Judgment :- VENKATARAMAN, J. The Cosmopolitan Club, Madras, which is a well-known members' club, owns 66 grounds 2150 sq. ft. of land in Mount Road. The club was required to pay urban land tax under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act, 1966, for eight years from 1st July, 1963 at the standard tax rate of 0.4 p.c. on the market value of the urban land owned by the Club. The Club claimed that it was entitled to the concession of 25 per cent under s. 26 of the Act, which, so far as material, says; 26(1) where any building is occupied wholly by the owner for residential purposes only and where such owner makes an application to the Urban Land Tax Officer, that Officer shall, ........... reduce by twenty five per cent the amount of urban land tax payable on the urban land on which the building has been constructed and on the urban land appurtenant to such building. The urban land Tax Officer rejected the claim, observing : "........... Sec. 26(1) is very clear that a building occupied wholly by the owner for residential purposes only is eligible for concession of 25 per cent. But in your case it is an association and the land under reference is used for different purposes (i.e. recreational, lodging and boarding, etc.) Hence the request for concession under s. 26(1) cannot be complied with." * 2. Aggrieved by this order the Club filed W.P. No. 1856 of 1972. Another Writ Petition, W.P. No. 3069 of 1973, was filed later in respect of fasli 1381. The point involved is the same. 3. Before dealing with the arguments advanced before us, we can briefly notice the facts which are really not in controversy. The Club is a members club; that is to say, no person who is not a member is admitted to enjoy the benefits of the club, and all the assets really belong only to the members. It was founded in 1873, by a few men of vision. They formed themselves into an association "for social, intercourse, discussion. Exchange of ideas, recreation, etc.," In 1934 the members got the Club registered under s. 26 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, as a non-profit organisation. As already stated, the Club owns 66 grounds 2150 sq ft. of land. It was founded in 1873, by a few men of vision. They formed themselves into an association "for social, intercourse, discussion. Exchange of ideas, recreation, etc.," In 1934 the members got the Club registered under s. 26 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, as a non-profit organisation. As already stated, the Club owns 66 grounds 2150 sq ft. of land. Upon this land there are a few buildings, and appurtenant to them are vacant species requisite for those buildings. The main building houses the administrative offices, members' lounge, restaurant, billiard-room, card room, library, conference room, etc., Behind the main buildings there are the mofussil quarters wherein mofussil members' come and stay. The space in between is occupied by tennis Courts, car parks, pathways, and roads. In the front there is a garden. All the buildings and appurtenant lands are in the exclusive occupation of the Club for the Club's own purposes. No portion of the buildings or appurtenant land has been let out on rent to any third party. The Club exists for no purpose other than its purposes as a members' club. A stranger cannot get in unless he is introduced by a member'. If a stranger partakes of refreshments, it has to be paid for by the member who introduces him. 4. The submission of V. Balasubrahmanyan, learned counsel for the petitioner, consists of two steps : (i) Though normally a company is a different juristic entity from its shareholders, in the case of member's club, like the petitioner, the incorporation does not make any difference. The Club belongs only to the members and the incorporation is only a convenient method for suing and for being sued. It does not alter the character of the members' club. Hence for the purpose of s. 26 of the Act, it can be assumed that the building is occupied wholly by the members. (ii) The occupation is for residential purposes only. 5. Satya dev, learned Assistant Government Pleader, concedes, in view of some Supreme Court decisions, that the incorporation does not alter the essential character of a members' club, and that, consequently, we can proceed on the assumption that the buildings, are occupied wholly by the members. But he stoutly resists the second limb of the submission of the petitioner's learned counsel. Satya dev, learned Assistant Government Pleader, concedes, in view of some Supreme Court decisions, that the incorporation does not alter the essential character of a members' club, and that, consequently, we can proceed on the assumption that the buildings, are occupied wholly by the members. But he stoutly resists the second limb of the submission of the petitioner's learned counsel. According to the learned Assistant Government Pleader, the occupation is for recreational purposes; it is not at al for residential purposes, much less for residential purpose only. 6. Though it is a matter of concession that, for the purpose of s. 26 of the Act, incorporation does not make any