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1975 DIGILAW 40 (GUJ)

Prafulchand Laxmichand Parekh, Food Inspector, Municipality, Jamnagar v. Shantilal Premji Lohana and the State of Gujarat

1975-03-21

A.N.SURTI, B.J.DIVAN

body1975
JUDGMENT : A.N. Surti, J. Both the aforesaid appeals are filed by the complainant, Food Inspector, appointed for the Jamnagar Municipal area, having obtained the leave of this Court under Section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, against the orders of acquittal passed in favour of respondent No. 1-accused by the learned Sessions Judge, Jamnagar who acquitted respondent No. 1-accused in Criminal Appeals Nos. 35 and 37 of 1973 of his Court which had arisen out of the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No. 1 Jamnagar, in Criminal Cases Nos. 435 and 434 of 1971, convicting respondent No. 1-accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 16(a)(i) read with Section 7(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The learned Magistrate directed in both the cases respondent No. 1-accused to suffer S.I. till rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 250/-, in default to suffer R.I. for one month. He also directed substantive sentence passed in Criminal Case No. 435 of 1971 to run concurrently with the substantive sentence passed in Criminal Case No. 434 of 1971. We may mention at this stage that the complainant-Food Inspector was aggrieved by the inadequacy of the sentence passed by the learned Magistrate in both the said cases and filed two Criminal Revision Application Nos. 11 and 12 of 1973 in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Jamnagar for the enhancement of sentence passed by the learned Magistrate, but in view of the aforesaid orders of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, both the revision applications were dismissed. 2. A few relevant facts giving rise to these two appeals may be stated in brief. 3. On April 15, 1970, the complainant-Food Inspector (hereinafter referred to as "the Food Inspector") went to the shop of respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as 'the accused'), who was selling different kinds of sweets at his shop known as "Shrikhand Samrat". Along with the Food Inspector, another Food Inspector Shri Dhirajlal Jayantilal Mehta and members of his staff were present at that time. The Food Inspector had introduced him as such to the accused and saw the various articles of food in the shop of the accused in his presence. 4. The Food Inspector suspected the three articles of food viz. Along with the Food Inspector, another Food Inspector Shri Dhirajlal Jayantilal Mehta and members of his staff were present at that time. The Food Inspector had introduced him as such to the accused and saw the various articles of food in the shop of the accused in his presence. 4. The Food Inspector suspected the three articles of food viz. (i) Hafus Penda, (ii) Mitha Sata and (iii) Kesri Shrikhand to be adulterated and, therefore, intimated the accused in writing as well as orally that he desired to send the samples of the aforesaid offending articles to the Public Analyst, Bhuj for analysis. The necessary intimations were given to the accused in this behalf in the prescribed form No. VI as provided in Rule 12 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") and the accused had signed the originals thereof in token of his having received the necessary carbon copies. 5. Thereafter the Food Inspector told the accused to give to him H Kilograms of (1) Hafus Penda, (2) Mitha Sata and (iii) Kesri Shrikhand. The Food Inspector paid to the accused Rs. 36/- and purchased the same. The Food Inspector prepared the necessary warranties in this behalf in the prescribed form No. VI-A for the offending articles viz. Mitha Sata and Hafus Penda as required by Rule 12-A of the aforesaid Rules, and the same were duly signed by the accused. We may also mention at this stage that the necessary panchnama, Ex. 40, in that behalf was drawn up at the shop of the accused and the same was signed by the accused and the panchas at that time. 6. The Food Inspector divided all the offending articles (1) Mitha Sata, (2) Hafus Penda and (3) Kesri Shrikhand in three equal parts of each of the articles and filled them in 9 polythene jars. According to the prosecution, all the 9 jars were empty and clean. Thereafter the Food Inspector filled the jars with each of the offending articles and the details on the labels which were pasted on the jars were filled by the members of the staff. The Food Inspector gave three sealed jars containing (1) Mitha Sata, (2) Hafus Penda and (3) Kesri Shrikhand to the accused. The Food Inspector took the remaining jars to his office. The Food Inspector gave three sealed jars containing (1) Mitha Sata, (2) Hafus Penda and (3) Kesri Shrikhand to the accused. The Food Inspector took the remaining jars to his office. All the necessary facts in that behalf were duly mentioned in the aforesaid panchnama Ex. 40, which was drawn at the shop of the accused, and in the presence of the accused, panchas Harilal Vallabhdas and Vadalia, the staff, and the Food Inspector. The prosecution alleged that thereafter the Food Inspector sent the two jars one containing Mitha Sata and the second containing Hafus Penda to the Public Analyst, Bhuj. The jars were duly wrapped with papers and were tied with string and sealed. With the jars sent to the Public Analyst the Food Inspector had sent Forms No. VII, duly filled in and duly signed by the Food Inspector with specimen seals thereon. The necessary forwarding letters in that behalf were also sent to the Public Analyst. The sealed jars were sent by post-parcel and the forwarding letters and the Forms No. VII were sent to the Public Analyst by registered post. The forwarding letters bear the signatures of the Food Inspector and in-charge Chief Officer of the Municipality. 7. Thereafter the Food Inspector received the reports of the Public Analyst at Exs. 37 and 38. The Public Analyst stated in his reports that the samples of the offending articles contained "A yellow coal-tar dye metanil yellow" and the same is not included in the list of permitted dyes under rule 28 of the aforesaid Rules. The Food Inspector reported the matter to the Chief Officer of the aforesaid Municipality and made the report dated July 6, 1970. After having perused the report made by the Food Inspector, the Chief Officer of the aforesaid Municipality gave to him his initial consent in writing to file the aforesaid prosecution against the respondent. 