided by him. The learned Magistrate passed the said order on 28th June, 1974 and he further directed that the attachment which was ordered by him would continue till the question of actual possession was decided by him. Both the preliminary order and the order of attachment were served on the petitioner on 29th June, 1974. It may be mentioned that when the police went to make a panchnama as per the directions of the Court at about 10.45 a.m. it was noticed that the petitioner was present in the room with her belonging and there was none else. On that very day, the order of attachment being executed, the petitioner filed an application Ex. E for raising the attachment. She pointed out that in fact the disputed room was never the subject matter of the demise and that she was all along in possession of the same and in particular she also referred to the fact that a suit in respect of the entire flat filed at the instance of the licence was pending and that in fact in that suit, the Court had declined to give interim relief of mandatory injunction which was sought against her. She also pointed out that in that very suit, inspite of the fact that an order of interim injunction restraining her from interfering with the right of the licensee to enjoy the flat excluding the disputed room being passed, no grievance was made by the licensee in that pending suit about any breach of the said order by her and, therefore, she pointed out that there was no case made out of any possible breach of peace and much less she contended, was there any reason for attaching the disputed room. She, therefore, prayed that the attachment should be raised. That application was not heard and ultimately on the 30th July, 1974, the petitioner actually filed a written statement to the main application and also filed documents and affidavit in support of her contentions along with that written statement. While her application Ex. E dated 29th June, 1974 was still pending the main application was admittedly taken up for hearing on the 21st September, 1974 after several adjournments. It appears that on that day, Mr. While her application Ex. E dated 29th June, 1974 was still pending the main application was admittedly taken up for hearing on the 21st September, 1974 after several adjournments. It appears that on that day, Mr. Mirchandani, learned Advocate for the petitioner before us orally requested the learned Magistrate to vacate the preliminary order under the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But actually Mr. Chagla, learned Counsel for the respondent argued the entire main application in full and concluded his arguments. The proceedings were thereafter deferred to 5th October, 1974 for the arguments of Mr. Mirchandani. But then on that day instead of arguing the main application by way of reply to the earlier addresses by Mr. Chagla, an application Ex. F was filed on behalf of the petitioner requesting the Court to dispose of her earlier application dated 29th June, 1974, and to set aside the order of attachment which was passed under section 146(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In addition to that application another application was also filed on that very day under section 145(5), requesting the learned Magistrate to cancel the preliminary order for the reasons stated in that application which are not necessary to state. The learned Magistrate thereafter rejected the application dated 29th June, 1974 and the application dated October 1974 by both of which the petitioner had requested him to set aside the earlier order of attachment of the disputed room. It is only these two applications consisting of the identical prayer, which were taken up for disposal by the learned Magistrate and the learned Magistrate rejected both the applications by observing that there was no ground to raise the attachment. 3. It is the propriety of the said order which is challenged by the petitioner under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 4. It is argued by Mr. Bhatt, learned Counsel for the petitioner that having regard to the fact that a civil suit was pending, the learned Magistrate was not justified in passing the preliminary order under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. At any rate argued Mr. Bhatt, the learned Magistrate ought to have vacated the said order under the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Lastly, Mr. At any rate argued Mr. Bhatt, the learned Magistrate ought to have vacated the said order under the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Lastly, Mr. Bhatt has argued that learned Magistrate was not at all justified in passing an order of attachment of the disputed room under section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 5. Mr. Chagla, learned Counsel for the respondent has met these submissions firstly, by pointing out that in fact what is sought to be impeached is an interlocutory order and since no revision can lie against such an order under sub-section (2) of section 397, Criminal Procedure Code, this Court could not exercise its powers under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. With regard to the second submission Mr. Chagla submits that the main application is still pending disposal and when it was actually ready for disposal without choosing to get a decision of the main application, the petitioner having rushed to this Court, this Court, would not be justified in interfering with that interlocutory order. Mr. Chagla has also submitted that so far as the preliminary order is concerned, since an application under section 145(5), filed by the petitioner is still pending before the learned Magistrate, there is no case made out for interfering either with the preliminary order or with the order of attachment. In our judgment this is not a fit case where we should interfere with the order which is challenged, in view of the background as against which the said order is challenged. 6. As already pointed out although the preliminary order was passed on 27th June, 1974 and was actually served on 29th June, 1974 and although in fact the petitioner filed a regular written statement to the main application on 30th July, 1974, she did not choose to make application under section 145(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code, till the date which was fixed for the reply argument of her Advocate in reply to the arguments of the respondent to the main application. In fact that belated application which was made by the petitioner on 5th October, 1974 is still pending disposal before the learned Magistrate. An effort was made to point out that in fact that application was also disposed off but after some research and particularly after going through the impugned order dated 14th October, 1974, Mr. In fact that belated application which was made by the petitioner on 5th October, 1974 is still pending disposal before the learned Magistrate. An effort was made to point out that in fact that application was also disposed off but after some research and particularly after going through the impugned order dated 14th October, 1974, Mr. Bhatt had to concede as he must, that application under section 