difference. And the buildings can be said to be occupied wholly by the members, we shall say just a few words explaining the position on that point. Sec. 7 requires every owner of urban land, liable to pay urban land tax, to submit a return-See 8 specifies the person who could sign the pay return in the case of "an individual, an HUF, company, firm other association, and any other person." * Technically, in this case, the owner will be the company. But the case law shows that, were the company is a members' club, virtually the owners are the members themselves. The importance of this, for the purpose of s. 26, is obvious, namely, it is easier for the assessee to build up an argument that the members are occupying the building for residential purposes only than to contend that the company is occupying it for residential purposes only. No doubt, in statutes like the IT Act, 1961, there is a distinction between a company resident in India and not resident in India, but the IT Act itself gives a definition to determine that question, and where there was no such definition in England, some tests were applied to determine whether a company was resident in England or not. 7. But the question before us is very limited, namely, whether s. 26 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax At applies, and it will be noted that there is no definition in the Act of the words "residential purposes" or of the word "residence.". 8. 7. But the question before us is very limited, namely, whether s. 26 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax At applies, and it will be noted that there is no definition in the Act of the words "residential purposes" or of the word "residence.". 8. The direct case of this Court dealing with this point is reported in Young Men's India Association, Madras vs. Joint Commercial Tax Officer, It was a decision of Ramachandra Iyer, C.J., and Anantanaarayanan, J. The Cosmopolitan Club was assessed to sales tax under the provisions of the Madras General ST Act, 1959, in respect of supply of refreshments by the Club to its members. The decision was that there was no sale at all, that the true character of the transaction was that the Club merely acted as an agent of the members in purchasing the articles, made the refreshments and distributed them amongst them selves and that consequently there was no transfer of property which is one of the essential elements of a sale. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court in Joint Commercial Tax Officer vs. Young Men's India Association, At page 245 26 STC their Lordship observe : "The law in England has always been that members' club to which category the clubs in the present case belong cannot be made subject to the provisions of the licensing Acts concerning sale because the members are joint owners of all the club property including the excisable liquor. The supply of liquor to a member at a fixed price by the club cannot be regarded to be a sale. If, however, liquor is supplied to and paid for by a member who is not a bona fide member of the club or his duly authorised agent there would be a sale. With regard to incorporated clubs a distinction has been drawn. Where such a club has all the characteristics of a members' club consistent with its incorporation, that is to say, where every member is a shareholder, and every shareholder is a member, no licence need be taken out if liquor is supplied only to the members. If some of the shareholders are not members or some of the members are not shareholders, that would be the case of a proprietary club and would not involve sale. Proprietary clubs stand on a different footing. If some of the shareholders are not members or some of the members are not shareholders, that would be the case of a proprietary club and would not involve sale. Proprietary clubs stand on a different footing. The members are not owners of or interested in the property of the club. The supply to them of food or liquor though at a fixed tariff is a sale. (See Halsbury's Law of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 5, pages 280-281). The principle laid down in Graff vs. Evans 1882 8 Q. B. D. 373, had throughout been followed. In that case Field, J., put it thus :'I think the true construction of the rules is that the members were the joint owners of the general property in all the goods of the club, and that the trustees were their agents with respect to the general property in the goods.' The difficulty felt in the legal property ordinarily vesting in the trustees of the members' club or in the incorporated body was surmounted by invoking the theory of agency, i.e., the club or the trustees acting as agents of the members ..... What was essential was that the holding of the property by the agent or trustee must be a holding for and on behalf of and not a holding antagonistic to the members of the club." At page 247 they observed : " The final conclusion of the High Court in the judgment under appeal was that the case of each club was analogous to that of an agent or mandatory investing his own moneys for preparing things for consumption of the principal, and later recouping himself for the expenses incurred. As no transaction of sale was involved there could be no levy of tax under the provisions of the Act on the supply of refreshments and preparations by each one of the clubs to its members." * This was a judgment of five of their Lordships Shah, J., also agreed with the final result. 