8. Thereafter the Food Inspector filed the necessary complaint being Case No. 276 of 1970 against the accused on an allegation that he had adulterated the offending article of food, namely, "Mitha Sata". He also filed another complaint against the same accused being Criminal Case No. 402 of 1970 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jamnagar on an allegation that the accused had adulterated another offending article of food, namely, 'Hafus Penda'. He also filed another complaint against the same accused being Criminal Case No. 402 of 1970 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jamnagar on an allegation that the accused had adulterated another offending article of food, namely, 'Hafus Penda'. In course of the proceedings of both the cases, an application was filed by the Food Inspector for consolidating both the cases and accordingly both the cases were consolidated. After consolidation of both the cases, the learned Magistrate framed the charge at Ex. 41 and it was alleged that the respondent-accused had adulterated the two offending articles of food viz. 'Mitha Sata' and 'Hafus Penda' and that, therefore, he was guilty of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 16(1)(a) read with Section 7(i) of the Act in respect of each of these articles of Food. The learned Magistrate in both the aforesaid cases came to the conclusion that the accused was guilty of the commission of the aforesaid offence and convicted and sentenced him separately in both the cases to suffer S.I. till rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 250/-, in default to suffer R.I. for one month. 9. The accused was aggrieved by the aforesaid orders of conviction and sentence and filed Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 1971 in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Jamnagar, who after hearing the appeal remanded both the cases to the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jamnagar and directed that they may be disposed of in accordance with law. After the remand order, the case pertaining to the offending article "Mitha Sata" was numbered as Criminal Case No. 434 of 1971, whereas the case pertaining to "Hafus Penda" was numbered as Criminal Case No. 435 of 1971. In course of the hearing of both the aforesaid Criminal Cases the prosecution examined Food Inspector, another Food Inspector Dhirajlal J. Mehta and punch Harilal Vallabhdas. After having considered the prosecution evidence and the line of defence accepted by the accused in both the cases, the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that the accused was guilty of the commission of the aforesaid offence and passed the aforesaid sentence as stated above. 10. The accused was aggrieved by the orders of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Magistrate, in Criminal Case Nos. 10. The accused was aggrieved by the orders of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Magistrate, in Criminal Case Nos. 434 and 435 of 197(sic) and filed two appeals in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Jamnagar being Criminal Appeals Nos. 35 and 37 of 1973. The Food Inspector was also aggrieved by the inadequacy of the sentence passed by the learned Magistrate and had filed Criminal Revision Application Nos. 11 and 12 of 1973 for the enhancement of sentence. 11. The learned Sessions Judge, having heard all the four matters together, took the view that, the instant cases, the identity of the jars in question was not established. He also took the view that the Public Analyst did not give any basis for arriving at his ultimate conclusion. He was also of the view that in both the cases the sanction to prosecute was not in accordance with law. He also doubted the genuineness of the panchnama, Ex. 40, which was drawn up at the shop of the accused as stated above. As a result of his aforesaid reasoning, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the accused. 12. It is under these circumstances that the present appeals are filed by the Food Inspector as stated above. We may state that as both the appeals involve common questions of law and facts, we propose to dispose of both the appeals by delivering this common judgment. We may also mention that in course of the hearing of the appeals, we have called for the muddamal jars in question from the lower court and the same were before us at the time of the hearing of the appeals. 13. In both the cases, the pattern of the defence adopted by the accused is the same. He stated that the Food Inspector had come to his shop but he did not tell the accused that he was the Food Inspector. According to the accused, he told the Food Inspector that Mitha Sata and Hafus Pendas were not to be sold. He stated that no amount was paid by the Food Inspector for the purchase of the offending articles. He denied that the samples of the aforesaid articles were given to him. He denied to have used any non-permitted improper dye in the preparation of the aforesaid food articles. He denied that he had signed any documents except aforesaid Forms No. VI. He denied that the samples of the aforesaid articles were given to him. He denied to have used any non-permitted improper dye in the preparation of the aforesaid food articles. He denied that he had signed any documents except aforesaid Forms No. VI. He stated that he had demanded Rs. 60/- for the price of the food articles sold to the Food Inspector but the Food Inspector did not pay the aforesaid amount and got himself excited. In this behalf, he made an application to the Municipality making a grievance about the conduct of the Food Inspector. Thereafter the Food Inspector filed a Civil Suit against the accused claiming damages of Rs. 5,000/- and that the suit was pending against the accused at the relevant time. He also stated that the panch was giving false evidence as he did not keep him in his service. He neither gave any evidence before the learned Magistrate nor did he examine any person as his defence witness. 14. In order to prove the case of the prosecution, the Food Inspector was examined as P.W. 1 at Ex. 73 in Criminal Case No. 434 of 1971 and as P.W. 1 at Ex. 23 in Criminal Case No, 435 of 1971, Another Food Inspector Dhirajlal Jayantilal Mehta was examined as P.W, 3 at Ex. 99 and P.W. 3 at Ex. 54 in Criminal Case Nos. 434 and 435 respectively. In both the cases, panch Harilal Vallabhdas was also examined as P.W. 2. 