JUDGMENT R. L. Gulati, J. - The petitioner is the owner of a shop in Bazar Sarafa, Saharanpur, bearing No. 21-36-9. The first respondent Mani Ram, is the tenant. The petitioner filed an application under Sec. 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 for permission to file a suit for the ejectment of the first respondent. The permission was granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 22nd September, 1970. The first respondent (hereinafter referred to as the tenant) then filed a revision before the Commissioner, which was dismissed on 30 h June, 1971. On the basis of the permission granted by the Commissioner the petitioner filed a civil suit in the Court of City Munsif, Saharanpur for the ejectment of the tenant on 3rd July, 1971. In the meantime the tenant approached the State Government under Sec. 7-F and the State Government by an interim order dated 2nd July, 1971 suspended the operation of the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commissioner. The intimation of this order was sent by the tenant to the petitioner telegraphically on 4th July, 1971. On the same day the petitioner informed the tenant telegraphically that he had already instituted the civil suit on 3rd July, in the Court of City Munsif, Saharanpur. The petitioner also sent a telegram to the Secretary, Food and Civil Supplies Department informing him of the filing of the suit. In his reply to the application under Sec. 7-F the petitioner also mentioned that a civil suit for ejectment on the basis of the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commissioner had already been filed. Notwithstanding these developments the State Government vide its order dated 24th November, 1971 set aside the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as also of the Commissioner and remanded the case to the Rent Control Officer for a fresh decision. The petitioner has challenged the order of the State Government by this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. In Mohammad Ismail v. Nannelal, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1919, the Supreme Court has held that State Governments power to revoke permission granted under Sec. 3 of the Act ceases when the suit is validly instituted. The petitioner has challenged the order of the State Government by this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. In Mohammad Ismail v. Nannelal, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1919, the Supreme Court has held that State Governments power to revoke permission granted under Sec. 3 of the Act ceases when the suit is validly instituted. Now, in the instant case a suit was instituted long before the State Government passed the order on 24th November, 1971 revoking the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commissioner. In such circumstances the State had obviously exceeded its jurisdiction under Sec. 7-F and was not competent to pass the impugned order. 3. The learned counsel for tenant argued that the permission on granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commissioner had been suspended by the State Government on 2nd July, 1971, before the suit came to be filed. On the other hand the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the stay order is effective only when it is communicated and in the instant case the stay order had been communicated to the petitioner after the suit had been filed and, as such, the stay order granted by the State Government was ineffective. He has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mulraj v. Murti Raghunath Ji Maharaj, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1386. In that case the Supreme Court held that an order of stay in execution proceedings becomes effective only when it is communicated. The question, however, rises as to whether the stay order passed by the State Government was a stay order in the nature of execution proceeding, and, as such, operated from the date it was communicated or it operated from the day it was passed. It is not necessary to decide this controversy in the instant case. The fact is that the suit had already been instituted and what would be the effect of the order passed by the State Government on a day earlier than the institution of the suit, even if communicated after the institution of the suit, is a question, which might relate to the validity of the suit. The validity of the suit has not been challenged in the present writ petition. Indeed, the Court where the suit is pending has not been made a party. The validity of the suit has not been challenged in the present writ petition. Indeed, the Court where the suit is pending has not been made a party. It may, therefore, be open to the tenant to challenge the validity of the suit before the Civil Court itself. But so far as the State Government is concerned it had no jurisdiction to pass an order revoking the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commissioner during the pendency of the suit. Its powers had been exhausted as soon as the suit was filed. The only claim by the petitioner in the instant case is against the order of the State Government and the question of the validity of the suit has no1 been raised. In these circumstances the only question which this Court is called upon to decide is as to whether the State Government was competent to pass the impugned order dated 24th November, 1971. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwandas v. Paras Nath, 1968 A.W.R. 713, it has to be held that the power of the State Government had exhausted after the suit had been instituted and, as such, it was not competent to pass the impugned order. 4. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Prabhawati v. Dr. Pritam Kaur, 1972 A.W.R. 870, relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is clearly distinguishable. There a landlord had applied for permission to file a suit for the ejectment of his tenant. The permission was granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and confirmed by the Commissioner but no suit was instituted on the basis of the permission so granted. The tenant approached the State Government under Sec. 7-F and the State Government by an interim order stayed the permission already granted to the landlord during the pendency of the tenants petition under Sec. 7-F. Later on the State Government allowed the revision petition and set aside the permission granted. The landlord challenged the order of the State Government before the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The landlord challenged the order of the State Government before the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court set aside the order of the Government on the ground that it had been influenced by irrelevant consideration and directed the State Government to re-hear the revision petition of the tenant This order was passed by the High Court on 28th February, 1967 and the very next day the landlord filed a suit for the eviction of the tenant. Thereupon the State Government dismissed the revision petition on the ground that the suit having been instituted the petition under Sec. 7-F had become in fructuous. This view was upheld by the High Court on the ground that the stay order earlier granted by the State Government had elapsed when the High Court set aside the order of the State Government and it did not revive when the matter was remanded. The Supreme Court did not decide the question as to whether the stay order granted by the State Government earlier had revived after the High Court remanded the case but it held that having regard to the circumstances of the case the suit filed by the landlord was premature inasmuch as it sought to nullify the direction given by the High Court to decide the controversy as to whether landlord was entitled to evict the tenant or not. In the instant case such is not the position. The suit had not been filed in violation of any direction issued by this Court. This suit had been filed on the basis of the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commissioner. There is no doubt that the suit was filed within 4 days of the order of the Commissioner granting permission but there is no law which requires a landlord to wait for the tenant to approach the State Government and to obtain a stay order. The contention of the learned Counsel that the landlord could have waited for a reasonable time before filing of the suit cannot be accepted. 5. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the State Government dated 24th November, 1971 (Annexure 6 to the writ petition) is quashed. In the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.