9. Mr. As no transaction of sale was involved there could be no levy of tax under the provisions of the Act on the supply of refreshments and preparations by each one of the clubs to its members." * This was a judgment of five of their Lordships Shah, J., also agreed with the final result. 9. Mr. Satyadev referred also to two other decisions of the Supreme Court, where it was held that the incorporation does not alter the character of the member's club : Madras Gymkhana Club Employees' Union vs. Management of the Gymkhana Club (SC) (e.g. paragraphs 32 to 34); and Cricket Club of India vs. Bombay Labour Union (SC) paragraph 14 at page 285 = 1969 I(LLJ) 775 at 784. 10. Mr. Balasubrahmanya referred also to 5 Halsbury (Somonds) Third Edition, pages, 253-55, and 6 Halsbury (Hailsham), Fourth Edition, pages 58-59, where members' clubs are divided into unincorporated members' clubs and incorporated members' clubs. In respect of an unincorporated members' club, it is stated : "It is not recognized as having any legal existence apart from the members of which it is composed" * Under the heading of 'Incorporated Members' clubs, the following is stated : "A member's club incorporated under the Companies Act, 1948 or earlier companies Act, enjoys the advantages incidental to incorporation as a company, especially that of suing and being sued as a legal entity. He also referred to Roscoe Pond's Jurisprudence, Volume IV, at page 250, where Jhering's (Cricket) Theory in respect of incorporated associations is discussed. It is stated :" * In this theory of incorporated associations (happily called by Mainland the Cricket Theory) the members of an incorporated association are considered the bearers of rights and as bound by the duties which for convenience are referred to as the rights and duties of the corporation itself. "11. We can therefore proceed on the basis that the incorporation of the Club does not matter, and that, for the purpose of s. 26 of the Act, the building is occupied wholly by the members of the Club. The more important question is whether the occupation is for "residential purposes only." In our opinion, the occupation of the Club by the members cannot at all be said to be for residential purposes. The occupation is only for recreational purposes and for purposes of social intercourse. The more important question is whether the occupation is for "residential purposes only." In our opinion, the occupation of the Club by the members cannot at all be said to be for residential purposes. The occupation is only for recreational purposes and for purposes of social intercourse. The term "residential purposes" is not defined in the Act, and its meaning is what an ordinary layman would understand by it. The common man, in our opinion, will not say that the members occupy the Club for residential purposes. He would only say that the members resort to the Club for recreational purposes and for purposes of social intercourse, etc. He would further say that each of the members has his own residence and comes to the club only for other purposes, like recreation, meeting others, etc. We have no hesitation in adopting this common man's interpretation. Without meaning any offence or disrespect to the learned counsel for the petitioner, we would venture to remark that the legislature must have thought, when it used the term "residential purposes only" that there could be no doubt about the matter, and the legislature could be no doubt about the matter, and the legislature could not have imagined that an argument could be put forth at all in respect of members' club like the Cosmopolitan club, Madras, that its building is occupied by the members for residential purposes or for residential purposes only. The mofussil quarters are, no doubt, occupied as temporary residence, by the mofussil members, but such temporary residence is only part of the amenities extended to the mofussil members as members of the club, and we do doubt whether that would a qualify as "residential purposes only" under s. 26 of the Act. In any case, that is only of a small portion of the buildings in the club and the main buildings are occupied for purposes of recreation, social intercourse, taking refreshments, etc., which are not at all residential and therefore it cannot be said that the buildings, taken together, are occupied wholly for residential purposes only. 12. In our view, the position is very clear and simple and it is unnecessary even to refer to the dictionaries. We may, however, refer to some of the standard dictionaries. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, which everybody uses, has this to say : Reside - (of persons) have one's home, dwell permanently. 12. In our view, the position is very clear and simple and it is unnecessary even to refer to the dictionaries. We may, however, refer to some of the standard dictionaries. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, which everybody uses, has this to say : Reside - (of persons) have one's home, dwell permanently. Residence - 1. Residing, dwell; 2. place where on resides, abode of. Residential - suitable for or occupied by private house; connected with residence. The Shorter Oxford English dictionary says : Reside - 1. To settle; to take up one's abode or station; 2. To dwell permanently or for a considerable time; to have one's settled or usual abode, to live in or at a particular place; Residential - 1. To have one's residence; to have one's usual dwelling place or abode; to reside; to take up one's residence to establish oneself; to settle the circumstance or fact of having one's permanent or usual abode in or at a certain place; the fact of residing or being resident; 2. The fact of living or staying regularly at or in some place for the discharge of special duties; 3. The place where a person resides; his dwelling place; the abode of a person. Residence-serving or use as a residence adopted or suitable for the residence of those belonging to the better class characterised by houses of a superior kind; connected with, pertaining or relating to residence. 13. Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, by West Publishing Company, under the heading "Residential" says : A house a portion of which was used in the practice of dentistry, was not being used exclusively for 'residential' purposes. 'Residential'; means used, serving, or designed as a residence of or occupation by residents or residences, as residential trade, occupied by residence, as a residential quarters; of, pertaining to, or connected with, residences or residences, residential trade, qualifications, or zones; of or pertaining to a resident.Residential' building-A 'residential building' within restrictive covenant, is a building which is used for residential purposes, that is, one in which people reside or dwell or in which they make their homes, as distinguished from one which is used for commercial or business purposes. Residential Purposes-where deed of Housing Authority contained valid covenant restricting use of really sold to 'residential purposes', and purchaser purchases the lots with full knowledge of the covenant, use of the realty for church purposes would violate the restive covenant. 14. Stroub's Judicial dictionary, fourth Edition, at page 22358, says : 'Residence' signifies a man's abode or continuance in a place. ........ 'I take it that word, where there is nothing to show that it is used in a more extensive sense, denotes the place where an individual eats, drinks and sleeps, or where his family or his servants eat, drink and sleep ...... A man's residence is where he habitually sleeps. 15. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, says : Reside-1. To settle oneself or a thing in a place; be stationed; 2. to dwell permanently or continuously; have a settled abode for a time; have one's residence or domicile; 3. to have an biding place. Residential-1. Used, serving or designed as a residence or for occupation by residents; 2. adapted or restricted to or occupied by residence; 3. of relating to or connected with residence or residences. 16. Mr. Balasubrahmanyan has contended that even an individual residing in a particular house with his family may have a billiards table or tennis Court in his house, or appurtenant to it and it will not be said that he not residing in his house merely because of the existence of the billiards table or tennis Court. Proceeding, he submits that, if, instead of having a billiards table and tennis Court in his house, he goes to the Cosmopolitan club for playing billiards or tennis, it can be said that he resorts to the Club for residential purposes. In our opinion, this argument is untenable. The vast majority of people do not have billiards tables or tennis Courts in their houses and hence the existence of a billiards table or tennis Court is not usually considered as an incident to residence. Indeed, it is precisely because an ordinary man cannot have a billiards table or tennis Court in his house, he goes the club to play billiards or tennis, and that purpose served by the club cannot in any sense be termed a residential purpose. 17. Mr. Balasubrahmanyan referred to Levene vs. CIT, Revenue 13 Tax(Cases) 486. And the observations of Lord Hanworth, M.R. (at page 497). 