15. The sworn testimony of the Food Inspector P.K. Parekh in both the cases completely satisfies us that in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 9 of the Act, the Government of Gujarat appointed the complainant as the Food Inspector and assigned to him the local area of "Jamnagar Municipal area" declared as such under Government of Bombay Local Self Government and Public Health Department Notification No. P.F.A. - 1958(B)-D, dated 4th March, 1960. The necessary notification dated October 17, 1967 in this behalf is produced at Ex. 30. Thereafter as provided in section 20(1) of the Act, the General Board of Jamnagar Municipality by its resolution (Ex. 39) No. 147 dated January 8, 1968 unanimously authorised the Food Inspector to institute any prosecution for the commission of any offence under the Act, after having obtained in writing the initial consent of the Chief Officer of the aforesaid Municipality. Thereafter as provided in section 20(1) of the Act, the General Board of Jamnagar Municipality by its resolution (Ex. 39) No. 147 dated January 8, 1968 unanimously authorised the Food Inspector to institute any prosecution for the commission of any offence under the Act, after having obtained in writing the initial consent of the Chief Officer of the aforesaid Municipality. 16. In the instant cases, the Food Inspector in his application dated July 6, 1970 (Ex. 14) requested the Chief Officer of the Municipality to peruse all the papers and if he thought that prosecution should be instituted against the accused, initial 'written consent' in that behalf should be given to him. The endorsement of the Chief Officer at Ex. 14 shows that the Chief Officer also saw the relevant bottles (jars) and by his order Ex. 16 dated July 6, 1970 gave his initial written consent to the Food Inspector to institute the aforesaid prosecution against the respondent-accused for the commission of the offence punishable under Section 16(l)(a) read with Section 7(i) of the Act. 17. The evidence of the aforesaid two Inspectors and the panch completely satisfies us that the Food Inspector followed the procedure as provided in Section 11 for taking the samples of the offending articles. As provided in Section I l(l)(a) of the Act, the Food Inspector gave a notice in writing then and there of his intention to have the samples analysed, to the accused from whom he had purchased the aforesaid articles. In this behalf he filled in the prescribed form as provided under Rule 12 of the aforesaid Rules. He filled in Exs. 6 and 7 and took the signatures of the accused thereon in token of the accused having received the aforesaid intimation. At this stage we may set out herein, the prescribed form for complying with the requirements of section 11 (0(a): "FORM VI To ........... ........... I have this day taken from the premises of ................................... situated at..........................samples of the food specified below to have the same analysed by the Public Analyst, for................... At this stage we may set out herein, the prescribed form for complying with the requirements of section 11 (0(a): "FORM VI To ........... ........... I have this day taken from the premises of ................................... situated at..........................samples of the food specified below to have the same analysed by the Public Analyst, for................... Details of food : Place : Food Inspector Date Area............" The evidence of the aforesaid three witnesses further satisfies us that the Food Inspector, as provided under section 11(1)(b) of the Act, separated the offending articles then and there into three parts and marked, sealed and fastened up each part in a separate clean and empty jar; and, as further provided in section 11(1)(c)(i) of the Act, delivered one of the parts of each offending article to the accused from whom the samples of the offending articles were purchased. As provided in section 11(1)(c)(ii) of the Act, the Food Inspector sent the other parts of the offending articles for analysis to the Public Analyst, and retained with him the other parts as contemplated under section 1 l(l)(c) (iii) of the Act. 18. The evidence shows that the accused did receive parts of the offending articles contained in different jars, and in this behalf, the evidence of all the three witnesses is consistent, clear and cogent. Suffice it to mention in this behalf that the evidence of the panch is duly corroborated by the contents of the panchnama, Ex. 40 duly signed by the panch and the accused. 19. Rules 14 to 22A of the aforesaid Rules provide for "sealing, fastening and dispatching of samples". The evidence of the aforesaid three witnesses discloses that the samples of the offending articles for the purpose of analysis were taken in clear and empty jars and they were closed sufficiently tight by sending them as provided in Rule 14. The evidence also shows that the jars containing the samples of the offending articles were properly labelled by the staff of the Food Inspector in his presence and the parcel thereof was properly addressed as provided in Rule 15. At this stage we may also mention that one of the jars in question, which is brought before us, is also having thereon the label duly pasted thereon. On the pasted label, the following printed words appear and the requisite information is also stated : "Jamnagar Municipality Health Department. At this stage we may also mention that one of the jars in question, which is brought before us, is also having thereon the label duly pasted thereon. On the pasted label, the following printed words appear and the requisite information is also stated : "Jamnagar Municipality Health Department. (1) Serial number of the sample : (2) Name of the vendor : (3) Date and place of collection : (4) Name of the articles submitted for analysis : (5) Nature and quantity of preservative, if any, added to the sample : (6) Time of collection of the sample : - " 20. It may be noted here that Rule 15 of the aforesaid Rules provides that the label on any sample of food sent for analysis shall bear - (a) Serial No. (b) Name of the sender with official designation, if any. (c) Name of vendor. (d) Date and place of collection. (e) Nature of article submitted for analysis. (f) Nature and quantity of preservative, if any, added to the sample. 21. In view of the contents of the label pasted on one of the jars, we are satisfied that the labels were properly put and pasted on the jars in question as required by Rule 15 of the aforesaid Rules. The necessary particulars were also duly filled in on the aforesaid labels which were pasted on the jars in question. 22. Rule 16 provides for the manner of packing and sealing the samples. Rule 17 provides as to how the containers of samples should be sent to the Public Analyst, Rule 18 provides that a copy of the memorandum and a specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet shall be sent to the Public Analyst separately by registered post or delivered to him or to any person authorised by him. Rules in to 22A of the Rules are not relevant for our purpose. 