145(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code, is in fact pending. When that is the position and since no grievance was made about the preliminary order till the application for raising the attachment was rejected as late on 14th October 1974, it would appear that we would not be justified in entertaining nay contention about the infirmity in the preliminary order under the purported exercise of powers by this Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In fact as we have already pointed out admittedly the main application could have been disposed of long back but for the fact that the matter was not argued on 5th October, 1974 on behalf of the petitioner although that was the date fixed for that particular purpose and the addresses of Mr. Chagla on the main application were already over on the 21st September 1974. Therefore, the position boils down to this. A preliminary order under section 145(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code was in fact passed by the learned Magistrate. That application is pending disposal and all that remains to be done in that application is for the petitioners Advocate to address the Court by way of reply to the addresses of the respondents Advocate which was already concluded. We do not, therefore, think it necessary to express any opinion about the merits of the dispute and much less about the validity or otherwise of the preliminary order which was passed, as we are anxious to avoid expressing any opinion in view of the fact that the main application is pending disposal and could be disposed of almost at the will of the petitioner if she only chooses to do so whatever be the final decision. 7. Admittedly it was after passing the preliminary order that the learned Magistrate has passed the order of attachment under section 146(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was argued by Mr. 7. Admittedly it was after passing the preliminary order that the learned Magistrate has passed the order of attachment under section 146(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was argued by Mr. Bhatt that the facts which are required for passing a preliminary order under section 145(1), would not he sufficient for giving jurisdiction to a Magistrate to pass an order under section 146(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, under which a Magistrate is empowered to make an order of attaching the property if he considers the case to be one of emergency. We are not concerned with the other clauses in that section. Mr. Bhatt is certainly right when he says that the ground sufficient for passing a preliminary order under section 145(1) would not be sufficient for passing an order under section 146(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. He is also right when he says that in a case like the one before us, in addition to the facts justifying a preliminary order under section 145(1), there must be material from which the Magistrate must consider that the case is one of emergency. Mr. Bhatt argued that the learned Magistrate has not given any finding about the jurisdictional fact of emergency while passing the order of attachment under section 146(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and, he, therefore, argues that this is an order which is passed without jurisdiction. We are not impressed with this submission of Mr. Bhatt. While as we have pointed out just now, we are anxious not to express an opinion on one way or the other, it is enough to state that while moving the Court for an order under section 146(1), the respondent after having referred to his allegations in the main application under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, further added that the situation in the flat was provocative and was likely to create breach of peace and therefore it was necessary to pass immediate order for sealing the south-west room. It would thus appear that Mr. Bhatt is not right when he submitted that no more material than that what was placed by the application was placed before Magistrate before passing the order under section 146(1). Apart from that there is not enough material before us to say or to hold that the learned Magistrate was not justified in considering that it was case of emergency. Bhatt is not right when he submitted that no more material than that what was placed by the application was placed before Magistrate before passing the order under section 146(1). Apart from that there is not enough material before us to say or to hold that the learned Magistrate was not justified in considering that it was case of emergency. True as is submitted by Mr. Bhatt, the learned Magistrate has not used the expression emergency or the existence of an emergency in order which is passed by him. It is true that expression is not used. But then since the learned Magistrate has passed the order of attachment, it follows by necessary implication that he did consider the case as one of emergency. Apart from these consideration, as we have already pointed out, in fact and in terms the order of attachment is an interlocutory order in as much as the learned Magistrate has observed that, order of attachment would be in force until he determines the question of actual possession of the property involved. Since admittedly it is an interlocutory order, having regard to the provisions of section 397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, no revision could lie. In fact the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner being fully aware of the same, they have sought to approach this Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. We do not see how we could interfere with the order declining to raise the attachment in purported exercise of the powers under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Bhatt argues that this is a case of the abuse of the process of the Court. That would take us to the merits of the case which we are not prepared to take into consideration, inasmuch as, the entire dispute is still pending before the Magistrate and in fact the affidavits of the both the parties have been filed. What is more, so far as this application is connected, we must proceed on the basis that the preliminary order is valid and it could not be challenged at this stage. What is more, so far as this application is connected, we must proceed on the basis that the preliminary order is valid and it could not be challenged at this stage. If that is so, it would appear that no case is made out for interfering with the inter-locutory orders which have been passed by the learned Magistrate particularly when as we have pointed out, the main application is ripe for disposal and could be disposed of only if the petitioner chooses to advance her reply addresses to the concluded addresses of Mr. Chagla. It is needless to say that the main application should be disposed of as early as possible. 8. In the result, the application is rejected and the rule is discharged. As the matter is old, it should be disposed of within one month after the receipt of the record and proceedings by the learned Magistrate. The record and proceedings should be despatched immediately. ------