17. Mr. Balasubrahmanyan referred to Levene vs. CIT, Revenue 13 Tax(Cases) 486. And the observations of Lord Hanworth, M.R. (at page 497). The question in that case was whether the appellant therein was a resident or ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom for the purpose of some provision of the IT Act. The facts were briefly these. He was a births subject and until march, 1918, he was a householder in London. He then surrendered the lease of his house and sold his furniture, and from march, 1918, until January, 1925, he did not occupy any fixed place of residence, but lived in hotels, whether in this country or abroad; He was admittedly resident and ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom until December, 1919. He then went abroad and in each subsequent year he had spent between 7 and 8 months abroad and between 4 and 5 months in the United Kingdom. The CIT were satisfied, upon the evidence, that when, he left the united Kingdom in December, 1919, he had formed the intention, which he had consistently carried out ever since, of living abroad for the grater part of the year, but of returning to that country each year and remaining there for considerable periods but not for a period equal in the whole to six months in any year. It was held that he was resident and ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom. This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. It was in that connection that, after dealing with the case law, Lord Hansworth, M. R., observed that it was not possible to frame a concrete definition of the words 'residence'. He proceeds :" * Residence must depend on question of degree and of fact; and I think the CIT were right in saying that the subject's claim to exemption must be determined on the balance of the facts in each case. He proceeds :" * Residence must depend on question of degree and of fact; and I think the CIT were right in saying that the subject's claim to exemption must be determined on the balance of the facts in each case. I suggest as a characteristic factor for consideration, even if it does not fulfil the nature of a test, to ascertain if the suggested alternative place or residence is one which the subject seeks willingly and repeatedly in order to obtain rest or refreshment or recreation suitable to his choice; where for a time he is embedded in the enjoyment of hat he desired to attain, and found in the abode of his option.Another factor may be found and an important one if he returns to and seeks his own fatherland in order to enjoy a sojourn in proximity to his relations and friends." 18. The passage on which Mr. Balasubrahmanyan relies is this : " to ascertain if the suggested alternative place of residence is one which the subject seeks willingly and repeatedly in order to obtain rest or refreshment or recreation suitable to his choice" 19. Using this language, Mr. Balasubrahmanyan submits that Cosmopolitan Club is one which a member 'seeks willingly and repeatedly in order to obtain rest or refreshment or recreation suitable to his choice, and argues that, according to the suggestion of Lord Hansworth, the Cosmopolitan Club can be said to be occupied by the members for residential purposes. In our opinion, this submission is far fetched. The observations must be understood in the background of the fact of that case. No question arose there similar to the present. There was no doubt that whatever place the assessee was occupying, it was for residential purposes and the only question for decision there as whether he was resident and ordinarily resent in the United Kingdom. The question here is, however, entirely different, namely, whether the occupation of the cosmopolitan Club by its members is for residential purposes at all and for residential purposes only. 20. Mr. Balasubrahmanyan laid great emphasis on the fact that the Club made no profit and distributed no dividends to the members. But this will only mean that the occupation of the building is not for commercial purposes. But it does not follow therefore that the occupation is for "residential purposes" only. 20. Mr. Balasubrahmanyan laid great emphasis on the fact that the Club made no profit and distributed no dividends to the members. But this will only mean that the occupation of the building is not for commercial purposes. But it does not follow therefore that the occupation is for "residential purposes" only. The assumption in the submission consists in thinking that the only alternative to commercial purpose is residential purpose. Actually there is at least one other alternative, like recreational purpose and purposes of social intercourse. To put it another way, if the legislature was anxious to give the concession to any person or set of persons using a building otherwise than for commercial purposes, it would have been the easiest thing to enact a provision to that effect; but the legislature has limited the concession by using the words "for residential purposes only". When the words are clear, it is really unnecessary to go into the reason why the legislature used the words "for residential purposes only". But, taking the different juristic entities mentioned in s. 8 of the Act, it seems to us fairly clear that, where an individual, major or minor, or a family occupiers a building for residential purposes only, the concession should be given. Perhaps the concession will also be admissible even where some persons form an association and buy a building for residential purposes only. But beyond that the legislature does not seem to have been prepared to go. However, it seems to us that this is a fit case where the Government may consider the question of granting concession under the provisions of s. 27 of the Act. 21. The Writ Petition are accordingly dismissed, but without costs.