23. On seeing the jars in question, which are before us, we are convinced that the Food inspector had affixed his four seals on each of the jars in question. We are also convinced that for keeping the jars in tact, he also used a piece of thick cloth. We are also convinced that the label in one of the jars before us is duly signed by the accused and the Food inspector. We are also convinced that for keeping the jars in tact, he also used a piece of thick cloth. We are also convinced that the label in one of the jars before us is duly signed by the accused and the Food inspector. We may mention at this stage that the evidence discloses that the accused had signed the labels pasted on the jars in presence of the panchas and the Food Inspector. 24. In the light of the provisions contained in the aforesaid rules and section 11 of the Act, we perused the evidence of the Food Inspector in Criminal Case No. 434 of 1971 out of which Criminal Appeal No. 132 of 1974 arises, and in this behalf he deposed inter alia as follows: "I divided 'satas' into three equal parts and tilled them in three polythene jars. Those jars were empty and clean. Thereafter I filled the details on the jars. The details on the labels were filled by my men. Thereafter the jars were sealed. I gave one sealed jar to the accused. I took two jars to our office. All these acts were done in presence of panchas Harilal Vallabhdas and H.M. Vadalia and also in presence of office staff. I took the two jars to office. Out of them one was sent to public analyst, Bhuj. That jar was wrapped with paper and was tied with string and was sealed. With that bottle I sent Form No. 7. Form No. 7 is at Ex. 34. It bears my signature and also bears the specimen seal. Along with that I had sent forwarding letter. The jar was sent by post parcel and the letter and Form No. 7 were sent by registered post A.D. That letter is at Ex. 35. It bears my signature and the signature of incharge Chief Officer. I had given mark 11 to 'satas'. The registered A.D. slip is at Ex. 36. Along with that jar there were other jars of samples taken from other shops. On that day 1 had purchased 'Hafus Penda', 'Kesari Shrikhand' and 'Satas' from the shop of the accused. I had paid Rs. 36/- for all the three items". In the cross-examination of the Food Inspector the witness deposed as follows: - "The details of the label on muddamal jar are filled by Himatsingh Rathod. There I affixed the label. On that day 1 had purchased 'Hafus Penda', 'Kesari Shrikhand' and 'Satas' from the shop of the accused. I had paid Rs. 36/- for all the three items". In the cross-examination of the Food Inspector the witness deposed as follows: - "The details of the label on muddamal jar are filled by Himatsingh Rathod. There I affixed the label. No seal was put on the label. There is no signature of the panchas on the label. The label can be removed and is partly removed. I cannot say if anything can be injected through the jar. The wrapping of cloth and strings etc. were done at the shop of the accused. In the panchnama it is not written that cloth and strings were wrapped and over them seals were affixed. It is not true that applying of labels and affixing of the seals etc. Were not done at the shop". 25. In the next case the same Food Inspector -P.W. 1 Ex. 23 deposed as follows: - "I divided them (Penda) into three equal parts. I filled each part in three separate polythene clean and empty jars. I sealed the jars. I gave one jar to the accused. I took two jars to our office. Out of them one was sent to Public Analyst, Bhuj. I divided 'Pendas' in three parts and filled each part in each jar and sealed in jars at the shop of the accused in presence of panchas. I sent a jar to Bhuj with Form No. 7 and wrapped it with thick paper. Form No. 7 bears my signature. Details are filled up by me. I produce form No. 7, Exhibited as Ex. 26. I had also sent one specimen copy of form No. 7 by registered A.D. It also had specimen seal. Public Analyst has analysed the sample and has sent his report". 26. In the cross-examination of this witness, the witness deposed: - "No seal is affixed on the label of muddamal jar. Seal is not affixed on the cloth wrapped on the label. There is no signature of panchas on the label. 1't is not true that there is no signature of the accused on the label. Now I got the idea that the label can be removed from the jar. I cannot say if anything can be injected, through injection syringe, in polythene jar. There is no signature of panchas on the label. 1't is not true that there is no signature of the accused on the label. Now I got the idea that the label can be removed from the jar. I cannot say if anything can be injected, through injection syringe, in polythene jar. It is not true that the label and seals were not affixed at the shop of the accused". 27. Thus on a careful scrutiny of the evidence of the Food Inspector and the other two witnesses, we are completely satisfied that in the instant cases, the Food Inspector followed the statutory procedure as provided in section 11 of the Act and the aforesaid relevant Rules before the samples of the offending articles reached the Public Analyst, Bhuj. In the cross-examination of the Food Inspector, a futile attempt was made to attack the testimony of the Food Inspector to point out the remote possibility of the samples being tampered with or the jars in question being changed. The statutory procedure does not provide for (i) sealing on the labels or on the cloth wrapped on the labels; (ii) taking the signatures of the panchas on the labels; and (iii) for drawing up of a panchnama as suggested by the defence, namely, that it should be written in the panchnama that cloth and strings were wrapped and over them seals were affixed. Suffice it to state that the evidence of the Food Inspector is not at all shaken by the unfounded apprehension on the part of the accused. 28. The Public Analyst in his reports Exs. 37 and 38 stated that the offending articles contained, "A yellow coal tar dye metanil yellow" and the same is not included in the list of permitted dyes under rule 28. We may here mention that Rule 28 provides that no coal tar dyes of a mixture thereof except the following shall be used: Colour Common name Colour Index I. Red Ponceau 4 R 185 Carmoisine 179 Fast Red F 182 Amaranth 184 Erythrosine 773 2. Yellow Tartrazine 640 Sunset Yellow, FCF --- 3. Blue Blue VRS. 672 4. Black Indigol Carmine 1180 29. In view of the aforesaid clear evidence on the record of the case, we are convinced that the accused sold the aforesaid articles and the same were adulterated food. 30. Yellow Tartrazine 640 Sunset Yellow, FCF --- 3. Blue Blue VRS. 672 4. Black Indigol Carmine 1180 29. In view of the aforesaid clear evidence on the record of the case, we are convinced that the accused sold the aforesaid articles and the same were adulterated food. 30. Section 7 of the Act provides as follows : - "No person |shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute - (i) any adulterated food; (ii) ............... (iii) .............. (iv) ............... (v) ................ Section 16 of the Act provides as follows : - (i) If any person - (a) whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf imports into India or manufactures for sale, or stores, sells or distributes any article of food - (i) which is adulterated or misbranded or the sale of which is prohibited by the Food (Health) authority in the interest of public health, (ii) ................. (b)............ (c)............ (d)............ (e)............ (f)............ he shall, in addition to the penalty to which he may be liable under the provisions of Section 6, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to six years, and with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees : ......." Having regard to the aforesaid consistent, cogent and clear evidence, we are convinced that the accused in both the cases committed the offence punishable under section 16(a)(i) read with section 7(i) of the aforesaid Act. We have indicated in the earlier part of our judgment the defence of the accused. As stated, he admitted that on the day in question the Food Inspector had come to his shop but he denied that the Food Inspector had told him about his identity. Now this part of his statement does not inspire any confidence. The evidence discloses that the Food Inspector had gone to his shop and gave to the accused the intimation in the aforesaid prescribed form in regard to his intention to buy the samples of the offending articles to be sent to Public Analyst. In this view of the evidence, he should not have stated that the Food Inspector did not disclose his identity as Food Inspector before him. The accused stated that the samples of the offending articles were not given to him. In this view of the evidence, he should not have stated that the Food Inspector did not disclose his identity as Food Inspector before him. The accused stated that the samples of the offending articles were not given to him. Now in this behalf, there is cogent evidence of the Food Inspector and the panch duly corroborated by the contents of the panchnama, Ex. 40 and the same completely satisfies us that on the day in question the Food Inspector did give to the accused the samples of the offending articles as deposed by the witnesses. The accused also denied that he had signed any documents except the aforesaid Forms prescribed as Form No. VI. Now in both the cases before us, the evidence is clear that the Food Inspector and the panch had actually seen the accused signing the relevant panchnama, Ex. 40 and the labels which were signed by the accused were pasted on the jars in question. As a matter of fact the accused in both the cases also signed the prescribed form of warranties in Form VIA as provided in rule 12A of the aforesaid Rules which were prepared by the Food Inspector at the shop of the accused. In this view of the matter it is difficult for us to accept the contention of the accused that he did not sign any documents except the aforesaid forms prescribed in Form No. VI. The accused also stated that the Food Inspector did not pay to him the sum of Rs. 60/-being the p ice of the offending articles but there is no substance in this grievance of the accused. The evidence of the aforesaid three witnesses and the contents of the panchnama Ex. 40 clearly prove that the Food Inspector paid a sum of Rs. 36/- to the accused being the price of the offending articles, and as at the relevant time, the Food Inspector had four rupees less, he borrowed a sum of Rs. 4/- from one of the neighbouring shopkeepers am paid the total amount of Rs. 36/- to the respondent-accused. In view of this clear and categorical evidence, there is no merit in the grievance made by the respondent-accused that he was not paid the price of the offending articles as stated by him. 4/- from one of the neighbouring shopkeepers am paid the total amount of Rs. 36/- to the respondent-accused. In view of this clear and categorical evidence, there is no merit in the grievance made by the respondent-accused that he was not paid the price of the offending articles as stated by him. The accused also stated that he had made an application to the President of the aforesaid Municipality in regard to the aforesaid alleged wrongful conduct of the Food Inspector and that the Food Inspector filed a Civil Suit against him for recovery of Rs. 5000/- on an allegation that the Food Inspector was defamed by the accused. This contention prima facie does not inspire any confidence in us. The Food Inspector was discharging his statutory duties under the Act and there are no facts before us from which we can say that he had any oblique motive to falsely implicate the accused while discharging his statutory duties in a bona fide manner. From this view point, when we examine the defence of the accused, we do not see any merit or substance in any of the grievances made by the accused. 31. The learned Magistrate who had the advantage of watching the demeanour of the prosecution witnesses, on appreciating the prosecution evidence led before him, came to the conclusion as above, that the accused was guilty of the commission of the aforesaid offence in both the cases and convicted and sentenced the accused as aforesaid. 32. We have indicated the reasoning of the learned Sessions Judge in the earlier part of our judgment as to why he acquitted the accused. 33. Mr. Dave, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Food Inspector, mainly urged that the reasoning of the learned Sessions Judge has resulted into gross and patent miscarriage of justice. He stated that he erroneously appreciated the evidence on the record. Mr. Dave submitted that in the instant cases, each sanction to prosecute the accused is perfectly valid, legal and in accordance with law. In this behalf, Mr. Dave invited our attention to the aforesaid notification Ex. 3) issued by the Government of Gujarat by which the complainant is appointed as the Food Inspector as stated in the earlier part of our judgment. Mr. Dave also invited our attention to Ex. In this behalf, Mr. Dave invited our attention to the aforesaid notification Ex. 3) issued by the Government of Gujarat by which the complainant is appointed as the Food Inspector as stated in the earlier part of our judgment. Mr. Dave also invited our attention to Ex. 39 the unanimous resolution passed by the General Board of the Jamnagar Municipality by which the Food Inspector was authorised to institute any prosecution in the aforesaid matters after having obtained the initial consent of the Chief Officer of the aforesaid Municipality. Mr. Dave also invited our attention to the aforesaid order, Ex. 16, dated July 6,1970 by which the Chief Officer of the aforesaid Municipality gave his initial written consent to institute the aforesaid prosecution against the accused. We have carefully read sections 9(i) and 20 of the Act and on a perusal of the aforesaid notification, Ex. 30, the resolution of the General Board Ex. 39 bearing No. 147 and the written consent of the Chief Officer as mentioned in Ex. 16 dated July 6, 1970, we are convinced that in both the cases, the sanction to prosecute the accused is in accordance with law. 34. Mr. Dave submitted that in both the cases the learned Sessions Judge obviously erred in taking the view that the identity of the jar in question was not adequately established by the prosecution. Now in this behalf. Mr. Dave invited our attention to Ex. 37, the report of the Public Analyst and it mentions that the jar in question which was sent to him bears the No. HD/P/10. In this behalf Mr. Dave invited our attention to the forwarding letter which was sent by the Food Inspector to the Public Analyst and that letter bears the same number, namely, No. HD/P/10. In regard to the second case also, Mr. Dave invited our attention to the report of the Public Analyst, Ex. 38, which mentions the number of the relevant jar in question and that number is HD/P/10. In Mr. Dave in this behalf also invited our attention to the forwarding letter of the Food Inspector at Ex. 50 and drew our attention that the relevant jar which was sent to the Public Analyst was given the aforesaid No. HD/P/11. In substance Mr. In Mr. Dave in this behalf also invited our attention to the forwarding letter of the Food Inspector at Ex. 50 and drew our attention that the relevant jar which was sent to the Public Analyst was given the aforesaid No. HD/P/11. In substance Mr. Dave's argument was that in view of this clear unimpeachable evidence in regard to the identity of the relevant jars in question, the learned Sessions Judge obviously erred in his conclusion that the identity of the jars in question was not established. 35. Mr. Dave also urged that in the instant cases, the prosecution should not suffer by reason of the prosecution having not examined the Public Analyst. Mr. Dave very frankly admitted that in the instant cases the reports of the Public Analyst, Exs. 37 and 38, do not contain any basis for his aforesaid conclusion. In this behalf, Mr. Dave invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jagdish Prasad v. State of West Bengal, 1972 F.A.C. 127. In that case also, the report of the Public Analyst did not show any basis of his conclusion. In that case in para 11 the Supreme Court observed as follows : - "It was again urged that the Public Analyst had not given the basis for his conclusion that the saponification test did not conform to the standards specified in A. 17.06 of Appendix B to the Rules which contention is also not tenable. Under S. 13(5) of the Act any document purporting to be a report signed by a Public Analyst unless it has been superseded under sub-section (3), or any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein in any proceeding under the Act or under SECTIONS 272 to 276 of the Indian Penal Code. Under the proviso to that sub-section, any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. If the report of the Public Analyst was not satisfactory, it was open to the appellant to have made an application for the sample which was in his possession to be sent to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for examination. If the report of the Public Analyst was not satisfactory, it was open to the appellant to have made an application for the sample which was in his possession to be sent to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for examination. If he had made such an application and sent the sample under S. 13(2) the certificate granted by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory would have superseded the report given by the Public Analyst. This he has not done. In the circumstances he has been properly convicted." 36. Mr. Dave submitted that in both the cases, the accused did not challenge that the reports Exs. 37 and 38 of the Public Analyst were not satisfactory. If the reports of the Public Analyst were not satisfactory, it was .open to the accused to have made an application for the samples which were in his possession to be sent to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for examination. Mr. Dave submitted that in both the cases the accused did not make such an application or send the samples under section 13(2) of the Act. He stated that in view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, by reason of the absence of the basis for the conclusion of the Public Analyst in the aforesaid two reports, Exs. 37 and 38, the prosecution should not suffer. 37. Mr. Dave also argued that the learned trial Judge also erred in not placing reliance on the panchnama Ex. 40 which was drawn at the shop of the accused and duly signed by the accused. He stated that in the instant cases, the evidence of the Food Inspectors and the panch clearly proves that it was the accused who had sold the offending articles to the Food Inspector and that the same were adulterated. Mr. Dave finally urged that in the instant cases the reasoning of the learned Sessions Judge in the impugned judgment has obviously resulted in gross and patent miscarriage of justice and we should set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge and should adequately punish the accused for the commission of the aforesaid offence in both the cases. 38. Mr. H.M. Chinoy, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the accused, submitted that in both the cases the sanction to prosecute the accused is not in accordance with law. 38. Mr. H.M. Chinoy, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the accused, submitted that in both the cases the sanction to prosecute the accused is not in accordance with law. We may mention that Mr. Chinoy did not make any grievance in regard to the notification issued by the Government of Gujarat on October 17, 1967, Ex. 30. But Mr. Chinoy submitted that the unanimous resolution of the General Board of the Municipality does not delegate its powers to the Chief Officer to sanction the prosecution of the accused either expressly or by necessary implication. In substance Mr. Chinoy's attack on the legality of the sanction to prosecute was, that on a true reading of the aforesaid resolution and the provisions of section 20 of the Act, only the General Board of the Municipality could have given its consent to the Food Inspector to file the aforesaid two complaints against the accused. 39. In order to substantiate the aforesaid contention, Mr. Chinoy invited our attention to the decision in Arvindbhai v. Hargovind, 1972 F.A.C. 346. In the aforesaid decision, this Court took the view that under section 20 of the Act, the prosecution can be instituted (1) By the State Government, (2) by a local authority, (3) by a person authorised in that behalf by the State Government, or (4) by a person similarly authorised by a local authority. The Court also took the view that a prosecution can also be instituted with the consent of any of these four authorities. Mr. Chinoy submitted that in both the aforesaid cases the General Board of the Jamnagar Municipality did not delegate its powers to the Chief Officer to consent to file the aforesaid prosecution either expressly or by necessary implication. As stated above, Mr. Chinoy argued that in both the cases the consent to file the prosecution could have been given only by the local authority. 40. It is not possible for us to accept the aforesaid submission of Mr. Chinoy. In both the cases, as provided in section 20(1) of the Act, the General Board of the Jamnagar Municipality by its resolution dated January 8, 1968 had unanimously authorised the Food Inspector to institute any prosecution for the commission of any offence under the Act, and for that purpose, he was required to obtain the initial consent of the Chief Officer of the Municipality. As a matter of fact the General Board of the Municipality seems to have directed the Food Inspector to obtain the initial consent of the Chief Officer of the Municipality for filing any complaint against an offender for the commission of any offence under the Act possibly with a view to be doubly sure of the prosecution case and to check any frivolous prosecution. In this view of the matter, we do rot see any substance or merit in the submission of Mr. Chinoy that in the instant cases, the sanction to prosecute is not in accordance with law. We are of the opinion, for the reasons aforesaid, that in both the cases, the sanction to prosecute the accused is in accordance with law. 41. Mr. Chinoy also urged that in the instant cases, the identity of the jars in question was not established by the prosecution before the learned trial Magistrate. He submitted that it was the duty of the Food Inspector to obtain the signatures of the panchas at a place where he had affixed the various seals on the jars in question containing the samples of offending articles. Mr. Chinoy also urged that in both the cases, the Food Inspector did not obtain the signatures of the panchas on the labels which were pasted on the jars in question. On these premises, Mr. Chinoy argued that the possibility of 1 the jars in question being tampered with can not be ruled out and, if that is so, Mr. Chinoy submitted, that the identity of the jars in question was not adequately established before the learned Magistrate. We may mention at this stage that possibly with a view to safeguard against the mischief of tampering with the samples of the offending articles before they reached the Public Analyst, the Legislature prescribed the statutory procedure provided in section 11 of the Act and Rules 14 to 22A of the aforesaid Rules. In both the cases, from the evidence on the record, we have satisfied ourselves that the Food Inspector did follow the statutory procedure fully before he sent the samples of the offending articles to the Public Analyst. For this reason, it is not possible for us to accept the aforesaid submission of Mr. Chinoy. In both the cases, from the evidence on the record, we have satisfied ourselves that the Food Inspector did follow the statutory procedure fully before he sent the samples of the offending articles to the Public Analyst. For this reason, it is not possible for us to accept the aforesaid submission of Mr. Chinoy. In this view of the matter, we must say that there was no statutory duty or obligation imposed on the Food Inspector either to take the signatures of the panchas at a place or places where the Food Inspector had put his seals on the jars in question or on the label; pasted on the jars. In both the cases before us, the Food Inspectors and the accused had put their signatures on the labels which were put or pasted on the jars in question. As a matter of fact evidence does disclose that the prosecution witnesses had seen the accused signing the labels and the panchnama Ex. 40. In this view of the matter, we fail to see as to | how in the instant cases, there was even remote possibility of the jars in question being tampered with as unjustifiably apprehended by the accused. In both the cases, the labels which were affixed on the jars in question did contain the aforesaid two Nos. HD/P/10 and HD/P/11 respectively. Those two very numbers were also stated by the Food Inspector in the forwarding letters sent by him to the Public Analyst and these two very numbers were also written in the reports sent by the Public Analyst to the Food Inspector. For the reasons aforesaid, it is not possible for us to accept the submission of Mr. Chinoy that in both the cases, there was a possibility of the jars in question being tampered J with or there was any possibility of the jars in question being changed. 42. Mr. Chinoy also urged that the reports of the Public Analyst Exs. 37 and 38 do not contain any basis for his conclusion. We have dealt with I this aspect in the earlier part of our judgment. The this behalf placing reliance of the decision of the Supreme Court, in Jagdish Prasad's case 1972 F.A.C. j 127, we have taken the view that in both the cases, the accused did not I challenge that the reports Exs. We have dealt with I this aspect in the earlier part of our judgment. The this behalf placing reliance of the decision of the Supreme Court, in Jagdish Prasad's case 1972 F.A.C. j 127, we have taken the view that in both the cases, the accused did not I challenge that the reports Exs. 37 and 38 of the Public Analyst were not satisfactory. We also took the view that if the reports of the Public Analyst were not satisfactory, it was open to the accused to have made an application for the samples which were in his possession to be sent to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for examination, but in the instant cases the accused did not make such an application or send the samples under section 13(2) of the Act. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision took the view that by reason of the absence of the basis for the conclusion of the Public Analyst, the order of conviction should not be set aside. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, there is no substance or merit in this submission of Mr. Chinoy. 43. Mr. Chinoy also urged that it was not open to the Food Inspector to file any appeals in this Court unless the General Board of the Jamnagar Municipality had given fresh sanction to file the appeals in this Court. In support of his argument, Mr. Chinoy invited our attention to the decision of - the Supreme Court in Dhian Singh v. Saharanpur Municipality, 1973 F.A.C. 404. Now it is significant to note that in that case, the original complaint for an offence under the Act was purported to have been filed by the Municipal Board, but it was signed by its Food Inspector. The trial Court acquitted the accused and the concerned Municipal Board went up in appeal to the High Court under section 417(3), Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court convicted the accused for the commission of the alleged offence under the Act. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the appeal filed by the Municipal Board before the High Court under section 417(3), Criminal Procedure Code, was not maintainable as the complaint from which that appeal had arisen had been instituted by the Food Inspector. The High Court convicted the accused for the commission of the alleged offence under the Act. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the appeal filed by the Municipal Board before the High Court under section 417(3), Criminal Procedure Code, was not maintainable as the complaint from which that appeal had arisen had been instituted by the Food Inspector. Dealing with the contention, the Supreme Court took the view that special leave under section 417(3), Criminal Procedure Code, can only be granted to the complainant and to no one else. The Supreme Court in that case took the view that the Municipal Board was competent to file the appeal. In the two cases before us, the necessary complaints were filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, by the Food Inspector and the appeals are also filed in this Court by the Food Inspector. It is well settled that the appeals filed in this Court are in continuation of the original complaints filed by the Food Inspector and hence we are of the view that no fresh sanction was at all necessary for the purpose of filing the appeals in this Court. The aforesaid decision in Dhian Singh's case 1973 F.A.C. 404 does not assist the accused in any manner. 44. Mr. Chinoy finally urged that the offences in question were committed five years before. He also urged that the accused is aged 50 to 55 years and that in both the cases, if we come to the conclusion that the orders of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge are illegal, we should only impose the sentence of fine and not of any imprisonment against the accused. 45. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the opinion that in both the cases the prosecution did prove by leading cogent, consistent and clear evidence that the accused did sell the offending articles to the Food Inspector which were adulterated. In both the cases, the Food Inspector followed the statutory procedure fully for sending the samples of the offending articles to the Public Analyst. The Public Analyst in his reports Exs. 37 and 38 came to the conclusion that the samples of the offending articles contained "yellow coal tar dye metanil". In both the cases, the Food Inspector followed the statutory procedure fully for sending the samples of the offending articles to the Public Analyst. The Public Analyst in his reports Exs. 37 and 38 came to the conclusion that the samples of the offending articles contained "yellow coal tar dye metanil". Rule 28 of the aforesaid Rules by necessary implication provides that it was not open to the accused to use "yellow coal tar dye metanil" either for the preparation of the offending articles or for selling articles which contained the said coal tar. The aforesaid coal tar dye is not included in the list of permitted dyes under Rule 28 of the aforesaid Rules. In this view of the matter, it is clear to us that in both the cases we should set aside the order is of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge which have resulted into serious and patent miscarriage of justice. 46. That brings us to the consideration of the question of sentence to be passed in both the cases. With considerable anxiety and a watchful eye, we have noticed that in many cases of Food Adulteration, lighter punishments inflicted on the offenders by our magistracy in the State, neither brought about any beneficial results to the society, nor promoted the very object of the Act in any mariner whatsoever. Cases are not few in number, when the offenders, on hearing the lighter punishments inflicted on them, for the commission of the offence as contemplated under the Act, left the Court room with an annoying smile on their faces, and with no deterrent effect in their minds. Cases of adulteration in food, resulting into the development of a serious disease like cancer", are increasing in number, and if the sale of adulterated food is not drastically checked by inflicting proper and adequate punishment on the offenders, he same will continue to result into shocking and disastrous consequences and the probability of the health of the innocent purchasers of food being shattered will be inevitable, 47. As a result of our aforesaid consideration of the evidence on the record of the cases, we set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Jamnagar in Criminal Appeals Nos. 35 and 37 of 1973 and allow the present appeals. As a result of our aforesaid consideration of the evidence on the record of the cases, we set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Jamnagar in Criminal Appeals Nos. 35 and 37 of 1973 and allow the present appeals. We hold the accused guilty of the commission of the offence punishable under section 16(I)(a) read with section 7(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act in both the cases and the accused is sentenced to suffer R.I. for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default to suffer R.I. for three months in each of the two cases. The substantive sentence of imprisonment shall not run concurrently. 48. Mr. H.M. Chinoy the learned Advocate for the accused in both the cases made an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134(l)(c) of the Constitution of India but as there is no substantial question of law involved in both the matters, Mr. Chinoy's application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is rejected. Appeals allowed.